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HEGEL'S 


DOCTRINE  OF  REFLECTION, 


BEING  A  PARAPHRASE  AND  A  COMMENTARY  INTER- 
POLATED INTO   THE  TEXT   OF  THE  SECOND 
VOLUME  OF  HEGEL'S  LARGER  LOGIC, 
TREATING   OF  " ESSENCE." 


BY 

WILLIAM  T.   HARRIS, 

EDITOR  OF  THE  JOURNAL  OP  SPECULATIVE  PHILOSOPHT. 


NEW    YORK: 
D     APPLETON   AND   COMPANY, 

1,  3,  AND  5  BOND   STBEBT. 
1881. 


COPYRIGHT  BY 

WILLIAM  T.  HARRIS, 


TO 
JAMES    S.    GARLAXD. 

WITH   WHOSE  UXD   ASSZSTASCK  THIS    WOBK. 


btbitatf 


WILLIAM    T. 


2O54073 


TO   THE   READER. 


This  translation  and  paraphrase  of  the  second  volume  of  Hegel's  larger 
Logic  is  herewith  submitted  to  a  small  circle  of  students  who  sympathize 
with  an  attempt  to  interpret  in  English  the  subtle  and  fruitful  thoughts 
of  Hegel  on  the  subject  of  the  categories  of  Reflection — showing  their 
genesis  from  the  experience  which  the  mind  makes  of  the  transitoriness 
of  the  world  of  sense-objects,  and  showing,  at  the  same  time,  the  limits 
of  the  validity  of  those  categories.  It  is  by  no  means  a  complete  elabora- 
tion of  the  whole  book — some  parts  being  less  than  a  fluent  translation, 
and  lacking  commentary  altogether,  while  others  are  believed  to  be  fairly 
adequate.  The  translator's  commentary  is  included  in  parentheses.  The 
work  was  begun  and  continued  under  the  auspices  of  the  "  Kant  Club  " 
of  St.  Louis,  Missouri,  and  has  been  used  as  a  hand-book  by  that  club. 
The  translator  hopes  to  add,  from  time  to  time,  more  commentary  to 
this  volume,  and  has  promised  to  write  for  it  an  introduction  which  will 
attempt  to  deduce  the  point  of  view  for  "  Essence,"  from  that  of  "  Being," 
which  Hegel  treats  in  the  first  volume.  A  paraphrase  of  the  third  vol- 
ume, treating  of  the  Syllogism,  Teleology  in  Nature,  and  the  absolute 
Ideal  of  the  World  or  the  Personality  of  the  Absolute — which  Hegel 
discusses  under  the  subjects  of  "  Subjectivitat,"  "  Objectivitat,"  and 
"  Idee " — is  in  progress,  and  may  be  given  to  the  same  public  that  this 
volume  reaches. 

The  reader  will  find  it  profitable  to  study  these  pages  in  connection 
with  the  exposition  of  "  Essence "  given  in  the  smaller  Logic  of  the 
Encyclopaedia  of  Hegel,  as  found  in  the  elegant  and  exact  rendering  of 
Mr.  Wallace  of  Oxford  University. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  this  book  will  in  no  wise  supply  the  place  of  a 
continuation  of  the  famous  "  Secret  of  Hegel  "  by  Dr.  Stirling,  which  gives 
a  translation  of,  and  an  exhaustive  commentary  on,  the  greater  part  of  the 
first  volume  of  the  larger  Logic.  This  paraphrase  undertakes  a  sort  of 
auxiliary  work  that  will  be  unnecessary  when  we  receive  the  continuation 
of  that  work  from  its  author. 

May  7,  1881. 


ESSENCE. 


The  truth  (i.  c.,  the  outcome)  of  being  is  essence. 

Being  is  the  immediate  (i?  'e.^The  first  phase  of  things),  since  know- 
ing ought  to  recognize  the  true,  that  which  being  is  in  and  for  itself , 
it  does  not  stop  with  the  first  phase  of  things  and  its  determinations 
(its  belongings),  but  it  transcends  this  with  the  assumption  that 
behind  this  first  phase  (being)  there  is  something  else,  something 
deeper  than  being,  that  which  constitutes  the  background,  the  truth 
of  being.  This  investigation  is  a  process  of  mediating  the  knowing ; 
for  it  does  not  find  essence  as  something  direct,  a  first  phase,  but  it 
begins  with  something  else,  with  being  as  a  first  phase,  and  has  a  pre- 
liminary way  or  road  to  travel,  namely,  to  proceed  beyond  being,  or 
rather  to  descend  into  it.  First,  upon  collecting  itself,  returning  within 
itself  (Erinnern,  re-collecting  itself)  from  immediate  being  (first 
phase  of  things)  —  through  this  mediation,  it  finds  essence.  Language 
has  in  the  verb  Seyn  (being)  adopted  for  the  past  tense  the  word 
gewesen  (been) ;  (  Wesen  denotes  essence) ;  for  Wesen  (essence)  is 
past  being,  bat  a  timeless  past. 

This  movement,  represented  as  the  progress  of  the  activity  of 
knowing,  ma\-  appear  as  an  activity  that  is  merely  subjective,  exter- 
nal to  being  as  such,  and  in  no  wise  concerning  its  real  nature; 
but  this  beginning  from  being,  and  this  progress  which  cancels  the 
same  and  arrives  at  essence  as  a  mediated  knowing,  is  an  activity  ap- 
pertaining to  being  itself.  It  has  been  already  demonstrated  (in  the 
first  book  of  this  logic)  that  it  (being)  re-collects  itself  (ermnert), 
and,  through  this  return  into  itself,  becomas  essence.  (Every  form 
of  being  —  every  category  thereof  —  presents  some  form  of  relation 
to  the  without  or  the  beyond,  which,  when  traced  out,  as  it  has  been 
done  by  the  author  in  Volume  I.,  relates  back  to  the  l>eginning,  thus 
resulting  on  every  hand  in  the  category  of  self-relation,  which  is 
essence.) 

If,  therefore,  the  absolute  was   defined  on  a  former  occasion  as 

being  (Seyn),  now'  it  is  to  be  defined  as  essence.     The  scientific 

knowing  (Erkemien)  cannot  on  any  account  remain  at  the  standpoint 

of  the  multiplicity  of  existences  (the  first  phase  of  particular  being, 

1  1 


2  Essence. 

Daseyn),  nor  any  more  at  the  standpoint  of  being  (pure  abstract 
being)  ;  it  is  impressed  with  the  conviction  that  this  pure  being,  the 
negation  of  everything  finite,  presupposes  (implies)  an  activity  of 
re-collection,  which  has,  by  abstraction,  ascended  from  immediate 
particular  existence  to  pure  being.  Being  by  this  process  has  come 
to  be  defined  as  essence,  as  such  a  being  from  which  everything 
definite  and  finite  has  been  abstracted  (removed  by  negation).  Thus 
this  being  is  a  somewhat  devoid  of  determination  (particularity),  a 
simple  unity,  from  which  eveiything  definite  has  been  removed  by  an 
external  process  (i.  e.,  by  the  abstract  reflection  of  the  thinker)  ;  to 
this  unity,  definiteness  or  particularity  was  already  something  for- 
eign (external),  and  it  remains  as  something  standing  over  against  it- 
after  this  act  of  abstraction  ;  for  it  has  not  been  annulled  absolutely, 
but  only  in  relation  to  this  unity  (i.  e.,  the  act  of  reflection  has  not 
discovered  the  nugatoriness  in  particular  things  —  that  is,  their  tran- 
sitory nature  —  but  in  this  analytic  process  of  arriving  at  pure 
being  it  arbitrarily  separates  the  determinations  from  being  as  a  sub- 
strate, and  holds  them  apart).  It  has  already  been  mentioned  above 
that  if  the  pure  essence  is  defined  as  the  including  comprehension  of 
all  realities  (Inbegriff  a  Her  Realitaten),  these  realities  underlie  the  na- 
ture of  the  determinateness  and  of  the  abstracting  reflection,  and  this 
including  comprehension  reduces  them  to  an  empty  simplicity. 
Essence  is,  according  to  this  view,  only  a  product,  an  artificial  result. 
This  external  negation,  which  is  abstraction,  merely  removes  the  de- 
terminateness of  being  from  it,  and  what  remains  is  essence;  it 
merely  places  them  somewhere  else,  and  leaves  them  existing  as 
before.  According  to  such  a  view,  essence  would  be  neither  in  itself 
nor  for  itself  (i.  e.,  neither  an  independent  being  nor  a  totality,  but 
merely  a  phase  of  something  else,  or,  what  is  worse,  an  arbitrary 
abstraction)  ;  it  would  depend  on  another  —  i,  e. ,  on  external,  abstract- 
ing reflection;  and  it  would  be  for  another,  namely,  for  the  abstrac- 
tion, and,  besides  this,  for  the  particular  existence  which  had  been 
separated  from  it,  and  which  remained  over  against  it.  Taken  in 
this  sense  essence  is,  therefore,  a  dead,  empty  abstraction  from  all 
determinations. 

Essence,  however,  as  we  find  it  here  (as  a  result  of  the  discussion 
of  the  categories  of  being),  is  what  it  is,  not  through  an  external  act  of 
negation  (abstraction),  but  through  its  own  negativity,  the  infinite 
movement  of  being  ("  infinite :  "  that  is  returning  into  itself,  the  cate- 
gories of  being  have  all  been  traced  through  relations  to  others,  back 
into  relations  to  themselves.  Dependence  always  implies  self-de- 


Introduction.  3 

pendence,  which  is  independence ;  because  that  which  depends  has 
its  being  in  another,  and  really  depends  on  its  own  being  in  this  other). 
It  is  being  in  and  for  itself  (independent  and  total)  ;  absolute  being 
in  itself,  since  it  is  indifferent  towards  all  determinateness  of  being 
(i.  e.,  towards  all  that  belongs  to  the  first  phases  of  things),  all  other- 
being  (dependence  on  others),  and  relation  to  another,  is  entirel}'  an- 
nulled ;  it  is,  however,  not  merely  this  being  in  itself,  for  as  such  it 
would  be  only  the  abstraction  of  the  pure  essence  ;  but  it  is  likewise 
essentially  being  for  itself  (t.  e.,  a  being  which  realizes  itself  in  others 
dependent  upon  it  —  others  which  manifest  it),  it  is  itself  the  negative 
activity  which  performs  for  itself  this  cancelling  of  the  other-being, 
dependence  upon  others,  and  the  characteristics  which  it  receives 
through  otliers. 

Essence  as  the  perfect  return  of  being  into  itself  (i.  e.,  the  first 
phase  of  things  traced  out  through  its  relations  into  a  totality,  so  that 
the  whole  stands  in  self-relation,  is  essence)  is,  at  first,  undefined, 
for  the  determinateuess  of  being  are  cancelled  in  it;  it  contains 
them  in  itself  —  but  not  in  a  form  in  which  they  are  explicitly  stated. 
Absolute  essence,  in  this  simplicity,  has  no  particularit\*  (Daseyn). 
But  it  must  pass  over  into  particularity  (?'.  e.,  a  correct  apprehension 
of  it  will  find  particularity  belonging  to  it)  ;  for  it  is  being  in  and  for 
itself  —  that  is  to  say,  it  distinguishes  the  determinations  which  it  con- 
tains in  itself  (for  this  is  an  active  process  whose  negative  relation  to 
itself  is  an  act  of  distinguishing),  since  it  is  a  repulsion  of  itself  from 
itself,  or  indifference  towards  itself,  negative  relation  to  itself,  it 
posits  itself  in  self -opposition,  and  is  only  infinite  being  for  itself  in 
so  far  as  it  is  the  unity  of  itself  with  this  its  difference.  Essence  is 
the  absolute  unit}*  of  Being  within  and  for  itself;  its  act  of  determin- 
ing remains,  therefore,  wholly  within  this  unity,  and,  therefore,  is  not 
a  BECOMING,  nor  a  TRANSITION,  nor  are  its  determinations  something 
other  (alien,  foreign),  nor  are  its  relations  directed  to  another;  they 
are  independent  —  but  only  thus  while  they  are  in  their  unity  with 
each  other.  Since  essence  is  in  its  first  aspect  simple  negativity,  the 
determinateness  which  it  contains  only  in  itself,  in  its  sphere,  is  to  be 
stated  so  as  to  give  it  its  particularity,  and  its  being  for  itself  (its 
realization). 

Essence  is,  in  the  entire  compass  of  logic  (that  is,  in  relation  to 
the  other  spheres),  the  same  that  quantity  was  in  the  sphere  of  being 
(quantity  as  related  to  qualit}-  and  to  mode).  That  is  to  say,  essence 
is  absolute  indifference  toward  limits.  Quantity  is  this  indifference 
in  its  iinmediateuess  or  first  phase,  and  the  limit  as  regards  it  is  an 


4  Essence. 

immediate  external  determinateness ;  this  passes  over  into  quantum 
(i.  e.,  the  particularity  of  quantity  is  through  an  entirely  external  or 
indifferent  limit)  ;  the  external  limit  is  necessary  to  it,  and  exists  in 
connection  with  it.  On  the  contrary,  determinateness  does  not  exist 
over  against  essence,  it  is  posited  only  through  essence,  not  free, 
but  only  in  relation  to  its  unity.  The  negativity  of  essence  is  feflec- 
tion,  and  the  determinations  are  all  reflected,  posited  through  Essence 
and  remaining  in  it  as  cancelled. 

Essence,  in  the  logic,  stands  between  Being  and  the  Idea  (Qegrijf), 
and  constitutes  the  middle  term,  and  its  activity  is  the  transition 
from  being  to  the  idea  (from  unconscious  existence  to  conscious 
subjectivity).  Essence  is  the  being  in  and  for  itself,  but  this  rather 
in  the  form  of  the  being  in  itself;  for  its  general  characteristic  is 
determined  through  the  fact  that  it  is  the  first  phase  after  being,  or 
the  first  negation  of  being.  Its  activity  consists  in  this,  that  it  pos- 
its negation  or  determination  within  itself,  and  through  this  gives 
itself  particularity,  and  proceeds  toward  the  state  of  infinite  being  for 
itself,  which  it  is  potentially.  Thus  it  attains  its  particularity,  which 
is  identical  with  its  nature,  and  through  this  becomes  the  idea.  For 
the  idea  is  the  absolute,  realizing  its  absoluteness  in  the  particular  de- 
terminations which  manifest  the  internal  nature  or  essence  of  things. 
The  particularity,  however,  which  essence  creates,  is  not  yet  true  par- 
ticularity, such  as  it  is  in  and  for  itself,  but  it  is  posited,  or  dependent 
on  essence ;  and  therefore,  to  be  carefully  distinguished  from  the 
particularity  of  the  idea. 

The  first  phase  of  essence  is  appearance,  or  it  is  the  activity  of 
reflection.  Secondly,  it  is  a  manifestation  or  phenomenon.  Thirdly, 
it  is  self-ievelation.  Its  activity,  therefore,  posits  the  following  deter- 
minations :  — 

1st.  As  simple  potential  essence  in  its  determinations  within  itself. 
2d.  As  emerging  into  particularity,  or  into  existence,  or  manifest- 
ation. 

3d.  As  essence  which  is  one  with  its  manifestation,  as  actuality. 
(The  above  is  a  very  general  statement  of  the  standpoint  and  con- 
tents of  this  second  book  of  the  Logic.  This  book  is  the  most  original 
part  of  Hegel's  Philosophy,  formulating  as  it  does  the  nature  of 
reflection,  and  exploring  its  scope  and  the  genesis  of  it  categories. 
Hegel,  in  his  general  •  statements  prefixed  to  his  chapters,  does  not 
attempt  to  demonstrate  anythii  g,  or  show  the  dialectic  of  its  process, 
although  his  remarks  are  made  in  full  view  of  the  entire  compass  of 
the  treatment  which  follows.  The  special  treatment  begins  below 
with  the  caption,  "Essential  and  Unessential.") 


Reflection. 


FIRST  SECTION. 

Essence  as  Reflection,  into  Itself. 

Essence  comes  from  being  (t.  «.,  a  consideration  of  being  finds 
essence  as  a  necessary  presupposition,  the  totality,  the  including  pro- 
cess  of  which  being  is  a  phase)  ;  it  is.  therefore,  not  immediately  in 
and  for  itself  (independent),  but  a  result  of  that  movement  (t.  e., 
the  process  in  which  being  has  been  proved  inadequate).  In  other 
words,  essence,  taken  as  something  immediate  (that  is,  as  a  first  phase 
of  things),  would  be  a  definite,  particular  existence  (besthnmtes 
Daseyri)  standing  in  opposition  to  another  particular  existence  ;  it  is, 
in  fact,  only  an  essential  particular  existence  opposed  to  an  unessential 
one.  But  essence,  according  to  its  true  definition,  is  the  in  and  for 
itself  cancelled  being  (t.  e.,  being  which  has  shown  itself  to  be  a  first 
phase  of  an  including  process  in  which  it  loses  its  individuality  and 
vanishes  in  other  phases,  the  total  process  being  the  annulment  of  each 
particular  phase,  and,  as  such,  the  essence).  It  (essence)  has  only 
appearance  opposed  to  it  (i.  e.,  nothing  independent  or  self-existing, 
nothing  standing  on  an  equality  with  essence,  but  only  appearance, 
show,  seeming).  But  appearance  is  the  proper  activity  of  essence 
manifesting  itself  (dew  eigene  Setzen  des  Wesen*). 

Essence  is,  in  the  first  place,  reflection  (t.  e.,  it  offers,  on  first  con- 
sideration, this  phase  of  its  activity).  Reflection  determines  itself 
(i.  e.,  it  particularizes  itself,  comes  into  the  form  of  self -opposition). 
Its  determinations  are  in  the  form  of  posited-being  (t.  e.,  dependent 
phases  resulting  from  a  process  which  transcends  them)  ;  a  posited- 
being  which  is  at  the  same  time  reflection  into  itself  (completing  itself 
to  a  totality,  self-dependent)  ;  its  determinations  are  — 

Secondly,  Reflected  determinations,  or  essentialities  (».  e.,  total 
processes ;  these  reflected  determinations  are  phases  of  essence,  hav- 
ing its  form,  that  is  of  self-related  determination,  but  each  one  is  a 
special  phase,  while  essence  includes  them  all). 

Thirdly,  Essence,  as  the  reflection  of  the  determining  activity  into 
itself,  becomes  ground  (cause  or  reason),  and  passes  over  into  ex- 
istence and  phenomenon,  or  manifestation  (X.  B. — This  "becom- 


6  Essence. 

ing  and  passing  over  "  of  categories,  is  objective  in  the  sense  that  it  is 
demonstrated  to  be  presupposed,  as  the  necessity  of  things,  but  it  is  a 
becoming  and  passing-over  from  subjective  illusion,  or  inadequate 
ideas,  to  true  and  adequate  ideas  of  what  must  be  in  the  nature  of 
things. ) 

(The  above  is  a  mere  recapitulation  of  the  contents  of  this  first  sec- 
tion, and  in  no  wise  offered  as  a  demonstration  by  the  author.  The 
following  three  chapters  furnish  the  demonstration.) 

FIRST  CHAPTER. 

Appearance. 

Essence,  conceived  as  a  result  from  being  —  as  the  presupposition 
of  the  categories  of  being  —  seems,  at  first,  to  stand  in  opposition  to 
being ;  in  which  case  immediate  being  is  regarded  as  the  unessential. 

But  it  is,  secondly,  something  more  than  a  mere  "unessential," 
it  is  essence-less  being,  it  is  appearance. 

Thirdly.  This  appearance  is  not  something  external  to  essence, 
outside  of  it,  another  to  essence,  but  its  (essence's)  own  appearance 
(or  manifestation).  The  appearing  of  essence  as  a  part  of  its  own 
activity  (  das  Scheinen  des  Wesens  in  Him  selbsf),  is  reflection. 

(This,  likewise,  is  a  recapitulation,  but  only  of  the  present  chap- 
ter.) 

A. 

The  Essential  and  the  Unessential. 

Essence  is  cancelled  or  annulled  (aufgehobene)  being  (see  pnge  1 
of  this  translation,  explanatory  of  the  general  standpoint  of  this  brok. 
This  paragraph  is  the  first  one  in  this  book  which  is  not  a  recapitula- 
tion of  what  follows  it.  It  takes  up  the  subject  where  it  was  left  at 
the  close  of  the  first  book  of  this  logic,  namely :  at  the  doctrine  of 
being.  Here  it  attempts  to  seize  the  subject  in  its  immediate  or 
most  obvious  aspect  —  the  first  impressions  of  thought  upon  what  is 
the  true  result  of  the  investigation  up  to  this  point).  It  (essence) 
is  simple  identity  (Gleichheit)  with  itself,  but  it  is  this,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  the  negation  of  the  entire  sphere  of  being  (or  first  phases 
of  things).  Essence  has,  therefore,  immediateness  opposed  to 
it,  as  something  from  whence  it  has  originated,  and  has  proved 
itself  abiding  and  persistent  under  the  changes  of  the  former  (im- 
mediate being).  Essence,  itself,  regarded  in  this  aspect,  is  a  being 


Essential  and   Unessential.  1 

also,  an  immediate  essence,  and  the  sphere  of  being  opposed 
to  it,  is  a  negative,  only  in  this  relation  to  essence,  and  not 
otherwise;  essence  is,  therefore,  a  particular  negation.  Being  and 
essence,  in  this  respect,  stand  in  relation  to  each  other  as  somewhat 
and  other  —  a  reappearance  of  those  categories  of  being  —  for  each 
possesses  being,  immediateness,  indifference  towards  the  other,  and 
equal  validity  as  regards  being.  (Evidently,  a  very  inadequate  notion 
of  the  true  results  of  the  investigation  of  the  categories  of  beiug.  Es- 
sence stands  in  relation  to  being,  not  as  something  else  opposed  to 
it,  but  as  its  truth,  the  totality  of  its  process,  in  which  particular 
phases  —  of  being  —  appear  and  disappear). 

But  being,  as  standing  in  opposition  to  essence,  according  to  this 
point  of  view,  is  the  unessential;  it  is  that  which  has  been  annulled, 
cancelled,  shown  to  be  a  phase  of  a  process.  And  in  so  far  as  this 
stands  in  relation  to  essence  as  another  (co-ordinate),  it  prevents 
essence  from  being  regarded  properly,  and  reduces  its  concept  to 
that  of  another  particular  being,  an  "essential"  being. 

The  distinction  between  "'essential "  and  •*  unessential,"  therefore, 
is  a  distinction  wltich  treats  of  essence  as  though  it  were  JL  category 
of  being  (and  loses  sight  of  the  standpoint  of  essence  altogether) ; 
for  essence  in  this  regard  is  an  immediate  somewhat,  and,  hence,  only 
one  as  opposed  to  another,  namely,  to  being.  The  sphere  of  being  is 
presupposed  by  this  mode  of  considering  it,  and  what  is  called  being 
in  this  relation  is  an  independent  somewhat,  a  further  external  deter- 
mination to  being,  and  conversely,  what  is  called  essence  is  also  inde- 
pendent, but  only  as  regards  the  other,  and  from  a  special  point  of 
view  —  in  so  far,  therefore,  as  the  phases  of  "essential  "  and  "  unes- 
sential" are  discriminated  in  a  being,  this  distinction  is  an  external 
subjective  one,  one  not  affecting  the  being  itself,  a  separation  which 
falls  in  a  third  (t.  e.,  in  the  subject  making  the  distinction,  but  not  in 
the  being  thus  separated  into  "essential"  and  "unessential").  It 
is  left  undetermined  what  belongs  to  the  "  essential,"  or  the  '*  unes- 
sential; "  it  is  some  external  mode  of  consideration  (some  subjective 
interest  or  point  of  view)  which  makes  this  distinction,  and  at  one 
time  looks  upon  the  content  as  "  essential "  and,  at  another,  as  "  un- 
essential." 

More  strictly  considered,  essence  is  reduced  to  the  category  of 
./ual,"  as  opposed  to  "  unessential,"  only  when  taken  as  can- 
celled being  or  particularity  (Daseyn).  Essence  is  in  this  manner 
regarded  only  as  the  first  or  the  negation,  which  is  determinateness, 
through,  and  by  means  of  which,  being  becomes  particular  beiug  (Z>a- 


8  Essence. 

seyn),  or  particular  being  is  opposed  to  "other"  as  "other."  But 
essence,  on  the  other  hand,  pfoperly  defined,  is  the  absolute  negativity 
of  being  (i.  e.,  it  is  not  "  another,"  to  being,  but  the  total  process  in 
which  being  is  utterly  swallowed  up,  and  all  of  its  phases  annulled  — 
nothing  of  it  persisting,  as  opposed  to  the  negativity  of  this  process, 
which  is  essence)  ?  it  (essence)  is  being  itself,  but  not  in  the  form 
of  particulars,  opposed  to  each  other  (oZs  ein  Anderes  bestimmt'),  but 
as  being,  which  has  been  annulled,  not  only  as  immediate  being,  but 
as  immediate  negation,  that  is,  as  such  negation  as  is  involved  in  the 
categories  of  otherness.  Being,  or  particularity,  persists  consequently 
not  as  "another" — for  essence  exists  —  and  that  which  (being)  is 
still  an.  immediate,  to  be  distinguished  from  essence,  is  not  merely  an 
unessential  being,  but  an  immediate  which  is  utterly  nugatory,  it  is 
only  a  no-essence  (Unwesen)  —  appearance. 

B. 

Appearance. 

(1.)  Being  is  appearance.  The  being  of  appearance  consists  only 
in  the  annulment  (the  being  cancelled)  of  being  —  in  its  nugatoriness  ; 
this  nugatoriness  belongs  to  essence,  and  being  is  appearance  in  and 
through  this  nugatoriness,  and,  therefore,  only  in  and  through  essence  ; 
it  (appearance)  is  the  negative  posited  as  negative. 

Appearance  is  the  whole  of  what  is  left  from  the  sphere  of  being ;  at 
first,  however,  it  seems  as  though  appearance  still  possessed  a  side,  or 
a  phase,  of  independence  from  essence — to  be  in  some  respect  another 
to  it.  The  "  other  "  (as  a  categor}')  contains  two  phases  (Momente), 
particularity  and  its  negation.  The  "  unessential,"  since  it  does  not 
possess  being,  possesses  the  phase  of  non-extantness,  which  belongs 
to  the  category  of  otherness.  Appearance  is  this  immediate  negation 
of  particular  being,  regarded  as  a  being,  and  as  only  in  relation  to 
another,  so  that  it  possesses  being  through  the  fact  that  it  negates 
particular  being ;  the  unessential  is,  therefore,  a  dependent  some- 
what, which  exists  only  in  its  negation  (throilgh  another).  There 
remains  for  it,  therefore,  only  the  pure  determinateness  of  immedi- 
ateness  (the  form  of  it,  without  the  substance),  it  is  reflected  imme- 
diateness :  i.  e.,  an  immediateness  which  is  only  by  means  of  its  ne- 
gation, and  which  is,  outside  of  this  mediation,  nothing  else  than 
the  empty  determination  of  immediateness  of  the  negation  of  particu- 
lar being.  (Appearance  has  independence,  or  immediate  validity, 
not  as  a  mediate  being  —  a  somewhat  —  but  through  the  negating  ac- 


Appearance.  9 

tivity  which  annals  ft.  This  annulling,  or  negating  activity,  which 
triumphs  over  the  phase  of  being,  is  itself  an  immediate,  and,  in  fact, 
is  the  true  substance  of  each  and  every  phase  of  being  succes- 
sively annulled  by  it ;  for  each  phase  of  being  is  the  negation,  or  an- 
nulment of  a  relatively  previous  phase  of  being.  Hegel,  in  this 
passage,  calls  attention  to  the  nature  of  this  immediateness,  or  inde- 
pendence, as  arising  from  the  activity  of  negation,  which  triumphs 
in  reducing  phases  of  being  to  appearances).1 

1  Appearance  is  the  "phenomenon"  of  the  skeptics,  or  the  "manifestation" 
of  the  Idealists — such  an  immediateness  as  is  no  somewhat,  and  no  thing; 
in  fact,  no  independent  being  at  all,  which  would  hare  existence  outside  of  its  refa- 
tion  to  the  subject  beholding  it,  or  outside  of  its  apparent  substance.  If  exists,  is 
a  predication  which  skepticism  does  not  allow  itself  to  make.  Modern  idealism 
does  not  allow  itself  to  look  upon  knowledge  as  a  knowing  of  the  "  thing  in  itself." 
The  mentioned  "appearance"  is  to  hare  no  foundation  whatever  of  being,  and 
the  "knowledge"  of  this  idealism  is  not  to  be  able  to  attain  to  the  "thing  in 
itself."  At  the  same  time,  however,  skepticism  attributes  many  determinations 
to  its  "  appearance,"  or,  rather,  its  "  appearance  "  possesses  the  entire  manifold 
wealth  of  the  world  for  its  content.  ("Appearance  "  includes  all  objects  of  nature 
and  history.)  Likewise,  the  "  phenomenon  "  of  idealism  includes  the  entire  corn- 
paw  of  these  determinations.  "Appearance"  and  "phenomenon"  are  thus  con- 
ceived as  manifold  in  their  immediateness.  It  is  true  that  there  may  be  no  being, 
nothing,  or  no  "thing  in  itself,"  lying  at  the  basis  of  this  content;  nevertheless,  it 
remains  for  itself  as  it  is  (it  manifests  independence) ;  it  has  only  been  transposed 
from  being  into  appearance ;  and  appearance  possesses  within  itself  those  manifold 
determinations  which  are  immediate  existence,  and  opposed  to  each  other  (i.  e^  the 
determinations  of  appearance  have  precisely  the  form  of  the  determinations  of 
being,  according  to  the  crude  conception  of  this  idealism).  Appearance  is,  there- 
fore, itself  an  immediate,  particular  somewhat.  It  may  have  this  or  that  content ; 
but  whatever  content  it  has  is  not  something  posited  by  it  (i.  e.,  a  result  of  its  ac- 
tivity), but  it  has  it  immediately  (L  «.,  not  as  a  result).  The  idealism  of  Leibnitz, 
Kant,  or  Fichte,  has  not  transcended  the  category  of  being,  nor  its  form  of  immedi- 
ateness, any  more  than  the  other  forms  of  idealism,  or  than  skepticism  (i.  «..  they 
do  not  arrive  at  the  concept  of  process  or  activity,  as  underlying  immediate  things). 
Skepticism  admits  the  content  of  its  "appearance,"  it  finds  it  given  as  an  immedi- 
ate somewhat  (not  as  a  manifestation  of  an  essence).  The  monad  of  Leibnitz  evolves 
its  own  representations,  but  it  is  not  the  power  which  generates  and  combines 
these  representations  —  they  arise  in  it  rather  like  babbles ;  they  are  independent, 
indifferent  toward  each  other,  and  likewise  toward  the  monad  itself.  So.  likewise, 
the  Kantian  "  phenomenon  "  (Enehcinung)  is  a  given  content  of  perception,  which 
presupposes  affections — determinations  of  the  subject — independent,  as  regards 
each  other,  and  as  regards  the  subject  (and  hence,  no  manifestation  of  an  essence). 
(The  infinite  occasion  (Attstoss)  of  Fichtian  idealism,  it  is  true,  may  have  no  "  thing 
in  itself"  at  all  for  its  basis,  so  that  it  may  be  a  pure  determinateness  of  the  ego, 
but  this  determinateness  is  something  independent  of  the  ego,  a  limit  of  it,  which 
the  ego  assimilates  and  deprives  of  its  externality,  and  transcends,  although  it 
possesses  a  aide  •  f  independence,  which  remains  an  immediate  negation  of  the  ego 
throughout  the  entire  process). 


10  Essence. 

(2.)  Appearance,  therefore,  contains  an  immediate  presupposi- 
tion —  a  side  of  independence  as  regards  essence.  But  it  is  impossible 
to  show  that  appearance,  if  it  is  regarded  as  distinct  from  essence,  is 
cancelled  and  returns  into  essence,  (i.  e.,  that  it  is  a  phase  of  an  in- 
cluding process)  ;  but  the  standpoint  of  being  has  been  entirely  an- 
nulled ;  appearance  is  nugatory  in  itself ;  it  remains  only  to  show  that 
the  determinations  which  distinguish  it  from  essence,  are  in  fact 
nothing  but  determinations  of  essence,  and,  moreover,  that  this  de- 
terminateness  of  essence,  which  constitutes  appearance,  is  annulled  in 
essence  itself. 

It  is  the  immediateness  of  non-being  which  constitutes  appearance, 
(i.  e.,  the  reality  of  appearance  is  the  reality  of  the  destructive  pro- 
cess, a  negative  activity  manifested  in  the  change  of  things  —  things 
negated,  rendered  transitory,  are  mere  appearance)  ;  this  non-being 
however,  is  nothing  else  but  the  negativity  of  essence  within  itself. 
Being  is  non-being  in  the  sphere  of  essence,  (£.  e.,  immediateness  is 
found  only  in  connection  with  the  negative  or  destructive  phase  of  the 
activity  of  a  process).  Its  nugatoriness  is  the  negative  nature  of 
essence  itself.  But  immediateness,  or  indifference  (independence), 
which  contains  this  non-being,  is  the  absolute  self-contained  being 
(A.nsichseyn') ,  which  belongs  to  essence.  The  negativity  of  essence  is 
its  identity  with  itself,  or  its  simple  immediateness  and  independence 
(i.  e.,  its  negativity  produces  its  identity  etc.,  by  the  form  of  self- 
relation,  as  will  be  shown  later  on).  Being  is  retained  in  essence  in 
so  far  as  the  latter  comes  into  identity  with  itself,  through  its  infinite 
(i.  «.,  self-related)  negativity;  through  this  (in  this  phase)  essence 
is,  itself,  being.  Immediateness  which,  in  the  category  of  appearance 
Fias  a  determinateness  opposed  to  essence,  is,  therefore,  nothing  else 
than  the  immediateness  belonging  to  essence  ;  but  not  the  irnmediate- 
n-ass  of  particular  existence,  but  the  immediateness  which  is  wholly 
mediated  or  reflected,  namely,  as  found  in  the  category  of  appear- 
ance. Being,  therefore,  as  a  phase  of  essence,  is  not  being  in  its  first 
phase,  but  only  as  a  determinateness  opposed  to  mediation  ;  being  has 
become  a  moment  (i.  e.,  complemental  element,  or  phase,  of  the  pro- 
cess here  called  essence-). 

These  two  moments  (phases),  the  negativity  which  takes  on  the 
form  of  persistence, -and  the  being  which  is  only  a  dependent  deter- 
minateness (moment)  —  in  other  words,  the  self-existent  negativity, 
and  the  reflected  immediateness  which  constitute  the  elements  of 
appearance,  are,  therefore,  the  elements  of  essence  itself:  it  is  not 
an  appearance  of  being  manifested  in  essence,  nor  an  appearance  of 
essence  manifested  in  being  —  the  appearance  in  essence  is  not 


Appearance.  11 

appearance  of  something  else  (than  essence),  but,  it  is  appearance 
as  such,  the  appearance  of  essence  itself  (».  e.,  the  elements  of  a 
process  are  continually  vanishing  and  reappearing,  not  in  and  for 
themselves,  but  as  manifestation  of  the  power  acting  in  the  process). 
Appearance  is  the  essence  itself  in  the  determinateness  of  being. 
Essence  has  appearance  through  the  fact  that  it  is  determined  (par- 
ticularized), and  through  this  has  distinction  from  itself  as  abso- 
lute unitv.  But  this  particularity  is  likewise  annulled.  For  essence 
is  independent,  that  which  mediates  itself,  being  what  it  is  through 
its  negation;  it  is,  therefore,  the  unity  and  identity  of  absolute 
negativity  and  immediateness.  Negativity  is  the  negativity  in  itself  — 
is  its  relation  to  itself,  and,  consequently,  it  is  immediateness  (because 
a  mediation  which  does  not  get  beyond  itself  is  no  mediation,  but  is 
immediateness)  ;  but  it  is  negative  relation  to  itself,  a  negation  that 
repels  itself,  and,  therefore,  this  immediateness  is  a  negative,  or  a  par- 
ticular opposed  to  it  (i.  e.,  the  process  of  self-determination  involves 
identity  —  the  relation  of  the  same  to  the  same — and  difference,  or 
the  negation  of  the  same  by  the  same).  But  this  determinateness  is 
itself  the  absolute  negativity,  and  this  act  of  determination,  which  is, 
as  active  determination,  the  annulment  of  itself  and,  at  the  same 
time,  return  into  itself. 

Appearance  is  the  negative  which  has  a  phase  of  being,  but  in 
another,  viz :  in  its  negation ;  it  is  dependence  which  is  cancelled  and 
nugatory.  It  is,  therefore,  the  negative  returning  into  itself,  the 
dependent  as  dependent  on  the  negative.  This  relation  of  the  nega- 
tive, or  of  dependence,  to  itself,  is  its  immediateness ;  it  is  another 
than  itself ;  it  is  its  determinateness  opposed  to  itself,  or  it  is  the 
negation  opposed  to  the  negative.  But  the  negation  opposed  to  the 
negative  is  a  self-relating  negativity,  which  is  an  absolute  annulment 
of  the  determinateness  itself.  (Relation  is  negation,  self -relation  is 
self- negation,  in  the  sense  of  self-determination ;  and  this,  as  before 
shown,  is  both  identity  and  difference. ) 

The  determinateness,  therefore,  of  essence,  which  is  "  appearance," 
is  infinite  (self -related)  determinateness ;  it  is  only  the  negative  di- 
rected against  itself ;  it  is,  therefore,  determinateness,  which,  as  such, 
is  independence  and  not  determined  through  another  (i.  e.,  not  de- 
terminateuess  of  another,  but  self-determination).  Conversely,  inde- 
pendence, as  self-relating  immediateness,  is  likewise  simple  determi- 
uateuess  and  phase,  and  negativity  only  as  relating  to  itself.  This 
negativity,  which  is  identical  with  immediateness,  and  the  immediate- 
ness  which  is  identical  with  negativity,  is  essence,  (essence  is  the  ac- 


12  Essence. 

tivity  of  self-relation).  Appearance  is,  therefore,  the  essence  itself, 
but  essence,  in  the  phase  of  determinateness  in  which  it  manifests 
itself  to  itself  (the  activity  of  anything  manifests  its  nature,  and 
even  the  activity  directed  upon  itself  musi  manifest  itself,  though  in 
tli£  form  of  particularity). 

In  the  sphere  of  being  the  non-being  arises,  as  an  immediate  in  op- 
position to  the  immediateness  of  being,  and  the  truth  (the  unity)  of 
these  two  immediates  is  becoming  (transition  is  the  only  form  of 
unity  in  which  two  immediates  may  be  combined).  In  the  sphere  of 
essence  we  find,  first,  the  categories  of  essential  and  unessential  op- 
posed to  each  other,  and,  next  afterwards,  the  categories  of  essence 
and  appearance ;  the  unessential  and  appearance  in  these  antitheses 
stand  for  what  remains  of  the  categories  of  being.  But  both,  as  well 
as  the  difference  of  essence  from  them,  have  no  further  independent 
validity  than  what  is  given  them  through  the  fact  that  essence  is  at 
first  taken  as  an  immediate  somewhat  (an  utter  misconception)  not 
as  it  is  fh  truth,  namely,  not  as  that  immediateness  which  arises 
through  pure  mediation  or  absolute  negativity,  (i.  e.,  self-mediation, 
or  self-negativit}').  That  first  form  of  immediateness  is  consequently 
only  the  determinateness  of  immediateness,  (i.  e.,  only  a  phase  of  true 
immediateness,  namely,  the  phase  of  self-relation,  leaving  out  of  sight 
the  self-negation  involved  in  it).  The  annullment  of  this  determi- 
nateness of  essence  consists,  therefore,  only  in  this,  that  the  unes- 
sential is  shown  to  be  only  appearance,  and  that  essential  is  shown 
to  contain  (as  a  negative  process  or  activity)  appearance  in  itself  as 
its  infinite  (self- related)  activity,  which  determines  its  immediateness 
as  negativity,  and  its  negativity  as  immediateness  (its  self-distinction 
being  its  identity,  and  its  self-identity  being  through  its  negative  rela- 
tion to  itself),  and,  therefore,  in  this  activity  is  the  manifestation  of 
itself  in  itself.  Essence  in  this  its  self-activity  is  reflection. 

c. 

Reflection 

Appearance  is  the  same  as  reflection  ;  or  rather  it  is  the  immediate 
phase  of  reflection.  We  use  the  word  reflection,  borrowed  from  the 
Latin  language  —  for  the  category  of  appearance  turned  back  into 
jtself,  and  therewith  estranged  from  its  immediateness  (a  foreign  word 
to  express  the  category  of  self-estrangement,  as  the  author  suggests). 
Essence  is  reflection,  the  movement  of  becoming  and  transition  which 
remains  in  itself ;  in  which  the  different  (the  other)  is  defined  as 


Reflection.  13 

appearance,  as  what  is  simply  negative  in  itself  (t.  e.,  not  as  an  inde- 
pendent other).  In  the  becoming  of  being,  the  determinateness 
of  being  lies  at  the  basis,  and  becoming  is  a  relation  to  another.  The 
movement  of  reflection,  on  the  contrary,  involves  otherness  only  as 
negation  in  itself,  which  has  being  only  as  a  phase,  the  self-relation 
of  negation.  Or,  since  this  relation  to  itself  is  this  negating  of  nega- 
tion, the  negation  as  negation  is  present  as  something  which  has  its 
being  in  its  being-negated  (i.  e.,  appearance).  Otherness  is,  there- 
fore, in  this  place,  not  being  with  negation  or  limit,  but  negation  with 
negation  (the  form  of  self-relation  involves  negation  of  negation,  for 
relation  is  negation).  The  first  which  corresponds  to  this  other,  the 
immediate  somewhat,  or  being,  opposed  to  it,  is  only  this  identity  of 
negation  with  itself,  the  negated  negation,  the  absolute  negativity. 
This  identity  with  itself,  or  immediateness,  is,  therefore,  not  a  first,  a 
somewhat  from  which  a  beginning  was  made,  and  from  which  a 
transition  into  its  negation  was  effected  (as  was  the  case  in  the  cate- 
gories of  "somewhat"  and  "other"  in  the  logic  of  being);  nor  is 
it  an  existent  substrate  which  underlies  the  activity  of  reflection,  but 
the  immediateness  is  only  this  activity  itself  (i.  e.,  as  before  explained, 
the  immediateness  is  a  result  of  self-relation,  sustained  only  through 
the  persistence  of  the  activity  of  self -negation,  it  is  a  phase,  and  the 
same  phase  as  identity. 

Becoming,  in  the  sphere  of  essence,  that  is,  its  reflecting  movement, 
is  therefore,  the  movement  from  nothing  to  nothing,  and  through  this 
a  return  into  itself  (i.  e.,  negation  of  negation  is  self -return).  Tran- 
sition, or  becoming,  annuls  itself  in  its  transition  (t.  e.,  it  sets  out 
from  itself  but  comes  to  itself,  the  from  and  the  to,  essential  to 
becoming,  are  identical  in  the  sphere  of  essence,  hence  transition  and 
becoming  are  said  to  be  annulled)  ;  the  "  other"  to  which  a  transi- 
tion is  made,  is  not  a  non-being,  as  it  was  in  the  logic  of  being,  but 
it  is  the  nothing  of  a  nothing  (negation  of  negation),  and  this  nega- 
tion of  nothing  is  what  constitutes  its  being.  Being  is  only  the 
movement  from  nothing  to  nothing  in  the  sphere  of  essence,  and 
essence  does  not  have  this  movement  in  itself,  but  it  is  this  movement 
as  absolute  appearance ;  pure  negativity,  which  has  nothiug  outside 
of  it  that  negated  it,  but  which  negates  only  its  negative  self,  and 
exists  only  in  this  activity  of  negation. 

This  pure  absolute  reflection  which  is  the  movement  from  nothing 
'to  nothing  develops  the  following  phases : 

It  is,  first,  positing  reflection. 

Secondly,  it  begins  from  a  pre-supposed  immediate  and  is,  there- 
fore, external  reflection. 


14  Essence. . 

Thirdly,  it  cancels  this  presupposition,  and  since  it  presupposes  in 
the  very  act  of  annulling  presupposition,  it  is  determining  reflection. 

(The  foregoing  paragraphs,  commencing  with  "  C,"  are  in  the  nature 
of  a  general  introduction  to  the  subject  of  "  Reflection,"  treating  of 
its  entire  scope.  The  detailed  treatment  of  this  subject  follows  in 
the  subdivisions,  1,  2,  and  3,  below.  The  first  of  which  subdivisions 
begins  properly  with  the  results  reached  at  the  close  of  the  discussion 
of  Appearance,  in  Section  B. ) 

1.  Positing  Reflection. 

Appearance  is  the  nugatory  (negative),  or  devoid  of  essence,  (i. 
e.,  it  has  no  persistence);  but  the  nugatory,  or  devoid  of  essence, 
does  not  have  its  being  in  another  in  which  it  appears,  but  its  being 
is  its  own  identitjT  with  itself ;  this  exchange  or  relation  (  Wechsel} 
of  the  negative  with  itself  if  defined  as  the  absolute  reflection  of 
essence. 

This  self-relating  negativity  is,  therefore,  the  negating  of  itself.  It 
is,  consequently,  annulled  negativity,  so  far  as  it  is  negativity  at  all. 
In  other  words  it  is  the  negative  and  the  simply  identity  with  itself, 
or  immediateness.  This,  therefore,  is  involved  in  it,  to  be  itself  and 
not  itself  in  one  unity. 

In  the  first  place,  reflection  has  been  defined  as  the  movement 
from  nothing  to  nothing,  and  hence,  as  negation  returning  to  itself. 
This  act  of  returning  to  itself  is  nothing  but  simple  identity  with 
itself,  immediateness.  But  this  return  is  not  transition  of  negation  into 
identity  —  as  though  into  another  phase  —  but  reflection  is  transition, 
as  cancelling  of  transition ;  for  it  is  immediate  return  of  negation  to 
itself.  The  first  phase  of  this  return  to  itself  is  identity  with  itself, 
or  immediateness ;  but,  secondly,  this  immediateness  is  the  identity 
resulting  from  the  negation  of  itself,  consequently  the  negation  of 
identity;  immediateness,  therefore,  which  is  in  itself  negative  and  is 
the  negative  of  itself  —  it  is  what  it  is  not. 

The  relation  of  the  negative  to  itself  is,  therefore,  its  return  into 
itself ;  it  is  immediateness,  as  the  cancelling  of  the  negative ;  but  it 
is  immediateness  only  as  this  relation,  or  as  a  return  out  of  a  nega- 
tive, consequently  a  self -cancelling  immediateness  (an  immediate- 
ness  which  is  a  result,  is  a  contradiction).  This  is  posited-being 
(an  immediateness  which  is  a  result)  immediateness  only  as  deter- 
minateness,  or  as  self-reflecting  (result  of  self- relation).  This 
immediateness,  which  exists  only  as  a  return  of  the  negative  into 
itself,  is  that  immediateness  which  has  already  been  discussed  as 
that  which  constitutes  the  determinateness  of  appearance,  and  that 


Positing  Reflection.  15 

from  which  the  movement  of  reflection  seemed  to  begin  —  (it  would 
seem  by  all  means  necessary  that  an  activity  should  act  upon  some- 
thing—  imply  something,  i.  e.,  an  immediate,  but  in  the  realm  of 
self-determination,  of  essence,  of  true  being,  we  find  that  immedi- 
ateness  is  only  a  phase,  or  result  of  the  activity  of  self-relation,  and 
not  its  substrate.  Reflection  is,  therefore,  the  activity  which,  while 
it  is  the  return,  comes  to  be  what  it  is,  first,  in  the  activity  which 
begins  or  which  returns  (the  beginning  and  the  returning  create  the 
form  whence  the  movement  started ! ). 

It  (reflection)  is  positing  in  so  far  as  it  is  immediateness  as  a  re- 
turn. There  is,  in  fact,  nothing  else  extant  but  the  activity  of  reflec- 
tion ;  neither  a  somewhat  from  which  it  returned,  nor  to  which  it  re- 
turned ;  it  is,  therefore,  nothing  but  return  and  thus  the  negative  of 
itself,  but  besides  this  the  immediateness  is  annulled  negation,  and 
cancelled  return  into  itself.  Reflection,  as  the  annulment  of -the  nega- 
tive, is  the  annulment  of  its  other,  namely,  of  the  immediateness.  In 
the  fact,  therefore,  that  it  is  the  immediateness  as  a  return,  a  relating 
of  the  negative  to  itself,  it  is  negation  of  the  negative  as  negative. 
Consequently,  it  is  the  activity  of  presupposition.  (Implying  some- 
thing already  existent  as  its  own  condition ;  this  act  of  presupposition, 
here  as  a  phase  of  self-relation  is  the  second  aspect  of  that  activity ; 
while  the  positing  is  the  first  aspect  of  self-relation,  namely,  that  in 
which  the  phase  of  identity,  or  immediate^iess,  is  seen  as  the  result  of 
the  activity,  on  the  other  hand,  the  negativity  of  the  relation  produces 
self-opposition  —  difference ;  this  dualism,  or  antithesis,  resulting  from 
the  negative  aspect,  is  a  presupposing  activity,  because  its  thought 
necessarily  involves  or  implies  a  first  phase  against  which  the  opposi- 
tion is  directed.  The  positing  activity  results  in  identity,  in  unity, 
in  immediateness.  in  the  annulment  of  all  before  and  after  —  the  utter 
collapse  of  all  determination.  The  prepositing  activity  results  in 
setting  up  an  antithesis,  a  dualism,  something  dependent,  something 
opposed  to  something  else,  a  sharp  distinction,  or  difference.  In  a 
word,  contrast  presupposes  something  immediate  or  self-identical,  as 
the  basis  of  distinction,  and  this  activity  of  negation,  acting  upon 
itself,  is  just  as  effective  in  producing  contrast  as  in  producing  iden- 
tity). In  other  words,  immediateness  is  as  return  only  the  negative 
of  itself,  the  annulment  of  immediateness ;  but  reflection,  in  its  ac- 
tivity, annuls  the  negative  of  itself,  it  comes  into  self-relation  (X.  B. 
the  negative  of  reflection  is  immediateness) ;  it  therefore,  cancels  its 
positing,  and  since  it  is  the  annulment  of  positing,  in  the  very  activity 
of  positing,  it  is  presupposition  (prepositing).  In  the  activity  of 


16  Essence. 

presupposition,  reflection  turns  the  return  into  itself  into  the  negative 
of  itself,  into  that  whose  annulment  is  essence  (N.  B.  the  pre-sup- 
posing  activity  also  involves  the  annulment  of  reflection,  and  the  an- 
nulment of  reflection  is  the  annulment  of  the  activity  of  the  process 
called  essence ;  and  the  annulment  of  presupposition  is  essence.  It 
(this  activity)  is  directed  towards  itself,  but  to  itself  as  its  negative, 
only  in  this  aspect  is  it  abiding,  persistent,  negativity  relating  to 
itself.  Immediateness  comes  from  no  other  source  than  return,  and 
is  that  negative  somewhat  which  is  the  beginning  or  substrate  of  ap- 
pearance, which  is  negated  through  the  return.  The  return  of  es- 
sence is,  consequently,  its  repulsion  from  itself.  In  other  words,  re- 
flection into  itself  is  essentially  the  presupposition  of  that  from  which 
it  is  the  return. 

It  is  the  annulment  of  its  identity  with  itself  which  constitutes  the 
identity  of  essence  with  itself.  It  presupposes  itself,  and  the  annul- 
ment of  this  presupposition  is  itself ;  conversely,  this  annulment  of 
its  presupposition,  is  the  presupposition  itself.  Reflection,  therefore, 
finds  an  immediate  already  given,  beyoud  which  it  proceeds,  and 
from  which  it  is  the  return.  But  this  return  is  itself  the  very  pre- 
supposition of  the  immediate  which  it  found  given.  This  presup- 
posed immediate  comes  to  be  only  through  the  fact  that  it  is 
abandoned ;  its  immediateness  is  the  cancelled  immediateness.  The 
cancelled  immediateness,  conversely,  is  the  return  into  itself,  the 
arrival  of  essence  at  itself,  the  simple,  self-identical  being.  This 
arrival  at  itself,  consequently,  is  the  annulment  of  itself,  and  the 
reflection  which  repels  it  from  itself  and  presupposes  it ;  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  its  repulsion  from  itself  is  the  arrival  at  itself. 

The  reflecting  movement  is,  consequently,  as  here  considered,  to 
be  taken  as  the  absolute  counter-impulse  in  itself  —  (a  pure,  self- 
repulsion,  always  in  opposition  to  itself,  its  identity  being  the  product 
of  an  activity  which  proceeds  beyond  itself  into  difference,  and  yet  in 
this  difference,  or  duality,  finds  again  its  identity,  as  shown  in  the 
text  with  some  prolixity).  For  the  presupposition  of  the  return 
into  itself,  that  from  whence  the  essence  proceeds  and  becomes 
essence  through  this  act  of  return,  is  only  in  the  return.  The  act  of 
transcending  the  immediate,  with  which  reflection  begins,  is  rather 
itself  a  result  of  this  transcending ;  and  the  transcending  of  the 
immediate  is  the  arrival  at  the  same.  The  movement  turns  itself 
round  (inverts  itself)  as  a  forward  progress,  and  is  thereby  self- 
movement  (self-activity).  Activity  which  proceeds  from  itself,  in  so 
far  as  the  positing  reflection,  is  the  prepositing  (presupposing),  and, 


External  Reflection.  17 

likewise,  the  prepositing  reflection  is  precisely  identical  with  the 
positing  reflection. 

Reflection  is,  therefore,  itself  and,  at  the  same  time,  its  non-being; 
and  is  only  itself,  while  it  is  the  negative  of  it,  for  only  thus  is  the 
annulment  of  the  negative  at  the  same  time  the  return  to  itself. 

The  immediateness  which  it  presupposes  as  self -cancelling,  is  noth- 
ing else  than  the  posited-being,  the  in-itself-annulled,  which  is  not 
different  from  the  return  into  itself,  and,  in  fact,  is  just  this  return. 
But  it  is,  at  the  same  time,  determined  as  negative,  as  immediately  in 
opposition,  and  hence  producing  an  antithesis  of  one  and  other  within 
itself  (self-opposition).  Therefore,  reflection  is  determined ;  it  is  — 
in-as-mtieh  as,  according  to  this  determinateness,  it  has  a  presupposi- 
tion., and  begins  with  an  immediate  opposed  to  it,  as  its  other  (found 
already  extant) — external  reflection. 

(The  above  exposition  has  developed  for  us  the  insight  into  the 
ambiguity  of  reflection ;  all  relation,  when  traced  out,  being  found  to 
be  self-relation.  Relation  is  transcendence,  duality,  a  from  and  a  to, 
negation;  self-relation,  while  it  bends  back  the  procedure  —  outward 
to  another,  and  directs  it  upon  itself,  differentiates  itself,  produces 
duality.  Self-determination  involves  determiner  and  determined, 
active  and  passive,  and,  hence,  difference  from  itself,  within  itself ; 
the  negation  of  itself  cancels  all  otherness,  and  is  pure  identity; 
and  yet  it  determines  itself  in  the  form  of  self-opposition,  and  is 
pure  difference.  The  second  of  these  phases,  that  of  self- opposi- 
tion, or  difference,  is  that  of  external  reflection,  now  to  be  consid- 
ered.) 

2.  External  Reflection. 

Reflection,  as  absolute  reflection,  is  the  activity  of  essence  in  the 
phase  of  self-appearance,  and  presupposes  only  appearance,  posited- 
being  ;  it  is  as  presupposing  immediately  the  same  as  positing  reflec- 
tion. But  the  external,  or  real  reflection,  presupposes  itself  as 
annulled,  as  the  negative  of  itself  (reflection,  it  will  be  remembered, 
as  self-return,  produces  identity,  immediateness,  as  a  result;  this  is 
positing  reflection ;  the  presupposing  reflection  implies  identity,  or 
immediateness,  as  a  pre-existing  condition;  thus  it  is  said  to  pre- 
suppose the  positing  reflection  as  annulled).  It  is  in  this  aspect  du- 
plicated :  in  the  first  place,  as  presupposed,  or  reflection  into  itself, 
which  is  the  immediate.  Secondly,  it  is  reflection,  as  relating  nega- 
tively to  itself,  and  thus  to  itself  as  its  own  non-being.  (Thus  what 
is  really  one  activity  with  two  aspects,  may  be  seen  as  two  entirely 


18  Essence. 

different  activities,  independent  of  each  other,  and,  in  fact,  the  one- 
succeeding  the  other  in  time.  This  is  the  maya,  or  illusion  of  exter- 
nal reflection.) 

External  reflection,  therefore,  presupposes  a  being,  and  this,  toor 
not  in  the  sense  that  its  immediateness  is  a  mere  posited-being,  or 
moment  (as  it  really  is,  in  the  positing  reflection),  but  rather,  in  the 
sense  that  this  immediateness  is  the  relation  to  itself  (£.  e.,  independ- 
ent—  not  a  result  of  some  antecedent  activity),  and  the  determinate- 
ness  (produced  by  this  presupposing  activity,  which  is  a  negative,, 
determining  activity,  directed  against  the  immediateness,  or  identity,. 
produced  by  the  positing  reflection),  is  looked  upon  only  as  moment 
(i.  e.,  as  a  modification  of  an  already  existent  being).  It  (i.  e.,  ex- 
ternal reflection)  relates  to  its  presupposition  (i.  e.,  the  result  of  the 
positing- reflection,  viz:  immediateness,  identity),  as  though  the  lat- 
ter were  the  negative  of  reflection  (L  e,,  an  immediate  which  needs  no- 
antecedent  reflecting  activity  to  posit  it),  and  yet  this  negative  were 
cancelled  as  negative  (i.  e.,  utterly  indifferent  to  antecedent  positing). 
(Again,  in  other  words)  Reflection  in  its  positing,  annuls  immediately 
its  positing,  and  hence  has  an  immediate  presupposition.  It,  there- 
fore, finds  the  same  already  existent  before  it,  as  something  with 
which  it  begins,  and  from  which  it  commences  the  return  into  itself  — 
the  negating  of  this,  its  negative.  But,  the  fact,  that  this  presupposed 
is  a  negative,  or  posited,  is  not  suspected  by  it.  This  determinate- 
ness  (i.  e.,  "negative,  or  posited,")  belongs  only  to  the  positing 
reflection,  but  in  the  prepositing  reflection  it  is  cancelled  (t.  e.,  the 
immediateness  is  not  a  posited,  not  a  result).  What  the  external  re- 
flection determines  and  posits  on  the  immediate  are,  therefore,  only 
external  determinations  (i.  e.,  external  to  the  immediate,  which  is  the 
result  of  the  positing  reflection).  An  example  of  this  is  the  category 
of  the  infinite,  as  it  is  found  in  the  logic  of  being ;  the  finite  is  taken 
as  a  real  somewhat,  already  existent  before  the  infinite,  and  from 
which  one  begins  as  a  basis  for  the  infinite,  to  which  he  proceeds ; 
and  the  infinite,  in  this  connection,  is  a  reflection  into  itself,  standing 
in  opposition  to  it  (i.  e.,  the  finite  as  the  limited  and  particular,  ought 
to  be  regarded  as  the  dependent,  as  a  phase  merely,  while  the  infinite 
should  be  the  independent,  the  totality,  including  the  finite  as  its 
phase.  But  the  imperfect  insight  which  thinks  with  the  categories  of 
being,  looks  npon  the  finite  as  one  independent  sphere,  and  the  infi- 
nite as  another,  opposed  to  it.  As  here  pointed  out,  the  only  distinc- 
tion between  them  is  that,  in  the  finite  the  reflection  into  itself  is 
annulled,  while  in  the  infinite,  it  is  conceived  as  active.  The  irnme- 


External  Refection.  19 

diateness  which  results  from  the  positing  reflection,  is  regarded  by 
external  reflection  as  sundered  from  the  positing  activity,  and  as  inde- 
pendent—  this  is  the  finite :  the  reflection,  of  self-relation,  which 
results  in  pure  identity,  is  the  activity  likewise  sundered,  by  external 
reflection,  and  regarded  as  the  infinite). 

External  reflection  is  the  syllogism  containing  the  two  extremes, 
the  immediate  and  the  reflection  into  itself ;  the  middle  term  is  the 
relation  of  the  two,  the  determined  immediate  conceived  in  such  a 
manner,  that  the  one  part  of  it,  viz.,  the  immediateness,  belongs  ex- 
clusively to  one  extreme,  and  the  other  part,  viz.,  the  determinateness, 
or  negation,  belongs  exclusively  to  the  other  extreme  (*".  e.,  our  ex- 
ternal reflection  unites  the  two  extremes  in  a  middle  term,  but  it  an- 
nuls its  own  work  in  the  fact  that  it  regards  this  unity  still  as  a  sub- 
jective product,  and  discriminates  the  two  elements,  still  as  belonging 
to  the  two  extremes,  and  as  not  united  so  as  to  lose  their  identity  in 
a  third.  We  can  still  distinguish  in  a  plum-pudding  the  various  in- 
gredients, not  become  identical,  although  united). 

If  we  consider  the  doings  of  external  reflection  more  critically,  we 
shall  find  it  a  positing  of  the  immediate,  which,  in  so  far,  becomes  the 
negative,  or  the  determined  ;  but  it  is  immediately  also  the  annulment 
of  this  its  positing,  for  it  presupposes  the  immediate ;  it  is,  therefore, 
a  negative  activity  which  negates  its  own  negation  (in  this  critical 
consideration,  we  discover  why  external  reflection  does  not  suspect 
the  identity  of  immediateness  and  reflection  into  itself,  but  holds  them 
asunder  as  two  independent  somewhats ;  it  is  itself  the  positing  ac- 
tivity, or  reflection  into  itself,  and  through  this  it  is  led  to  regard  the 
positing  activity  as  entirely  subjective).  It  is  immediately  a  positing 
activity,  a  cancelling  of  the  immediate  which  is  negative  to  it,  and 
this  immediate  with  which  it  supposed  itself  to  begin  as  a  foreign  (». 
e.,  independent,  already  existent)  somewhat,  comes  to  be  in  this  ac- 
tivity of  beginning.  The  immediate  is  thus  not  only  in  itself  identi- 
cal with  reflection  —  and  this  would  mean  for  us,  subjectively  or  in  ex- 
ternal reflection  —  but  this  identity  of  the  immediate  and  reflection  is 
posited  (established  through  an  objective  process).  It  is,  namely. 
determined  through  reflection,  as  its  negative,  or  its  other,  but  it  is 
its  own  activity  that  negates  this  very  determining.  And  thus,  the  ex- 
ternality of  reflection  to  the  immediate  is  annulled  ;  its  self-negating 
positing,  unites  it  with  its  negative,  with  the  immediate,  and  this  unit- 
ing is  the  essential  immediateness  itself.  It  is,  therefore,  proved  that 
the  external  reflection  is  not  external,  but  the  immanent  reflection  of 
iminediateness  itseif ;  or,  in  other  words,  that  that  which  is  through 


20  Essence. 

the  positing  reflection  is  the  in-and-for-itself  existing  essence  (f.  e., 
tlie  total  process  of  essence).     Hence  it  is  determining  reflection. 

(The  demonstration  of  the  nature  of  external  reflection  in  the  above 
paragraphs,  and  as  supplemented  in  the  next  section  —  "  determining 
reflection" — forms  one  of  the  most  wonderful  movements  of  Hegel's 
philosophy.  In  it  he  transcends  all  mere  subjective  idealism  and  all 
phases  of  philosophical  nescience.  The  gist  of  the  demonstration  is 
to  be  found  first  in  his  subtle  analysis  of  reflection  ;  having  shown  in 
a  former  book,  that  all  beings,  or  categories  of  being,  are  valid  only 
in  their  relation  to  each  other,  and  that  relation  is  the  truth  of  being, 
and  thus  that  being  is  seeming  —  in  other  words,  that  particular 
beings  are  phases  of  a  total,  including  process  —  it  follows  that  all 
relation  is  self- relation  when  traced  out.  Self -relation  is  reflection 
and  self-negation.  Having  discovered  this  he  finds  by  analysis  the 
two  aspects  in  it ;  a  positing  aspect  resulting  in  identity  and  imtnedi- 
ateness,  the  prepositing  aspect  resulting  in  self-opposition  and  differ- 
ence. The  stage  of  external  reflection  takes  on  itself  one  of  these 
aspects  as  subjective,  and  through  this  the  connecting  link  between 
immediateness  and  reflection  becomes  invisible.  To  see  this  as  maya, 
or  illusion,  is  to  have  an  insight  into  the  dialectic  of  pure  thought.) 

Remark. 

Reflection  is  taken  in  a  subjective  sense,  by  current  usage,  as  the 
activity  of  the  faculty  of  judgment,  which  transcends  a  given  imme- 
diate representation,  and  seeks  to  find  general  predicates  for  the 
same,  or  to  compare  it  with  them.  Kant  contrasts  the  reflecting 
judgment  with  the  determining  judgment.  He  defines  judgment  as 
the  general  faculty  which  thinks  the  particular,  as  contained  under 
the  universal.  If  the  universal  is  given  —  as  rule,  principle,  law  — 
the  judgment,  which  subsumes  the  particular  under  it,  is  determin- 
ing. But,  if  only  the  particular  is  given,  for  which  the  universal  is 
to  be  found,  the  judgment  is  merely  reflecting.  Reflection  is,  conse- 
quently, in  the  latter  instance,  the  transcending  of  an  immediate, 
and  the  attaining  of  a  universal.  The  immediate  is  partly  defined 
as  particular,  and  through  this  defined  as  relation  of  the  same  to  its 
universal ;  for  and  by  itself,  it  is  only  an  individual,  or  something 
immediately  existent.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  that  to  which  it  is 
related  is  its  universal,  its  rule,  principle,  or  law ;  in  any  case,  it 
is  something  reflected  into  itself,  relating  to  itself  —  essence,  or 
the  essential.  (A  rule,  principle,  or  law,  is  said  to  be  reflected  into 
itself,  because,  in  its  application  to  a  multiplicity  of  cases,  it  finds 


Remark.  21 

only  confirmation ;  that  which  is  peculiar,  and  belongs  only  to  one 
individual,  in  contrast  with  another,  relates  by  that  contrast  to  a 
beyond,  to  another ;  but,  if  the  characteristic  applies  not  only  to  the 
one,  but  to  its  other,  and  to  another,  and  to  all  others,  it  is  said  to  be 
reflected  into  itself,  for  it  is  affirmed,  and  continued  by  its  others, 
by  its  limit). 

But,  in  this  place,  we  are  not  treating  of  the  reflection  of  con- 
sciousness (consciousness,  in  general,  has  the  form  of  reflection  — 
it  is  self-relatiou,  self-knowing) ;  nor  is  'it  the  narrower  sphere  of 
the  reflection  of  the  understanding  which  deals  with  the  categories 
of  particularity  and  universalitj-.  Here  we  are  speaking  of  reflection 
in  general  (objective,  as  well  as  subjective).  That  reflection  to  which 
Kant  ascribes  the  function  of  finding  a  universal  for  a  given  particu- 
lar, is,  evidently,  only  "  external "  reflection,  which  relates  to  the 
immediate,  as  something  given.  But  the  idea  of  absolute  reflection 
is  contained  in  it  implicitly ;  for  the  universal  —  the  principle,  rule,  or 
law  —  which  it  attains  in  its  determining,  is  regarded  as  the  essence  of 
that  immediate  with  which  it  began,  and,  consequently,  the  imme- 
diate is  regarded  as  a  nugatory ;  and  the  return  from  the  immediate, 
the  determining  of  reflection,  is  regarded  as  the  positing  of  the  imme- 
diate, in  its  true  being  (even  external  reflection,  in  finding  the 
essence  of  an  immediate,  supposes  itself  to  find  the  true  nature  of 
it) ;  therefore,  that  which  reflection  predicates  of  the  immediate  — 
the  determinations  which  it  finds  in  it  —  is  not  looked  upon  as  some- 
thing external  to  that  immediate,  but  as  its  real  being. 

External  reflection,  and  in  fact  reflection  in  general,  had  the  for- 
tune for  a  long  time  to  fall  under  the  ban  of  modern  philosophy ;  it 
was  the  fashion  to  attribute  everything  evil  to  it  and  to  its  activity, 
and  it  was  regarded  as  the  antipode  and  hereditary  enemy  of  the 
"  absolute  "  mode  of  viewing  things.  In  fact  the  thinking  reflection, 
in  so  far  as  it  conducts  itself  externally,  sets  out  from  a  given  some- 
what —  an  immediate,  foreign  to  it  —  and  regards  its  own  activity  as 
a  merely  formal  affair,  which  receives  its  content  and  matter  from 
without,  and  is  for  its  own  part  only  an  activity  conditioned  through 
it.  Moreover,  as  we  shall  learn  in  the  consideration  of  the  determin- 
ing reflection,  reflected  determinations  are  of  another  kind  than  the 
merely  immediate  determinations  of  being.  The  latter  are  conceded 
to  be  transitory,  merely  relative  determinations,  standing  each  in  rela- 
tion to  another ;  but  the  reflected  determinations  have  the  form  of 
the  being  in  and  for  itself  (i.  e.,  they  are  independent,  because  self- 
related)  ;  they  make  themselves  valid,  therefore,  as  essential,  and, 


22  Essence, 

instead  of  effecting  a  transition  into  their  opposites,  they  manifest 
themselves  rather  as  absolute,  free  and  indifferent  towards  each  other. 
'They  refuse,  therefore,  stubbornly,  to  move ;  their  being  is  their 
Identity  with  themselves,  in  their  determinateness,  in  which  they  are 
held  asunder,  although  they  reciprocally  presuppose  each  other. 

(Hegel's  "remarks"  sometimes  are  explanatory  of  the  strictly 
scientific,  or  dialectic  portions  of  the  text,  but  more  frequently  they 
furnish  digressions  pertaining  to  matters  which  have  a  merely  his- 
torical interest. ) 

3.  Determining  Reflection. 

The  determining  reflection  is  the  unity  of  the  positing  and  the 
•external  reflection.  This  is  to  be  considered  more  in  detail : 

(1).  External  reflection  commences  with  immediate  being;  posit- 
ing reflection  commences  with  nothing.  External  reflection,  which 
becomes  determining  reflection,  posits  another,  viz.,  the  essence,  in 
the  place  of  the  cancelled  being ;  but  the  positing  reflection  does  not 
posit  its  determination  in  the  place  of  another  —  it  has  no  presuppo- 
sition. But  on  this  account  it  is  not  the  completed  determining  reflec- 
tion ;  the  determination  which  it  posits,  is,  therefore,  a  merely 
posited  (i.  e.,  dependent)  ;  it  is  immediate,  not,  however,  as  self- 
identical,  but  as  self-negating  ;  it  has  absolute  reference  to  the  return 
into  itself,  and  has  existence  only  in  reflection,  although  it  is  not  this 
reflection  itself. 

That  which  is  posited,  is,  therefore,  another,  but  in  such  a  manner 
that  the  identity  of  reflection  with  itself  is  entirely  preserved ;  for 
that  which  is  posited  is  only  annulled  —  relation  to  the  return  into 
itself.1 

If  some  one  says  of  anything  that  "it  is  only  a  posited-being," 
"we  may  understand  this  expression  in  two  meanings ;  it  is  this,  as 

1  In  the  sphere  of  being  the  category  of  particular  being  (Daseyn)  was  a  being 
•which  had  negation  attached  to  it,  and  being  was  the  immediate  basis  and  element 
-of  this  negation,  which,  therefore,  was  itself  immediate.  To  particular  being 
{Daseyn)  corresponds  posited-being  in  the  sphere  of  essence;  it  too  is  a  particular 
being  (Daseyn),  but  its  basis  is  being  as  essence,  or  as  pure  negativity  (pure=self- 
related);  it  is  a  determinateness,  or  negation,  not  regarded  as  existent,  but  as 
directly  annulled.  Particular  being  is  nothing  but  posited-being ;  this  is  the  pro- 
position (principle  or  maxim)  of  essence  in  regard  to  particular  being  (in  arriving 
flt  the  idea  of  essence  it  had  been  found  that  particular  being  was  a  vanishing 
phase,  something  posited  through  a  process  of  essence).  Posited-being,  therefore, 
stands,  in  one  respect,  opposed  to  particular  being,  and,  in  another  respect,  opposed 
to  essence,  and  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  the  middle  term  which  connects  particular 
being  with  essence,  and,  conversely,  essence  with  particular  being. 


Determining  Reflection.  23 

opposed  to  particular  being,  or,  as  opposed  to  essence.  In  the  for- 
mer meaning,  particular  being  is  taken  as  something  higher  than  the 
posited-being,  and  the  latter  is  ascribed  to  external  reflection  as  some- 
thing subjective.  In  fact,  however,  the  posited-being  is  itself  the 
higher  of  the  two ;  for  as  posited-being,  particular  being  is  taken  for 
what  it  really  is  in  itself  —  as  a  negative,  as  something  which  exists 
only  as  a  relation  to  the  return  into  itself.  Hence,  the  expression, 
^'it  is  only  a  posited-being,"  should  be  used  in  contrast  to  essence 
4.  e.,  as  the  negation  of  the  being- returned-into- itself. 

(2).  Posited-being  does  not  contain  the  full  thought  expressed  by 
-**  determination  of  reflection  "  ;  it  is  determinateness  merely  as  nega- 
tion in  general  (posited-being  expresses  mere  dependence,  that  which 
is,  but,  as  being  dependent,  its  being  is  in  and  through  another ;  hence, 
it  is  annulled.  The  determinations  of  reflection  are  not  mere  phases 
of  reflection  like  posited-being,  but  aspects  of  the  totality  of  reflec- 
tion, as  will  be  seen  below).  But  positing  has  been  found  in  unity 
with  external  reflection  ;  the  latter  is  in  this  unity  absolute  presuppo- 
sition, i.  e.,  the  repulsion  of  reflection  from  itself,  or  the  positing 
of  determinateness  as  the  presupposition  itself.  Posited-being  is, 
therefore,  as  such,  negation,  but  as  presupposed,  it  is  reflected  into 
itself.  In  this  sense,  posited-being  is  "determination  of  reflection" 
.(as  above  remarked,  posited-being  taken  in  the  two  aspects  of 
reflection). 

Determination  (Bestimmung)  of  reflection  is  to  be  discriminated 
from  determinateness  (Btstimmtheit}  of  being,  t.  e.,  from  quality; 
•quality  is  immediate  relation  to  another,  in  general ;  posited-being,  also, 
is  relation  to  another,  but  to  being,  as  reflected  into  itself.  Negation, 
as  quality,  is  negation  as  existent ;  being  constitutes  its  ground,  and 
element.  Determination  of  reflection,  on  the  contrary,  has,  as  its 
basis,  being  reflected  into  itself.  (Categories  of  being  have  validity 
directly  in  themselves,  ».  e.,  independently ;  or,  rather,  they  have 
not  this  validity,  but  are  thought  to  have  it,  by  the  stage  of  thinking 
which  gives  validity  to  such  categories ;  but,  in  essence,  every  cate- 
gory, or  determination,  is  a  result  of  a  self-related  process,  called 
by  Hegel,  "reflection  into  itself";  thus,  its  determinations  are 
posited-being  —  posited  by  the  activity  of  self-negation;  e.  gr., 
identity  is  the  self- relation  of  negation;  so,  also,  is  difference.) 
Posited-being  fixes  itself*  in  the  aspect  of  determination,  precisely 
for  this  reason,  that  reflection  is  identity  with  itself  in  its  self-nega- 
tion ;  its  being  negated  is,  therefore,  its  very  reflection  into  itself. 
The  determination  is  effected,  not  through  being,  but  through 


24  Essence. 

identity  with  itself.  Because  being,  which  is  the  substrate  of  quality,, 
is  non-identical  with  negation,  it  follows  that  quality  is  non-identical 
with  itself,  and,  therefore,  transitory,  a  vanishing  phase.  (Quality 
is  regarded  as  consisting  of  two  elements,  being  and  negation,  two- 
non-identical  somewhats,  which  do  not  produce  a  stable  result;  the 
negation  appears  in  quality  as  its  dependence,  the  occasion  of  its 
dissolution;  but  the  determination  of  reflection  is  produced  through 
self- relation,  and  its  elements,  therefore,  have  no  subsistence  out- 
side of  it — it  is  their  subsistence;  it  is,  thus,  unlike  the  determin- 
ateness  of  being,  whose  elements  have  subsistence  apart  from  it.) 
On  the  contrary,  the  determination  of  reflection  is  posited  being,  as 
negation  —  negation,  which  has  lying  at  its  basis  annulled  being, 
and,  therefore,  is  not  non-identical  with  itself,  but  is  essential,  and! 
not  a  transitory  determinateness.  The  self-identity  of  reflection, 
which  has  the  negative,  merely  as  negative,  as  cancelled  or  posited,, 
is  what  gives  persistence  to  the  same  (the  negative,  as  negative,  i.  e.> 
not  as  another  being). 

On  account  of  this  reflection  into  itself,  the  determinations  of 
reflection  appear  as  free  essentialities  hovering  in  the  empty  void, 
without  attraction,  or  repulsion,  towards  each  other ;  in  them,  deter- 
minateness has,  through  relation  to  itself,  been  established,  and 
infinitely  fixed  (a  firm  basis  for  imperishable  individuality  is  found 
in  self-relation,  while  individuality  is  impossible  in  the  form  of 
being  or  simple  quality)  ;  it  is  determination  which  has  subordinated 
its  transition  and  its  mere  posited-being,  or  has  bent  back  its  reflec- 
tion into  another —  into  reflection  into  itself.  These  determinations 
constitute,  therefore,  the  particular  appearance,  which  is  the  "mani- 
festation" of  essence  —  essential  appearance.  For  this  reason,  deter- 
mining reflection  is  reflection  which  has  emerged  from  itself;  the- 
identity  of  essence  with  itself  is  lost  in  the  negation,  which  is  domi- 
•nant. 

Therefore,  in  the  determination  of  reflection  there  are  two  sides,. 
which  are  to  be  distinguished.  First,  that  of  posited-being,  negation, 
as  such  ;  secondly,  reflection  into  itself.  According  to  the  posited- 
being,  negation  is  taken  as  negation ;  this  is  consequently  its  unity 
with  itself,  but  it  is  this  at  first  only  potentially  (an  sick)  ;  or  it  is  the 
immediate  as  self-annulling,  as  the  other  of  itself.  Reflection  into 
itself  is,  therefore,  an  abiding  activity  of  determination  ;  essence  does 
not  transcend  itself  in  that^  activity,  its  distinctions  are  merely  pos- 
ited—taken  back  into  essence,  but,  according  to  the  other  phase, 
they  are  not  posited,  but  reflected  into  themselves  ;  negation  as  nega- 


Essentialities  or  Determination*  of  Reflection.          25 

lion  is  reflected  into  identity  with  itself,  and  not  into  its  other  — 
not  into  its  non-being. 

(3.)  Since  now  the  determination  of  reflection  is  both  reflected  re- 
lation into  itself,  as  well  as  posited-being,  its  nature  becomes  through 
this  fact  immediately  evident  to  ns.  As  posited-being,  namely,  it  is 
negation  as  snch,  a  non-being  opposed  to  another,  namely,  opposed 
to  the  absolute  reflection  into  itself,  or  to  essence.  But  as  relation 
to  itself  it  is  reflected  into  itself.  This,  its  reflection,  and  that,  its 
posited-being,  are  different;  its  posited-being  is  rather  its  being-an- 
nulled ;  its  being  reflected  into  itself  is,  however,  its  persistence. 
In  so  far  as  it  is  the  posited-being,  which  is  at  the  same  time  reflection 
into  itself,  the  determinateness  of  reflection  is  the  relation  to  its  alter- 
UTO  (other-being)  within  itself.  It  is  not  as  an  existent  quiescent  de- 
terminateness, which  would  be  related  to  another  in  such  a  manner, 
that  the  related  and  its  relation  are  different  from  each  other,  the 
former  a  being  in  itself,  a  somewhat,  which  excludes  its  other,  and  its 
relation  to  this  other  from  itself.  But  the  determination  of  reflec- 
tion, is,  in  itself,  the  definite  particular  side  and  the  relation  to  this 
definite  particular  side  as  definite,  i.  «.,  to  its  negation.  Quality 
through  its  relation  makes  a  transition  into  another,  its  change  begins 
in  its  relation.  The  determination  of  reflection,  on  the  contrary,  has 
taken  up  its  other-being  into  itself.  It  is  posited-being,  negation 
which,  however,  bends  back  the  relation  to  another  into  itself,  and 
negation  which,  as  self-identical,  is  the  unity  of  itself  and  its  other, 
and  through  this  fact  alone,  essentiality.  It  is,  therefore,  posited- 
being,  negation,  but  as  reflection  into  itself,  it  is  at  the  same  time, 
the  annulled-being  of  this  posited-being,  infinite  relation  to  itself. 

(In  this  first  chapter  of  Essence,  Hegel  has  exhibited  the  nature  of 
reflection,  relation,  negation  as  totality ;  as  self-relation,  or  totality, 
it  has  the  two  phases  of  identity  and  difference,  of  dependence  within 
independence  —  t.  e.,  of  posited-being,  within  reflection  into  itself; 
while  in  the  sphere  of  being,  no  determinations  were  found  that  were 
persistent,  abiding,  here  in  Essence  we  find  abiding  determinations  — 
which  are  such  through  their  self-relation). 

SECOND  CHAPTER. 
Essentialities  or  Determinations  of  Reflection. 

Reflection  is  determined  reflection,  consequently  essence  is  de- 
termined, or  essentiality  (by  the  expression  "determined  "  is  meant 
particularized,  since  essence  is  reflection,  according  to  the  results  of 
the  first  chapter,  it  follows  that  essence  is  particularized,  ».  «.,  ite 


26  Essence. 

negative  activity  determines  it,  produces  self-opposition,  gives  rise 
to  its  differences.  "  Essentiality  "  (  Wesenheit  )  means  the  state  of 
being  essential ;  it  refers  to  the  abstract  phase,  or  general  aspect  of 
the  process  to  which  the  term  essence  is  here  applied.) 

Reflection  is  the  appearing  (Scheinen)  of  essence  in  itself.  Es- 
sence, as  infinite  return  into  itself,  is  not  immediate  simplicity,  but 
negative  simplicity.  It  is  a  movement  containing  different  phases 
(durch  unterschindene  Momente),  constituting  absolute  mediation  with 
itself  (''absolute  mediation,"  because  it  is  utterly  a  product  of  its 
own  activity). 

These,  its  phases,  are  its  manifestation  (and  since  it  is  reflection), 
therefore,  these  phases  are  determinations,  which  are  reflected  into 
themselves.  (N.  B.  — If  they  were  not  reflected  determinations  they 
would  not  resemble  essence — would  not  manifest  it.) 

First.  Essence  is  simple  relation  to  itself  —  pure  identity.  This 
determination  is  rather  the  lack  of  determinations  (pure  identity  is 
the  void  of  determinations). 

Secondly.  The  determination  properly  so-called  is  distinction. 
Distinction,  as  external  or  indifferent  to  the  nature  of  the  somewhats 
distinguised,  is  called  difference  (  Verschiedenheit  —  variety,  differ- 
ence between  things  not  essentially  related  to  each  other,  e.  g.,  a  book 
and  a  lamp-post).  But,  as  essential  difference,  it  is  the  difference 
of  contraries,  antithesis  —  the  difference  of  opposition  (Gegensatz  = 
antithesis  —  a  difference  or  distinction  in  which  the  phases  distin- 
guished are  dependent  upon  each  other  —  e.  0.,  sweet  and  sour,  posi- 
tive and  negative,  same  and  different). 

Thirdly.  Distinction,  as  it  exists  in  the  form  of  contradiction 
{  Wider sprucli),  reflects  (bends  back)  the  antithesis  into  itself  (self- 
difference,  self-negation,  self-distinction,  self-opposition,  are  forms 
of  contradiction,  i.  e.,  reflected  distinctions).  With  the  category  of 
contradiction,  distinction  passes  into  that  of  ground  or  reason  («'.  e., 
self- distinction  implies,  or  presupposes,  ground  or  reason). 

Remark. 

Determinations  of  reflection  are  usually  given  in  the  form  of 
propositions,  in  which  they  are  predicated  as  valid  of  all  things. 
These  propositions  are  set  up  as  general  laws  of  thought,  which  lay 
at  the  basis  of  all  thinking,  —  which  are  absolute  and  indemonstra- 
ble, but  which,  at  the  same  time,  are  assumed  and  acknowledged  as 
true  by  every  thinking  being  who  can  seize  their  meaning,  and  this 
directly  and  without  contradiction. 

Thus  the  essential  determination  of  identity  is  expressed  in  the 


Remark.  27 

proposition:    Everything  is  identical  with  itself:    A  =  A.     Or,  ex- 
pressed negatively :     A  cannot  be  at  the  same  time  A  and  not- A. 

In  the  first  place,-  it  is  not  easy  to  see  why  these  simple  determina- 
tions of  reflection  should  be  the  only  ones  apprehended  in  this  par- 
ticular form.  Why,  for  instance,  should  not  other  categories,  say  the 
determinatenesses  of  the  sphere  of  being,  take  the  form  of  propo- 
sitions (and  be  laws  of  thought).  There  would  be,  for  example, 
such  propositions  as,  •  everthing  is,  everything  has  particular  being, 
etc.  ;  or,  everything  has  quality \  quantity,  etc.  For  being,  particu- 
larity (Daseyn),  etc.,  are  as  logical  determinations  predicates  of  every- 
thing whatsoever.  A  "  category  "  is,  according  to  its  etymology 
and  the  definition  of  Aristotle,  that  which  is  predicated  of  existences. 
But  a  determinateness  of  being  is  essentially  a  transition  into  its  op- 
posite. The  negative  of  each  and  every  determinateness  is  as  neces- 
sary as  itself.  As  immediate  determinatenesses,  each  one  stands  in 
opposition  to  some  other.  If  these  categories  (i.  e.,  of  being), 
therefore,  are  put  in  the  form  of  propositions,  their  corresponding 
antithetic  propositions  are  suggested  ;  both  offer  the  same  degree  of 
necessity,  and  have  equal  validity  as  immediate  assertions.  On  this 
account  each  assertion  requires  proof  as  against  the  other,  and  hence 
they  do  not  possess  the  character  of  immediately  or  indisputably 
true  propositions  of  thought. 

Determinations  of  reflection,  on  the  contrary,  do  not  possess  a 
qualitative  nature  (like  the  categories  of  being).  They  are  self- 
relating,  and  on  this  account  their  relation  to  others  has  been 
removed  (t.  e.,  they  are  self-relating,  and,  therefore,  independent). 
Moreover,  since  their  determinatenesses  are  self-relations,  they 
contain  in  this  fact  the  form  of  propositions  already.  For  a 
proposition  is  to  be  distinguished  from  a  judgment  chiefly  through 
this  fact,  that  in  the  proposition,  the  content  is  the  relation  itself, 
i.  e.,  it  is  a  particularized  relation.  But  a  judgment  places  all  of  its 
content  in  the  predicate  as  a  general  determinateness,  which  is  to 
be  distinguished  from  its  relation  —  the  simple  copula  —  and  as  pos- 
sessing independence  (fur  sic/i).  If  a  proposition  is  to  be  changed 
into  a  judgment,  its  particular  content  —  e.  g.,  if  it  lies  in  a  verb, 
must  be  changed  into  a  participle,  in  order,  by  this  means,  to  sepa- 
rate the  determination  itself  from  its  relation  to  a  subject.  The 
determinations  of  reflection,  as  before  remarked,  take  the  form  of 
the  proposition  quite  naturally,  inasmuch  as  they  are  posited-being 
reflected  into  itself  (dependence  related  to  itself).  Since  they  are 
expressed  as  general  laws  of  thought,  they  require  a  subject  of  their 


28  Essence. 

relation,  and  this  is  "All,"  or  "A" — denoting  each  and  every 
being. 

In  one  respect  this  form  of  the  proposition  is  superfluous,  for 
determinations  of  reflection  are  to  be  regarded  by  themselves  (and 
not  as  pertaining  to  a  subject) .  Moreover,  these  propositions  are 
incorrect  in  having  being  (everything,  something)  as  their  subjects. 
With  this  they  recall  the  stand-point  of  being,  and  therewith  they 
express  determinations  of  reflection,  such  as  identity,  etc.,  in  the 
form  of  mere  quality  (as  though  identity  were  an  immediateness). 
By  such  predication  in  which  the  subject  is  posited  in  a  qualit}7  as 
existing  in  it,  the  determinations  of  reflection  lose  their  speculative 
meaning,  so  that  identity,  for  example,  is  not  predicated  as  the  truth 
and  essence  into  which  the  subject  has  passed  over.  ("Specula- 
tive "  applies  to  the  comprehension  of  things  as  wholes,  or  totalities. 
Thus,  identity  applies  to  categories  of  being,  viewed  in  their  entire 
process  of  change,  or  their  transition  from  one  to  another,  and  their 
return  from  each  other). 

Finally,  however,  determinations  of  reflection  have  the  form  of 
self-identity,  and  are  without  relation  to  each  other,  and  without  anti- 
thesis ;  and  yet,  as  we  shall  see  upon  consideration  more  in  detail, 
or,  as  will  become  clear  in  the  discussion  of  identity,  difference,  and 
antithesis,  they  do  assume  particular  forms  of  opposition  to  each 
other,  and  through  their  form  of  reflection  are  not  prevented  from 
transition  and  contradiction.  The  several  propositions  which  are  set 
up  as  absolute  laws  of  thought  are,  therefore,  found,  upon  examina- 
tion, to  be  in  opposition  to  each  other ;  they  contradict  and  mutually 
annul  each  other.  If  everything  is  identical  with  itself,  then  it  is  not 
different,  not  opposed  (within  itself),  and  has,  therefore,  no  ground 
(it  is  evident  that  a  ground  or  identity-in-difference  can  exist  only 
for  what  is  self-opposed).  •  Or,  if  it  is  assumed  that  there  are  no  two 
things  identical,  i.  e.,  everything  is  different  from  everything  else, 
it  follows,  that  A  is  not  identical  with  A,  and  that  A  is  not  in  oppo- 
sition, etc.  (?'.  e.,  without  identity  there  is  no  ground  for  difference, 
and  without  difference  there  is  no  basis  for  the  relation  which  consti- 
tutes identity).  The  assumption  of  universality  ("each,"  "every," 
"all  "),  made  by  these  propositions,  leaves  no  room  for  the  assump- 
tion of  the  other.  The  thoughtless  consideration  of  these  proposi- 
tions enumerates  them,  one  after  the  other,  as  though  they  had  no 
relation  to  each  other ;  it  thinks  rarely  on  their  form  of  reflection 
(independence),  and  does  not  regard  the  other  aspect  —  their  posi- 
ted-being — (dependence),  i.  e.,  their  determinateness,  as  such, 


Remark.  29 

which  impels  them  into  transition  and  into  their  negation.  (The 
foregoing  remark  is  an  "  external  reflection,"  or  digression,  which 
has  nothing  to  do  with  the  logical  treatment  of  the  subject  here. 
It  may,  of  course,  incidentally  give  one  a  valuable  insight  into  the 
nature  and  form  of  the  so-called  laws  of  thought.  What  precedes 
the  remark  is  the  usual  definition  and  division  of  the  subject  placed 
at  the  head  of  the  chapter,  and  is  not  put  forward  as  scientific 
demonstration.  The  demonstration  proper  begins  in  the  following 
sections,  in  which  are  treated  Identity,  Difference,  etc.  It  is  also  to 
be  noted  —  and  this  is  of  the  greatest  importance  to  the  student  of 
Hegel  —  that  the  first  part  of  the  discussion  of  any  and  every  cate- 
gory treats  only  its  immediate  phases ;  hence,  only  its  most  shallow 
and  superficial  regards.  After  this  succeed  paragraphs  treating  the 
subject  in  its  forms  of  antithesis,  f.  e.,  of  relation,  but  not  yet  of 
self- relation.  Here,  accordingly,  come  in  the  antinomies  and  nega- 
tive, or  skeptical,  modes  of  viewing  the  subject.  Finally,  the  third 
part  of  the  discussion  considers  the  subject  in  its  self-relation,  its 
totality,  and  this  part  contains  the  insight  into  what  is  universal  and 
necessar}'.  Since  each  subject,  in  its  totality,  involves  every  other 
subject  in  the  universe,  it  follows  that  in  the  third  part  of  each  dis- 
cussion, one  maj-  find  a  solution  identical  with  the  solutions  given 
in  the  third  part  of  each  and  every  other  discussion  throughout  this 
logic.  The  chief  difficulty  met  by  the  students  of  Hegel  everywhere, 
and  throughout  the  entire  history  of  Hegelianism,  has  been  the  failure 
to  distinguish  these  three  stages  in  the  discussion,  and  to  discrim- 
inate their  degrees  of  validity.  One  takes,  for  example,  the  first  part 
as  presenting  a  valid  result ;  he  goes  forward  to  the  second  part,  tak- 
ing for  granted  that  it  harmratjzes  with  what  precedes.  He  soon  dis- 
covers incongruities,  and,  asnc  proceeds,  these  become  more  striking 
and  numerous.  In  the  third  part  he  loses  all  trace  of  logical  con- 
nection and  consistency.  His  natural  conclusion  is  that  the  author 
has,  by  a  high-handed  disregard  of  logical  rules,  attempted  to  recon- 
cile these  incongruities,  leaving  each  position  in  its  validity  and  in  its 
hostile  attitude  towards  the  others.  For  a  notable  illustration  of 
this  procedure  see  Feuerbach's  account  of  his  studies  in  Hegel's 
Phenomenology.  The  various  attitudes  of  consciousness  towards  the 
objects  of  the  senses,  as  there  depicted,  are  taken  as  entirely  valid. 
Feuerbach  attempts  to  explain  them  and  reconcile  them,  and  failing 
in  this,  condemns  Hegel's  dialectic.  Not  to  continue  this  comment 
farther,  it  may  be  said  that  Hegel's  logic  is  a  series  of  refutations, 
commencing  with  the  emptiest  and  shallowest  category,  and  refuting 


30  Essence. 

it  by  finding  that  it  presupposes  another  category  opposed  to  it,  and 
a  third  one  including  both.  This  series  of  refutations  ends,  neces- 
sarily, only  when  a  category  is  discovered  whose  opposition  is  entirely 
within  itself,  and  which,  therefore,  is  its  own  totality.  Although 
every  category  in  this  logic,  except  the  last  one  —  the  Idea  as  con- 
scious personality,  —  is  refuted,  yet  its  refutation  is  accomplished 
through  an  insight  into  its  totality  —  a  "speculative"  insight, 
identical  in  kind  with  the  insight  into  the  category  of  the  Idea. ) 

A. 

Identity. 

(1.)  Essence  is  simple  immediateness  as  cancelled  imtnedinteness. 
Its  negativity  is  its  being.  It  is  self-identical  in  its  absolute  nega- 
tivity, and  through  this,  the  otherness  and  relation  to  another,  have 
utterly  vanished  in  its  pure  self-identity.  Essence  is,  therefore, 
simple  identity  with  itself. 

(This  category  of  identity  might  be  considered  as  the  beginning  of 
this  second  part  of  the  Logic,  and  all  of  the  previous  portion  treating 
of  Appearance,  Reflection,  etc.,  might  be  omitted  as  an  investigation 
belonging  to  the  third  part  of  this  Logic.  Hegel  died  just  before 
revising  this  part  of  the  work.  From  the  extensive  alterations  and 
additions  made  to  the  first  part,  it  may  be  supposed  that  many 
changes  and  additions  would  have  been  made  in  this  part.  In  the 
Logic  of  the  Encyclopaedia,  the  pai't  treating  of  Essence  is  relatively 
much  fuller  than  in  this  work,  ajid  it  begins  properly  with  the  cate- 
gory of  Identity). 

Identity  with  itself  is  the  immediateness  of  reflection  (the  only 
immediateness  that  we  shall  find  after  transcending  the  categories  of 
being).  It  is  not  that  identity  with  itself  which  being,  or  naught, 
is,  but  the  identity  with  itself  which  consists  in  the  restoring  of  itself 
to  unity ;  not  a  restoration  from  something  else,  or  by  something 
else,  but  the  pure  restoration  from,  and  by,  and  of,  itself.  This  is 
essential  identity.  It  is  in  so  far  not  an  abstract  identity  —  not  an 
identity  that  has  its  origin  in  a  relative,  or  partial  negation  —  a  nega- 
tion which  precedes  and  conditions  identity,  i.  e.,  separates  from  it 
all  distinctions,  leaving  them,  however,  still  extant  as  they  were. 
But  being,  and  every  determination  of  being  (others  and  otherness), 
has  been  annulled,  not  relatively  or  partially,  but  wholly.  This 
simple  negativity  of  being  in  itself  is  identity. 

It  (identity)  is  in  so  far  still  the  same  as  essence. 


Remark.  31 


Remark. 

The  thinking  activity,  which  is  on  the  plane  of  external  reflection, 
and  which  knows  no  other  kind  of  thinking  than  that  on  this  plane, 
never  attains  the  ability  to  comprehend  identity  as  it  has  been  above 
defined,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  to  comprehend  essence.  Such 
thinking  has  alwa3*s  before  itself  abstract  identity  and  difference,  and 
it  holds  the  two  thoughts  side  b}-  side,  and  independent  of  each  other. 
It  supposes  that  the  faculty  of  reason  is  nothing  but  a  loom  upon 
which  the  warp  is  placed  —  "  identity  "  —  and  then  the  woof —  "  dif- 
ference " — is  introduced  and  woven,  thus  making  a  texture  com- 
posed of  different  threads  (externally  combined  but  still  independ- 
ent —  i.  c.,  not  become  one  as  in  a  chemical  unity,  or  vital  unity  in 
which  the  identity  «  r  individuality  of  the  elements  is  lost).  And  so 
it  happens  that  external  reflection  analyzing  its  result  may  unravel  it 
and  draw  out  first  "identity"  and  afterwards  "  differeuce,"  and 
place  them  side  by  side ;  finding  at  one  time  the  identity  of  objects 
and  at  another  time  their  non-identity  —  their  identity  when  one  ab- 
stracts their  difference — their  non-identity  when  one  abstracts  their 
identity.  One  must  forget  all  these  assertions  and  hypotheses  as  to 
what  reason  does,  since  they  are  merely  historical  in  their  character 
("historical,"  i.  e.,  descriptive  —  i.  e.,  without  characterizing  the 
logical  necessity  which  connects  the  subject  and  its  determina- 
tions). A  consideration  of  everything  that  exists  shows  that  it  is  in 
its  very  identity  non-identical  and  contradictory,  and,  in  its  differ- 
ence, in  its  contradiction,  it  is  self-identical ;  it  is  within  itself  this 
movement  of  transition  from  one  determination  into  another,  and  it 
is  this  because  each  determination  is  within  itself  its  own  opposite. 
The  idea  of  identitj-  —  its  definition  —  according  to  which  it  is  sim- 
ple self-related  negativity,  is  not  a  product  of  external  reflection,  but 
has  arisen  in  the  consideration  of  being  (out  of  its  dialectical  inves- 
tigation). On  the  contrary,  that  identity  which  contains  no  differ- 
ence, and  that  difference  which  contains  no  identity,  are  products  of 
external  reflection  and  abstraction  which  hold  asunder  in  an  arbitrary 
manner  these  predicates,  and  attribute  to  them  independence  (ab- 
stract identity  and  difference  are  conceived  by  external  reflection  as 
possessing  permanent  exclusion  toward  each  other,  and,  though  they 
mingle  in  the  formation  of  concrete  things,  they  are  still  as  distinct  as 
the  threads  iii  cloth ;  but  the  speculative  idea  of  identity  and  differ- 
ence makes  them  both  to  be  phases  of  the  same  activity  of  self-ne- 
gation or  self-relation  —  an  activity  which  produces  identity  in  pro- 
ducing difference,  a.ul  difference  in  producing  identity). 


32  Essence . 

(2.)  This  identity  is  in  the  first  place  essence  itself,  and  not  a 
determination  of  it  —  the  entire  movement  of  reflection,  and  not  a 
part  of  that  movement.  As  absolute  negation,  it  is  negation  which 
immediately  negates  itself — a  non-being  and  difference  which  van- 
ishes in  its  beginning,  or  an  act  of  distinguishing  through  which 
nothing  is  distinguished.  The  act  of  distinguishing  is  the  positing  of 
a  non-being  as  the  non-being  of  another.  But  the  non-being  of 
another  is  the  cancelling  of  another,  and  consequently  of  the  very 
act  of  distinguishing.  The  act  of  distinguishing  is,  therefore,  nega- 
tivity relating  to  itself  —  a  non-being  which  is  the  non-being  of  itself  ; 
a  non-being  which  has  its  own  non-being  not  in  something  else,  but 
in  itself.  It  is,  therefore,  that  which  relates  to  itself  —  reflected 
difference  —  or  pure,  absolute  difference  (or  "  distinction  "). 

In  other  words,  identity  is  reflection  into  itself,  and  this  is  nothing 
but  internal  repulsion,  and  it  is  this  repulsion  as  reflection  into  itself, 
—  a  repulsion  which  immediately  recoils  upon  itself.  It  is  conse- 
quently identity  as  self-identical  difference.  Difference  is,  however, 
identical  with  itself  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  identity,  but  absolute 
non-identity.  But  non-identity  is  "absolute"  only  in  so  far  as  it 
contains  nothing  derived  from  anything  else,  but  is  only  itself,  i.  e. 
in  so  far  as  it  is  absolute  identity  with  itself. 

Identity  is,  therefore,  in  itself  (/.  e.,  involves  in  its  definition) 
absolute  non-identity.  But  it  is  also  the  determination  of  identity 
(as  a  contrast  to  itself  as  the  entire  movement,  it  is  the  special  form 
of  identity).  For  as  reflection  into  itself  it  posits  itself  as  its  own 
non-being;  it  is  the  entire  movement,  but  as  reflection  it  posits  itself 
in  this  movement  as  a  single  phase  of  itself,  as  posited-being 
(dependent  being)  from  which  it  returns  into  itself  (dependent 
being  manifests  that  upon  which  it  depends,  and  is  the  appearance 
of  the  same.  In  this  it  points  towards  the  independent  being,  and 
is  its  reflection;  i.  e,,  the  independent  being  reflects  itself  in  what 
depends  on  it,  or  to  use  the  words  of  the  text,  it  is  the  return  into 
itself  from  what  depends  on  it,  or  is  "  posited  "  by  it).  Therefore, 
as  a  phase  of  its  movement,  it  is  first  identity,  as  such,  in  the  form 
of  simple  self-sameness,  as  opposed  to  absolute  (*'.  e.,  self-related) 
difference. 

Remark. 

In  this  remark  I  will  consider  more  in  detail  the  question  of  iden- 
tity, as  found  in  the  principle  of  identity  which  is  set  up  as  the  first 
law  of  thought. 

This   principle  in  its  positive  expression,  A=:A,  is,  in  the  first 


Laws  of  Thought.  33 

place  nothing  else  but  the  expression  of  empty  tamtology.  It  has, 
therefore,  been  truly  said  that  this  law  of  thought  is  without  a  con- 
tent, and  adds  nothing  to  our  knowledge.  Thus  the  empty  identity 
to  which  those  adhere  who  are  accustomed  to  regard  it  as  true,  and 
•quote  it  on  all  occasions  —  this  identity  excludes  all  difference,  and  is 
•different  from  difference.  The3T  do  not  see  that  in  this  they  have 
already  conceived  identity  as  possessing  difference ;  for  they  say  that 
identit}'  is  different  from  difference.  Now,  since  this  must  be  con- 
ceded to  be  the  nature  of  identity,  the  conclusion  must  be  that  iden- 
tity does  not  possess  difference  externally  but  in  its  own  nature 
(identity  cannot  exclude  difference  without  possessing  it  as  its  very 
nature).  Moreover,  when  they  conceive  it  strictly  as  an  unmoved 
identity  (£.  e.,  deroid  of  activity),  which  is,  therefore,  the  opposite  of 
difference,  they  do  not  see  that  by  this  they  conceive  identity  as  a 
one-sided  determinateness,  which  as  such  has  no  truth  ("truth" 
means  here  actuality).  It  is  conceded  that  the  principle  of  identity 
•expresses  only  a  one-sided  determinateness, — that  it  contains  only 
formal,  abstract,  imperfect  truth.  In  this  concession,  which  is  cor- 
rect", is  contained  the  admission  that  the  truth  is  to  be  found  only  in 
the  unit}' of  identity  and  difference.  When  it  is  asserted  that  "iden- 
tity "  (as  here  conceived)  is  imperfect,  there  hovers  before  the  mind 
this  totality  (i.  e.,  of  identity  and  difference),  compared  with  which 
•"identity"  is  something  incomplete.  The  totality  is  the  complete. 
When,  however,  identity  is  separated  from  difference,  and  regarded 
as  absolute — being  held  as  something  essential,  valid,  and  true  in 
this  state  of  isolation — there  is  nothing  to  be  seen  in  these  contra- 
dictory assumptions  but  the  inability  of  thought  to  bring  together  and 
reconcile  the  idea  of  abstract  identity  conceived  as  essential  with  the 
idea  of  its  incompleteness,  — its  want  of  totality,  or  wholeness.  It  is 
an  inability  of  consciousness  to  grasp  identity  as  a  negative  activity 
<«'.  e.,  self-relation  of  the  negative),  although  in  these  very  assertions 
identity  is  indirectly  assumed  to  be  such  an  activity;  in  other  words, 
since  identity  is  expressly  stated  to  be  such  only  as  separated  from 
difference,  or  thai  its  essence  consists  in  this  separation,  we  have 
its  truth  expressed  directly  as  consisting  in  separation,  —  its  essen- 
tial characteristic  is  separation,  — without  separation  it  could  not  be; 
therefore,  this  "identity"  is  nothing,  considered  for  and  by  itself, 
but  its  existence  lies  wholly  in  this  relation  expressed  in  its  separation 
from  difference. 

As  regards  that  confidence  which  was  expressed  in  the  principle  of 
of  identity  as   absolute  truth,   it   was   founded   on   experience, — 


34  Essence. 

that  is  to  say,  the  experience  of  every  conscious  being  was  appealed 
to,  and  the  assertion  made  that  in  this  proposition,  A  is  A,  or  a  tree 
is  a  tree,  there  is  a  direct  concession  and  a  complete  conviction  that 
the  proposition  is  true  and  self-evident,  and  requires  no  proof  what- 
ever. This  appeal  to  experience,  that  every  conscious  being  acknowl- 
edges the  truth  of  the  principle  of  identity,  is  merely  a  rhetorical 
statement.  For  no  one  will  say  that  he  has  ever  made  the  experi- 
ment of  testing  every  conscious  being  in  regard  to  the  abstract  prop- 
osition that  A=A.  There  is  no  serious  attempt  made  at  an  appeal 
to  real  experience,  but  only  an  assurance  that  if  such  an  appeal  were 
made  a  universal  assent  would  be  the  result.  Bat,  if  the  abstract 
proposition,  as  such,  is  not  meant,  but  rather  a  concrete  application 
of  it,  from  which  the  abstract  proposition  could  be  deduced,  then  it 
follows  that  the  assertion  of  its  universal  validity  for  every  conscious- 
being  would  amount  to  no  more  than  this:  that  the  principle  of  iden- 
tity lies  at  the  basis,  implicitly,  of  every  act  of  predication  by  a  con- 
scious being.  But  a  concrete  application  is  precisely  the  relation  of 
simple  identity  to  a  multiplicity  different  from  it.  (Identity,  as  it 
appears  in  a  concrete  proposition,  is  in  union  with  difference:  i.  e., 
every  proposition  expresses  in  the  act  of  predication  a  relation  of  its- 
subject  to  some  other  subject,  hence  predication  in  its  very  nature 
asserts  relation  to  others,  and  thus  involves  difference ;  in  this  predi- 
cation the  fact  that  the  subject  is  posited  as  identical  with  the  predi- 
cate signifies  that  the  subject  is  dependent  upon  others.  Dependence 
involves  identity  and  difference.  If  a  concrete  proposition  is  reduced 
to  the  form  of  identity,  or  simple  self-relation,  the  element  of  otherness 
is  intentionally  ignored,  and  the  subject  placed  in  the  form  of  inde- 
pendence, or  simple  self-identity.  It  is  evident  in  this  that  the  reduc- 
tion of  concrete  propositions  to  identical  ones  does  violence  to  their 
nature,  —  what  is  dependent  is  stated  as  independent.  "A  is  B," 
means  that  the  totality  of  B  involves  A,  or  that  A  is  dependent  upon 
the  totality  of  B  ;  this  is  the  type  of  the  concrete  proposition.  To 
change  this  to  "  A  is  A  "  is  to  omit  entirely  the  totality  of  B,  in  so 
far  as  it  transcends  A;  for  the  proposition,  "A  is  B,"  means  that  A 
is  in  a  totality  consistingof  A-}-X,  which  equals  B.  "  The  Earth  is  a 
planet,"  asserts  the  dependence  of  the  Earth  [upon  a  sun]  ;  the  solar 
system  is  the  totality,  containing  this  relation  of  dependence  within  it. 
"The  Earth  is  the  Earth,"  although  having  the  form  of  a  proposition, 
and  thus  involving  difference,  really  expresses  only  self-identity  and 
independence.  This,  in  the  case  of  the  Earth,  is  not  its  truth ;  it  is 
partial  only. )  Expressed  in  the  form  of  a  proposition,  that  which  is 
concrete  requires  a  synthetical  proposition ;  and  the  abstract  propo- 


Laws  of  Thought.  35 

sition  of  identity  may  be  derived,  through  analysis,  from  the  con- 
crete itself,  or  from  its  s}'nthetic  proposition.  But  such  derivation, 
through  analysis  or  abstraction,  does  not  leave  experience  as  it  found 
it,  but  changes  it.  For  experience  contains  identity  in  unity  with 
difference,  and  this  fact  refutes  at  once  the  assertion  that  abstract 
identity,  as  such,  is  something  true  (i.  e.,  actually  existing),  for 
experience  finds  exactly  the  opposite  to  be  true, — it  finds,  viz., 
identity  only  in  union  with  difference  in  every  example. 

On  the  other  hand,  experience  often  enough  learns  the  true  charac- 
ter of  this  proposition  of  pure  identity,  and  ascertains  what  truth  it 
has.  If,  for  example,  to  the  question,  "  What  is  a  plant?"  the  answer 
is  given,  "A  plant  is  —  a  plant,"  while  the  truth  of  such  an 
answer  would  doubtless  be  conceded  at  once  by  the  entire  company 
present,  yet  there  would  be  an  equal  unanimity  on  this  point,  viz., 
that  such  a  proposition  had  said  nothing.  If  one  opens  his  mouth 
for  the  purpose  of  announcing  what  God  is,  and  says,  "God  is  — 
God,"  the  expectation  of  the  listener  finds  itself  deceived,  for  it 
looked  for  a  different  predicate.  If  such  a  proposition  is  called 
"  absolute  truth,"  such  predications  of  "  absolute  "  will  be  held  very 
cheap.  Nothing  is  more  tedious  and  unendurable  than  a  conversa- 
tion which  travels  round  and  round  the  same  point,  or  than  such 
identity-predication  which  is  offered  as  truth. 

Upon  analyzing  the  conditions  of  this  tediousness,  we  find  that  the 
beginning  of  the  proposition,  "the  plant  is,"  leads  us  to  expect 
something  else  for  a  predicate.  But  when  the  subject  recurs  in  the 
predicate,  we  find  the  opposite  of  what  we  had  expected,  and  noth- 
ing is  the  result.  Such  identity-predication,  therefore,  contradicts- 
its  own  form.  Identity,  instead  of  being  the  absolute  truth,  is  there- 
fore the  opposite  of  the  truth.  Instead  of  being  the  unmoved  sim- 
ple, it  has  the  form  of  transcending  itself  and  resulting  in  self-dissolu- 
tion. (If  it  states  a  dependent  being  in  the  form  of  the  proposition 
of  identity,  it  attributes  to  it  independence  ;  if  it  states  independent 
being  in  the  form  of  the  proposition  of  identity,  it  puts  it  in  the  form 
of  dependence,  but  does  not  exhibit  its  reflection  into  itself  by  pre- 
dicating of  the  subject  its  dependent  phases ;  such  dependent  phases 
reflect  it  into  itself,  and  thus  "manifest"  the  independence  of  the 
subject.) 

Therefore,  in  the  form  of  the  proposition  in  which  identity  is 
expressed  there  is  involved  something  else  than  simple  abstract 
identity  (i.  e.,  the  form  of  the  proposition  involves  difference,  anti- 
thesis, dependence).  The  form  of  the  proposition  involves  the  move- 
ment of  reflection,  in  which  movement  otherness  enters  only  as 


36  Essence. 

"appearance," — {.  e.,  as  a  vanishing.  "A  is  —  "  is  a  beginning,  in 
which  difference  hovers  before  the  mind  as  the  end  to  be  reached ; 
but  in  the  identity-proposition  we  do  not  arrive  at  the  different:  "  A 
is — A  ;  "  the  difference  is  only  a  vanishing,  the  movement  returns  to 
itself.  The  form  of  the  proposition  may  be  looked  upon  as  a  latent 
necessity  to  add  to  the  abstract  identity  something  else  through  its 
movement.  Therefore  the  predicate  adds  to  the  empty  form  of  the 
subject,  which  has  no  meaning  on  account  of  its  emptiness,  an  "A," 
or  a  "plant,"  or  some  substrate;  and  this  addition  of  the  predicate 
makes  the  difference  to  be  seemingly  an  accidental  increment.  If 
identity  itself  is  taken  as  the  subject,  instead  of  "A,"  or  any  other 
substrate — "identity  is  identity" — still  it  is  conceded  that,  instead 
of  this,  any  other  substrate  may  be  used.  The  significance  of  all  this 
is  that  difference  makes  its  appearance  in  the  expression  of  identity ; 
or,  in  other  words,  as  shown,  this  identity  is  negativity,  which  is  ab- 
solute distinction  from  itself. 

The  other  expression  of  the  principle  of  identity  —  "A  cannot  be 
at  the  same  time  A  and  not-A  " — is  its  negative  form;  it  is  called 
the  principle  of  contradiction.  It  is  customary  to  regard  this  propo- 
sition as  self-evident,  and  as  requiring  no  explanation  of  its  connec- 
tion witli  the  principle  of  identity  through  the  form  of  negation.  But 
the  form  of  the  principle  of  contradiction  arises  necessarily  from  the 
fact  that  identity,  as  the  pure  movement  of  reflection,  is  the  simple 
negativity ;  and  this  negativity  is  expressed  more  explicitly  in  the 
principle  of  contradiction.  There  is  "A,"  and  "a  not-A,"  the 
pure  other  of  "A,"  expressed  in  this  principle,  but  the  difference 
vanishes  as  soon  as  it  appears.  Identity  is,  therefore,  expressed  in 
this  principle  as  the  negation  of  negation.  "A"  and  "  not-A  "  are 
distinguished,  and  these  distinct  somewhats  are  related  to  one  and 
the  same  "A."  Identity  is,  therefore,  exhibited  as  this  distinction 
of  somewhats,  which  are  in  one  unity,  or  as  the  simple  distinction 
in  itself  (i.  e.,  a  distinction  of  itself  from  itself  through  its  negative 
self-relation  —  i.  e.,  through  the  relation  of  its  negative  activity  to 
itself;  self-determination  is  self-negation,  or  negative  self-relation). 
It  is  evident,  from  this,  that  the  principle  of  identity, —  and  still 
moi-e  the  principle  of  contradiction,  — is  not  merely  an  analytic  prin- 
ciple, but  that  it  possesses  a  synthetic  nature.  For  the  principle  of 
contradiction  contains  in  its  very  expression  not  merely  the  empty, 
simple  identity  with  itself,  nor  merely  its  opposite,  but  absolute 
non-identity,  contradiction  of  itself.  The  principle  of  identity  con- 
tains, as  has  been  shown,  the  movement  of  reflection, — identity  as 
the  vanishing  of  otherness. 


Distinction.  37 

What,  therefore,  this  investigation  establishes,  is  this:  first,  the 
principle  of  identity,  or  that  of  contradiction,  held  abstractly  in 
order  to  express  truth  by  separating  identity  from  difference,  is  no 
law  of  thought,  but  rather  the  opposite  of  it ;  secondly,  that  these 
principles  contain  more  than  is  intended,  viz.,  their  opposite,  which 
is  absolute  distinction  itself. 

B. 

Distinction. 
1.  Absolute  Distinction. 

Distinction  (  Unterschied)  is  negativity  as  found  in  reflection.  It  is 
the  "nothing"  which  is  expressed  in  identity-predication  ("the 
plant  is  a  plant,"  etc.).  The  essential  movement  of  identity  itself 
is  the  negating  of  itself ;  through  this  it  determines  itself,  and  dis- 
tinguishes itself  from  difference. 

(1.)  This  phase  of  distinction  is  absolute  distinction  (i.  e.,  self- 
distinction),  —  distinction  as  a  phase  of  Essence.  It  is  distinction  in 
and  for  itself,  —  not  distinction  through  an  external  somewhat,  but 
through  its  relation  to  itself,  and,  therefore,  simple  distinction  (i.  e., 
'•simple"  in  the  sense  of  not-involved-with-others).  It  is  essen- 
tial to  apprehend  absolute  distinction  as  simple.  In  the  absolute 
distinction  of  "A"  and  "not-A"  from  each  other,  it  is  the  sim- 
ple "not"  which  constitutes  this  (absolute  distinction).  Distinction 
itself  is  a  simple  idea ;  one  expresses  it  thus :  "  two  things  are  to  be 
distinguished  in  this,  that  the}-,  etc."  "  In  this,"  —  that  is  to  say,  in 
one  and  the  same  respect,  in  the  same  ground  of  determination.  It 
is  distinction  as  a  phase  of  Reflection,  not  "  otherness  "  as  a  category 
of  Being.  One  particular  being  and  another  particular  being  are 
posited  as  excluding  each  other ;  each  one  of  the  two  has  immediate 
being  (i.  e.,  not  through  each  other,  or  through  any  other.  The 
category  of  dependence  belongs  to  the  phase  of  Essence,  and  not  to 
the  phase  of  Being).  The  "other"  in  the  sphere  of  Essence  is  the 
"other"  of  itself,  not  the  "other"  as  existing  independent,  outside 
of  it:  it  (the  "other"  in  Essence)  is  a  simple  determinateness  in 
itself  (an  sick  sometimes  means  "in  itself,"  in  the  sense  of  "  poten- 
tial."  that  which  is  contained  in  it  implicitly,  t.  e.,  in  an  undeveloped 
form;  at  other  times  an  sich  means  "in  itself"  in  the  sense  of  in- 
dependence,  of  not-being-involved-with-others,  —  simple  identity 
with  itself).  Likewise,  in  the  sphere  of  Being,  "otherness"  and 
determinateness  of  this  character  proved  to  be  simple  determinate- 


38  Essence. 

ness,  —  identity  in  opposition;  but  this  identity  (in  the  sphere  of 
Being)  was  only  transition  from  one  determinateness  into  the  other. 
Here,  in  the  sphere  of  Reflection,  distinction  enters*  as  reflected, 
as  that  which  is  posited  to  be  what  it  is  in  itself  (i.  e.,  distinction  is 
reflected  when  it  is  distinction  not  from  another,  but  distinction  from 
itself,  and  made  by  itself,  as  in  human  consciousness ;  a  distinction 
from  another  forms  only  a  transition  to  that  other,  and  shows  up 
the  limit  or  the  non-being  of  the  determinatenesses  distinguished ; 
self-distinction,  on  the  contrary,  posits  the  true  nature, — the  "in 
itself"  of  the  activity,  which  has  the  form  of  reflection). 

(2.)  Distinction  in  itself  is  distinction  in  the  form  of  self-relation; 
hence  the  negativity  of  itself, —  distinction  not  from  another,  but  of 
itself  from  itself.  It  is  not  itself,  but  its  other.  But  that  which  is 
distinguished  from  distinction  is  identity.  ("Distinction  "  and  "  dis- 
tinguished "  are  used  for  the  German  words,  Unterschied,  unterschie- 
•dene,  etc;  these  might  be  translated  by  "difference,"  "different," 
etc.,  but  "difference  "  is  reserved  as  the  equivalent  of  Verschiedenheit, 
and  "distinction"  is  used  as  the  general  category,  including  the 
three  phases  of  difference,  antithesis,  or  contrariety,  and  contradiction; 
the  use  of  "distinction"  in  this  sense  is,  of  course,  at  times  some- 
what awkward,  and  the  word  "  difference "  has  occasionally  been 
substituted  for  it.)  It  (Distinction)  is,  therefore,  itself  and  identity; 
the  two  together  constitute  Distinction.  It  (Distinction)  is,  therefore, 
the  whole  and  a  phase  of  it  (in  the  "external  reflection"  it  was 
shown  that  the  presupposing  activity  included  the  positing  activity,  — 
in  other  words,  that  the  relation  of  the  negative  to  itself  produced 
identity  or  immediateness  as  one  result,  while  at  the  same  time  it 
negated  and  determined  the  identity  or  immediateness  as  another 
result;  the  first  result  was  called  "  positing,"  the  second  result  was 
called  "  pre-positing ;  "  the  total  activity  is  this  process  of  "distinc- 
tion," but  the  pre-positing  activity  within  the  total  is  also  the  pro- 
•cess  of  distinction;  hence,  "Distinction  is  the  whole  and  a  phase 
of  it"). 

It  can  likewise  be  said  that  distinction,  as  simple,  is  no  distinc- 
tion. It  becomes  distinction  through  relation  to  identity ;  therefore 
it  contains  distinction  and  this  relation  to  identity.  Distinction  is  the 
whole  and  one  of  its  own  phases.  And  so,  also,  identity  is  the  whole 
and  a  phase  of  itself.  We  must  consider  this  as  the  essential  nature 
of  reflection,  and  as  the  primitive  source  of  all  activity  and  self- 
movement.  Both  identity  and  distinction  are  processes  in  which  each 
becomes  a  moment  as  well  as  the  total  movement,  and  as  a  moment 
(reciprocally  complemental  element)  it  is  a  posited-being  (£.  e.,  a 


Distinction.  39 

result,  a  dependent  somewhat)  ;  inasmuch  as  identity  and  distinction 
both  involve  the  activity  of  reflection  (in  fact,  are  constituted  by  it  as 
the  self-relation  makes  the  identity,  and  relation  being  negation,  the 
self-negation  makes  distinction,)  they  are  both  negative  relation  to 
themselves. 

Distinction,  inasmuch  as  it  is  the  unity  of  itself  and  identity,  is 
-distinction  which  is  particularized  within  itself  (<".  e.,  containing  con- 
trast within  itself).  It  is  not  transition  into  another, —  not  a  relation 
to  another  outside  of  it.  It  has  its  other  within  itself ;  its  other, 
namely,  is  identity  (and  identity  is  a  phase  of  its  own  movement). 
And  so,  likewise,  with  identity ;  while  it  possesses  the  determination 
of  distinction,  it  does  not,  for  that  reason,  lose  itself  in  distinction  as 
its  "  other,"  but  it  preserves  itself  in  its  other,  and  finds  its  reflection 
or  return  in  it:  Distinction  is  a  moment  of  identit}*.  ("To  pre- 
serve itself  in  its  other"  means  that  it  meets  with  its  own  activity  in 
•what  should  be  its  other  or  negation.  For  example,  in  the  action  of 
<;ause  and  effect,  we  may  turn  our  attention  first  to  the  phase  of 
identity:  The  cause  reappears  in  the  effect,  the  activity  in  the  cause 
transplants  itself  into  the  effect ;  the  cause  determines  or  modifies  the 
•effect  so  as  to  bring  it  into  identit}'  with  itself, —  that  is,  to  assimilate 
the  effect  to  the  cause.  Turning  our  attention  to  the  aspect  of  dis- 
tinction or  difference,  we  note  that  the  activity  of  the  cause  utters 
itself, —  expresses  itself.  Utterance  and  expression  proceed  out  from 
the  cause,  and  in  obtaining  independent  subsistence  —  external  realiza- 
tion—  in  an  effect,  they  produce  distinction.  The  original  unity  in  the 
•activity  of  the  cause,  conceived  before  its  utterance  or  expression,  is 
dualized,  dirempted  by  its  causal  activity;  and  through  its  self- 
relnted  negation  results  the  distinction  or  contrast  of  cause  and  effect. 
In  the  simple,  precise,  technical  language  with  which  Hegel  analyzes 
the  categories  of  reflection,  such  as  cause  and  effect,  force  and  man- 
ifestation, identity  and  distinction,  essence  and  phenomenon,  etc., 
the  underlying  movement  is  characterized  as  negative  self-relation,  — 
self-relation  having  two  aspects,  the  first  one  of  identity,  the  second 
one  of  self- negation,  contrast,  or  distinction). 

(3.)  Distinction  has  two  moments,  identity  and  distinction  (or 
difference).  The  two  moments  are,  therefore,  posited-being,  —  deter- 
minateness  (»".  e.,  as  moments  each  determines  the  other,  and  the 
unity  of  both  is  the  resultant  determinateness).  But  in  this  posited- 
being  each  is  self-relation  (as  explained  in  the  next  sentence,  each 
moment  is  a  self-determining  activity,  which  evolves  the  other  within 
itself;  one  activity,  A,  evolves  another  activity,  viz.,  B;  but  the 
activity  B  evolves  again  the  activity  A;  such  a  process  is  called 


40  Essence. 

self- relation).  The  one,  —  namely,  identity  —  is  in  its  first  aspect  a. 
phase  of  the  movement  of  reflection  into  itself.  In  like  manner,  the 
other  movement,  —  viz.,  distinction,  — is  distinction  within  itself  (self- 
distinction), —  reflected  distinction  ("reflected,"  i.  e.,  an  activity 
which  produces  another,  but  another  which,  in  Us  activity,  produces 
the  first  activity.  For  example,  the  generic  process  of  life:  the- 
activity  of  reproduction  propagates  the  species  ;  the  vital  activity  in 
the  parents  produces  an  independent  vital  activity  having  the  same 
character.  The  species  is  identical  in  parents  and  offspring.  The  in- 
dividuals are  different  on  the  plane  of  life,  —  "  The  species  lives,  and 
the  individual  diea."  But  on  a  higher  plane,  that  of  thinking-activity, 
for  another  example,  the  universal  reproduces  itself  in  the  same  indi- 
vidual, and  not  in  different  individuals.  This  is  consciousness.  The 
ego,  as  universal  subject,  is  an  activity  of  knowing  and  willing ;  di- 
rected upon  itself,  it  makes  itself  its  own  object;  this  is  the  stage  of 
specialization;  in  its  specialization  it  recognizes  itself;  hence  in  its. 
third  phase  the  activity  returns  into  itself  generically  —  just  as  it  did 
on  the  plane  of  life  in  the  propagation  of  the  species  —  and  also  as 
particular  individual;  and  this  is  personal,  conscious  identity). 
Distinction,  inasmuch  as  it  has  two  such  moments  within  itselfr 
both  of  which  are  reflections  into  themselves,  is  Difference  (dis-par- 
ateness,  i.  e.,  the  reader  will  have  noted  that  reflection  into  itself  gives 
independence  through  the  fact  that  it  gives  totality ;  the  activity 
proceeds  to  its  other,  a'id  through  its  other  returns  to  itself;  this 
totality  or  reflection-into-itself  does  not  stand  in  contrast  to  another 
outside  of  it,  —  all  of  its  contrast  is.  within  itself  as  self-distinction  ; 
now  [N.  B.],  the  two  moments  which  are  each  a  reflection  into  itself 
are  necessarily  independent  of  each  other,  being  total  processes ; 
such'  independent  moments  of  Distinction  are  indifferent  to  each 
other ;  this  phase  of  distinction  between  independent,  indifferent, 
objects  is  called  "difference,"  "disparateness,"  [ Verschiedenheit] 
"variety."  The  ordinary  consciousness  views  distinction  from  this 
standpoint,  but  does  not  know  that  reflection-into-itself  is  presup- 
posed by  it). 

2.  Difference. 

(1.)  Identity  is  dirempted  within  itself  in  the  category  of  differ- 
ence, inasmuch  as  it  (identity)  has  absolute  distinction  within  itself, 
posits  itself  as  the  negative  of  itself,  and  these  its  moments,  viz., 
itself  and  its  negative  (i.  e.,  identity  and  distinction),  are  reflections 
into  themselves,  and  hence  self-identities;  in  other  words,  pre- 
cisely because  the  identity  immediately  annuls  its  negative  activity, 


Difference.  41 

and  is  reflected  into  itself  in  its  determination  (f.  e.,  the  determina- 
tion produced  upon  itself  by  self-negation).  The  moments  which 
are  distinguished  are  contrasted  with  each  other  as  different  or  dis- 
parate, because  each  is  identical  with  itself  —  ».  e.,  because  identity 
constitutes  the  ground  and  element  of  each.  (N.  B.  Identity  is 
always  to  be  regarded  as  the  product  of  self-relation.)  In  other 
words,  the  different  or  disparate  is  what  it  is  only  in  its  opposite, — 
i.  e.,  in  identity. 

Difference  or  disparateness  constitutes  what  may  be  regarded  as 
the  otherness  (other-being  —  Andersseyn  =  that  phase  of  a  being 
which  exists  in  it  because  of  external  limitation)  of  reflection.  The 
other,  as  a  category  of  particular  being,  has  for  its  ground  immediate 
being  —  and  in  this  immediate  being,  the  negative  inheres  (*'.  e.,  "  the 
o'.her  "  is  a  negative  category,  but  a  category  to  which  negativity  is 
only. incidental  and  not  essential;  the  k'  other, "  as  opposed  to 
the  "somewhat,"  is  itself  an  independent  existence  as  much  as 
the  ''somewhat,"  and  its  relation  to  the  ''somewhat"  as  "other" 
is  a  mere  external,  subjective  distinction;  the  "other"  may  itself 
be  regarded  as  the  "somewhat,"  and  what  was  regarded  as  the 
"somewhat"  may  be  its  "other").  But  in  Reflection,  self-iden- 
tity—  reflected  immediate  ness — constitutes  the  ground  in  which 
the  negative  inheres,  and  the  basis  of  its  indifference.  (Self-relation, 
as  the  true  ground  of  individuality,  is  not  a  relation  founded 
on  a  being ;  being  is,  rather,  founded  on  self-relation ;  being  is  the 
result  of  the  process  of  self- relation  or  self-negation ;  but  being  is 
not  the  only  result  of  this  process ;  determination,  or  negation,  in  its 
annulling  activity  is  likewise  a  result  of  self-negation.  In  the  sphere 
of  Being,  in  which  the  mind  looks  upon  objects  as  essentially  inde- 
pendent of  each  other,  and  regards  each  as  having  a  substrate  of 
being,  all  relation  is  considered  to  be  incidental,  or  an  external  dis- 
tinction made  by  the  observer.  But  the  result  of  the  investigation 
of  Being  has  shewn  that  every  phase  of  Being  that  can  be  conceived 
is  necessarily  transitory,  and  passes  away  into  some  other  phase 
equally  transitory.  The  entire  system  of  the  categories  of  Being 
forms  a  circular  movement.  The  whole  persists,  but  the  parts  con- 
tinually vanish.  Any  one  part,  in  vanishing  into  another,  is  on  its  way 
back  to  itself,  just  as  the  movement  onward  in  a  circle  is  a  return  to 
the  starting-point.  The  process  in  which  the  parts  vanish  is  a  negat- 
ing one ;  hence  the  return,  which  is  self- relation,  is  self-negation. 
Self-relation,  self-negation,  is  all  that  persists  in  the  annulment  of 
the  categories  of  Being.  Hence,  the  mode  of  view  which  regards 
objects  as  beings  gives  wa}',  in  the  course  of  experience,  to  the  view 


42  Essence. 

which  regards  objects  as  appearances,  —  that  is  to  say,  as  phases 
occurring  in  the  course  of  the  activity  of  a  process  of  self-relation  or 
self-negation.  This  view  is  able  to  understand  the  being  and  the 
annulment  of  objects.  The  aspect  of  the  process  wherein  it  is  related 
to  itself  results  in  iramecliateness,  or  phases  of  being;  the  aspect 
wherein  the  process  is  negative  results  in  determination,  annulment, 
and  transition.  Both  being  and  negation  are  seen  as  results.  They 
have  the  same  activity  for  their  basis,  but  neither  one  of  them  is  an 
ultimate  basis  or  element  itself.  Thus  the  text  in  this  paragraph 
draws  attention  again  —  as  on  former  occasions  —  to  the  difference 
between  Being  and  Essence,  and  to  the  negative  as  found  in  cate- 
gories of  Being  as  contrasted  with  the  negative  in  the  sphere  of 
Essence.  "Other"  is  a  category  of  Being,  has  a  basis  of  being, 
and  is  negative  only  in  a  superficial  aspect.  Difference  is  a  category 
of  Essence,  and  consists  in  pure  relation,  having  no  being  as  its 
basis,  but  arising  in  and  persisting  in  self-negation,  solely.  For 
difference,  whether  subjective  or  objective,  is  necessarily  in  the  last 
analysis  based  on  self-distinction ;  and  self-distinction  is  identity  as 
well  as  distinction,  and,  in  fact,  all  distinction  is  between  identity  as 
the  one  factor  and  difference  as  the  other.  An  illustration  in  a 
more  concrete  sphere  is  found  in  the  doctrine  of  the  correlation  of 
forces.  A  "thing"  is  regarded  —  like  "somewhat"  in  the  sphere 
of  Being — as  an  independent  existence;  science  shows  the  transi- 
toriness  of  "  things,"  and  finds  them  to  be  phases  in  the  activity 
of  "forces;"  "forces,"  like  "  appeai'ance  "  in  the  sphere  of 
Essence,  are  taken  as  the  abiding,  and,  being  found  to  constitute 
phases  of  a  process  of  I'eturn, —  i.  e.,  to  pass  over  into  each  other 
reciprocally, —  the  entire  pi'ocess  of  force  is  seized  as  the  persistent. 
Persistent  force  is  a  negative  self-relation,  producmg  particular 
forces ;  these  are  its  distinctions  and  differences,  and  through  the 
annulment  of  these  distinctions,  the  vanishing  of  the  individuality  of 
the  particular  forces,  the  Persistent  Force  comes  to  identity  with 
itself.  Its  distinctions  as  particular  forces  constituted  its  "other- 
ness" [Andersseyn]  ;  the  vanishing  of  these  distinctions  constitutes  its 
return  into  identity  with  itself.  Since  the  return  into  identity  is  at 
the  same  time  the  act  of  further  determination  or  particularization,  it 
is  the  occasion  for  the  continuance  of  the  process.  In  this  is  found 
the  idea  or  conception  of  an  eternal  activity). 

("The  basis  of  its  indifference  "  — the  category  of  Difference,  or 
Disparateness,  is  spoken  of  as  possessing  "  indifference."  This  re- 
fers to  the  fact  that  "  Difference,"  as  an  undeveloped,  implicit  cate- 
gory of  "Distinction," — a  crude,  first  phase  of  distinction, — 


Difference.  43 

regards  the  objects  between  which  difference  exists  as  independent 
of  each  other,  — that  is  to  say,  as  indifferent.  For  example,  it  com- 
pares disparate  objects,  —  as  a  lamp-post  and  a  lead-pencil, — and  finds 
** difference;"  the  relation  is  an  arbitrary  one,  — the  objects  are  in- 
different towards  each  other:  On  the  contrary,  sweet  is  not  indiffer- 
ent to  sour,  light  to  dark,  nor  heat  to  cold,  nor  the  planet  to  its  sun. 
The  relation  of  dependence  cancels  indifference.  The  thoughtless 
consideration  of  objects  discovers  no  dependence,  no  essential  rela- 
tion. It  discovers  only  difference,  variousness,  disparateness,  «'.  e., 
external,  "indifferent"  distinction.  "Indifference,"  as  the  char- 
acteristic of  true  independence,  arises  from  self-relation.  Inasmuch 
as  distinction  is  a  phase  of  the  process  of  self -relation,  indifference 
appertains  to  it.  There  are  all  degrees  of  insight ;  the  degrees  of 
insight  which  perceive  objects  as  phases  of  Being  are  superficial ; 
the  degrees  of  insight  which  perceive  the  processes  of  Essence  are 
more  profound ;  but  the  first  or  crude  phases  of  each  and  every 
category  are  the  results  of  equally  crude  and  imperfect  insight. 
The  category  of  Difference,  e.  g.,  is  used  by  a  stage  of  insight  which 
is  unconscious  of  some  of  the  phases  of  Distinction  implied  by  the 
phases  included  in  the  term  "Difference."  To  use  a  figure:  identity, 
difference,  antithesis,  etc.,  are  portions  of  the  total  process  of  Dis- 
tinction, above  the  surface  of  consciousness ;  other  portions  of  the 
process  of  Distinction  lie  below  the  surface  of  consciousness,  or, 
-when  brought  to  the  surface,  are  not  perceived  to  be  identical  with 
the  former.  So  this  phase,  viz.,  the  "indifference,"  which  is  inci- 
dental to  the  self-relation  underlying  Distinction,  is,  first  of  all, 
above  the  surface  of  consciousness,  when  it  begins  to  reflect  on 
things.  "The  basis  of  its  indifference"  is,  therefore,  explained  in 
the  text  to  be  the  general  form  of  self-relation,  i.  e.,  of  independ- 
ence, underlying  the  category  of  Distinction.) 

("  Indifference  "  has  been  predicated  of  Essence  in  general.  [See 
above,  page  3,  line  4.]  The  same  category  [indifference]  is  used  in 
expounding  the  category  of  quantity  in  the  sphere  of  Being.  As 
above  explained,  indifference  is  the  aspect  of  independence.  Inde- 
pendence is  a  predicate  applying  only  to  a  totality ;  hence  only  to 
what  has  the  form  of  self-relation.  In  the  sphere  of  Being,  quality 
is  finitude,  ».  e.,  transitoriness,  change;  that  which  has  its  being  in 
another  finds  its  quality  determined  for  it  by  what  lies  beyond  it. 
The  category  of  quality  is  transcended  by  the  discovery  that  determi- 
nation through  another  is,  in  the  last  analysis,  determination  through 
itself -i- because  its  determinateness  being  its  character,  its  whatness 
[quiddity]  is  its  being,  and  since  this  is  derived  from  another  being 


44  Essence. 

lying  beyond  it,  it  follows  that  its  being  is  outside  of  itself.  The 
being  of  what  is  dependent  lies  in  the  independent ;  the  being  of  that 
which  is  determined  through  another  lies  in  this  "other,"  and  that 
same  "other,"  in  the  act  of  determination,  determines  only  itself; 
that  which  is  dependent  is  only  a  determinateness  of  the  independ- 
ent, or  self-determined.  With  this  insight,  all  particular  beings,  as- 
qualitative  determinations,  must  be  looked  upon  as  parts  of  total 
processes  of  determination,  which  total  processes  are  ones  identical 
with  each  other  —  independent,  and  hence  '•'•indifferent"  towards 
each  other.  This  conception  of  indifferent  ones  is  the  insight 
into  quantity.  Hence  the  point  of  view  of  quantity  is  directed 
towards  the  aspect  of  indifference.  The  distinctions  of  quantity 
are  indifferent  as  regards  quality.  Seven  oxen  are  oxen  as  well  ns 
fourteen  oxen  ;  one  house  is  as  much  a  qualitative  being  as  a  mil- 
lion houses  ;  the  quantitative  distinction  of  multiplicity  is  indifferent 
to  quality.  It  has  been  remarked  by  acute  lexicographers  [e.  g., 
Noah  Webster  in  his  "Unabridged,"  1st  edition]  that  "  quantit}' 
is  undefinable ;"  that  they  have  been  unable  to  find  its  genus  and 
differentia.  But  there  will  be  no  difficulty  for  us  here  to  define 
"quantity;"  "quantity"  and  "quality"  are  species  of  determi- 
nateness which  is  the  genus;  "quality"  is  the  determinateness 
which  is  immediately  one  with  being  —  change  the  quality  or  "  what- 
ness  "  of  an  object,  and  you  change  it;  "quantity"  is  the  de- 
terminateness indifferent  to  being — change  the  quantity  of  some- 
thing, and  you  do  not  change  its  being.  Hence  the  transition  from 
quantity  to  a  new  category,  through  the  idea  of  maxima  and  minima, 
as  limits  within  which  quantitative  indifference  prevails,  and  beyond 
which  there  results  a  qualitative  change,  or  change  in  the  being. 
Indifference  appertains  universally  to  the  categories  of  Essence,  but 
chiefly  to  one  category  of  Being,  viz.,  quantity.  All  the  categories  of 
Essence  are  founded  on  self-relation, — the  form  of  self-relation 
being  essential  to  every  totality,  to  every  independent  being.  "  Quan- 
tity" is  the  second  of  the  three  phases  of  Being,  or  Immediateness. 
Essence  is  the  second  of  the  three  parts  of  Logic,  or  the  system  of 
Pure  Thought.  Being  is  the  first  part,  and  Idea  the  third  part.  The 
second  part  of  any  dialectic  or  exhaustive  consideration  expounds  its 
subject  in  the  form  of  self-antitheses.  Quantity  is  the  self-antithesis 
of  Being;  Essence  the  self-antithesis  of  the  Idea  [personality]. 
Indifference  recurs,  therefore,  in  every  second  phase  of  considera- 
tion in  this  Logic  as  an  aspect  of  the  categories  introduced,  but 
affecting  them  with  various  degrees  of  validity.  For  instance,  even 
in  the  category  of  Becoming,  the  second  phase  of  its  consideration 


Difference.  45 

finds  two  species  of  it,  viz.,  beginning  and  ceasing,  each  of  which 
contains  the  other  as  its  own  moment,  and  is  thus  the  totality  of  Be- 
coming [a  reflection-into-itself,  in  the  language  of  Essence],  and 
thus  each  is  indifferent  to  the  other ;  as  sundered  from  the  other,  — 
excluding  it,  —  its  lack  of  the  other  would  annul  itself ;  but  as  con- 
taining the  other,  it  reflects  [bends  back]  its  dependence  upon  an- 
other, thereby  converting  it  into  dependence  upon  itself,  or  independ- 
ence and  indifference  of  others). 

The  moments  of  Distinction  are  Identity  and  Distinction  itself. 
They  are  different,  disparate,  inasmuch  as  they  are  reflected  into 
themselves,  self-relating;  in  the  determination  (or  category)  of 
Identity  they  are  relations  exclusively  to  themselves ;  Identity  does 
nut  relate  to  Distinction,  nor  does  Distinction  relate  to  Identity ;  for 
since  each  one  of  these  moments  is  exclusively  self-related,  thej-  are 
not  determined  in  opposition  to  each  other.  And  since  this  is  the 
fact  the  distinction  is  external  to  them ;  the  different  moments  do 
not  stand  in  relation  to  each  other  as  Identity  and  Distinction,  but 
onl}'  as  different  ones  in  general,  which  are  indifferent  towards  each 
other  and  towards  their  determinateness. 

(2.)  In  the  category  of  Difference  (variousness  or  disparateness) 
as  the  phase  of  indifference,  of  Distinction,  the  reflection  (which  lies 
at  the  basis  of  the  category)  is  "  external  reflection."  Distinction  is 
only  a  posited-being,  or  as  annulled,  but  it  is  also  the  entire  move- 
ment of  reflection.  If  we  take  this  into  careful  consideration  we 
shall  see  that  both  its  moments  —  Identity  and  distinction,  as  above 
determined  —  are  reflections.  Each  one  is  a  unity  of  itself  and  of  the 
other  —  each  is  the  total  movement.  Therefore  the  exclusiveness  of 
the  determinateness  of  Identity  or  of  Distinction,  according  to  which 
each  was  only  itself  and  not  the  other,  is  annulled.  They  are, 
therefore,  no  Qualities  (quiddities,  i.  e.,  particular  beings,  deter- 
mined through  each  other)  ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  their  determinate- 
ness  consists  solely  in  reflection  into  itself,  f.  e.,  solely  in  self- 
negation.  Therefore  we  have  this  duplication,  viz.,  reflection  into 
itself  as  such,  and  determinateness  as  negation  or  posited-being. 
Posited-being  is  the  self-external  reflection.  It  is  negation  as  nega- 
tion. Hence,  potentially,  it  is  the  self-relating  negation  and  reflection 
into  itself,  but  only  potentially ;  for  it  is  the  relation  to  it  as  to  an  ex- 
ternal (posited-being  is  the  result  of  reflection  considered  as  result, 
and,  therefore,  as  dependent ;  dependence  is  not  reflection  into  itself, 
but  a  portion  of  its  cycle.  Hence,  as  it  implies  reflection,  it  is  poten- 
tially or  implicitly  self-relation). 

Reflection  into  itself  and  external  reflection  are  consequently  the 


46  Essence. 

two  determinations  in  which  are  posited  the  moments  of  Distinction  — 
t.  e.,  Identity  and  Distinction.  They  are  these  moments  just  as  they 
are  denned  here.  Reflection  into  itself  is  Identity,  but  defined  as- 
indifferent  to  Distinction,  not  as  having  no  distinction  at  all,  but  as. 
standing  in  relation  to  it  as  self -identical ;  it  is  difference  or  disparate- 
ness. It  is  Identity,  which  has  therefore  reflected  its  movement  into 
itself  in  such  a  manner  that  it  is  really  the  one  reflection  of  the  two- 
moments  into  themselves,  the  two  being  reflections  into  themselves. 
Identity  is  this  one  reflection  of  the  two  which  has  distinction  within 
it  as  an  indifferent  somewhat,  and  is  difference  or  disparateness.  On 
the  other  hand,  external  reflection  is  the  particularized  distinction  of 
the  same,  not  as  absolute  reflection  into  itself,  but  as  determination, 
opposed  to  which  the  in-itself-existent  reflection  is  indifferent.  Its 
two  moments,  Identity  and  Distinction,  are,  therefore,  posited  exter- 
nally, not  as  inherent  determinations.  (It  will  be  noticed  that  ex- 
ternal reflection  looks  upon  the  distinction  between  identity  and  dif- 
ference as  something  arising  outside  of  the  activity  which  constitutes 
them ;  in  fact,  it  does  not  recognize  either  as  an  activity ;  it  looks 
upon  them  as  dead  results.) 

This  external  identity  (as  result  of  external  reflection)  is  equality, 
likeness,  or  sameness  (Gleichheit),  and  the  external  distinction  is  un- 
likeness, inequality  (or non- identity— Ungleichheit).  "Sameness"  or 
"likeness"  is  identity,  but  only  as  a  posited-being,  —  an  identity 
which  is  not  in-and-for-itself  (i.  e.,  not  essential,  not  appertaining  to 
the  nature  of  the  things  themselves).  In  like  manner,  unlikeness  or 
inequality  is  distinction,  but  as  an  external  one,  not  belonging  to 
the  objects  themselves.  It  does  not  concern  the  objects  themselves 
whether  they  are  like  or  different  (it  is  only  a  comparison  made  by 
the  observer).  Each  object  is  self-related,  and  what  it  is  is  its  own 
affair  (there  is  in  it  no  relation  to  another,  and  no  occasion  for  the 
comparison  which  we  make)  ;  the  identity  or  non-identity,  considered 
as  likeness  and  unlikeness,  is  the  result  of  an  act  of  comparison,  and 
is  an  external  affair  as  regards  the  objects. 

(3.)  External  reflection  compares  objects  in  regard  to  likeness  and 
difference,  and  the  act  of  comparison  deals  with  no  other  categories 
than  these,  and  it  flits  to  and  fro  between  objects,  in  order  to  ascer- 
tain points  of  resemblance  or  of  difference.  But  its  flitting  to  and  fro 
is  an  external  affair,  even  to  these  very  distinctions.  They  are  not 
related  to  themselves,  but  each  only  to  a  third  (the  observer).  Each 
makes  its  appearance  in  this  interchange  prima  facie  for  itself  (inde- 
pendent). External  reflection  is,  as  such,  self-external.  Particular- 
ized distinction  is  absolute  distinction  as  annulled  ;  it  is  consequently 


Difference.  47 

not  simple,  not  reflection  into  itself,  but  external  to  the  reflection  into 
itself.  (It  is  unconscious  of  the  phases  of  the  activity  which  unite 
the  two  sides.)  Its  elements  (or  "  moments")  fall  asunder  (iden- 
tity and  difference  are  not  seized  as  the  same  activity),  and  they 
relate,  as  opposed  to  each  other,  to  the  reflection-into- itself  (the  ob- 
jects are  regarded  as  independent,  — "  reflection-into-itself,  " —  and 
yet  are  compared  with  each  other  to  discover  likenesses  and  differ- 
ences which  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  dependence  of  the  objects 
upon  each  other). 

To  reflection,  estranged  from  itself  (producing  what  is  exactly  the 
opposite  of  its  own  activity,  —  it  being  return-to-itself  as  identity, 
while  its  product  is  a  relation  of  an  alien  to  an  alien, —  and  hence  no 
return,  but  only  a  going  abroad),  likeness  and  difference,  therefore, 
appear  as  utterly  without  connection,  and  it  separates  them  by  the  use 
of  such  categories  as  "in  so  far,"  "  sides,"  and  "points  of  view," 
when  they  relate  to  the  same  thing.  Thus,  different  things,  which 
are  one  and  the  same  as  regards  the  fact  that  likeness  and  unlikeness 
are  attributed  to  both,  are  according  to  one  side  like,  and  according 
to  another  side  unlike ;  and  m  so  far  as  they  are  like,  they  are  not 
unlike.  Likeness,  therefore,  relates  only  to  itself  (is  not  dependent  on 
unlikeness),  and  unlikeness  is,  in  like  manner,  only  unlikeness. 

Through  this  separation  of  the  categories  of  likeness  and  unlikeness 
from  each  other  they  mutually  annul  themselves.  Precisely  the  very 
distinction  which  has  been  introduced  to  prevent  them  from  contra- 
diction and  dissolution,  namely,  that  something  is  like  another  in  one 
respect  and  different  from  it  in  another  respect  —  this  isolation  of 
likeness  from  unlikeness  is  their  destruction.  For  both  likeness 
and  unlikeness  are  determinations  of  distinction.  They  are  rela- 
tions to  each  other  —  the  one  is  defined  to  be  what  the  other  is 
not:  Like  is  not  unlike,  and  unlike  is  not  like.  The  two  have 
essentially  the  same  relation,  and  outside  of  it  have  no  meaning 
at  all.  As  determinations  of  distinction  (».  e.,  as  subordinate 
phases  of  the  category  of  Distinction),  each  one  is  what  it  is  in 
distinction  from  its  other.  But  through  their  indifference  to  each 
other,  likeness  or  equality  is  only  a  self-relation,  and  so  also  is 
unlikeness  its  own  "point  of  view"  and  a  "reflection  "  (i.  e.,  when 
likeness  and  difference  are  predicated  of  the  same  subject,  but  are 
explained  through  different  "  points  of  view,"  the  "  point  of  view  " 
belongs  essentially  to  the  predication,  and  must  be  added  to  the 
category  predicated ;  "likeness"  predicated  with  a  "  point  of  view" 
is  thereby  conditioned,  and  its  meaning  is  limited  through  the  impli- 
cation of  unlikeness  thereby  conveyed ;  likewise,  "  difference  "  predi- 


48  Essence. 

cated  in  a  certain  "point  of  view"  implies  as  its  conditioning  limit 
the  "likeness,"  which  is  not  expressly  stated.  Any  category  in  the 
form  of  not-A  is  dependent  wholly  upon  the  extension  and  compre- 
hension of  A  for  its  signification ;  in  the  separation  of  likeness  and 
unlikeness  by  different  "  points  of  view,"  the  essential  limit  is  ex- 
pressed which  is  common  to  both,  and  hence  their  indissoluble  unity 
is  posited).  Each  one  of  these  categories  thus  isolated  (by 
"  points  of  view  ")  is  self-identical  (in  the  "  point  of  view  "  is  con- 
tained its  own  difference  from  itself,  which  really  belongs  to  the 
totality  of  its  thought;  "  external  reflection  "  is  always  trying  to  save 
its  thoughts  from  contradiction ;  therefore  it  places  their  essential 
self -opposition  in  something  else  outside  of  them,  which  it  regards  as 
subjective  and  unessential ;  "  a  point  of  view"  for  example,  is  a  merely 
subjective  distinction, — the  self-difference  having  been  removed, 
nothing  but  abstract  identity  remains).  The  distinction  between 
likeness  and  unlikeness  has  vanished,  for  they  have  no  determinate- 
ness  remaining  in  which  they  can  be  contrasted  (all  determinateness 
has  been  placed  in  the  "  point  of  view  " —  a  mere  external  consider- 
ation) ;  hence  each  is  a  mere  abstract  identity. 

This  aspect  of  indifference  —  in  other  words,  this  external  distinc- 
tion— annuls  itself,  therefore,  and  is  the  negativity  of  itself  through 
itself.  (This  refers  to  the  contradiction  involved  in  placing  all  of 
the  determinateness  in  the  "  points  of  view,"  and  in  holding  the  same 
to  be  subjective  and  unessential ;  the  very  distinction  between  likeness 
and  unlikeness  which  external  reflection  thinks  it  necessary  to  pre- 
serve from  annulment,  and,  therefore,  seeks  to  prevent  self-contra- 
diction by  such  devices  as  "points  of  view"  and  "in  so  far,"  is 
annulled  by  this  very  procedure ;  for  the  distinction  between  likeness 
and  unlikeness  vanishes  when  their  characteristic  determinatenesses 
are  removed  and  placed  in  something  else.  Hence  this  activity  of 
distinguishing  is  a  self-negating  activity.)  It  is  tlTat  negativity 
which,  in  the  act  of  comparison,  belongs  to  the  objects  compared. 
The  act  of  comparing  passes  to  and  fro  from  likeness  to  unlikeness, 
and  from  the  latter  to  the  former ;  it  lets  one  vanish  in  the  other, 
and  is  in  fact  the  negative  unity  of  both.  The  act  of  comparison  is 
an  external  affair  —  a  subjective  performance  outside  of  the  objects 
compared,  and  outside  of  the  aspects  in  which  they  are  compared. 
But  this  negative  unity  is  in  fact  the  very  nature  of  likeness  and 
unlikeness,  as  we  have  seen  above.  This  independent  "  point  of 
view,"  which  constitutes  the  validity  of  likeness  in  contrast  to  unlike- 
ness, and  which  in  the  same  manner  gives  validity  to  unlikeness,  is 
precisely  the  respect  in  which  they  lose  their  distinction  from  each 


Difference.  49 

other,  and  become  self-identical  and  identical  with  each  other.  (Their 
difference  is  posited  in  the  point  of  view,  and  outside  of  their  differ- 
ence—  i.  e.,  except  wherein  they  differ — they  are  the  same;  but 
their  difference  is  posited  in  the  "  point  of  view,"  i.  e.,  it  is  in  a 
unity ;  hence  this  external  reflection  contradicts  itself  by  doing  pre- 
cisely what  it  attempts  to  avoid,  viz.,  it  brings  together  the  contra- 
diction in  a  "  point  of  view  "  in  order  to  save  likeness  and  difference 
from  unity  and  consequent  contradiction.) 

Accordingly,  likeness  and  difference  as  moments  of  external  reflec- 
tion, and  as  excluding  each  other,  vanish  in  their  identity.  But  this 
negative  unity  of  likeness  and  difference  is  posited  (explicitly  con- 
tained) in  them,  namely,  the  activity  of  reflection  is  stated  as  belong- 
ing to  them,  but  as  external  to  them  ;  in  other  words  tbev  are  the  like- 
ness and  difference  of  a  third  somewhat  —  i.  e.,  of  something  differ- 
ent from  them.  Thus  likeness  is  not  the  likeness  of  itself,  nor  is 
unlikeness  the  nnlikeness  of  itself,  but  of  a  somewhat  unlike  ft.  and 
the  unlike  is  self-identical.  Likeness  and  uulikeness  are,  therefore, 
each  a  self-contradiction.  Each  one  is  cousequentlv  an  activity  of 
reflection  (a  return  into  itself  through  its  opposite),  inasmuch  as 
likeness  is  the  identity  of  itself  and  uulikeness,  and  uulikeness  is  the 
identity  of  itself  and  likeness. 

Likeness  and  difference  were  seen  to  constitute  the  sides  or  phases 
of  posited-being,  as  opposed  to  the  objects  compared, —  i.  e.,  the  ob- 
jects held  as  different,  —  and  these  objects  were  regarded  as  an  objec- 
tively existent  reflection  opposed  to  the  distinction  of  likeness  and 
unlikeness  (i.  e.,  the  objects  were  regarded  as  independent,  and  their 
relation  to  each  other  only  an  external  act  of  comparison).  But  this 
independence  has  been  lost.  Likeness  and  unlikeness,  the  deter- 
minations of  external  reflection,  are  determinations  of  the  objectively- 
existing  reflection,  which  reflection  the  different  objects  are  supposed 
to  be  —  likeness  and  uulikeness  are  only  the  undefined  distinction 
between  the  existing  objects.  The  objectively-existing  Reflection 
(an  sich  seyende  Reflexion  =  implicit  or  potential  reflection ;  the 
expression  is  used  throughout  this  logic  to  characterize  whatever  is 
apprehended  as  independently  existing,  without  stating,  however,  its 
mediation  as  return  through  the  annulment  of  its  other),  is  the  relation 
to  itself  without  negation  («".  e.,  without  the  annulment  of  its  other), 
the  abstract  identity  with  itself.  Consequently,  it  is  nothing  but  the 
posited-being  itself.  The  mere  difference  passes  over,  through 
posited-being,  into  the  negative  reflection  (i.  e.,  the  "  posited-being  " 

;mmeJiateness  as  a  result;  hence  dependent;  hence  self-negative); 


50  Essence. 

hence  that  phase  of  reflection  which  negates  or  determines  the 
immediate.  Difference  is  nothing  but  the  posited  distinction;  hence, 
distinction  which  is  none  ;  hence  a  self-negation  of  distinction.  Thus 
likeness  and  difference — posited-being  —  return  through  their  indif- 
ference, or  the  objectively  existing  reflection,  into  negative  unity 
with  themselves ;  they  return  into  the  reflection  which  is  potentially 
the  distinction  of  likeness  and  difference.  The  difference  (dispar- 
ateness) whose  indifferent  sides  are  mere  moments  and  also  negative 
unities,  is  ANTITHESIS. 

Remark, 

Difference,  like  Identity,  has  been  expressed  in  a  principle  of  its 
own ;  these  two  principles  are  held  in  a  relation  of  indifference  to- 
wards each  other,  each  one  having  independent  validity. 

"Everything  is  different  from  everything  else"  (Alle  Dinge  sind 
veraehiederi),  or  in  another  form:  "  there  are  no  two  things  which  are 
identical  with  each  other."  This  principle  is,  in  fact,  the  opposite  of 
the  principle  of  Identity,  for  it  states  that  A  is  something  different ; 
therefore  that  A  is  also  not-A ;  in  another  form,  A  is  non-identical 
with  another,  and  therefore  it  is  not  A-in-general,  but  rather  a  defi- 
nite, particular  A.  ("  A  is  something  different" —  i.  e.  it  has  no  mean- 
ing except  a  negative  one  of  dependence  upon  some  other  term  ;  i.  e., 
the  predication  made  of  A  is  limited  or  conditioned  through  the  other 
term  of  the  relation  posited  in  the  predicate  "  different;  "  since  dif- 
ference posits  relation  and  dependence,  its  predication  of  A  amounts 
in  fact  to  the  predication  of  not-A,  as  stated  in  the  text,  viz :  "There- 
fore A  is  also  not-A.'"  If  A  were  a  universal  existence,  i.  e.,  "  true  " 
in  the  Hegelian  sense,  it  would  not  stand  in  opposition  to  something 
else,  but  would  possess  only  self-distinction.  Hence,  if  "  A  is  some- 
thing different,"  it  is  partial  and  complementary  —  and,  as  a  "definite 
particular,"  demands  another  to  complete  the  totality  of  its  sphere  of 
being).  In  the  place  of  A  in  the  principle  of  Identity  any  other  sub- 
strate may  be  substituted,  but  for  A  in  the  principle  of  Difference 
there  can  be  no  such  exchange.  It  is  not  intended  by  this  principle 
to  affirm  of  something  that  it  is  different  from  itself,  but  only  that  it 
is  different  from  another;  but  this  difference  is  (in  truth)  its  own  de- 
termination. As  self-identical,  A  is  an  indeterminate  somewhat; 
but,  as  determinate  or  particular,  it  is  the  opposite  of  this  ;  it  has  not 
only  identity  with  itself,  but  also  negation,  and,  consequently,  differ- 
ence of  itself  from  itself. 

That  everything  is  different  from  everything  else,  is  a  superfluous 


Difference.  51 

principle,  for  in  the  plural  "things,"  involving  multiplicity,  there  is 
implied  nnparticularized  difference.  But  the  principle :  "  There  are 
no  two  things  perfectly  identical  with  each  other,"  expresses  more 
than  this,  to-wit:  particularized  difference.  Two  things  are  not 
merely  two-,  numerical  multiplicity  implies  sameness  of  quality,  but 
the  two  spoken  of  are  different  through  a  "  qualitative  "  determina- 
tion. The  principle  which  states,  that  there  are  no  two  things  identi- 
cal with  each  other,  calls  to  mind  the  anecdote  in  which  Leibnitz  sug- 
gested to  the  ladies  at  the  court,  the  impossibility  of  finding  two  leaves- 
in  the  forest  that  were  just  alike. — Those  were  happy  times  for  meta- 
physics, when  people  at  court  busied  themselves  with  it,  and  when  it 
needed  no  greater  exertion  to  prove  its  principles,  than  to  compare 
the  leaves  of  trees !  —  The  reason  why  the  mentioned  principle  at- 
tracts attention,  lies  in  the  explanation  given  that  "two,"  or  num- 
erical multiplicity,  contains  no  definite,  or  particularized  difference ; 
and,  that  difference,  as  such,  in  its  abstraction,  is  indifferent  as  regards 
likeness  and  unlikeness.  For  the  imagination,  (Vorstellen)  since 
it  attains  only  to  qualitative  determination,  (Bestimmung)  these' 
moments  (the  "two"),  are  presented  as  indifferent  towards  each 
other,  so  that  the  one  or  the  other  —  the  mere  likeness  of  things  ob- 
tains determination  without  unlikeness,  or  that  things  are  different  if 
they  have  mere  numerical  multiplicity,  difference  in  general,  and  are 
not  unlike.  On  the  contrary,  the  principle  of  difference  asserts  that 
things  are  different  through  unlikeness,  from  each  other  (qualitative 
opposition)*  that  the  determination  of  unlikeness  belongs  to  them  as- 
well  as  the  determination  of  likeness,  for  it  requires  the  two  to  make 
a  definite  distinction. 

Now,  this  principle  that  the  determination  of  unlikeness  belong* 
to  each  and  everything,  requires  a  proof.  It  cannot  be  appealed 
to  as  a  self-evident  truth,  (iinmittelbarer  Salz) ;  for  the  ordinary 
stage  of  consciousness  demands  a  proof  for  every  combination  of 
different  predicates  in  a  synthetical  proposition ;  it  asks  for  a  third 
term  in  which  they  are  mediated.  This  proof  must  show  the 
transition  of  Identity  into  Difference,  and  likewise  the  transition  of 
the  latter  into  particularized  (bestimmte — qualitatively  determined > 
difference,  i.  e.  into  unlikeness.  But  this  is  not  usually  attempted. 
For  it  is  evident  that  difference,  or  external  distinction,  is,  in  truth, 
reflected  into  itself;  it  is  distinction  in  itself;  the  indifferent  attitude 
of  the  different  ones  towards  each  other  is  a  mere  posited-being,  and 
hence  not  an  external,  indifferent  distinction,  but  one  (including} 
relation  of  the  two  moments. 

There  is  also    involved  in   this,  the  dissolution  and    nugatoriness- 


52  Essence. 

of  the  principle  of  Difference.  Two  things  are  perfectly  like 
(equal)  :  then  they  are  like  and  unlike  at  the  same  time  ;  like,  in  the 
fact  that  they  are  both  "  things,"  or  that  they  are  "  two;  "  for  each 
one  is  a  "thing"  and  a  one  of  two;  each  is,  therefore,  the  same  as 
the  other ;  but  they  are  assumed  as  unlike.  Consequently  the  two 
moments,  likeness  and  unlikeness,  are  different  in  one  and  the  same 
respect,  or  in  that  their  distinction  is  one  and  the  same  relation. 
Consequently  they  have  passed  over  into  Antithesis  (Entgegensetzung 
=  opposition,  or  contrariety). 

When  the  two  predicates  are  affirmed  at  the  same  time,  contradic- 
tion is  prevented  by  the  reservation,  "in  so  far."  Two  things  are 
like  in  so  far  as  they  are  not  unlike  ;  or,  they  are  like  according  to 
one  side,  or  respect,  and  unlike  according  to  another,etc.  By  such  a 
process  the  unity  of  likeness  and  unlikeness  is  supposed  to  be  re- 
moved from  the  things,  and  this  unity  held  to  be  an  external  reflec- 
tion. This  is,  however,  a  process  in  which  the  two  sides  of  likeness 
and  unlikeness  are  distinguished,  although  they  are  contained  in  one 
and  the  same  activity,  and  it  is  one  and  the  same  activity  which  dis- 
tinguishes them —  each  one  reflects  the  other,  and  manifests  itself  in  it. 
That  kind  considerateness  for  the  welfare  of  "things,"  which 
sees  to  it  that  they  are  not  allowed  to  contradict  themselves,  is  utterly 
oblivious  here  as  elsewhere  of  the  fact  that  it  does  not  do  away  with 
the  contradiction,  but  it  only  places  it  in  another,  viz. :  in  the  subject- 
ive or  external  reflection,  and  loaves  in  this  external  reflection  both 
moments  (of  the  contradiction)  which  are  expressed  by  this  removal 
or  transposition  as  mere  positei-oeing,  as  annulled,  and  as  related  to 
each  other  in  one  unity  (annulled,  because  posited  in  one  unity  —  be- 
ing negative  toward  each  other). 

3.  Antithesis. 

In  Antithesis  the  particularized  reflection  as  found  in  the  category  of 
Distinction  is  perfected.  It  (antithesis)  is  the  unity  of  identity  and 
difference.  Its  moments  are  in  one  identity,  but  in  this  identity  are 
differentiated.  Being  different  and  yet  identical,  they  are  contraries 
(opposites  —  antithetic). 

Identity  and  distinction  are  the  moments  of  distinction  as  found 
within  it.  They  are  reflected  moments  of  its  unity  ("reflected  "  in 
that  each  is  a  return  to  itself  through  the  other  ;  each  moment  devel- 
ops its  "other"  within  itself).  Likeness  and  unlikeness  (sameness 
and  difference),  however,  belong  to  reflection  as  externalized  (*'.  e., 
are  a  distinction  supposed  to  be  subjective  and  arbitrary).  Their 
identity  with  themselves  is  not  only  the  indifference  of  each  towards  the 


Antithesis.  53 

other,  but  it  is  the  indifference  towards  being  in-and-for-itself  (/.  e., 
towards  essence — towards  the  independent  being  or  totality).  Their 
identity  is  an  identity  of  each  as  opposed  to  the  identity  reflected 
into  itself;  it  is,  therefore,  immediateness  which  is  not  reflected  into 
itself.  The  posited-being  of  the  sides  (opposite  phases)  of  external 
reflection  is,  therefore,  a,  being  while  its  not-posited-being  is  a  non- 
being. 

The  moments  (elements  or  terms)  of  Antithesis  when  examined 
carefully,  prove  to  be  posited-being  or  determination  reflected  into 
itself.  The  posited-being  takes  the  form  of  likeness  and  unlikeness, 
(sameness  and  difference).  The  two,  as  reflected  into  themselves. 
constitute  the  determinations  of  antithesis.  Their  reflection  into 
themselves  consists  in  this,  that  each  is  in  itself  the  unity  of  same- 
ness and  difference.  Sameness,  for  example,  is  found  only  in  the 
movement  of  reflection,  which  makes  comparison  of  different  some- 
whats ;  consequently,  sameness  is  mediated  through  its  other  moment, 
which  is  indifferent  to  it  (i.  e,,  not  dependent  upon  it,  for  difference 
seems  to  be  independent  of  sameness).  Likewise,  also,  difference  is 
found  only  in  the  same  activity  of  reflection,  which  makes  comparison 
and  involves  sameness  as  one  of  its  results.  Each  of  these  moments 
is,  therefore,  in  its  determiaateness  the  entire  process.  It  is  the 
whole,  because  it  contains  its  other  moment,  (its  opposite)  ;  bat  this. 
its  other,  exists  indifferently,  or  independent  of  it ;  and  so  each  con- 
tains a  relation  to  its  own  non-being;  and,  in  fact,  is  only  reflection 
into  itself,  or  the  total  process  in  its  relation  to  its  own  uou-being. 

This  "  sameness  "  (identity)  which  is  reflected  into  itself  —  which 
contains  within  itself  relation  to  difference — is  the  Positive  /  and,  in 
like  manner,  difference  which  contains  within  itself  its  relation  to  its 
non-being,  to  sameness,  is  the  Negative.  In  other  words,  the  two  are 
posited-being.  In  so  far  as  the  detenninateness  of  distinction  is  taken 
as  the  relation  of  posited-being  to  itself,  in  a  particularizing  (differ- 
entiating) form  of  relation,  the  antithesis  is  reflected  into  its  self- 
sameness  as  one  aspect  of  its  posited-being ;  in  another  aspect  it  is 
reflected  into  self-difference.  Thus  arises  the  distinction  of  positive 
and  negative.  The  positive  is  the  posited-being,  reflected  into  itself 
as  self-sameness.  But  what  is  reflected  is  the  posited-being,  ».  e., 
negation  a*  negation;  therefore,  this  reflection  into  itself  contains 
relation  to  another  as  its  own  determination.  The  negative,  on 
the  other  hand,  is  posited-being,  as  difference  reflected-into-itself. 
But  the  posited-being  is  difference  itself ;  hence  this  reflection  (in- 
volved ir  the  "negative")  is  the  identity  of  difference  with  itself, 
or  its  absolute  self-relation.  Therefore,  each  contains  the  other ; 


54  Essence. 

the  posited-being  reflected  into  itself  as  sameness  contains  difference ; 
and  reflected  into  itself  as  difference  contains  sameness. 

(The  reader  must  not  fail  to  remember  that  we  are  treating  here  of 
relation.  Sameness  is  relation,  and  difference  is  relation.  The  dis- 
tinction of  sameness  and  difference  belongs  to  posited-being.  In 
•"posited-being"  the  distinction  made  is  regarded  as  an  external  or 
arbitrary  one.  Sameness  and  difference  are  distinguished  in  it,  and 
are  referred  to  independents-existing  somewhats  between  which 
comparison  is  instituted.  The  Maya  of  reflection  —  the  illusion  of 
abstract  knowing  is  found  right  here.  It  sees  the  distinctions  of 
sameness  and  difference,  but  sees  no  essential  inter-dependence  ex- 
isting between  the  objects  which  it  compares.  It,  therefore,  in  its 
impotency,  supposes  the  individuality  of  the  objects  compared  to  be 
perfect  without  reference  of  each  to  the  other.  But  all  distinction 
which  it  makes,  rests  upon,  and  presupposes  objectively-existent  dis- 
tinction. And,  in  general,  every  existence  possesses  individuality  and 
preserves  the  same  through  such  distinction.  But  this  distinguish- 
ing is  a  process  of  relation,  essential  to  the  existence  of  things, 
and  hence  -the  arbitrary  subjective  distinguishing  of  external  reflec- 
tion, explains  no  real  process  of  distinguishing,  and  in  so  far  as  it 
supposes  all  relations  to  belong  to  external  reflection,  it  completely 
shuts  its  eyes  to  the  fact  that  all  real  existence  is  such  through  rela- 
tion —  essential  relation.  Since  the  individuality  of  objects  depends 
on  distinction,  such  objects  are,  in  reality,  terms  of  a  process ; 
in  relating  to  another  —  distinguishing  itself  from  another  —  an 
object  is  obtaining  its  own  individuality.  In  this  pi'ocess  the  rela- 
tion is  first  an  expression  of  its  own  dependence:  the  object  seems 
to  depend  upon  another  —  seems  to  point  out  or  manifest  the 
other  —  directing  us,  so  to  speak,  to  the  other  as  its  essence.  But 
the  other  in  the  process  manifests  the  first  somewhat,  depends  upon 
it  in  like  manner;  hence  the  total  process  re- affirms  our  first  object. 
The  total  process  is  a  reflection  into  itself  made  up  of  two  positings  — 
the  positing  of  the  other  by  the  first,  and  the  positing  of  the  first  by 
the  other.  The  two  positings  are  two  manifestations  —  two  expres- 
sions of  dependence ;  and,  hence,  the  positing  phases  are  negative, 
and  express  the  nugatoriness,  or  lack  of  essentiality  of  the  depend- 
ent somewhats.  A  somewhat,  regarded  as  through  another,  is  regarded 
as  a  posited-being,  a  somewhat  regarded  as  positing  another  is  a  pre- 
supposed-being,  i.  e.,  presupposed  by  that  which  it  posits.  In  the 
total  process  which  contains  two  positings  —  or  two  negations,  i.  e., 
expressions  of  dependence  —  there  results  identity,  self-relation,  but 
self-relation  which  contains  self-distinction,  viz.,  the  two-fold  nega- 


Antithesis.  55 

tire  expression  contained  in  the  doable-positing.  The  total  process 
which  as  a  whole,  is  identity,  has  been  shown  to  be  a  two-fold  differ- 
entiation. The  differentiation  or  negative  aspect  of  the  process  is 
essential  to  the  identity.  Unless  the  two  negative  movements  are  of 
equal  value,  the  return  into  itself  or  reflection  is  not  realized.  But 
if  it  is  realized,  the  equality  of  the  movements  named  is  presupposed, 
and  with  this  the  validity  of  the  distinction  and  the  independence 
of  its  moments.  This  contradiction  has  its  solution  only  in  the 
fact  pointed  out,  namely  the  mutual  reflection  into  themselves 
of  the  two  moments,  each  through  the  other.  This  reflection  into 
itself  makes  each  moment  a  total  movement,  and  elevates  each 
one  to  independence — in  short,  makes  each  an  identity  with  itself, 
containing  distinction  between  itself  and  its  other,  within  itself.  This 
is  the  idea  of  Antithesis  or  self-opposition,  the  moments  whereof  are 
4 i  contraries."  But;  external  reflection,  while  it  discovers  sameness 
and  difference  in  objects,  and  vainly  supposes  these  distinctions  to  be 
due  to  its  own  exploits,  in  this  conduct  does  both  too  much  and  too 
little.  In  one  respect,  it  is  modest  in  regarding  its  distinctions  as  un- 
essential to  the  existence  of  things.  But  in  another  respect,  it  is  the 
height  of  presumption  on  its  part  to  deny  the  objectivity  of  sameness 
and  difference,  as  essential  relations.  In  other  words,  to  deny  that 
relation  has  more  validity  than  immediate  being  has.  For  relation  is 
the  essence  of  particular  things.  They  exist  only  as  moments  of  total 
processes,  and  whatever  identity  they  have  is  derived  solely  from  the 
process  of  self-relation.  But  the  self-relation,  being  a  process  of 
self-determination,  is  a  process  of  self-particularization,  or  self-dis- 
tinction. In  the  text,  Hegel  has  shown  the  implication  of  this  ex- 
ternal reflection,  which  treats  sameness  and  difference  as  subjective 
distinctions.  He  has  shown  that  in  all  cases  such  distinctions  imply 
each  other,  and  that  each  contains  within  itself  the  contrary  of  itself. 
They  are  distinctions  of  posited-being,  and  each  involves  duality  —  a 
duality  of  dependence  and  independence,  of  identity  and  distinction, 
of  self -relation  and  self-negation.) 

The  Positive  and  the  Negative  are  thus  the  two  extremes  of  the  an- 
tithesis which  have  become  independent  They  are  independent 
through  this  fact,  that  each  one  of  them  is  the  reflection  of  the  whole, 
of  the  totality,  into  itself,  and  they  belong  to  the  antithesis  in  so  far 
as  it  is  the  determinateness  which  is  reflected  into  itself  as  the  total- 
ity (the  positive  is  within  itself  the  antithesis  of  identity  and  distinc- 
tion, i.  e.,  it  is  itself  as  the  opposite  of  something  which  is  negative ; 
so  likewise  the  negative.  Hence,  since  each  is  the  antithesis,  each  is 
the  totality  including  the  other,  and  each  is  reflected  into  itself  through 


56  Essence. 

the  totality,  and  the  totality  is  the  "  determinateness,  which  is 
reflected  into  itself  as  totality  ").  On  account  of  their  independence 
they  constitute  an  antithesis  which  is  particularized  in  itself.  Each  is 
itself  and  its  other,  and  through  this  each  has  its  determinateness,  not 
in  and  through  another,  but  in  itself.  Each  relates  to  itself,  and  is 
only  self-relation  when  it  relates  to  its  other  (for  the  other  relates 
back  to  the  first,  and  thereby  produces  a  return  or  reflection).  This 
has  two  aspects ;  each  is  relation  to  its  non-being  as  a  cancelling  of 
this  other-being  in  itself ;  therefore,  its  non-being  is  only  an  element 
within  it.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  posited-beinghas  here  become 
a  being,  and  possesses  an  aspect  of  indifference.  Its  other,  which  each 
contains,  is,  therefore,  the  non-being  of  that  in  which  it  is  supposed 
to  be  contained  as  a  mere  element.  Each,  therefore,  is  only  in  so  far 
as  its  non-being  is,  and  therefore  its  being  as  a  totality  is  the  being 
of  its  non-being  (zwar  in  einer  identischen  Beziehung). 

The  determinations  which  constitute  the  positive  and  negative,  sus- 
tain themselves,  therefore,  through  this  fact,  that  the  positive  and  the 
negative  are,  in  the  first  place,  absolute  moments  or  elements  of  the 
antithesis.  Their  existence  is  one  undivided  reflection  ;  it  is  one  act 
of  mediation  in  which  each  exists  through  the  non-being  of  its  other, 
and,  hence,  through  its  other,  or  through  its  own  non-being.  Therefore 
they  are  contraries  in  general ;  in  other  words,  each  is  only  the  con- 
trary of  its  other,  and,  in  this  respect,  one  is  not  positive  and  the  other 
negative,  but  both  are  negative  to  each  other.  Each,  therefore,  ex- 
ists in  so  far  as  the  other  does.  It  is,  through  the  other  —  through 
its  own  non-being  —  what  it  is  ;  it  is  only  posited-being.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  in  so  far  as  the  other  is  not ;  it  is  through  the  non- 
being  of  its  other  that  it  exists ;  it  is  reflection  into  itself.  These  two 
phases  are,  however,  the  one  mediation  of  the  antithesis,  and  in  this 
they  are  only  posited  somewhats. 

But,  besides  this,  the  mere  posited-being  is  reflected  into  itself. 
The  positive  and  the  negative  are,  in  this  respect  —  according  to  ex- 
ternal reflection  —  indifferent  to  the  first  identity  in  which  they  are 
only  moments.  In  other  words,  since  that  first  reflection  belongs  to 
the  positive  and  the  negative  as  their  own  reflection  into  themselves, 
each  is  within  itself  its  own  posited-being,  and,  therefore,  each  is  in- 
different towards  (independent  of)  its  reflection  into  its  non-being 
and  towards  its  own  posited-being.  The  two  sides  are,  therefore 
merely  different  (i.  <?.,  are  distinguished  from  each  other,  without  rela- 
tion of  dependence),  and  in  so  far  as  their  determinateness  of  posi- 
tive and  negative  constitutes  their  posited-being  (relation  of  mutual 
dependence),  each  is  not  determined  in  itself  in  that  manner,  but  is 


Antithesis.  57 

only  detenninateness  in  general.  To  each  side  belongs,  therefore, 
one  of  the  detenninatenesses  of  positive  and  negative ;  bat  they  conk! 
be  interchanged,  and  each  side  is  of  such  a  kind  that  it  can  be  taken 
as  positive  or  as  negative. 

But  the  positive  and  the  negative  are  in  the  third  place  not  merely 
a  posited-being,  nor  merely  an  indifferent  being,  bat  their  posited- 
being  or  the  relation  which  each  has  to  the  other  within  one  unity  — 
which  unity  neither  one  is — is  recalled  from  each.  Each  is  within 
itself  both  positive  and  negative ;  the  positive  and  the  negative  are 
determinations  of  reflection,  each  per  se;  in  this  reflection  of  the  con- 
traries into  themselves  they  first  become  positive  and  negative,  prop- 
erly so  called.  The  positive  possesses  relation  to  the  other  within  its 
own  being,  in  as  much  as  the  other  contains  the  ddianmimatemess  of 
the  positive.  Likewise  the  negative  is  not  negative,  as  the  opposite 
of  another;  bat  it  has  the  detenninateness  through  which  it  is  nega- 
tive, within  itself. 

Therefore,  each  one  is  an  independent,  for-itsetf  existing  unity 
with  itself.  Although  the  positive  is  a  posited-being.  it  is  this  in 
such  a  manner,  that  the  posited-being  for  it  is  such  only  as  annulled. 
It  is  the  not-opposed  (not  in  an  antithesis,  not  a  contrary),  the 
annulled  antithesis,  bat  as  a  term  of  its  own  antithesis  (e.  g.  the 
positive,  containing  as  it  does  identity  and  distinction,  is  totality 
and,  therefore,  exists  as  its  own  element  or  as  part  and  whole  at  the 
same  time.  So  also  exists  the  negative  as  its  own  negative  and  posi- 
tive, or  totality.  The  nature  of  this  process  to  be  whole  and  part  of 
itself,  is  the  nature  of  the  universal  as  a  process  of  self-determination, 
to  be  general  or  generic,  and  special  or  particular  as  a  result  of  its 
own  process,  at  the  same  time.  All  self-activity  dirempts  or  dua- 
lizes itself  in  the  form  of  antithesis,  and  this  dualizing  process  is  the 
origin  of  all  particularity.  But  the  process  which  produces  particu- 
larity by  its  self-determination,  is  the  total  —  generic  —  universal). 
As  a  positive,  something  is  described  as  in  relation  to  another  bat  in 
such  a  relation  to  this  other,  that  it  is  not  a  posited  (dependent)  ;  it 
is  within,  itself  the  activity  of  reflection  which  negates  otherness. 
Bat  its  other,  the  negative,  is  also  no  posited-being  or  dependent  ele- 
ment, bat  an  independent  being.  Hence  the  negating  reflection  which 
belongs  to  the  positive,  must  exclude  from  itself,  tins,  its  non-being. 
Therefore  the  negative  as  absolute  reflection  is  not  the  immediate 
negative,  bat  the  negative  as  a  cancelled  posited-being.  The  nega- 
tive is  hi  and  for  itself,  and  the  positive  rests  upon  itself  alone.  As 
reflection  into  itself  it  negates  its  relation  to  another;  its  other  is  the 
positive,  an  independent  being.  Its  negative  relation  to  the  latter  is, 


58  Essence. 

therefore,  one  of  exclusion.  The  negative  is  an  opposite,  or  contrary, 
which  exists  independently,  although  opposed  to  the  positive  which  is 
the  determination  of  the  annulled  antithesis,  the  entire  antithesis  op- 
posed to  the  self-identical  posited  being. 

The  positive  and  the  negative  are,  consequently,  not  only  in  them- 
selves positive  and  negali've,  but  in  and  for  themselves  positive  and 
negative  (t.  e.,  not  only  by  nature,  but  as  realized  through  the  ac- 
tivtty  of  a  process).  "/n  themselves  "  they  are  positive  and  nega- 
tive in  so  far  as  their  excluding  their  other  is  not  considered,  but  each 
is  taken  only  in  its  own  determination.  Something  is  positive  or 
negative  "  in  itself"  when  it  is  thus  described  as  not  merely  in  opposi- 
tion to  another.  But  the  positive  or  negative  not  as  a  posited-being, 
and,  consequently,  not  as  antithetic,  would  be  the  immediate  —  being 
or  non-being.  But  the  positive  and  the  negative  are  the  elements  of 
antithesis ;  their  nature  consists  only  in  this  form  of  reflection  into 
themselves.  Something  is  positive  "in  itself  "  outside  of  its  relation 
to  the  negative,  and  something  is  negative  in  itself  outside  of  its  re- 
lation to  the  positive.  In  this  predication  a  close  regard  is  had  to  the 
abstract  phases  of  this  reflected-being.  But  the  positive  or  negative, 
as  existing  in  itself,  is  understood  to  be  that  which  is  opposed  to 
another,  and  not  merely  as  dependent  moment  nor  as  belonging  to 
the  comparison  (i.  e.,  objectively  relative),  but  to  be  the  determina- 
tion which  belongs  to  the  sides  of  the  antithesis.  They  are,  therefore, 
positive  or  negative  in  themselves,  not  outside  of  the  relation  to 
another,  but  this  relation  to  another  constitutes  their  very  nature,  or 
the  function  of  their  process,  and  in  fact  as  excluding.  In  this  pro- 
cess they  are,  therefore,  positive  or  negative  in  and  for  themselves  (i. 
e.,  and  at  the  same  time  independent). 

Remark. 

This  is  the  proper  place  to  refer  to  the  terms  "  positive  and  nega- 
tive," as  they  are  used  in  mathematics.  They  are  employed  as  well- 
known  expressions  needing  no  definition.  But  for  the  reason  that 
they  are  not  defined  accurately,  their  treatment  does  not  escape  inso- 
luble difficulties.  There  occur,  first,  the  two  concepts  of  positive  and 
negative  as  real  distinctions  —  apart  from  their  distinction  as  contra- 
ries. In  this  sense,  there  lies  at  the  basis  an  immediate  particular 
being,  taken  thus,  in  the  first  place,  as  mere  difference  —  dispar- 
ateness: the  simple  reflection  into  itself  is  distinguished  from  its 
posited-being  —  the  relation  of  opposition.  The  relation  of  opposi- 
tion is,  therefore,  taken  as  an  arbitrary  distinction,  as  something 


Antithesis.  59 

which  does  not  objectively  exist,  and  does  not  belong  to  die  disparate 
somewhats.  In  that  case,  each  one  may  be  regarded  as  an  opposite, 
or,  on  the  other  hand,  as  existing  independent] j.  And  it  is  a  matter 
of  indifference  which  of  the  two  things  is  regarded  as  positive  or  as 
negative.  The  second  view  which  one  may  take  of  the  positive  and 
negative,  regards  each  of  these  terms  as  essentially  antithetic ;  the  posi- 
tive as  in-itself  positive,  and  the  negative  as  in-iiself  negative,  in  such 
a  manner  that  the  two  different  somewhats  stand  in  essential  relation 
to  each  other.  These  two  views  of  the  positive  and  negative  are 
found  in  the  first  definitions  given  of  the  positive  and  negative  in 


The  -f-  a  and — a  are  in  the  first  place  opposite  magnitudes :  a  lies 
at  the  basis  of  each,  and  is  an  independent  unity  which  is  indifferent 
to  the  antithetic  relation ;  a  lifeless  substrate  if  no  further  determina- 
tion is  added.  The  — a  is  characterized  as  the  negative,  the  -f-  a  as 
the  positive,  and  each  is  treated  as  antithetic. 

Moreover,  a  itself  is  not  only  the  simple  unity  which  lies  at  the 
basis,  but,  as-|-a  and  —  a,  it  is  the  reflection  into-self  of  these  con- 
traries. There  are  two  different  a'*,  and  it  is  indifferent  which  of  the 
two  is  characterized  as  positive  or  as  negative.  Each  has  a  particular 
phase  of  persistence,  and  is  positive- 
According  to  the  first  view,  +y — y=  0 ;  or  in  the  expression —  8 
-|-3,  the  three  is  positive,  but  negative  as  regards  —  8.  The  contra- 
ries cancel  each  other  in  the  combination.  An  hour's  journey  towards 
the  East  and  a  similar  journey  back  towards  the  West  cancel  each 
other.  A  given  sum  of  liabilities  cancels  an  equal  amount  of  assets. 
And  whatever  assets  are  on  hand  balance  a  like  amount  of  liabilities. 
The  hour's  journey  towards  the  East  is  not  positive  as  regards  di- 
rection, nor  the  return  towards  the  West  negative ;  but  these  direc- 
tions are  indifferent  as  regards  the  terms  of  antithesis ;  they  become 
positive  and  negative  only  when  referred  to  a  third  point  of  view,  ex- 
ternal to  them.  So,  too,  the  liabilities  are  not  essentially  negative ; 
they  are  negative  only  in  relation  to  the  debtor;  for  the  creditor  they 
are  positive  assets ;  for  him  they  are  equivalent  to  a  sum  of  money, 
or  a  certain  definite  value  which  becomes  assets  or  liabilities  through 
an  external  standpoint. 

Contraries  cancel  each  other,  so  that  the  result  is  zero.  But  there 
is  a  relation  of  identity  in  them  and  in  this  relation  they  are  indiffer- 
ent to  the  antithesis ;  this  constitutes  the  unity  underlying  it.  The 
sum  of  money  mentioned  iJbove,  which  was  only  one  sum,  although 
from  one  point  of  view,  liabilities,  and  from  the  other  point,  assets, 
is  a  unity  of  this  kind ;  so,  also,  the  a  which  is  the  same  in  -f-  a 


60  Essence. 

and  —  a;  and  the  journey  which  travels  over  the  same  road,  and  not 
over  two  roads,  one  of  which  extends  to  the  East  and  the  other  to 
the  West.  In  like  manner  an  ordinate  y  is  the  same  whether  taken 
on  this  side  or  that  side  of  the  axis  ;  in  this  sense  -j-y  —  y  =  y.  It 
is  only  the  ordinate,  it  is  only  one  determination  and  its  law. 

From  another  point  of  view  the  contraries  are  not  one  independent 
somewhat  (i.  e.,  as  underlying  the  antithesis),  but  they  are  two  inde- 
pendent somewhats.  They  are  namely  as  opposed,  also  reflected 
into  themselves,  and  they  have  independent  subsistence  as  dis- 
parates. 

In  the  expression  —  8-J-3,  considered  in  this  manner,  there  are  11 
units  ;  -j-  y  —  y  are  ordinates  upon  opposite  sides  of  the  axis.  Each 
one  is  an  independent  being  opposed  to  this  limit,  and  opposed  to  the 
antithetic  relation;  therefore,  -\-y —  y  =  2  y.  Also,  the  journey  to 
the  East  and  back  to  the  West  over  the  same  road  is  the  sum  of  two 
exertions,  or  the  sum  of  two  periods  of  time.  Likewise  in  political 
economy,  a  quantity  of  money,  or  of  value,  is  not  merely  this  one 
quantity  as  a  means  of  subsistence,  but  it  has  a  two-fold  validity:  it 
is  means  of  subsistence  both  for  the  creditor  and  for  the  debtor. 
The  wealth  of  the  nation  includes  not  merely  the  cash,  and  besides 
this  the  value  of  real  and  personal  property  in  the  nation,  still  less 
what  remains  after  deducting  liabilities  from  assets ;  but  its  capital,, 
even  if  the  liabilities  and  assets  balance  each  other,  remains  positive 
capital ;  as  -|~  a  —  a  =  a ;  but,  in  the  second  place,  since  the  capital 
may  be  regarded  as  liabilities  over  and  over  again,  being  loaned  re- 
peatedly, it  becomes  a  multiplied  means. 

But  the  antithetic  quantities  are  not  merely  contraries  j  in  another 
respect  they  are  real  or  independent,  and  indifferent  to  each  other. 
But  whether  a  quantity  is  the  particular  being  with  indifferent 
limits  or  not,  the  positive  and  negative  belongs  to  it  potentially.  For 
example,  a,  in  so  far  as  it  has  no  sign  of  -\-  or  —  attached  to  it,  is 
taken  in  a  positive  sense  as  though  the  -j-  belonged  to  it.  But  if  it 
was  intended  to  be  a  contrary  only,  it  might  be  taken  as  —  a,  just  as 
well.  But  the  positive  sign  is  readily  given  it,  because  the  positive  is 
regarded  as  somewhat  which  is  identical  with  itself,  and  the  self-iden- 
tical is  the  immediate  independent,  that  which  is  not  in  a  relation 
of  antithesis  to  anything. 

Moreover,  when  positive  and  negative  magnitudes  are  added  or  sub- 
stracted  they  are  taken  for  such  as  would  be  positive  or  negative  by 
themselves,  and  not  as  though  this  distinction  depended  upon  the  oper- 
ation of  addition  or  subtraction.  In  the  expression,  8  —  (-^-3),  the 
first  minus  is  opposed  to  8,  but  the  second  minus,  ( — 3)  is  taken  as 


61 

though  the  3  were  negative  in  itself ,  independent  of  its  relation  within 
the  entire  expression. 

TUB  peculiarity  comes  out  more  dearly  in  multiplication  and  di- 
vision: in  these  operations  the  positive  is  essentially  not  antithetic, 
bat  the  negative,  on  the  contrary,  is  taken  as  antithetic.  The  ex- 
pressions positive  and  negative  are  not  taken  as  opposites  of  each 
other.  While  the  text-books,  in  their  demonstrations  of  the  mathe- 
matical operations  in  which  positive  and  negative  occur,  treat  them  in 
all  cases  as  contraries  they  mistake  their  nature,  and.  therefore,  in- 
volve themselves  in  contradictions.  Pirns  and  BUN*?,  in  the  operations 
of  multiplication  and  division,  obtain  this  more  specific  meaning  of 
positive  and  negative,  for  the  reason  that  the  relation  of  the  factors 
(which  are  that  of  sum  and  unity  —  Eimkttg  WJM!  AxzaJf-,1  —  i.  «?..  moi- 
tiplier  or  divisor  being  the  "  sum,"  or  the  how-many-times,  and  the 
multiplicand  or  quotient  being  the  "  unity."  or  the  that- whit  Ii- is  re- 
peated), is  not  a  relation  of  mere  increase  and  diminution,  as  is  found 
in  addition  and  subtraction,  but  it  is  a  qualitative  relation :  where- 
fore pirns  and  mimms  receive  the  qualitative  meaning  of  positive  and 
negative.  Unless  this  distinction  is  kept  in  mind  it  is  easy  to  show, 
on  the  supposition  that  these  are  mere  antithetic  magnitudes,  that  if 
the  product  of  —  a  into  -\-a  is  — a  *.  conversely,  the  product  of  -f-a 
into — a  wffl  be  +  a*,  obviously  a  false  conclusion.  When  the  one 
factor  is  taken  as  sum  (how-many-times),  and  the  other  factor  is 
taken  as  unity  (the  unit  of  repetition)  — and  the  first  factor  is  usually 
written  first  in  the  expression — the  two  expressions  ( — »i)  X  (-J-  a) 
and  (+a)  X  ( — a)  differ  in  this  respect:  in  the  former,  -|-  a  is  the 
*•  unity,"  and  —  a  the  "•  sum,"  and  in  the  other  the  converse  is  true. 
In  explaining  the  former  it  is  customary  to  say:  •*  If  I  take -j-a, — a 
times,  then  I  take  +  a  not  merely  a  times,  but  at  the  same  time  in  a 
negative  manner,  i.  e,,  +  a  times — a;  hence  the  -jh  a  has  to  be  taken 


negatively,  and  the  product  is  — a*.  Now,  in  the  second  case,  if — a 
is  to  be  taken -{-a  times,  then  —  a  ought  likewise  to  be  taken  not — a 
times,  but  in  the  opposite  relation,  viz.:  -j-a  times:  if  the  pirns  sign 
indicated  antithetic  relation,  the  reasoning  which  holds  good  in  the 
case  of  the  negative  multiplier  would  prove  here  in  the  case  of  a  posi- 
tive multiplier  that  the  product  should  be  Hh  a2.  The  same  remark 
applies  to  division.  (But  Hegel  holds,  as  above  shown,  that  in  mul- 
tiplication and  division  the  mtmm*  sign  indicates  a  negative  quantity, 
Hfgatite  having  the  sense  of  contrary;  while  the  fiux  sign  does  not 
indicate  a  positive  quantity,  i.  e.,  -positive  "  in  the  sense  of  a  term  of 

This  consequence  (that  a  jfo*  multiplier  should  give  as  product  a 


62  Essence. 

positive  result,  while  a  negative  multiplier  gives  a  negative  result),  is 
a  necessary  one,  provided  that  -f-  and  —  are1  taken  as  indicating 
antithetic  magnitudes  (as  they  are  taken  in  the  demonstrations  usually 
found  in  text-books).  To  minus  is  ascribed  the  power  of  changing 
the  plus;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  no  such  power  of  changing  minus 
is  ascribed  to  plus,  notwithstanding  plus  is  looked  upon  as  an  anti- 
thetic quantity  just  as  much  as  minus  is.  In  fact,  plus  does  not  pos- 
sess this  power  of  changing  minus,  because  it  is  here  taken  in  its 
qualitative  relation  to  minus,  inasmuch  as  the  factors  have  a  qualitative 
relation  to  each  other.  Hence,  in  so  far  as  the  negative  is  here  taken 
as  antithetic,  the  positive,  on  the  other  hand,  is  taken  as  indetermin- 
ate, indifferent.  The  plus  is,  indeed,  also,  the  negative,  but  the 
negative  of  the  minus,  not  the  in-itself-negative  as  the  minus  is. 
Hence,  the  negative  effect  of  changing  the  sign  of  the  unity  (multi- 
plicand) appertains  to  the  minus  and  not  to  the  plus. 

Therefore  —  a  into  —  a  gives  -|-  a2,  for  the  reason  that  the  negative 
a  is  not  to  be  taken  merely  as  antithetic  (for  it  would  be  thus  taken 
if  multiplied  by  minus  a)  but  because  it  is  to  be  taken  negatively. 
The  negation  of  negation  is  the  positive. 

c. 

Contradiction. 

(I.)' Distinction  contains  its  twosides  as  moments;  in  the  phase  of 
difference  (disparateness)  they  are  sundered  and  indifferent  towards 
each  other ;  in  the  phase  of  antithesis,  these  moments  are  sides,  each, 
one  of  which  is  determined  through  the  other,  so  that  they  are  recip- 
rocally complemental  elements.  They  are,  however,  likewise  deter- 
mined in  themselves  (as  well  as  through  each  other),  and,  therefore, 
indifferent  towards  each  other,  and  at  the  same  time  reciprocally 
excluding  each  other.  These  are  the  independent  determinations  of 
Reflection. 

The  one  is  the  positive,  the  other  the  negative ;  the  former,  how- 
ever, as  the  in-itself  positive,  the  latter  as  the  in-itself  negative. 
Each  one  possesses  this  indifference  and  independence  for-and-by- 
itself  through  the  fact  that  it  has  the  relation  to  its  other  moment,  in 
itself;  in  this  manner  it  is  the  entire  antithesis  —  including  both 
moments  in  itself.  (It  was  shown  that  the  identity  was  a  phase  of 
activity  of  the  entire  process  of  self-difference,  and  that  difference 
was  another  phase  of  the  same  process.  The  "  positive  "  is  this  pro- 
cess looked  upon  as  self-determined  in  the  form  of  identity,  while  the 
negative  is  the  same  in  the  form  of  difference).  Each  moment,  as- 


Contradiction.  63 

this  entire  process  is  mediated  through  its  other  within  itself,  and 
contains  the  same.  But  it  is  mediated,  also,  through  the  non-being 
of  its  other,  within  itself ;  hence,  it  is  a  unity  existing  for  itself  (as 
independent),  and  it  excludes  the  other  from  itself. 

Since  the  independent  determination  of  reflection  excludes  the  other, 
and  in  the  same  respect  in  which  it  contains  it,  and  thereby  is  inde- 
pendent, it  follows  that  it  excludes  its  independence  from  itself  in  the 
very  attitude  in  which  it  is  independent.  For  this  independence  con- 
sists in  the  fact  that  it  contains  the  other  determination  within  itself, 
and  has,  through  this  very  circumstance,  no  relation  to  an  external 
somewhat ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  this  independence  consists  also 
in  the  fact  that  it  is  itself,  and  excludes  from  itself  its  negative 
determination.  In  this,  it  is  CONTRADICTION. 

Distinction  is  always  contradiction,  at  least  implicitly.  For  it  is 
the  unity  of  moments  which  are  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  not  on«, 
and  it  is  the  separation  of  moments  which  are  separated  only  as  exist- 
ing terms  of  the  same  relation.  But  when  distinction  develops  into 
positive  and  negative,  we  have  the  contradiction  as  posited ;  because 
they,  as  negative  unities,  are  the  positing  of  themselves,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  each  one  of  them  is  the  cancelling  of  itself  and  the  positing 
of  its  opposite.  They  constitute  the  determining  reflection  as  an  exclud- 
ing reflection ;  because  the  act  of  exclusion  is  one  of  distinguishin?, 
and  each  of  the  terms  distinguished,  as  also  excluding,  is  the  entire 
process  of  exclusion,  and  hence  each,  within  its  own  activity, 
excludes  itself. 

The  two  independent  determinations  of  reflection,  considered  by 
themselves,  are  the  following:  (a)  the  positive  is  the  posited-being 
as  reflected  into  identity  with  itself ;  and  this  is  the  posited- being 
which  is  not  relation  to  another,  and  is,  therefore,  independent  sub- 
sistence, in  so  far  as  the  posited-being  is  cancelled  and  excluded 
from  it.  With  this,  however,  the  positive  enters  into  relation  to  a 
non-being  —  to  a  posited-being.  It  is.  therefore,  contradiction  in  that 
as  the  positing  of  identiry-with-itself  through  the  act  of  excluding 
the  negative,  it  makes  itself  into  a  negative  somewhat,  and,  therefore, 
into  another,  which  it  excludes  from  itself.  This  other  is,  as  excluded, 
posited  as  independent  of  that  which  excludes  it ;  hence,  as  reflected 
into  itself  and  self-excluding.  Therefore,  the  excluding  reflection  is 
the  positing  of  the  positive  as  excluding  the  other,  and,  therefore, 
this  positing  is  immediately  the  positing  of  its  other  which  excludes 
it.  This  is  the  absolute  contradiction  of  the  positive,  but  it  is  at  the 
same  time,  also,  the  absolute  contradiction  of  the  negative,  for  the 
one  reflection  posits  both. 


64  Essence. 

(b)  The  negative  considered  for-and-by  itself  as  the  contrary  of 
the  positive,  is  the  posited-being  as  reflected  into  non-identity  with 
itself,  i.  e.,  the  negative  as  negative.  But  the  negative  is  itself  the 
non-identical,  i.  e.,  the  non-being  of  another;  consequently  the  re- 
flection in  its  non-identity  is  rather  its  relation  to  itself.  Negation  in 
the  first  place  is  the  negative  as  quality,  or  as  immediate  determinate- 
ness  ;  but  the  negative  as  negative,  is  the  same,  as  related  to  the  nega- 
tive of  itself,  i.  e.,  to  its  other.  If  this  negative  is  taken  as  identical 
with  the  former  (qualitative)  negative,  it  is  then  only  an  immediate 
negative,  in  which  case  it  would  not  be  taken  as  other  opposed  to 
other,  consequently  not  as  negative  at  all ;  the  negative  is  not  an  imme- 
diate. Furthermore,  since  each  one  is  the  same  that  the  other  is,  this 
relation  of  the  non-identical  somewhats  is  at  the  same  time  an  identi- 
cal relation. 

This  (the  negative)  is,  therefore,  the  same  contradiction  that  the 
positive  is,  namely,  posited-being,  or  negation  as  relation  to  itself  (i. 
e.,  dependence  which  is  dependence  on  itself).  But  the  positive  is 
only  potentially  this  contradiction ;  the  negative,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  the  posited  contradiction ;  for  in  its  reflection  into  itself,  in  which 
it  is  for-itself  negative,  or  identical  with  itself  as  negative,  it  is  non- 
identical  or  the  exclusion  of  identity.  While  it  is  in  opposition  to 
identity  it  is  identical  with  itself,  and  hence,  through  its  excluding- 
reflection  it  is  the  exclusion  of  itself  from  itself. 

The  negative  is,  therefore,  the  entire  movement  —  the  antithesis 
which  is  self-antithesis ;  the  distinction  which  does  not  relate  to 
another  but  only  to  itself;  it  excludes,  as  antithesis,  identity  from 
itself ;  and  consequently  it  excludes  itself,  for  as  relation  to  itself  it 
determines  itself  in  the  form  of  identity  which  it  excludes. 

(2)  Contradiction  cancels  itself. 

In  the  self-excluding  reflection  which  has  been  considered,  the  posi- 
tive and  the  negative  cancel  —  each  itself  in  its  independence  ;  each  is 
nothing  but  the  transition,  or  rather  the  translation,  of  itself  into  its 
opposite.  This  ceaseless  vanishing  of  the  opposites  is  the  first  unity 
in  which  the  contradiction  results.  It  is  that  of  zero. 

Contradiction  contains,  however,  not  merely  the  negative,  but  also 
the  positive ;  in  other  words,  the  self-excluding  reflection  is,  at  the 
same  time,  the  positing  reflection  ;  hence,  the  result  of  the  contradic- 
tion is  not  merely  zero.  The  positive  and  negative  constitute  the 
posited-being  of  independence ;  their  negation  through  themselves 
cancels  the  posited-being  of  the  independence.  It  is  this  posited- 
being  which  is  annulled  (geht  zu  Grund)  in  contradiction. 

Reflection  into  itself,  through  which  the  sides  of  the  antithesis  are 


Contradiction.  65 

reduced  to  independent  self-relations,  is,  in  the  first  place,  their  inde- 
pendence as  separate  moments.  They  are,  therefore,  only  potentially 
this  independence,  for  they  are  still  in  opposition  to  each  other,  and 
this  potential  or  implicit  state  which  belongs  to  them  is  their  posited- 
b?ing.  But  their  excluding  reflection  cancels  this  posited-being,  and 
reduces  them  to  independent  somewhats —  f.  e.,  to  somewhats  that 
exist,  not  only  in  potentia  but,  to  such  as  through  their  negative  rela- 
tion to  their  others,  are  independent.  Their  independence  becomes 
posited  in  this  way.  But  they  still  reduce  themselves  to  a  posited- 
being  through  this  positing  which  they  have.  They  cancel  them- 
selves, in  that  they  determine  themselves  into  self-identical  some- 
whats, but  in  the  same,  being  still  negative  —  a  self-identity  which 
is  a  relation  to  another. 

But  this  excluding  reflection  is  not  merely  this  formal  determina- 
tion. It  is  excluding  independence,  and  is  the  annulling  of  this 
posited-being,  and  through  this  annulling  it  becomes  for  itself,  and  in 
fact,  a  truly  independent  unity.  Through  the  annulling  of  the  other- 
being,  the  posited-being  again  makes  its  appearance  as  the  negative  of 
another.  But,  in  fact,  this  negation  is  not  again  a  merely  first, 
immediate  relation  to  another,  not  a  posited-being  as  cancelled 
.immediateness,  but  as  cancelled  posited-being.  The  excluding  reflec- 
tion which  belongs  to  independence,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  exclud- 
ing, becomes  a  posited-being,  but  is  at  the  same  time  a  cancelling  of 
its  posited-being.  It  is  a  cancelling  relation  to  itself.  It  annuls  in 
this  relation,  first,  the  negative  ;  secondly,  it  posits  itself  as  negative, 
and  thereby  becomes  the  very  negative  which  it  cancels :  in  the  annul- 
ling of  the  negative  it  posits  it  and  annuls  it  at  the  same  time.  This 
activity  of  exclusion  is,  therefore,  the  other  whose  negation  it  is ;  the 
annulment  of  this  posited-being  is,  therefore,  not  again  posited-being 
in  the  sense  that  it  is  a  negative  of  another,  but  it  is  the  identification 
with  itself,  a  posited  unity  with  itself.  Independence  is,  therefore, 
through  its  own  negation,  unity  which  returns  into  itself  through  the 
circumstance  that  it  returns  into  itself  by  negating  its  posited-being. 
It  is  the  unity  of  Essence,  a  unity  which  arises,  not  through  the  nega- 
tion of  another,  but  through  a  negation  of  itself,  being  through  this 
act  self-identical. 

(3.)  According  to  this  positive  side  of  the  question,  and  through 
the  fact  that  the  independence  which  we  find  in  the  Antithesis  has 
reduced  itself,  through  its  excluding  activity  of  reflection,  to  posited- 
being,  and  at  the  same  time  annulled  this  posited-being,  the  Antithe- 
sis has  not  only  been  destroyed,  but  has  gone  back  into  its  ground. 

5 


66  Essence. 

The  excluding  activity  of  reflection  which  appertains  to  an  independ- 
ent contrary  makes  it  a  negative,  and  therefore  a  mere  posited 
somewhat.  Through  this  it  reduces  its  determinations,  which  at  first 
have  the  phase  of  independence  (the  positive  and  negative),  to  mere 
determinations  —  (i.  e.,  to  dependence).  Since  the  posited-being 
is  by  this  means  made  to  become  posited-being,  it  returns  into  unity 
with  itself  (its  becoming  is  a  becoming  of  itself ;  herein  the  circular 
movement  of  reflection  makes  itself  manifest) ;  it  is  the  simple 
essence,  but  the  simplicity  of  essence  in  this  phase  is  the  category  of 
Ground,  or  Eeason  (Grund).  Through  the  annulling  of  the  self-con- 
tradictory determinations  of  essence,  we  have  the  restoration  of  the 
simplicity  of  essence,  but  as  an  excluding  unity  of  reflection.  This  is 
a  simple  unity  which  determines  itself  as  negative,  but  in  this  posited- 
being  is  immediately  self-identical. 

The  independent  Antithesis,  through  its  contradiction,  is  cancelled, 
and  results  in  a  ground  which  is  the  first  immediate  whence  issued  the 
antithesis ;  the  annulled  antithesis,  or  the  annulled  posited-being,  i& 
itself  a  posited-being.  Hence,  essence  as  ground  is  a  posited-being,  a 
result  which  has  become.  But,  conversely,  only  this  has  resulted : 
that  the  antithesis,  or  the  posited-being,  is  annulled  or  only  as  posited- 
being.  Essence  is,  therefore,  as  ground,  this  excluding  reflection, 
which  makes  itself  a  posited-being,  so  that  the  antithesis  with  which 
it  began,  and  which  was  immediate,  is  only  the  posited,  definite  inde- 
pendence of  essence,  and  that  at  the  same  time  it  is  only  the  self- 
annulling  ;  but  essence  is  reflected  into  itself  in  its  determinateness. 
Essence  as  ground  excludes  itself  from  itself,  and  thereby  posits 
itself.  Its  posited-being,  which  is  that  which  is  excluded,  is  only  as 
posited-being,  as  identity  of  the  negative  with  itself.  This  independ- 
ent somewhat  is  the  negative,  posited  as  negative.  It  is  a  self- 
contradictory  which,  therefore,  remains  immediately  in  essence  as  its 
ground.  (Posited-being  is  the  immediate  being  which  has  shown 
itself  to  be  transitory  or  dependent  upon  something  else ;  this  de- 
pendence, traced  out,  is  found  to  be  a  relation  to  that  wh>ch  posits  it, 
again ;  so  the  dependence  is  a  dependence  on  its  own  dependence, 
and  this  is  independence  ;  or,  in  the  language  of  the  text,  the  posited- 
being  is  an  "annulled  posited-being,"  being  annulled  through  this 
very  self-relation ;  it  is  a  posited-being  which  is  annulled  by  being 
posited,  again,  as  posited-being;  i.  e.,  its  dependence  is  cancelled  by 
being  made  self-dependent.  N.  B.  It  is  only  the  tracing  out  of  the 
entire  relation  which  changes  the  aspect  of  the  category  here  in- 
volved.) 


Contradiction.  67 

The  annulled  contradiction  is,  therefore,  the  ground ;  it  is  essence 
as  the  unity  of  positive  and  negative ;  in  antithesis,  determination  at- 
tains to  independence,  but  its  independence  is  perfected  in  the  cate- 
gory of  Ground.  The  negative  is  developed  into  independent  essence 
in  it,  but  still  as  negative.  Therefore,  it  is  at  the  same  time  the  posi- 
tive, while  it  is  self-identical  in  this  negativity.  The  antithesis  aud- 
its contradiction  are,  therefore,  annulled  in  the  category  of  Ground, 
as  well  as  preserved.  Ground  is  essence  as  positive  identity  with. 
itself ;  but  it  at  the  same  time  relates  to  itself  as  negativity,  and,  there- 
fore, determines  itself,  and  becomes  the  excluded  posited-beiu^. 
This  posited-being,  however,  is  the  wholly  independent  essence  ;  and 
the  essence  is  ground  through  the  fact  that  in  this,  its  negation,  it  is 
self-identical  and  positive.  The  self-contradicting,  independent  an- 
tithesis was,  therefore,  ground  already.  There  was  added  only  the 
determination  of  unity  with  itself.  This  (unity)  made  its  appearance 
through  the  fact  that  the  independent  opposites  cancelled  each  itself r 
and  each  became  its  other,  and  consequently  was  annulled.  But  in 
that  annulment  each  one  came  into  self-identity;  and,  therefore, 
proved  itself  to  be  self-identical  essence,  a  somewhat  reflected  into 
itself,  even  in  its  destruction,  in  its  posited-being,  or  self -negation. 

Remark  1. 

The  positive  and  the  negative  are  the  same.  This  expression 
belongs  to  external  reflection  in  so  far  as  it  institutes  a  comparison  of 
these  two  determinations  ;  but  the  question  is  not  what  the  relation  is 
between  two  categories,  as  found  by  external  comparison ;  they  must 
be  considered  in  themselves,  and  their  own  reflection  discovered.  And 
in  the  case  of  these  two  categories,  we  have  seen  that  each  is  essen- 
tially the  manifestation  of  itself  in  the  other,  and  the  positing  itself  as 
the  other. 

The  thinking  which  deals  with  images  (  Fors/eZZen),  does  not  con- 
sider the  positive  and  negative  in  themselves,  and  has  recourse  to  the 
act  of  comparison  in  order  to  seize  these  distinctions,  which  are  evanes- 
cent, but  which  it  nevertheless  holds  to  be  fixed  and  abiding  opposites 
to  each  other.  A  very  little  experience  in  the  habits  of  reflecting- 
thiuking  will  suffice  to  convince  one  that  when  it  defines  a  somewhat 
as  positive,  it  will  often  invert  the  same  into  negative  upon  very 
slight  pretexts ;  and,  conversely,  what  it  has  defined  as  negative,  into 
positive.  The  reflecting-thinking  falls  into  confusion  and  self-con- 
tradiction hi  dealing  with  these  categories.  To  one  who  is  ignorant 
of  the  nature  of  these  categories,  it  looks  as  though  this  confusion 
were  something  improper,  and  which  ought  not  to  happen ;  it  there- 


68  Essence. 

fore  ascribes  it  to  subjective  incompetency.  This  transition  of  one 
contrary  into  the  other  does,  in  fact,  produce  mere  confusion  so  long 
as  the  necessity  for  the  transformation  has  not  been  seen.  It  is, 
however,  even  for  external  reflection,  a  matter  of  simple  observation 
that  the  positive  is  not  a  somewhat  immediately  identical  with  itself, 
but  it  is  opposed  to  a  negative,  and  has  significance  only  in  this  rela- 
tion ;  therefore,  the  negative  itself  is  involved  in  the  positive ;  and, 
more  than  this,  the  positive  is  the  self-relating  negation  of  the  nega- 
tive, which  is  the  mere  posited-being ;  therefore,  the  positive  is  the 
absolute  negation  in  itself.  Likewise  the  negative,  which  is  opposed 
to  the  positive,  has  its  meaning  in  this  relation  to  its  other.  Its 
totality,  therefore,  involves  the  positive.  But  the  negative  has  also  — 
outside  of  its  relation  to  the  positive  —  a  subsistence  of  its  own  ;  it 
is  self-identical.  Hence  the  negative  has  all  that  belongs  to  the  defi- 
nition of  the  positive. 

The  opposition  of  positive  and  negative  is  most  commonly  under- 
stood in  the  sense  that  the  positive  is  something  objective,  notwith- 
standing its  very  name  expresses  posited-being.  On  the  contrary,  it 
understands  the  negative,  in  a  subjective  sense,  as  belonging  only  to 
external  reflection,  which  never  concerns  itself  with  the  objective  ;  and, 
indeed,  for  which  the  objective  does  not  exist.  In  fact,  if  the  nega- 
tive expresses  nothing  else  than  an  arbitrary  abstraction,  or  the  result 
of  an  external  comparison,  then,  of  course,  it  has  no  existence  for  the 
objective  positive,  and  the  positive  is  not  in  itself  related  to  such  an 
empty  abstraction.  But  in  that  case  the  determination  of  "  positive" 
is  likewise  merely  an  external  and  arbitrary  designation.  For  an  ex- 
ample of  these  fixed  contraries  of  reflection :  light  is  generally  taken 
as  the  positive,  and  darkness  as  the  negative.  But  light  has  in  its 
infinite  expansion,  and  in  the  force  of  its  unfolding  and  vitalizing  in- 
fluences, the  nature  of  absolute  negativity.  Darkness,  on  the  con- 
trary, as  devoid  of  multiplicity,  or  as  the  womb  of  productive  ac- 
tivity, in  which  no  distinctions  are  produced  by  its  own  energy,  is 
rather  the  simple  identity  with  itself,  the  positive.  It  is  taken  as 
negative  in  the  sense  that  it,  as  the  mere  absence  of  light,  does  not  ex- 
ist at  all,  and  has  no  relation  to  light ;  so  that  light,  inasmuch  as  it  is 
a  self-relation,  and  is  regarded  as  not  depending  upon  others,  but  as 
related  purely  to  itself,  should  cause  darkness  to  vanish  before  it. 
But  it  is  a  familiar  fact  that  light  may  be  dimmed  through  the  agency 
of  darkness,  so  that  it  becomes  gray ;  and  besides  this  merely  quanti- 
tative change  into  gray,  it  also  suffers  qualitative  changes  through 
relation  to  darkness,  and  is  modified  into  color.  So,  too,  for  an  ex- 
ample :  virtue  is  not  without  struggle  ;  it  is  rather  the  highest,  most 


;.-:,::  ;;.:"__-,  .  :- :-:::-.  .:  ->  :.::  M'.J  :-  ro^tlre,  but  it  i=  abso- 
lote  negativity.  Virtue,  Boreover,  B  not  sncfa  nwrely  in  comparison 
with  Tin-,  bat  it  is  in  its  very  nature  opposite  ai  atraggliBg.  In 
other  words,  vine  m  not  only  the  atafam  of  liitnc — innocence,  too, 
BthB  absence — andnotdistinginshedftomTirtne  bye£tjernal  Te&ec- 
ioo^lralilkuiite^^Mlareo|j|ios^U>it;  itisw^L  EvSeonsists 
in  seff-pecntence  in  active  immiliiB  to  good;  it  is  the  positive 
:  is  the  «^T«"*"f>  off  good  as  well  as  of  e  viL 
feAernunations,,  and  is  aaeither  positive  nor 
Bat  at  the  sanvs  tine  Oil  •lainiii  is  to  be  taken  also  as 
Onltoonehand,itisto!!«:regardeda5  the  positive 
on  the  other  hand,  it  relates  to  a  contrary ; 
2  —  from  their  in- 
relation  to  their 

;  go  to  destroetaon,  or,  in  the  positive  sense,  go 
bo  is  1t2ae  positive,  as  the  knowing 
i  it  B  only  tihis  self -identity  in  so 
towrards  its  other,  pene- 

;  object,  and  cancels  its  negation  (for  tike  object  is  the  nega- 
of  the  subject).      Error  B  mnn<  Iliiin^,  positive,  as  an  opinion 

i  does  not  exist.     Ignorance, 

r,  is  either  indifferent  towards  troth  and  error,  and.  conse- 
poaatiwe  nor  niflilin,  in  vMch  case  the  distinction. 


of  a  person,  it  is  the  npulse  whieh  B  dnccted  against  itself,  a  nega- 

tiNne  which  containig  a  positive  duecliuu  hi  itself.  It  is  one  of  the 
most  important  principle*  of  philosophy,  tMs  insagfci  into  the  nature 
of  the  determinations  of  lenection,  as  here  considered ;  that  their 
troth  consists  only  m  their  relation  to  each  other,  aaad  that  each  in- 
dndes  (in  its  totafity)  the  other.  Without  tMs  princ^plte  tSaere  can 
be  no  tme  step  Bade 


.     ,   "  .  ...      .  .        _.'.:.,,..  .  _•    "  ^     '  ..    *  .    : 

BeitherAornott-A;  ftereisno 

,  in  the  irst  place,  the  proposition  that  every- 


(£.  «.,  the  tottBiy  of  each  inclndes  tie 


70  Essence. 

But  it  is  not  usual  to  take  these  determinations  in  this  meaning. 
Ordinarily,  the  principle  is  understood  to  assert  that  of  the  predicates 
belonging  to  a  thing,  a  given  predicate  either  does  or  does  not  belong 
to  it.  The  opposite  signifies  in  this  case  merely  absence,  or,  rather, 
indeftniteness ;  and  the  principle  taken  in  this  sense  is  so  empty  of 
meaning  that  it  is  not  worth  the  trouble  of  quoting.  If  the  qualities 
siceet,  green,  square  are  taken  —  and  all  predicates  are  allowable  by 
this  principle  —  and  predicated  of  the  mind  thus :  the  mind  is  sweet 
•or  not  sweet,  green  or  not  green,  etc. ,  this  would  be  pronounced  trivial, 
and  as  leading  to  nothing.  The  determinateness  contained  in  the 
predicate  is  related  to  something ;  every  proposition  expresses  that 
something  is  determined.  It  ought  essentially  to  contain  this :  that 
the  determinateness  expresses  what  is  essential,  in  the  form  of  antithe- 
sis. Instead  of  that,  however,  the  proposition  quoted  goes  in  the 
opposite  direction,  back  toindeterminateness,  in  the  fact  that  it  predi- 
cates in  a  trivial  manner  the  determinateness,  or  its  indefinite  non- 
being. 

The  principle  of  Excluded  Middle  is  further  to  be  distinguished 
from  the  principles  of  Identity  and  Contradiction,  already  discussed. 
It  asserts  that  there  is  no  thing  which  is  neither  A  nor  not- A,  no 
tertium  quid  indifferent  to  the  antithesis.  In  fact,  however,  this  very 
principle  gives  a  tertium  quid  which  is  indifferent  to  the  antithesis  — 
viz. :  A,  itself.  This  A  is  neither  -(-  A  nor  —  A,  and  it  is  equally  -j-  A 
and  — A.  That  which  is  to  be  either  -f-  A  or  not-A  is  hence  related 
to  -|-  A,  as  well  to  not-A;  and,  again,  in  the  fact  that  it  is  related  to 
A  it  ought  not  to  be  related  to  not-A,  nor  when  it  is  related  to  not-A 
should  it  be  related  to  A.  The  somewhat  itself  is,  therefore,  the 
tertium  quid  which  was  to  be  excluded.  Since  the  contraries  are 
both  posited  and  annulled  in  the  somewhat,  the  tertium  quid,  which 
is  here  a  lifeless  abstraction,  if  taken  in  a  more  profound  meaning, 
is  the  unity  of  reflection  into  which,  as  the  ground,  the  Antithesis 
recedes. 

Remark  3. 

If  the  first  determinations  of  Reflection,  viz.,  Identity,  Difference, 
and  Antithesis  (Polarity),  can  be  set  up  as  principles,  as  has  been 
shown,  it  is  certain  that  Contradiction  ought  also  to  admit  of  state- 
ment in  the  form  of  a  principle ;  for  contradiction  is  the  result  of 
the  mentioned  determinations  of  reflection  (£.  e.,  the  truth  or  totality 
of  which  Identity,  Difference,  and  Antithesis  are  phases.  Contra- 
diction is  their  "  pre-supposition"),  and  if  stated  in  the  form  of  a 
principle  would  run  thus :  All  things  are  in  themselves  contradic- 


Contradiction.  71 

tory;  and  this  principle  should  be  understood  in  the  sense  that  it 
expresses  the  truth  and  essence  of  things  better  than  the  former 
principles  mentioned.  Contradiction,  which  succeeds  the  category 
of  Antithesis,  is  only  the  category  of  Naught,  fully  unfolded  (become 
explicit)  — the  category  of  Naught  as  contained  in  the  category  of 
Identity;  and  this  was  partially  seen  in  the  expression  that  the 
principle  of  Identity  says  nothing  (adds  nothing  in  the  predicate  to 
the  contents  of  the  subject).  This  negation  was  further  defined  in 
the  categories  of  Difference  and  Antithesis,  and  still  further  in  the 
posited  Contradiction.  (The  principle  of  Contradiction  as  here  set 
up  by  Hegel,  is  the  basis  of  all  relation  and  of  all  being.  Being  has 
been  found  to  depend  upon  Relation,  and  all  Relation  has  been  found 
to  be  Return  or  Reflection ;  Reflection  is  a  phase  of  self-relation  or  of 
self-negation ;  all  relation  is  negation ;  self-relation  or  self-negation 
is  the  origin  at  once  of  all  identity,  subsistence,  persistence,  repose, 
and  individuality,  as  well  as  of  all  distinction,  opposition,  activity, 
dependence,  and  manifestation.  Contradiction  makes  explicit  what 
was  implicit  in  the  determinations  of  Reflection  previously  discussed. 
"  All  things  are  in  themselves  contradictory,"  means  nothing  more 
nor  less  than  that  all  finite  or  dependent  things,  when  traced  out 
as  totalities,  will  be  found  to  belong  to  self-relation,  self-determina- 
tion, self-negation.  And  all  independent  things  are  self-determining 
and  totalities.) 

It  is,  however,  one  of  the  fundamental  prejudices  of  the  formal 
logic  and  of  the  ordinary  mode  of  viewing  things,  that  Contradiction 
is  not  a  determination  of  such  essential  and  immanent  character  as 
that  possessed  by  Identity.  Yet,  if  order  of  rank  is  the  question, 
and  the  two  determinations  are  to  be  compared  as  separately  valid, 
Contradiction  will  certainly  be  found  to  be  the  deeper  and  more 
essential.  For  Identity  is  in  comparison  with  Contradiction  only  a 
determination  expressing  simple  immediateness,  the  immediateness 
-of  dead  being ;  but  Contradiction,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  root  of 
all  activity  and  vitality  (self-movement  is  the  basis  of  all  movement, 
for  no  thing  can  move  another  until  it  originates  movement  within 
itself;  but  self-movement  is  self-negation,  contradiction).  Only  in 
so  far  as  something  contains  a  contradiction  within  itself,  does  it 
move  itself,  and  possess  impulse  and  activity. 

Contradiction  is  usually  held  to  be  excluded  from  things,  from  all 
existence  and  from  all  truth.  In  fact,  it  is  asserted  that  there  is 
nothing  self-contradictory ;  on  the  other  hand,  regardless  of  this 
assertion,  Contradiction  is  thrust  into  the  subjective  reflection  which 
posits  it  through  its  act  of  relating  and  comparing.  (The  activity  of 


72  Essence. 

reflection  brings  disparate  objects  into  relation  and  compares  them ; 
it  thereby  unites  contradictories.)  But  it  is  denied  that  Contradiction 
really  exists  in  this  subjective  activity  of  reflection ;  for  it  is  said  that 
the  self-contradictory  cannot  be  conceived  or  thought.  If  it  were 
found  in  reality,  or  in  the  thinking  reflection,  it  would  pass  for  an 
accident  or  for  something  abnoi'mal,  or  a  transitory  state  of  delirium. 

Now,  as  regards  the  assertion  that  there  is  no  Contradiction,  and 
that  it  cannot  appertain  to  reality,  we  need  not  give  ourselves  any 
concern.  A  category  of  Essence  will  certainly  be  found  in  all  experi- 
ence, and  in  all  reality  as  well.  Already,  when  speaking  of  the  cate- 
gory of  the  Infinite,  we  have  made  the  same  remark ;  and  indeed 
Contradiction  is  the  category  of  the  Infinite  as  occurring  in  the 
sphere  of  Being  (i.  e.,  Contradiction  is  self-determination  in  the 
category  of  Essence,  and  the  Infinite  is  the  category  of  self-determi- 
nation in  the  sphere  of  Being).  But  even  common  experience  iteelf 
bears  testimony  to  the  fact  that  there  are  a  multitude  of  self-contra- 
dictory things,  of  self-contradictory  plans,  and  so  forth,  whose  self- 
contradiction  is  not  merely  one  of  external  reflection,  but  is  inherent. 
And  moreover,  their  self-contradiction  is  not  to  be  taken  as  some- 
thing .abnormal  which  is  found  only  here  and  there,  and  not  in  a 
majority  of  cases  ;  but  it  is  the  negative  in  its  essential  characteristic, 
the  principle  of  all  self-activity ;  for  self-activity  is  nothing  else  than 
an  exhibition  of  self-contradiction.  External  movement  perceptible 
by  the  senses  is  the  immediate  existence  of  self-contradiction.  Some- 
thing moves,  not  through  the  fact  that  it  is  now  here,  and  in  the  next 
moment  there,  but  through  the  fact  that  in  one  and  the  same  moment 
of  time  it  is  here  and  not  here — through  the  fact  that  in  this  "here" 
it  is  and  is  not,  at  the  same  time.  It  is  necessary  to  acknowledge  the 
contradictions  which  the  ancient  philosophers  have  shown  up  in  the 
category  of  movement,  but  in  conceding  the  validity  of  the  contra- 
diction shown  by  their  dialectic,  we  must  not  adopt  their  conclusion  and 
deny  the  existence  of  movement ;  on  the  contrary,  we  must  affirm 
that  movement  is  the  real  existence  of  contradiction. 

Likewise,  the  internal,  real  self-activity,  viz.,  impulse  in  general 
(2Vie&) —  appetite  or  nisus  of  the  monads  (Leibnitz')  the  Entelechy 
of  absolute,  simple  essence  (Aristotle)  —  is  nothing  else  than  this 
contradiction  that  something  is  in  itself,  and  at  the  same  time  the  lack 
of  itself,  its  own  negative,  and  this  in  one  and  the  same  respect. 
(Inslinct,  impulse,  desire,  are  manifestations  within  a  being  of  its 
dependence  upon  another ;  they  express  its  lack  or  want  of  its  own 
true  being,  that  upon  which  it  depends ;  and  at  the  same  time  they 
express  this  want  as  the  true  nature,  the  being-in-itself  of  the  thing 


Contradiction.  73 

itself.  Even  gravity  in  matter  is  a  similar  expression  of  self-contra- 
diction ;  the  very  essence  of  matter  expresses  its  own  non-being. ) 
The  mere  abstract  identity  is  not  yet  the  category  of  vitality  (it  is 
not  adequate  to  it),  but  the  category  of  vitality  demands  that  the 
positive  shall  be  the  negative  in  itself,  and  through  this  fact  issue 
forth  from  itself,  and  thereby  posit  change  within  itself.  Something 
is  vital,  therefore,  only  so  far  as  it  contains  the  contradiction  within 
itself,  and  nevertheless  is  a  force  sufficient  to  preserve  itself  in  spite 
of  this  contradiction  within  itself.  If,  however,  an  existence  does  not 
possess  the  capacity  to  retain  its  positive  determination  in  the  face  of 
its  negative,  and  to  hold  the  one  in  the  other,  in  other  words,  cannot 
endure  the  contradiction  within  itself,  then  it  is  not  a  vital  unity,  not 
a  Ground,  but  the  contradiction  destroys  it.  Speculative  thinking 
consists  only  in  this,  that  the  thinking  activity  grasps  firmly  the  cate- 
gory of  contradiction  and  holds  it  within  itself,  but  not  as  conceived 
by  the  ordinary  thinking  which  thinks  only  in  images ;  for  the  picture- 
making  thinking  thinks  contradiction  only  as  a  principle  which  rules 
thought  and  which  allows  of  no  other  solution  for  contradictory  deter- 
minations than  zero. 

The  contradiction  contained  in  movement  and  in  impulse,  desire,  and 
the  like  categories  is  concealed  from  the  thinking  which  deals  only 
with  images  through  the  appearance  of  simplicity  which  belongs  to 
such  categories.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  in  the  categories  of  Rela- 
tion the  self-contradiction  involved  becomes  immediately  manifest. 
The  most  trivial  examples,  those  of  above  and  beneath,  of  right  and 
left,  of  fatJter  and  son,  etc.,  etc.,  contain  each  the  antithesis  in  unit}-. 
Above  is  that  which  is  not  beneath;  above  is  thus  defined  to  be  only 
the  non-being  of  beneath,  and  is  only  in  so  far  as  the  beneath  is  (the 
totality  of  its  being  is  one  with  the  totality  of  the  being  of  the 
other) ;  and  vice  versa,  in  each  category  is  contained  its  opposite. 
Father  is  the  other  of  son,  and  son  the  other  of  father,  and  each 
is  only  as  this  other  of  another;  and  at  the  same  time  the  one 
determination  exists  only  in  relation  to  the  other;  their  being  is 
one  totality.  Father  is  besides  this  relation  to  son  also  some- 
thing independent,  it  is  true;  but  as  such  he  is  not  father,  but 
only  man  in  general.  So  also,  above  and  beneath,  right  and  left, 
reflected  into  themselves  («".  e.,  considered  not  as  terms  of  relation 
to  another,  but  in  regard  to  themselves),  are  something  independ- 
ent outside  of  this  relation,  but  as  such  they  are  only  places  in 
general.  Contraries  (polar  opposites)  contain  self-contradiction  in 
so  far  as  they  are  in  one  and  the  same  respect  related  negatively  to 
another,  or  reciprocally  annulling  and  at  the  same  time  indifferent  to 


74  Essence. 

each  other.  The  thinking  which  deals  in  images,  when  it  passes  over 
to  the  phase  of  indifference  in  categories,  forgets  their  negative  unity, 
and  treats  them,  consequently,  only  as  disparate  in  general ;  and  thus 
regarded,  "  right  "  is  no  longer  "  right,"  "left  "  no  longer  "  left," 
etc.  But  when  it  has  right  and  left  really  before  it,  it  has  these 
determinations  in  their  self-negating  activity,  the  one  existing  in  the 
other,  and  in  this  unity  at  the  same  time  not  annulling  itself,  but  each 
one  existing  indifferent  and  independent. 

The  thinking  which  deals  in  images  has,  therefoi'e,  self-contradic- 
tion always  for  its  content,  but  is  never  conscious  of  this  fact.  It 
remains  external  reflection,  therefore,  and  flits  to  and  fro  from  like- 
ness to  difference,  or  from  the  negative  relation  of  objects  distin- 
guished to  their  reflection  into  themselves.  It  holds  these  two  deter- 
minations (of  negative-relation  and  of  self- relation)  apart  and  opposite 
to  each  other,  and  has  in  mind  only  their  indifference  and  not  their 
transition,  which  is  the  essential  thing,  and  contains  the  contradiction. 
The  genial  reflection  (the  speculative  form  of  reflection),  if  we  may 
mention  it  here,  consists  —  in  contrast  to  the  forms  of  reflection 
mentioned — in  the  apprehension  and  expression  of  contradiction, 
although  it  does  not  express  the  comprehension  (Begriff=z  ideal 
totality)  of  things  and  their  relations,  and  has  only  image-forms  of 
thought  for  its  materials  and  contents,  yet  it  brings  them  into  a  relation 
which  contains  their  contradiction,  and  thereby  manifests  their  com- 
prehension (ideal  totality).  The  thinking  reason,  however,  sharpens, 
so  to  speak,  the  blunted  distinction  of  Difference,  the  mere  multi- 
plicity of  image-thinking,  to  essential  distinction,  to  antithesis ;  multi- 
plicity when  sharpened  to  the  point  of  contradiction  becomes  vital 
and  active,  each  of  its  individuals  manifesting  itself  against  the 
others,  and  thus  multiplicity  obtains  for  itself  the  negativity  which 
is  the  in-dwelling  pulsation  of  self-movement  and  vitality. 

In  speaking  of  the  ontological  proof  of  the  existence  of  God,  we 
have  already  mentioned  that  the  basis  of  that  proof  is  the  idea  of  an 
including  totality  of  all  real  things.  Of  this  idea  it  is  customary  to 
prove  first  its  possibility ;  this  being  done  by  showing  that  it  contains 
no  contradiction,  because  reality  merely  as  reality  has  no  limits. 
Attention  has  been  called  to  the  fact  that  with  this  proof,  the  men- 
tioned including  totality  is  reduced  to  the  simple,  indeterminate 
being ;  or  if  the  realities  are  taken  in  fact  as  a  multiplicity  of  par- 
ticulars, then  it  becomes  an  including  totality  of  all  negations. 
Critically  examined,  the  distinction  of  realities  passes  from  the  cate- 
gory of  difference  to  antithesis,  and  then  to  contradiction,  and  the 
including  totality  of  all  realities  goes  over  into  absolute  self-contra- 


Contradiction.  75 

diction.  The  prevailing  horror  of  contradiction  which  possesses  the 
thinking  that  deals  with  images,  but  not  the  speculative  thinking  — 
a  feeling  similar  to  that  which  nature  is  said  to  have  for  a  vacuum  — 
objects  to  this  result ;  for  it  holds  fast  to  the  one-sided  solution  of 
self-contradiction  in  zero,  and  ignores  the  positive  side  of  it,  accord- 
ing to  which  contradiction  becomes  absolute  activity  and  absolute 
ground. 

We  have  seen  from  the  consideration  of  the  nature  of  contradic- 
tion that  it  is,  so  to  say,  no  fault,  or  lack,  or  failure  of  a  thing  to 
exhibit  a  contradiction  within  it.  On  the  contrary,  every  determina- 
tion, every  concrete  thing,  every  idea,  is  essentially  a  unity  of  distinct, 
and  separable  moments,  which  pass  over  into  contradictory  moments 
through  the  particular  essential  distinction  in  them  (forming  the  basis 
of  their  difference).  This  contradictory  unity,  of  course,  resolves 
itself  into  a  zero  —  it  goes  back  into  its  negative  unity.  The  thing, 
the  subject,  the  idea,  is  precisely  this  negative  unity  itself;  it  is 
an  in-itself-contradictory,  but  at  the  same  time  equally  a  resolved 
contradiction ;  it  is  the  ground  which  retains  and  carries  with  it  its 
determinations.  The  thing,  subject,  or  idea  is  as  reflected  into  itself, 
as  regards  its  own  sphere,  its  solved  contradiction ;  but  its  entire 
sphere  is  a  particularized  one,  a  "  different"  as  regards  some  other 
sphere ;  hence  it  is  a  finite  somewhat,  and  to  be  a  "  finite  "  is  to  be 
a  contradiction.  Of  this  higher  contradiction,  in  which  its  entire 
sphere  is  involved,  the  thing,  subject,  or  idea  is  not  itself  the  solu- 
tion ;  but  there  is  a  still  higher  sphere  as  its  negative  unity,  as  its 
ground.  Finite  things,  in  their  indifferent  manifoldness,  involve 
always  a  contradiction ;  for  they  are  within  themselves  sundered,  and 
exist  only  in  their  ground  (into  which  they  return  through  the  activity 
of  the  process  to  which  they  belong).  As  will  be  shown  further  on, 
the  true  inference  from  a  finite  and  contingent  to  an  absolutely  nec- 
essary essence  does  not  consist  in  this :  that  the  latter  is  inferred  from 
a  finite  and  contingent  being  which  is  an  abiding  ground  underlying 
it,  but  rather  that  the  inference  is  made  because  contingency  implies  an 
in-itself-contradictory  being,  a  merely  transitory  one.  In  other  words, 
the  inference  is  based  on  the  fact,  that  the  contingent  being  returns 
into  its  ground  necessarily,  and  therein  annuls  itself ;  and,  moreover, 
that  through  this  return  into  its  ground,  it  posits  that  ground  (fur- 
nishes the  basis  for  the  inference  that  it  exists)  only  by  exhibiting 
itself  as  a  posited  (4.  e.,  as  a  dependent  being,  and  thereby  positing 
an  independent  being).  In  the  ordinary  syllogism,  the  being  of  the 
finite  appears  to  be  the  ground  of  the  absolute :  "  therefore,  because 
the  finite  is,  it  follows  that  the  absolute  is."  The  true  inference, 


76  Essence. 

however,  is  this :  "Therefore,  because  the  finite  is  an  in-itself-con- 
tradictory  antithesis  —  i.  e.,  because  it  is  not  —  the  absolute  is." 
In  the  former  case  the  conclusion  is :  The  being  of  the  finite  is  the 
being  of  the  absolute.  In  the  latter  case  it  is:  The  noil-being  of 
the  finite  is  the  being  of  the  absolute. 

THIRD  CHAPTER. 
Ground  or  Reason. 

Essence  defines  itself  as  ground  (or  reason). 

As  Naught  was  found  (in  the  dialectic  of  Immediateness)  to  be  in 
simple,  direct  unity  with  Being,  so  here  is  found  the  immediate  unity 
of  the  simple  Identity  of  essence  with  its  absolute  Negativity  (the 
Identity  of  Essence  attains  and  preserves  itself  through  its  activity  of 
negating ;  through  its  negating  arise  all  particular  determinations 
which  constitute  the  different  elements  of  its  content,  and  through 
the  same  determining  activity  this  multiplicity  is  negated,  and  disap- 
pears ;  only  the  process,  the  negative  activity,  abiding  as  ground  or 
essence).  Essence  is  only  this  negative  activity,  the  same  which  pure 
Reflection  is.  (All  proving  or  demonstration  depends  upon  reflection  — 
i.  e.,  on  the  fact  that  a  finite,  or  immediate  being  is  a  process  of  mani- 
festing its  dependence ;  its  incompleteness,  its  imperfection,  its 
fragmentariness,  are  all  only  a  manifestation  of  the  independent 
being,  its  ground.  This  reference  of  a  finite  somewhat  to  its  ground, 
as  that  upon  which  it  essentially  depends,  is  reflection;  it  comes  from 
the  ground,  and  is  a  process  of  return  to  the  ground.)  It  is  this  pure 
negativity,  as  the  return  of  being  into  itself.  Hence,  it  is  in-itself, 
or  for-us  determined  as  (i.  e.,  seen  to  esse'ntially  consist  in  or  depend 
upon)  ground  into  which  being  (immediateness)  dissolves.  But 
this  determinateness  (i.  e..  ground)  is  not  posited  through  itself  (i.  e., 
through  the  immediate  being,  because  the  immediate  being  is  only 
an  appearance  —  its  essence  lies  outside  of  itself,  in  the  ground ;  it 
cannot  posit  anything,  because  it  possesses  no  essence  to  bestow  upon 
another).  In  other  words,  the  determinateness  of  immediate  being, 
through  which  immediate  being  is  cancelled,  is  a  result  of  the  deter- 
mining activity  of  ground  or  essence  acting  upon  immediate  being  from 
without;  and,  therefore,  this  determinateness  is  not  self-posited.  Its 
reflection  consists  in  this :  what  the  immediate  being  is,  is  posited  as 
negative,  and  thereby  determined  (i.  e.,  negated  by  the  activity  of 
the  ground).  The  distinction  of  positive  and  negative  constitutes 
the  essential  determination  in  which  it  (being)  is  lost,  as  in  its  nega- 
tion. These  independent  determinations  of  reflection  cancel  each 


Ground.  77 

other,  and  the  determination  thus  annulled  —  gone  to  the  ground  — 
is  the  true  determination  of  essence. 

Ground  is,  therefore,  also  one  of  the  determinations  of  reflection 
which  form  the  categories  of  essence ;  but  it  is  the  final  one.  and  its 
determination  consists  rather  in  being  the  annulment  of  determina- 
tion. The  determination  of  reflection,  when  it  annuls  itself,  "goes 
to  the  ground,"  obtains  its  true  significance,  that  of  absolute  counter- 
impulse  within  itself,  viz.,  that  the  posited-being  which  belongs  to 
essence  is  only  an  annulled  posited-being ;  and,  conversely,  only  the 
self-annulling  posited-being  is  the  posited-being  of  essence  (••pos- 
ited-being "  :=  the  being-established  through  another ;  all  categories 
of  essence  are  categories  of  mediation,  categories  posited  through 
another ;  but  the  starting-point  in  this  positing  or  mediating  is.  of 
course,  always  being  or  immediateness ;  its  positing  is  always  due  to 
its  self-annulment,  to  its  transitoriness,  its  evanescence :  on  the  other 
hand,  that  which  is  posited  is  the  totality  of  its  negative  process : 
hence  the  abiding,  the  essence,  the  ground ;  but  the  essence  or  abid- 
ing thus  posited  is  posited  as  the  primordial  source,  the  origin  whence 
the  evanescent  being  proceeded ;  hence  the  immediate  being  which 
posited  the  essence,  posits  rather  the  being  which  posited  it — its 
positing  is  rather  a  presupposing  activity,  or,  in  the  words  of  the  text, 
"  its  positing  is  only  a  cancelling  or  annulment "  of  its  positing ;  it  is 
a  return  movement,  or  reflection,  rather  than  an  origination  or  posit- 
ing). Essence,  when  it  defines  itself  as  ground,  defines  itself  as  the 
non-determined,  and  it  is  only  the  annulment  of  this,  its  being-deter- 
mined, which  determines  it  as  essence  (i.e.,  the  cancelling  of  its  other 
being  —  the  particularized  somewhats  which  have  arisen  from  essence, 
and  stand  over  against  it  as  immediate  being  —  the  cancelling  of 
this  otherness  is  the  true  determination  of  essence).  In  this  being- 
determined  (of  essence),  as  the  self-annulling  essence,  it  is  not 
a  derivative  somewhat  derived  from  another  (originating  in  im- 
mediate being),  but  it  is  self-identical  in  and  through  this  negativity 
(i.  «.,  through  this  cancelling  of  all  otherness,  it  exhibits  itself  as 
primordial). 

In  so  far  as  the  category  of  Ground  is  reached  through  the  annul- 
ment of  Determination  (t*.  e.  Particular  Being),  as  the  first  or  imme- 
diate from  which  we  begin,  and  which  proves  transitory  (  "  goes  to 
the  ground "  )  —  a  result  which  follows  from  the  very  nature  of 
Determination — the  category  of  ground  is,  as  such  result,  condi- 
tioned through  its  Origin,  and  thus  a  determined  somewhat.  But  this 
determining  is,  in  the  first  place,  an  annulment  of  determination, 


78  Essence. 

and  hence  only  a  restored,  purified,  or  revealed  identity  of 
Essence  —  it  is  what  the  determination  of  reflection  is  potentially 
(and  not  yet  realized).  In  the  second  place,  this  determining  is,  as 
annulment  of  determining,  the  positing  of  that  determinateness  of 
reflection  which  was  called  the  Immediate  (  on  its  appearance  in  the 
positing  reflection),  but  which  is  posited  only  by  the  self-excluding 
reflection  of  Ground,  and  in  this  is  only  as  posited  or  as  annulled  (  in 
its  independence).  Essence,  when  it  is  defined  as  ground  in  this 
sense  is  a  self-result.  As  Ground,  therefore,  it  posits  itself  as 
Essence ;  and  in  this  fact,  that  it  posits  itself  as  Essence,  consists  its 
determination.  This  positing  is  the  reflection  that  appertains  to 
Essence  —  a  determining  that  annuls  itself  in  the  very  act  of  deter- 
mining itself — being  in  one  respect  a  positing,  and  in  another  re- 
spect a  positing  of  Essence,  and,  consequently,  both  in  one  act  (  the 
positing  of  itself,  and  of  Essence  which  is  its  own  annulment). 

Reflection  is  pure  mediation ;  Ground,  on  the  other  hand,  is  real 
mediation  of  Essence.  Reflection  is  the  movement  of  Naught  to 
Naught,  through  itself ;  it  is  its  manifestation  of  another ;  but  since 
the  antithesis  does  not  attain  to  independence,  as  regards  its  sides 
(the  contraries),  it  follows  that  in  Reflection  the  first  is  not  a  pos- 
itive—  that  which  appears;  nor  is  the  other  the  negative  —  that 
in  which  it  appears.  The  two  are  mere  substrates  of  the  imagina- 
tion ;  they  are  not  purely  self-related  terms.  Pure  mediation  is  only 
pure  relation  without  any  terms  that  stand  in  relation.  (The  rela- 
tion is  that  of  self-determination,  and  hence  an  activity  which  pro- 
duces itself  through  the  pure  activity,  and  is  not  a  relation  which 
exists  between  two  already  existing  somewhats.)  The  "Deter- 
mining Reflection"  posits  such  terms  as  are  self-identical,  but  at 
the  same  time  are  particular  (concrete)  relations.  Ground,  on 
the  contrary,  is  the  real  mediation,  because  it  contains  reflection  as 
annulled  reflection ;  it  is  Essence  positing  itself  and  returning  into  it- 
self, through  its  non-being.  (Ground,  thus  defined  and  distin- 
guished from  the  activity  of  reflection,  which  has  been  discussed  at 
such  length,  is  here  called  by  Hegel  a  real  mediation,  instead  of  a 
pure  mediation,  because  its  result  is  a  reality,  and  not  simply  a  nega- 
tion of  something  that  exhibits  itself  as  a  phenomenal  or  transitory 
being,  or  a  mere  appearance ;  in  this  determination,  the  real  some- 
what is  restored  to  validity  again,  so  that  it  finds  its  explanation  and 
justification,  and,  in  short,  is  shown  to  be  a  well-grounded  some- 
what. Of  course,  it  is  only  a  more  entire  view  that  yields  us  this  in- 
sight. We  see  the  general  form  of  the  activity  which  at  first  seemed 


Ground.  79 

to  have  only  a  negative  result ;  it  is  seen  to  have  a  positive  result, 
and  to  produce  reality,  instead  of  mere  annulment.  This 
insight  is  akin  to  the  insight  which  sees  Law  underlying  change  — 
it  sees  Return  where  at  first  there  appeared  to  be  only  a  vanishing 
of  whatever  appeared.  But  the  idea  of  Law  is  much  more  concrete 
or  deeper  than  this  idea  of  Ground,  which  here  is  only  the  explana- 
tion of  multiplicity  by  means  of  the  distinction  of  form  and  matter. ) 
According  to  this  phase  of  annulment  of  Reflection  (  that  in  which 
it  is  found  that  the  vanishing  of  the  immediate  being  is  not  into 
nothing,  but  into  a  process  which  returns  again  to  the  being  which  had 
before  vanished  —  and  so  the  reflection  is  thereby  annulled),  the 
posited  somewhat  is  determined  as  an  immediate  —  as  a  somewhat  that 
possesses  self -identity  outside  of  its  relation  or  outside  of  its  appear- 
ance (*'.  e.,  outside  of  its  relation  of  dependence.)  This  immediate- 
ness  is  the  phase  of  Being  restored  through  the  process  of  Essence  ; 
it  is  the  non-being  of  Reflection,  as  that  through  which  essence 
mediates  itself.  Essence  returns  into  itself  as  negating ;  hence  it 
determines  itself  in  this  return,  and  for  the  reason  that  this  is 
a  determination  arising  in  the  identity  of  the  negative,  in  its  self-rela- 
tion, which  is  the  annulment  of  the  positing  (of  the  dependence)  ; 
it  is,  therefore,  existing — or  real;  it  is  the  identity  of  Essence  as 
Ground. 

Ground  is  first  to  be  considered  as  Absolute  Ground  (i.  e., 
because  that  is  its  most  immediate  phase,  its  most  abstract,  or  empti- 
est phase).  In  the  phase  of  Absolute  Ground,  Essence  is  regarded 
as  the  "Basis"  for  the  distinction;  when  defined  with  more  atten- 
tion, it  is  stated  as  the  distinction  of  Form  and  Matter,  or  as  Form 
and  Content. 

In  the  second  place,  it  becomes  a  still  more  definitely  seized  dis- 
tinction —  that  of  Gronnd  of  a  special  content ;  and  since  the  relation 
of  Ground  is  one  in  which  the  Essence  is  regarded  as  externalizing 
itself  in  this  distinction  of  Ground  and  Content,  it  becomes  Condi- 
tioning Mediation. 

Thirdly,  Ground  presupposes  a  condition,  but  the  condition  like- 
wise presupposes  a  ground ;  the  unity  of  the  two  is  the  uncondi- 
tioned —  the  nature  of  the  thing  whereby  it  realizes  itself  in  the  cat- 
egory of  Existence,  through  its  mediation  with  its  conditioning 
relations. 

( It  will  be  understood  that  the  preceding  is  a  general  charadter- 
ization  of  the  entire  contents  of  the  third  chapter  of  this  work ;  this 
chapter  concludes  the  first  division  of  the  treatment  of  Essence,  and 


80  Essence. 

inducts  us  into  the  consideration  of  more  explicit  categories  of  Rela- 
tion. This  introduction  to  the  chapter  merely  states  the  general 
results,  which  we  may  expect  to  see  proved  in  detail  in  what  is  to 
follow.) 

Remark. 

Ground,  too,  like  the  other  categories  of  Reflection,  has  been 
expressed  in  the  form  of  a  Principle:  Everything  has  a  sufficient 
Ground,  or  Reason.  The  general  meaning  of  this  principle  is 
nothing  more  than  this :  that  whatever  is,  is  to  be  considered,  not  as 
a  something  existing  isolatedly  for  itself,  but  as  a  dependent  some- 
thing. It  implies,  therefore,  that  we  must  look  beyond  that  which 
we  see,  and  seek  a  ground  or  explanation  for  it  —  a  ground  in 
which  the  somewhat  is  not  as  it  at  first  seemed,  but  is  annulled  as 
regards  its  irnmediateness,  and  is  seen  as  it  is  in  its  being-in-and- 
for  itself  (  i.  e.,  in  its  law  or  in  the  general  type  of  its  process).  In 
the  principle  of  Ground  the  essentiality  of  Reflection-into-itself,  as 
compared  with  mere  immediate  being,  is  expressed. 

That  the  ground  must  be  a  "sufficient"  ground  needs  not  be 
added,  for  it  is  superfluous ;  that  for  which  the  ground  is  not  suffi- 
cient, would  not  have  a  ground  at  all.  Leibnitz,  who  placed  a  high 
estimate  upon  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  and  made  it  the  basis 
of  his  whole  system,  attached  to  it  a  deeper  signification  and  a  more 
important  conception  than  is  ordinarily  given  to  it.  Yet  even  in  the 
ordinary  acceptation  it  has  a  very  important  meaning,  inasmuch  as  it 
implies  that  being,  as  such,  in  its  immediateness,  is  to  be  taken  as 
untrue,  and  essentially  as  a  posited  (i.  e.,  as  a  dependent),  but  its 
ground  is  to  be  taken  as  the  true  immediate  (i.  e.,  as  the  true  individu- 
ality). But  Leibnitz  added  the  designation  "  sufficient,"  in  order  to 
distinguish  it  sharply  from  the  mechanical  conception  of  cause  as  an 
external  activity  or  influence.  When  causality  is  conceived  as  a 
form  external  to  its  content,  as  an  activity  that  produces  a  determina- 
tion in  an  effect  that  is,  after  all,  a  merely  external  modification 
superinduced  upon  the  so-called  "  effect,"  this  category  is  merely  a 
loose  and  fortuitous  connection  of  the  determinations  involved.  The 
fact  that  the  parts  belong  to  the  whole  is  comprehended  in  causality, 
but  the  definite  relation  of  these  parts  is  not  stated  in  the  concept  of 
mechanical  cause.  This  relation,  the  whole  as  the  essential  unity  of 
the  parts,  lies  only  in  the  idea  (ideal,  the  totality  of  its  being),  or  in 
the  final  cause.  Mechanical  causes  are  not  "sufficient"  for  this 
unity,  because  the  final  cause,  as  the  unity  of  their  determinations, 


Absolute  Ground.  81 

does  not  lie  at  the  basis  of  mechanical  causes.  Under  the  concept  of 
sufficient  cause,  therefore,  Leibnitz  has  conceived  a  cause  that  suf- 
ficed for  this  unity ;  and,  therefore,  not  a  mere  cause,  but  the  final 
cause.  This  definition  of  ground,  as  understood  by  Leibnitz,  is  not 
the  proper  one  of  ground  as  it  belongs  here ;  the  ideological  ground 
is  a  category  of  the  Idea  (or  BegrijT),  and  its  mediation  is  the  Reason. 


The  Absolute  Ground. 

L,  Form  and  Essence. 

The  determination  of  Reflection,  in  so  far  as  it  returns  to  a  ground 
(i.e.,  shows  that  the  idea  of  ground  underlies  the  immediate  being), 
constitutes  only  an  immediate  being  in  general  with  which  a  beginning 
is  to  be  made.  But  the  immediate  being  has  only  the  meaning  of  a 
posited  (dependent)  being,  and  presupposes  a  ground,  of  necessity. 
It  presupposes  a  ground  in  the  sense  that  it  does  not  posit  this  ground, 
but  rather  that  this  presupposition  on  its  part  is  indeed  a  negation  of 
itself  (for  it  is  a  confession  of  its  own  dependence  and  consequent 
lack  of  individuality) ;  the  immediate  is  only  the  posited,  and  the 
ground  is  the  non-posited.  As  it  has  been  shown,  the  presupposi- 
tion, which  is  a  positing  that  points  back  to  that  which  posited  it, 
is  the  ground,  but  not  as  undetermined,  in  the  annulment  of  all 
determinateness,  but  the  self-determined  essence  that  is  undetermined 
or  determined  only  as  cancelled  posited-being.  It  is  the  essence 
that  is  identical  with  itself  in  its  own  negativity. 

The  determinateness  of  essence  as  ground  is  therefore  duplicate  — 
that  of  ground  and  grounded.  It  is,  first,  essence  as  ground,  deter- 
mined as  essence,  as  non-posited-being,  in  opposition  to  the  posited- 
being.  Secondly,  it  is  the  grounded,  the  immediate,  which,  however, 
is  not  in-and-for-itself .  but  the  posited  being  as  posited-being.  This 
is,  consequently,  self-identical,  but  the  identity  of  the  negative  with 
itself.  The  negative  which  is  self -identical,  and  the  positive  that  is 
self-identical,  are  one  and  the  same  identity.  For  the  ground  is  iden- 
tity of  the  positive,  or  of  itself,  and  of  the  posited-being ;  and  that 
which  is  grounded  is  the  posited-being  as  posited-being,  and  this 
reflection-into-itself  is  the  identity  of  the  ground.  This  simple  identity 
is,  therefore,  not  the  ground  itself ;  for  the  ground  is  the  essence, 
posited  as  the  non-posited,  in  opposition  to  the  posited-being.  As 
this  unity  of  the  definite  identity  —  of  ground  —  and  of  the  negative 


82  Essence. 

identity  —  of  the  grounded — it  is  the  essence  in  general,  distin- 
guished from  its  mediation. 

This  mediation,  compared  with  the  reflections  that  have  preceded  it, 
and  from  which  it  has  originated,  is,  in  the  first  place  (as  is  obvious), 
not  the  pure  reflection,  as  which  it  is  not  distinguished  from  the 
essence ;  nor  is  it  the  negative,  as  which  it  would  possess  the  independ- 
ence of  the  determinations  within  itself.  In  the  category  of  Ground 
as  the  annulled  reflection,  however,  these  determinations  have  a  per- 
sistence. Moreover,  it  is  not  the  determining  reflection  whose  deter- 
minations possess  essential  independence ;  for  this  independence  of 
determinations  has  been  shown  to  be  groundless  when  we  were  demon- 
strating the  category  of  Ground,  and  within  its  unity  those  deter- 
minations are  as  merely  "  posited  "  determinations.  This  mediation 
of  Ground  is,  therefore,  the  unity  of  the  pure  reflection  and  the 
determining  reflection.  Its  determinations,  or  the  posited,  have 
persistence ;  and,  conversely,  the  persistence  of  the  same  is  a  posited 
somewhat.  For  the  reason  that  this  persistence  which  it  has  is  a 
posited  one,  or  has  determinateness,  it  follows  that  its  determinations 
are  different  from  its  simple  unity,  and  constitute  the  form  as  opposed 
to  the  Essence. 

Essence  has  a  form,  and  determinations  of  that  form.  First,  as 
ground  it  has  a  fixed  immediateness,  or  is  a  substratum.  Essence 
is  one  with  its  reflection,  and  its  movement  is  indistinguishable  from 
it.  It  is,  therefore,  not  the  Essence  which  it  penetrates ;  and,  more- 
over, it  is  not  that  which  constitutes  its  commencement.  This 
circumstance  makes  the  exposition  of  reflection  very  difficult;  for 
it  is  not  proper  to  say  that  the  essence  returns  into  itself,  that  it 
appears  in  itself,  because  it  is  not  before  its  movement,  nor  in  its 
movement,  and  the  movement  has  no  basis  which  supports  it.  A  re- 
lated somewhat  makes  its  appearance  in  the  ground  according  to  the 
moment  of  annulled  reflection.  Essence,  as  the  related  substratum, 
is,  however,  the  particularized  Essence  ;  and  on  account  of  this  posited- 
being  it  has  the  form  as  essentially  belonging  to  it.  The  form- 
determinations,  on  the  other  hand,  are  the  determinations  as  belong- 
ing to  Essence.  Essence  lies  at  the  basis,  as  the  indeterminate, 
which  in  its  determination  is  indifferent  towards  them.  They  have 
in  it  their  reflection  into  themselves.  The  determinations  of  reflection 
are  defined  as  possessing  their  subsistence  in  themselves,  and  as 
being  independent ;  but  their  independence  is  their  dissolution ;  there- 
fore, they  have  their  independence  in  another ;  but  this  very  dissolu- 
tion is  at  the  same  time  their  very  identity,  or  the  ground  of  their 
persistence. 


Form  and  Essence.  83 

Form  belongs  to  everything  that  is  determined  (or  to  all  particular 
being)  ;  form-determination  is  distinguished  from  that  whose  form  it 
is,  and  it  is  always  a  posited  somewhat;  the  determinateness  as. 
quality  is  one  with  its  substratum,  with  immediate  being.  Being  is- 
that  which  is  immediately  determined,  that  which  is  not  distinct  from 
its  determinateness ;  it  is  that  which  is  not  reflected  into  itself,  and 
hence  it  is  an  existent,  and  not  a  posited.  The  form-determinations  of 
essence  are,  moreover,  as  determinations  of  reflection  and  as  regards- 
their  definite  particularity  of  content,  the  moments  of  reflection  that 
have  been  considered  above.  Identity  and  distinction,  the  latter 
partly  as  difference,  partly  as  antithesis,  are  these  moments  of  reflec- 
tion. Besides  these,  the  determination  of  ground  belongs  to  these 
form-determinations  —  that  is,  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  annulled  determi- 
nation of  reflection,  or  through  this,  essence  is  at  the  same  time  a 
posited.  On  the  contrary,  Identity  does  not  belong  to  form,  namely,, 
that  which  is  contained  in  the  ground,  that  the  posited-being  as- 
annulled,  and  the  posited-being  as  such — the  ground  and  the 
grounded — is  one  reflection,  which  constitutes  the  essence  as  simple 
basis  —  that  is,  the  subsistence  of  the  form.  But  this  subsistence  is 
posited  in  the  ground ;  in  other  words,  this  essence  is  essentially  as 
determined;  consequently,  it  is  also  a  moment  of  ground-relation, 
and  of  form.  This  is  the  absolute  reciprocal  relation  of  form  and 
essence :  this  simple  unity  of  ground  and  grounded  which  is  in  this, 
at  the  same  time  a  particular,  or  a  negative,  and  distinguishes  itself 
from  the  form,  but  at  the  same  time  is  ground  itself,  and  a  moment 
of  form. 

Form  is,  therefore,  the  complete  totality  of  reflection ;  it  contains, 
moreover,  this  determination  of  reflection — it  is  annulled.  There- 
fore it  is  likewise  a  unity  of  its  determinations,  and  also  related  to- 
their  annulment,  to  another  which  is  not  form,  but  to  which  the  form 
belongs.  As  the  essential  negativity  which  relates  to  itself,  it  is  the 
positing  and  determining  as  opposed  to  this  simple  negative ;  as  simple 
essence,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  undetermined  and  non- active  basis 
in  which  the  determinations  of  form  have  their  inherence  or  their 
reflection  into  themselves.  External  Reflection  takes  its  stand  upon 
this  distinction  between  essence  and  form.  (It  has  not  the  ability 
to  transcend  this  category).  It  is  necessary  to  discriminate  between 
matter  and  form,  but  this  very  discrimination  is  their  unity ;  and  this 
unity  of  ground  is.essence  which  repels  from  itself  and  reduces  what  is 
repelled  to  a  posited-being.  Form  is  the  absolute  negativity  itself,  or 
the  negative,  absolute  self-identity,  through  which  essence  is  essence, 
and  not  mere  being.  This  identity,  taken  abstractly,  is  essence  as- 


84  Essence. 

opposed  to  form ;  just  as  negativity,  taken  abstractly  as  the  positcd- 
being,  is  the  particular  determination  cf  form.  This  determination, 
however,  as  has  been  shown,  is,  in  its  truth,  the  total  self-relating 
negativity,  which  is,  consequently,  as  this  identity,  the  simple  essence 
in  itself.  Form,  therefore,  has  essence  as  appertaining  to  its  own 
identity ;  so,  likewise,  essence  has  as  its  own  negative  nature,  the 
absolute  form.  Therefore,  the  question  cannot  be  asked :  how  form 
is  added  to  essence ;  for  form  is  only  the  manifestation  of  essence  in 
itself ;  it  is  the  inherent  reflection  of  essence.  Form  likewise  is,  by 
itself,  the  reflection  which  returns  into  itself;  or,  in  other  words,  it  is 
the  self-identical  essence.  In  its  act  of  determining,  it  reduces  its 
determination  to  posited-being  as  posited-being.  It,  therefore,  does 
not  determine  essence  as  though  it  were  presupposed,  as  though  it 
were  divided  from  the  essence ;  for,  as  thus  existing,  it  would  be  the 
unessential,  a  mere  determination  of  reflection,  restless,  and  perishing 
(going  into  its  ground),  and  with  this  it  would  be  rather  the  ground 
(or  result)  of  its  own  cancelling,  or  the  identical  self-relation  of  its 
determinations.  Form  determines  essence,  in  the  sense  that  form,  in 
its  separation  from  essence,  annuls  this  very  separation,  and  is  the 
self-identity  of  essence  as  the  persistence  of  the  determination.  It 
is  the  contradiction  which  is  annulled  in  its  posited-being,  and  in  this 
being-annulled  finds  its  persistence ;  consequently  it  is  ground  as 
essence,  which  is  self-identical  in  its  being  determined  or  negated. 

These  distinctions,  therefore,  of  form  and  essence  are  mere  ele- 
ments or  phases  of  the  simple  form-relation  itself.  But,  considered 
more  in  detail,  the  determining  form  relates  to  itself  as  posited- 
being  which  has  been  annulled ;  and,  therefore,  it  relates  to  its  iden- 
tity as  though  it  were  another.  It  posits  itself  as  annulled,  hence 
it  presupposes  its  identity ;  essence  is,  in  this  phase,  the  indetermin- 
ate for  which  form  is  its  other.  Therefore,  it  is  not  essence  which 
is  the  absolute  reflection  into  itself,  but  this  reflection  is  determined 
as  the  formless  identity ;  it  is  matter. 

2.  Form  and  Matter. 

Essence  becomes  matter,  in  the  fact  that  its  reflection  determines 
itself,  so  that  its  reflection  relates  to  it  as  to  the  formless  indeterminate. 
Matter  is,  therefore,  the  simple  identity  devoid  of  distinctions,  the 
identity  which  is  essence  determined  as  the  other  of  Form.  It  is, 
terefore,  the  real  basis  or  the  substrate  of  Form ;  since  it  constitutes 
the  reflection  into  itself  of  the  form-determinations,  which  reflection 
is  the  independent,  to  which  it  relates  as  to  its  positive  subsistence. 

If  abstraction  is  made  from  all  the  determinations  which  belong  to 


Form  and  Matter.  85 

the  form  of  a  somewhat,  there  remains  nothing  but  the  undetermined 
matter.  Matter  is  a  pure  abstraction.  One  cannot  see  matter,  nor 
feel  it;  what  one  sees  or  feels  is  the  determinations  of  matter,  ».  e.t 
the  unity  of  matter  and  form.  This  act  of  abstraction  from  which 
the  idea  of  matter  proceeds  is,  however,  not  a  mere  external  removal 
and  annulment  of  form ;  but  the  activity  of  form  (the  self-determi- 
nation which  belongs  to  form)  evolves  this  simple  identity  of  and 
from  itself,  as  we  have  already  seen  in  the  above  consideration. 

Moreover,  form  presupposes  matter  to  which  it  relates.  But  for 
this  reason  form  and  matter  are  not  found  as  two  external  categories 
accidentally  opposed  to  each  other ;  neither  of  the  two  is  self-originat- 
ing, or,  in  other  words,  eternal.  Matter  is  indifferent  as  opposed  to 
form,  but  this  indifference  is  the  determinateness  of  self-identity  into 
which  form  returns  as  into  its  basis.  Form  presupposes  matter.  In 
this  very  fact  that  it  posits  itself  as  anulled,  and  consequently  relates 
to  this,  its  identity  (matter),  as  to  another,  it  presupposes  matter. 
Conversely,  form  is  presupposed  by  matter.  For  matter  is  not  the 
simple  essence  which  is  the  absolute  reflection  itself,  but  it  is  the 
same  determined  as  the  positive,  i.  e.,  that  which  is  only  as  annulled 
negation.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  becfause  the  form  posits  itself 
only  as  matter,  in  so  far  as  it  annuls  itself  and  presupposes  mat- 
ter, matter  is  also  determined  to  be  persistence  without  a  ground. 
Likewise,  matter  is  not  determined  as  the  ground  of  form ;  but 
since  matter  posits  itself  as  the  abstract  identity  of  the  annulled 
form-determination,  it  is  not  identity  as  gromnd;  and  form,  as 
opposed  to  it,  is  groundless.  Form  and  matter  are  consequently 
defined  as  not  posited  through  each  other,  and  as  not  the  ground 
of  each  other.  Matter  is  rather  the  identity  of  the  ground  and 
the  grounded  —  i.  «.,  as  the  basis  (foundation)  which  stands  opposed 
to  this  form-relation.  This  determination  of  indifference,  which 
belongs  in  common  to  form  and  matter,  is  the  determination  of 
matter  as  such  (i.  e.,  its  definition),  and  constitutes  also  the 
relation  of  the  two  to  each  other.  And  in  the  same  manner  the  defi- 
nition of  form,  that  it  is  the  relation  of  distinct  somewhats,  is  also 
the  other  side  of  the  relation  of  the  two  to  each  other.  Matter 
which  s  defined*  as  indifferent  is  the  passive  opposed  to  the  form  as 
active.  And  this  as  the  self-related  negative  is  the  contradiction 
within  itself,  the  self-annulling,  self-repelling,  and  self-determining. 
It  relates  to  mattej,  and  it  is  posited  to  relate  to  its  subsistence  as 
though  to  another.  Matter  is,  therefore,  posited  as  relating  only  to 
itself,  and  as  indifferent  towards  others ;  but  it  relates  to  form  poten- 
tially (an  sick)  ;  for  it  contains  annulled  negativity,  and  is  matter  only 


86  Essence. 

because  of  this  characteristic.  It  relates  to  matter,  therefore,  as 
though  matter  were  another  being,  because  form  is  not  posited  as 
belonging  to  it  —  i.  e.,  because  the  same  is  only  potentially  attached  to 
it.  It  contains  the  form  involved  within  itself,  and  is  the  absolute 
receptivity  for  it,  and  only  for  this  reason:  that  it  has  the  same 
within  it,  and  that  this  is  its  undeveloped  nature.  Matter  must,  there- 
fore, receive  form,  and  form  must  materialize  itself ;  in  other  words, 
form  must  come  into  self-identity,  or  must  reach  its  reality  in  matter. 

(2. )  Form,  therefore,  determines  matter,  and  matter  is  determined 
by  form ;  since  form  is  the  absolute  self-identity,  it  follows  that  it 
contains  matter  within  itself ;  in  the  same  manner,  matter  possesses  in 
its  pure  abstraction  or  absolute  negativity  the  form  within  itself. 
Hence  the  activity  of  form  upon  the  matter,  and  the  being-determined 
of  the  latter  through  the  former  is  only  the  annulment  of  the  appar- 
ent indifference  and  independence  of  each  as  regards  the  other. 
This  relation  of  the  activity  of  determining  is,  therefore,  the  medi- 
ation of  each  with  itself,  by  means  of  its  own  non-being.  But  these 
two  mediations  are  one  activity,  and  the  restoration  of  their  original 
identity  —  the  re-collection  from  their  externalization. 

First.  Form  and  matter  presuppose  each  other  reciprocally.  As 
we  have  seen  above,  the  one  essential  unity  is  negative  relation  to 
itself,  and,  therefore,  dirempts  itself  into  the  essential  identity,  deter- 
mined as  the  indifferent  basis,  and  into  the  essential  distinction  or 
negativity  as  the  determining  form.  That  unity  of  essence  and  form 
which  posits  form  ar«l  matter  in  opposition  to  itself  is  the  absolute 
ground  which  determines  itself.  Since  it  reduces  itself  to  a  dis- 
parate somewhat,  the  relation,  on  account  of  the  identity  of  the  dis- 
parates which  lies  at  the  basis,  becomes  reciprocal  presupposition. 

Secondly.  Form,  as  independent,  is  the  self-annulling  contradic- 
tion ;  and  it  is  also  posited  as  such  inasmuch  as  it  is  at  the  same 
time  both  independent  and  essentially  related  to  another ;  it  there- 
fore annuls  itself.  Since  it  is  ambiguous,  this  annulment  has  two 
aspects :  In  the  first  place,  it  annuls  its  independence,  reduces  itself 
to  a  posited-being,  to  a  somewhat  that  belongs  to  another  —  this,  its 
other,  being  matter.  In  the  second  place,  it  annuls  its  distinction 
from  matter,  its  relation  to  the  same,  consequently  its  posited-being ; 
and,  therefore,  attains  self -subsistence.  Since  it  cancels  its  posited- 
being,  the  latter  is  its  reflection  and  its  own  identity,  into  which 
it  passes.  But  since  this  identity  externalizes  itself  and  polarizes 
against  itself  as  matter,  the  mentioned  reflection  of  the  posited-being 
into  itself  is  a  union  with  a  matter,  and  as  such  it  obtains  its  self- 
subsistence.  Therefore,  in  this  union  with  a  matter  as  with  another 


Form  and  Matter.  87 

being,   as   regards   the  first  aspect  in  which  it  reduces  itself  to  a 
posited-somewhat,  it  passes  into  identity  with  itself. 

Therefore,  the  activity  of  form  through  which  matter  is  determined 
consists  in  a  negative  relation  of  form  to  itself.  But,  conversely,  it, 
too,  relates  negatively  to  matter ;  but  this  being-determined  of  matter 
is  likewise  the  activity  that  belongs  properly  to  form  itself.  Form  is 
free  as  regards  matter  (i.  e.,  independent  of  or  indifferent  to  matter), 
but  it  annuls  this  independence ;  however,  its  independence  is  matter 
itself,  for  to  this  belongs  its  essential  identity.  Since  it  reduces  itself, 
therefore,  to  a  posited-somewhat,  this  is  one  and  the  same  activity 
•which  gives  particularity  to  the  matter.  But,  considered  from  the 
other  point  of  view,  the  identity  that  belongs  to  form  is  expressed, 
and  matter  is  the  "other"  thus  expressed;  to  that  extent  matter  is 
not  particularized,  for  the  reason  that  form  annuls  its  (matter's)  own 
independence.  But  matter  is  independent  only  as  opposed  to  form  ; 
since  the  negative  annuls  itself,  it  annuls  also  the  positive  ;  therefore, 
since  the  form  annuls  itself,  the  particular  determinations  of  matter 
fall  awa\- — those  determinations  which  it  has  as  opposed  to  form,  viz., 
its  indeterminateness  and  persistence. 

This  which  seems  to  be  an  activity  of  form  is,  therefore,  likewise 
the  movement  which  belongs  properly  to  matter  itself.  The  nature 
of  matter,  or  its  ideal  destiny  (what  it  should  realize)  is  its  absolute 
negativitj-.  Through  this,  matter  relates  not  only  to  form  as  to 
another,  but  this  external  (».  e.,  this  relation  itself)  is  the  form 
which  it  contained  in  an  undeveloped  state  within  itself.  Matter  is 
the  same  contradiction  potentially  as  that  which  form  contains,  and 
this  contradiction  is  like  its  resolution,  only  one.  Matter,  how- 
ever, is  in  itself  a  contradiction,  because  it  is  absolute  negativity 
while  it  is  an  undetermined  self-identity ;  it  therefore  annuls  itself 
within  itself,  and  its  identity  is  dirempted  in  its  negativity,  and  the 
latter  preserves  its  independence  through  the  former.  While,  there- 
fore, matter  is  particularized  (determined  or  rendered  definite)  by 
form  as  by  somewhat  external  to  it,  it  by  this  means  realizes  itself ; 
and  the  externality  involved  in  the  relation,  as  well  on  the  part  of 
form  as  on  the  part  of  matter,  consists  in  this :  that  each  of  the  two, 
or  rather  that  their  original  unity,  is  in  its  positing  likewise  a  presup- 
posing ;  whence  it  follows  that  the  relation  to  itself  is  a  relation  to 
itself  as  annulled,  and,  therefore,  a  relation  to  its  "  other." 

Tliirdly.  Through  the  activity  of  form  and  matter  their  original 
unity  is  restored,  but  as  a  posited.  Matter  determines  itself, 
although  this  determining  is,  as  far  as  matter  is  concerned,  an  exter- 
nal deed  emanating  from  form.  Conversely,  form  determines  only 


88  Essence. 

itself,  or  contains  matter  that  is  determined  by  it  within  itself, 
although  at  the  same  time  this  self-determining  appears  to  be  a  deter- 
mining of  something  else.  And  finally,  the  two  —  the  activity  of 
form  and  the  activity  of  matter  —  are  one  and  the  same  ;  only  that 
the  former  is  an  activity  (em  T7»m,  a  deed)  in  which  the  negative 
appears  as  a  posited,  while  the  latter  is  an  activity  (Bewegung,  i.  e., 
&  movement)  which  is  a  becoming,  in  which  the  negativity  appears  as 
characteristic  of  its  very  nature  (i.  e.,  its  potentiality,  or  its  ideal). 
The  result  is,  therefore,  the  unity  of  the  being-in-itself  (its  nature, 
or  potentiality,  or  ideal)  and  its  being-posited  (i.  e.,  its  dependence 
upon  others,  or  what  it  derives  from  others).  Matter,  as  such,  is 
determined  (particularized,  made  special),  or,  in  other  words,  has 
necessarily  a  form;  and  form,  on  the  other  hand,  necessarily  implies 
matter,  or  is  self-subsistent  form. 

Form,  in  so  far  as  it  presupposes  matter  as  its  other,  is  finite.  It 
is  not  Ground,  but  only  activity.  So  also  matter,  in  so  far  as  it  pre- 
supposes form  as  its  not-being,  is  finite  matter ;  it  is  likewise  not  the 
ground  of  its  unity  with  form,  but  only  the  basis  or  substrate  for  the 
form.  But  this  finite  matter,  as  finite  form,  has  no  truth  ;  each  of  the 
two  relates  to  the  other,  and  their  unity  only  is  their  truth.  In  this 
unity  the  two  determinations  have  their  return,  and  in  it  they  annul 
their  independence ;  hence  this  unity  is  proved  to  be  their  ground. 
Therefore,  matter  is  the  ground  of  its  determination  of  form  only  in 
so  far  as  it  is  not  matter  as  matter,  but  the  absolute  unity  of  essence 
and  form.  Form,  too,  is  the  ground  of  the  persistence  of  its  deter- 
minations only  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  same  one  unity.  But  this  one 
unity  as  the  absolute  negativity,  and  more  definitely  as  excluding 
unity,  is  in  its  act  of  reflection  a  presupposing  somewhat.  In  other 
words,  it  is  an  activity  which,  in  positing  itself  as  a  posited,  preserves 
itself  in  the  unity,  and  repels  itself  from  itself,  i.  e.,  relates  to  itself 
as  itself,  and  to  itself  as  though  itself  were  another.  Or.  again, 
it  may  be  stated  in  this  way:  The  particularizing  (die  Bestimmticer- 
den)  of  matter  through  form  is  the  mediation  of  Essence  as  Ground 
in  one  unity,  through  itself  and  through  its  own  negation. 

Matter  which  has  received  a  form,  or  form  which  has  obtained 
realization  on  a  matter,  is  not  merely  that  absolute  unity  of  the 
ground  with  itself  which  has  been  mentioned,  but  also  the  posited 
unity.  The  movement  already  considered  is  that  in  which  the 
absolute  ground  has  exhibited  its  movements  (or  phases)  as  at  the 
same  time  self-annulling,  and  hence  as  posited.  In  other  words,  the 
restored  unity  has,  in  its  return  to  itself,  at  the  same  time  repelled 
itself  and  determined  itself  (reduced  itself  to  particularity)  ;  for  its. 


Form  and  Content.  89 

i  it  has  come  into  existence  through  negation,  is 
also  a  negative  unity.  It  is,  therefore,  the  unity  of  form  and  matter 
9**tt\*&rt^^am*^*V&*A&^VB6oto*ma*<Kvxfo- 
strate ;  and  this  matter  that  has  received  its  form  is  indifferent  to 
form  and  *"*ftyr  as  to  something  th^t  jg  annulled  and  niwasa^Mtial  _ 
It  is  content. 

X,  Form  «nd  GontenL 

Form,  in  the  first  place,  stands  opposed  to  Essence:  hence  it  is  a 
relation  which  belongs  to  the  category  of  Ground,  and  its  determina- 
tions are  the  Ground  and  the  grounded.  In  the  next  place,  it  stands 
opposed  to  matter;  and  in  this  phase  it  is  a  "  determining  reflec- 
tion," and  its  determinations  are  the  determination-of-reflection 
itself  and  its  persistence  ("determination  of  reflection  "includes 
Identity,  Difference,  Antithesis,  and  Contradiction ;  its  persistence 
is  its  reality).  Thirdly,  and  finally,  it  stands  opposed  to  Content 
(JkAofr);  in  this  phase  its  determinations  are  itself  (i.  e.,  form)  and 
matter.  That  which  was  previously  self-identical,  to  wit,  Ground, 
in  the  first  place,  and  afterwards  its  persistence  (or  reality),  and, 
finally,  matter,  now  comes  under  the  dominion  of  form,  and  is  again 
one  of  its  determinations. 

Content  has,  in  the  first  place,  one  form  and  one  matter,  which 
belong  to  it,  and  are  essential;  it  is  their  unity.  But  since  this  unity 
is  at  the  same  time  a  particularized  or  posited  unity,  it  stands 
opposed  to  form ;  the  latter  constitutes  the  posited-being  of  the  unity 
(i.  e.,  the  form  is  that  which  comes  from  the  activity  of  that  on 
which  it  depends),  and  is,  as  regards  the  content,  unessential.  The 
content  is,  therefore,  indifferent  to  the  form ;  it  comprehends  both 
the  form,  as  such,  and  also  the  matter;  and  it  has,  therefore,  a  form 
and  a  matter,  and  it  constitutes  their  basis,  and  they  are  for  it  a  mere 
posited-being  (mere  result  of  its  activity). 

The  Content  is,  in  the  second  place,  that  which  is  identical  in  the 
form  and  matter;  and  in  this  respect  the  difference  between  form 
and  matter  would  be  a  mere  indifferent  externality.  They  are  noth- 
ing but  posited-being,  which,  however,  has  returned  to  its  unity  in  the 
content,  and  thus  into  its  ground.  The  self-identity  of  the  content 
is,  from  one  point  of  view,  therefore,  the  identity  which  is  indifferent 
to  the  form;  but  from  the  other  point  of  view  it  is  the  identity  of  the 
ground.  Ground  has  vanished  into  Content;  but  content  is  mean- 
while the  negative  reflection  of  f ornvdeterminations  into  themselves. 
Its  unity,  which  in  its  first  aspect  is  only  indifference  as  regards  fora, 
is,  therefore,  also  the  formal  unity  or  ground-relation  as  such.  Con- 


90  Essence. 

tent  has,  therefore,  this  unity  for  its  essential  form ;  and  the  Ground, 
conversely,  a  content. 

The  content  of  the  Ground  is  therefore  the  Ground,  which  has 
returned  into  its  unity  with  itself.  Ground,  in  the  first  place,  is 
Essence,  which  is  identical  with  itself  in  its  posited-being ;  as  distinct 
from  and  indifferent  towards  its  posited-being  it  is  the  undetermined 
(the  indefinite)  matter;  but  as  content,  it  is  the  identity  which  has 
received  form,  and  this  form  becomes  on  this  account  a  ground-rela- 
tion, because  the  determinations  of  its  antithesis  are  posited  in  the 
content  as  also  negated.  Content  is,  moreover,  determined  (defined, 
particularized)  within  itself  (by  its  own  nature),  not  only  as  matter 
in  the  phase  of  indifference  in  general,  but  as  matter  that  has  received 
form,  so  that  the  determinations  of  form  have  a  material  reality,  an 
indifferent  persistence  (independence).  In  one  respect  the  content 
is  the  essential  identity  of  the  ground  with  itself  in  its  posited-being. 
In  another  respect  it  is  the  posited  identity  as  opposed  to  the  ground- 
relation.  This  posited-being,  which  as  form-determination  belongs 
to  this  identity,  is  opposed  to  the  free  posited-being  —  i.  e. ,  it  is 
opposed  to  the  form  as  the  totality  of  the  relation  of  the  Ground  and 
the  grounded.  This  form  is  the  total  posited-being  which  returns 
into  itself.  The  first-mentioned  form,  therefore,  is  only  the  posited- 
being  as  an  immediate  somewhat  —  determinateness,  as  such. 

Ground  with  this  has  become  determined  (particularized)  ground, 
and  the  detei'minateness  itself  is  twofold :  First,  that  of  form ;  sec- 
ondly, that  of  content.  The  former  (the  determinateness  of  form) 
is  the  determinateness  which  is  external  to  the  content,  the  content 
being  indifferent  to  this  relation.  The  latter  is  the  determinateuess 
of  content  that  belongs  to  the  ground. 

B. 

The  Definite  (particular')  Ground. 
I.  The  Formal  Ground. 

Ground  has  a  definite  content.  The  definiteness  of  the  content 
(its  particularity)  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the  basis  for  the  form,  or  the 
simple  immediate  that  is  opposed  to  the  mediation  of  the  form. 
Ground  is  identity  relating  to  itself  negatively  (i.  e.,  annulling  its  inde- 
terminateness  and  proceeding  into  determinations),  and  this,  there- 
fore, reduces  itself  to  posited-being  (i.  e.,  to  dependent  somewhats). 
It  relates  negatively  to  itself  (determines  itself),  since  it  is  self- 
identical,  in  this  its  negativity  ;  this  identity  is  the  basis  or  the  con- 


The  Formal  Ground.  91 

or  positive  unity 
it. 

In  this  content  the  determinateness  of  ground  and  grounded,  as 
•opposed  to  each  other,  has  vanished.  The  mediation  is,  however, 
besides  this,  negative  unity.  The  negative  as  belonging  to  the  indif- 
ferent basis  is  its  immediate  determinateness,  and  through  it  the 
Around  possesses  a  definite  content.  But  in  the  next  place,  the  nega- 
tive is  the  negative  relation  of  form  to  itself  .  On  the  one  hand,  the 
itself  and  goes  back  into  its  ground;  but  the  ground, 
.  independence,  relates  negatively  to  itself,  and  reduces  itself 
to  posited-being.  This  negative  mediation  of  the  ground  and 
is  the  mediation  peculiar  to  form,  as  such — Ae  formal 
The  two  sides  of  form  now,  since  they  pass  over  into  one 
another,  posit  themselves  in  one  common  identity  as  annulled; 
through  tins,  at  the  same  time,  they  presuppose  this  identity.  Itisthe 
definite,  particular  content  to  which,  therefore,  the  formal  mediation 
relates,  as  the  positive  act  of  mediating  itself  through  itself.  It 
is  the  identical  phase  of  both,  and  while  they  are  different,  each, 
however,  being  in  its  distinction  in  relation  to  the  other,  the  content 
is  the  persistence  (reality)  of  the  same,  and  of  each  one  as  being  the 


According  to  the,  it  results  that  the  following  is  present  in  the  par- 
ticularized ground:  In  the  first  place,  a  particularized  content  is  re- 
garded from  two  points  of  view,  viz. :  (1)  in  so  far  as  it  is  posited  as 
ground;  (2)  as  grounded.  The  content  itself  is  indifferent  as  regards 
thfefoim:  it  is  o^  one  determination  in  both.  Secondly,  the  ground 
itself  is  as  much  an  element  (JToMcaf)  of  the  form,  as  it isa  somewhat 
posited  by  ft;  tins  is  its  identity  according  to  the  form.  It  is  indif- 
ferent which  of  the  two  determinations  are  taken  as  the  first— from 
which  as  the  posited  to  proceed  to  the  other  as  its  ground,  or  from 
which  as  the  ground  to  proceed  to  the  other  as  the  posited.  The 
grounded,  considered  for  and  by  itself,  is  the  annulling  of  itself ;  with 
tins  it  reduces  itself  on  the  one  hand  to  a-posited,  and  is  at  the  same 
time  the  positing  of  the  ground.  The  same  movement  is  the  ground 
as  such;  it  reduces  itself  to  a  posited,  and  through  this  it  becomes  a 
ground  of  something— that  is  to  say,  it  is  present  in  this  as  a  posited, 
and  also  as  ground.  That  a  ground  exists  implies  a  posited  as  a 
ground  of  tins  fact;  and,  conversely,  through  this  the  ground  is  in  so 
far  the  poshed.  The  mediation  begins  with  the  one  just  as  wefl  as  with 
the  other;  each  side  is  just  as  much  ground  as  posited,  and  each  is 
the  entire  mediation  of  the  entire  form.  This  entire  form  is  further- 
more the  basis  of  the  determinations  as  their  self-identity,  and  since 


92  Essence. 

the  determinations  are  the  two  sides  of  the  ground  and  the  grounded, 
the  form  and  content  are  thus  precisely  one  and  the  same  identity. 

On  account  of  this  identity  of  the  ground  and  grounded,  and  as 
well  according  to  the  content  as  according  to  the  form,  the  ground  is 
sufficient  ("sufficient  ground"  is  an  important  category  used  by 
Leibnitz)  — the  "  sufficient  "  being  limited  to  this  relation.  There  is 
nothing  in  the  ground  which  is  not  in  the  grounded,  and  nothing  in 
the  grounded  which  is  not  in  the  ground.  If  one  asks  for  a  ground, 
he  expects  to  see  the  characteristic  which  constitutes  the  content  used 
in  a  twofold  manner :  First,  in  the  form  of  the  posited  ;  secondly,  in 
the  form  of  the  reflection  into  itself  of  the  particular  being,  i.e., 
in  the  form  of  essentiality. 

In  so  far  as  ground  and  grounded  are  each  the  entire  form  in  the 
category  of  determined  (particularized)  ground,  and  their  content  is 
one  and  the  same,  although  particularized  ground  is  not  yet  fully 
determined  (i.e.,  particularized)  in  its  two  sides,  they  have  not  a  dif- 
ferent content ;  the  determinateness  is  first  simple,  and  not  a  deter- 
minateness  that  has  passed  over  into  the  two  sides.  We  have  here 
the  determined  (particularized)  ground  first  in  its  pure  form —  "the 
formal  ground."  Since  the  content  is  only  this  simple  determinate- 
ness,  to  which  the  form  of  ground-relation  does  not  belong,  it  is  a 
self-identical  content,  indifferent  as  regards  form,  and  form  is 
external  to  it ;  it  is  another  than  the  form. 

Remark. 

If  reflection  goes  no  further  than  the  consideration  of  determined 
ground,  as  here  defined,  it  follows  that  to  adduce  such  a  ground 
for  any  thing  is  a  mere  formalism,  an  empt}'  tautology,  which  expresses 
over  again  the  same  content  in  the  form  of  reflection-into-itself,  or  in 
the  form  of  essentiality,  what  has  already  been  expressed  in  the  form 
of  an  immediate  somewhat.  Such  a  mention  of  grounds  for  any  thing 
is  as  empty  an  affair  as  the  appeal  to  the  principle  of  identity  which 
has  been  mentioned.  Sciences,  and  more  especially  the  physical  sci- 
ences, are  full  of  tautologies  of  this  kind,  and  indeed  this  seems  to 
constitute  a  sort  of  prerogative.  For  example,  it  is  mentioned  as 
the  ground  of  the  fact  that  the  planets  move  around  the  sun  —  that 
there  is  an  attractive  force  existing  between  the  former  and  the  lat- 
ter. The  content  of  this  statement  expresses  nothing  besides  what  the 
phenomenon  contains,  viz.,  the  relation  of  these  bodies  to  each  other 
in  their  movement,  but  it  expresses  it  in  the  form  of  a  reflected  deter- 
mination—  that  is,  by  means  of  the  category  of  "  force."  If  it  be 


The  Formal  Ground.  93 

asked,  in  reference  to  this,  what  kind  of  a  force  the  attractive  force 
is,  the  answer  given  is,  that  the  force  is  what  causes  the  planets  to 
move  around  the  sun ;  in  these  statements  there  is  the  same  content 
throughout:  First,  as  the  fact  to  be  explained;  secondly,  as  the 
ground  or  reason  given  for  it.  The  relation  of  the  planets  to  the 
sun,  as  regards  movement,  is  the  basis  of  the  ground  and  the  grounded 
alike.  If  a  ciystalline  form  is  explained  by  the  particular  arrange- 
ment which  its  molecules  have,  we  have  the  same  tautology ;  the  fact 
of  the  crystallization  is  this  arrangement  itself,  which  is  again  ex- 
pressed as  the  ground.  In  ordinary  life,  these  aetiologies  (methods 
of  causal  explanation)  which  are  in  vogue  in  the  sciences  pass  for 
what  they  really  are  —  for  tautology,  for  empty  talk.  For  example : 
if  to  the  question,  why  this  man  goes  to  the  city,  it  should  be  stated, 
as  a  reason,  that  he  goes  to  the  city  because  there  is  an  attractive 
force  which  draws  him  there,  such  an  answer  would  pass  for  trivial, 
although  it  would  have  the  high  sanction  of  being  scientific.  Leib- 
nitz urged,  as  an  objection  against  the  Newtonian  force  of  attraction, 
that  it  was  an  occult  quality,  similar  to  those  which  the  scholastics 
employed  for  the  purposes  of  explanation ;  but  one  might  urge  the 
opposite  objection  that  it  is  a  too  well  known,  too  obvious  quality, 
for  it  has  no  other  content  than  the  phenomenon  itself.  Precisely 
what  recommends  this  mode  of  explanation  is  its  great  clearness  and 
intelligibility ;  for  there  is  nothing  clearer  and  more  intelligible  than 
to  say,  for  example,  that  a  plant  is  produced  by  (i.  e.,  has  its  ground 
in)  a  vegetative  power,  ?'.  e.,  a  plant-producing  power.  It  could  be 
called  an  "occult"  quality  only  when  the  ground  had  a  different 
content  from  that  which  it  is  intended  to  explain.  But  such  grounds 
are  not  given.  The  power  which  is  used  as  an  explanation  is  an 
"  occult "  ground,  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  such  aground  as  is  demanded 
for  explanation  (i.  e.,  the  ground  demanded  is  not  given,  but  remains 
"occult").  Through  this  formalism  there  is  as  little  explained  as 
there  is  explained  of  the  nature  of  a  plant  when  I  say  of  it :  It  is  a 
plant.  Notwithstanding  all  the  clearness  of  this  proposition,  or  of 
that  other  proposition,  that  it  has  its  ground  in  a  plant-producing 
power,  one  might  still  call  this  a  very  "  occult"  method  of  explaining 
things. 

Secondly.  As  regards  form,  we  find  in  this  mode  of  explanation  the 
two  opposite  phases  of  ground-relation,  without  recognizing  in  them 
their  definite  relation  to  each  other.  Ground  is  ground,  (1)  as  the 
into-itself- reflected  content  of  a  being  of  which  it  is  the  ground ;  (2) 
it  is  the  posited.  It  is  that  by  means  of  which  the  being  is  to  be  com- 
prehended. But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  ground  is  an  inference  from 


94  Essence. 

the  being ;  so  that  it  in  turn  is  comprehended  by  reference  to  the 
being.  The  chief  business  of  this  sort  of  reflection  consists  in  finding 
grounds  for  particular  being — i.  e.,in  converting  immediate  beings 
into  the  form  of  reflection.  The  ground,  instead  of  being  independ- 
ent, and  in  and  for  itself,  is,  therefore,  rather  what  is  posited  and 
deduced.  Now,  for  the  reason  that  this  procedure  of  finding  a  ground 
is  guided  by  the  phenomenon  investigated,  and  the  character  of  the 
ground  determined  by  the  latter,  it  follows  quite  smoothly  and  pros- 
perously from  its  ground.  But  scientific  knowledge  has  not  by  this 
means  gone  forward  a  particle ;  it  has  busied  itself  only  with  a  differ- 
ence in  form,  which  has  been  confounded  and  annulled  by  this  very 
procedure.  One  of  the  chief  difficulties  met  with  in  the  study  of 
the  sciences,  in  which  this  method  prevails,  consists  in  this  confound- 
ing of  the  positions  of  the  ground  and  grounded ;  placing  that 
beforehand  as  ground  which  in  fact  is  deduced,  and  arriving  at  a 
sequence  which  in  fact  should  have  been  placed  first,  as  the  ground  of 
the  alleged  ground.  In  the  exposition  the  beginning  is  made  with 
the  grounds  ;  they  are  set  up  in  the  air  as  principles,  or  first  ideas  ;  they 
are  simple  definitions,  without  any  apparent  necessity  in  and  for  them- 
selves ;  that  which  follows  is  deduced  from  them  ;  whoever,  therefore, 
would  master  these  sciences  must  begin  with  the  study  of  those 
grounds,  a  task  which  reason  finds  unpleasant,  because  it  has  to  take 
that  which  has  no  ground  as  a  basis.  He  will  come  out  best  who 
takes  these  principles  for  granted  without  much  reflection,  and  uses 
them  as  the  fundamental  rules  of  his  intellect.  Without  this  method 
he  cannot  make  a  beginning,  and  without  them  he  can  make  no 
progress.  This  inconsistency,  however,  impedes  his  progress:  he 
contradicts  his  method  by  deducing  —  from  grounds  which  have 
been  assumed  —  sequences  which  contain  grounds  of  the  former 
assumptions.  Moreover,  since  the  sequence  proves  to  be  the  fact  from 
whence  the  ground  was  deduced,  this  method  of  treating  it  causes 
one  to  distrust  the  exposition  of  it;  for  it  is  not  expressed  in  its 
immediateness,  but  as  a  result  of  the  ground.  Since,  however,  the 
ground  is  likewise  deduced  from  the  immediate  fact,  one  demands 
rather  to  see  the  fact  in  its  immediateness,  in  order  to  decide  upon 
the  validity  of  its  alleged  ground.  In  such  an  exposition,  therefore, 
in  which  that  which  is  properly  the  ground  is  brought  in  as  a  deduc- 
tion, one  knows  neither  how  to  regard  the  ground  nor  the  phenomenon. 
The  uncertainty  is  increased  by  this  circumstance,  especially  if  the 
exposition  is  not  strictly  consequent,  but  is  given  out  on  authority, 
viz.,  that  every  where  in  the  phenomenon  there  are  traces  and  con- 
ditions which  point  to  other  and  quite  different  things  from  those  con- 


The  Real  Ground.  95 

tamed  in  the  mere  principles.  The  confusion  is,  finally,  stffl  greater 
when  reflected  and  merely  hypothetical  determinations  are  mixed  in 
with  immediate  determinations  of  the  phenomenon,  and  the  former 
are  spoken  of  as  if  they  belonged  to  immediate  experience. 

Thus,  many  who  take  up  the  study  of  these  sciences  with  implicit 
faith  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  molecules,  and  the  void  spaces,  the 
repulsion,  ether,  single  beams  of  light,  electric  or  magnetic  matter, 
and  a  multitude  of  the  like  distinctions,  are  real  things  which  may  be 
found  in  actual  observation  existing  in  the  same  manner  as  described 
in  the  sciences.  They  serve  as  first  grounds  for  another;  are  ex- 
pressed as  actuaUties,  and  confidently  appfied.  And  they  are  allowed 
in  good  faith  to  pass  for  realities,  before  one  is  aware  that  they  are 
determinations  derived  from  those  things  for  which  they  are  offered 
as  the  grounds,  being  mere  hypotheses  formed  by  an  uncritical  reflec- 
tion. In  fact,  one  finds  himself  in  a  kind  of  witch's  circle  when  he 
uses  them,  in  which  determinations  of  particular  being  and  determina- 
tions of  reflection — ground  and  grounded,  phenomena  and  phan- 
toms— course  through  each  other  promiscuously,  and  are  all  received 
as  of  equal  rank  and  validity. 

In  this  formal  occupation  of  explaining  things  bymeansof  grounds, 
one  hears  again  and  again,  notwithstanding  all  this  explanation  by 
of  well-known  powers  and  matters,  that  we  do  not  know  the 
of  these  powers  and  matters.  In  this,  we  have  only 
a  confession  that  this  activity  of  explanation  is  wholly  insufficient, 
and  that  it  demands  something  quite  different  from  the  grounds 
which  it  offers;  and  the  only  difficult  thing  that  remains  for  us  to 
understand  is,  why  all  this  trouble  has  been  taken  to  make  such 
explanations;  why  something  else  has  not  been  sought,  or  at  least 
that  species  of  explanation  dispensed  with,  and  the  simple  facts 
themselves  accepted  without  any  explanation. 

2.  The  Bed  Ground. 

The  determinateness  of  ground  is,  as  has  been  shown,  in  the  first 
place,  the  determinateness.of  bask  (substrate)  or  of  the  content;  in 
the  second  place,  it  is  the  other-being  in  the  ground-determination 
itself,  viz.,  the  difference  between  its  content  and  the  form.  The  rela- 
tion of  ground  and  grounded  becomes  a  mere  external  form  to  the 
content,  which  is  indifferent  to  these  determinations.  But  in  fact  the 
two  are  not  external  to  each  other;  for  the  content  is  really  the  setf- 
identity  of  the  ground  in  the  grounded,  and  rfoe  reran,  of  the  grounded 
in  the  ground.  The  side  which  belongs  to  the  ground  has  shown  itself 
to  be  a  posited  somewhat,  and  the  side  which  belongs  to  the  grounded 


96  Essence. 

has  shown  itself  to  be  the  ground  itself ;  each  is  in  itself  the  identity  of 
the  whole,  but  because  they  belong  at  the  same  time  to  the  form,  and 
constitute  its  special  distinctions,  each  of  them  is  in  its  determinate- 
ness  the  self-identity  of  the  totality.  Each  has  consequently  a  sepa- 
rate content  opposed  to  the  other.  In  other  words,  considered  from 
the  side  of  content,  inasmuch  as  it  is  self-identity  as  ground-relation, 
it  has  esssentially  this  form-distinction  in  itself,  and  is,  as  ground, 
another  than  the  grounded. 

In  this  fact,  now  that  ground  and  grounded  have  a  different  con- 
tent, the  ground-relation  has  really  ceased  to  be  a  formal  distinc- 
tion. The  return  into  the  ground,  and  the  procedure  out  of  it  into 
posited-being,  is  no  longer  a  mere  tautology,  and  thus  the  ground  is 
realized.  When  one  asks  for  a  ground,  he  desires  to  be  answered  by 
the  statement  of  some  other  content-determination  than  the  very  one 
for  which  he  has  asked  a  ground  or  sought  an  explanation. 

This  relation  can  now  be  defined  more  accurately.  In  so  far, 
namely,  as  its  two  sides  are  different  in  content,  they  are  independ- 
ent of  each  other ;  each  is  an  immediate  self -identical  determination. 
Moreover,  as  ground  and  grounded  are  related  to  each  other,  the 
ground  is  reflected  into  itself  in  the  other  as  in  its  posited-being ; 
the  content,  therefore,  which  belongs  to  the  side  of  the  ground  is 
likewise  in  the  grounded ;  and  the  grounded,  as  the  posited,  has  in 
that  content  its  self-identity  and  reality.  Besides  this  content  of  the 
ground,  the  grounded  has  also  its  proper,  peculiar  content,  and  is 
consequently  the  unity  of  a  twofold  content.  Although  this  unity  is, 
as  a  unity  of  contents  which  differ,  their  negative  unity ;  for  the 
reason  that  these  content-determinations  are  indifferent  towards  each 
other,  it  follows  that  this  unity  is  only  an  empty  one,  a  relation  devoid 
of  content,  and  not  their  mediation ;  it  is  a  one  or  a  somewhat  as  an 
external  bond  of  union. 

In  the  real  ground-relation,  therefore,  the  twofold  content  is  to  be 
found,  in  the  first  instance,  as  content-determination,  which  is  con- 
tinued as  self-identical  in  the  posited-being,  so  that  it  constitutes  the 
simple  identity  of  ground  and  grounded.  The  grounded  contains, 
therefore,  the  ground  perfectly  within  itself ;  its  relation,  therefore,  is 
an  essential  continuity,  without  break  or^separation.  What  therefore 
appertains  to  the  grounded  as  additional  to  this  simple  essence,  is, 
therefore,  only  an  unessential  form,  external  content-determinations 
which,  as  such,  are  independent  of  the  ground,  and  possess  an  imme- 
diate manifoldness.  And  hence,  the  mentioned  essential  relation  is  not 
the  ground  of  this  unessential  (superfluity  and  immediate  manifold- 
ness)  ;  it  is  the  ground  of  the  relation  of  the  two  to  each  other  in  the 


The  Real  Ground.  97 

grounded.  It  is  a  positive,  identical  somewhat  which  inheres  in  the 
grounded  ;  although  it  is  posited  within  it,  not  as  in  a  form-distinction, 
but  as  a  self-relating  content  is  an  indifferent  positive  basis  or  principle. 
Finallj*,  that  which  is  externally  connected  to  this  basis  or  principle 
is  an  indifferent  content  as  the  unessential  side.  The  chief  thing  is 
the  relation  of  the  basis  or  substrate  to  the  manifoldness  which  is 
regarded  as  unessential.  But  this  relation,  since  the  determinations 
which  stand  in  relation  constitute  the  indifferent  content,  is  also  not 
the  ground,  although  the  one  is  essential,  and  the  other  is  defined 
as  unessential  or  a  posited-content ;  but  this  form  is  external  to  both, 
as  self-relating  content.  The  one  of  the  somewhat  which  constitutes 
their  relation  is,  therefore,  not  form-determination,  but  only  an  exter- 
nal bond  which  contains  the  unessential  manifold  content,  but  not  as 
a  posited  somewhat ;  it  is,  therefore,  only  basis  or  substrate. 

Ground,  determined  as  real  on  account  of  the  diversity  of  the  con- 
tent which  constitutes  its  reality,  falls  asunder,  therefore,  into  external 
determinations.  The  two  relations — on  the  one  hand,  the  essential 
content,  as  the  simple  immediate  identity  of  grouud  and  grounded ; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  somewhat,  as  the  relation  of  the  different 
elements  of  the  content  —  these  two  relations  are  two  different  sub- 
strates. The  self-identical  form  of  the  ground,  according  to  which 
the  same  thing  is  at  one  time  essential  and  at  another  time  posited, 
has  vanished,  and  the  ground-relation  has,  therefore,  become  self- 
external. 

There  is,  therefore,  now  an  external  ground,  which  brings  into 
external  relation  different  elements  of  the  content,  and  determines 
what  is  ground  and  what  is  posited  through  the  ground ;  in  the  two 
phases  of  the  content  itself,  there  is  not  to  be  found  the  means  for 
determining  this  question.  The  real  ground  is,  therefore,  relation- 
to-other,  on  the  one  hand,  of  content  to  other  content,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  of  ground-relation,  or  form,  to  something  else,  viz.,  to 
an  immediate  that  is  not  posited  through  it. 

Remark. 

The  formal  ground-relation  contains  only  one  content  for  ground 
and  grounded ;  and  in  this  identity  of  content  lies  its  necessity,  but, 
at  the  same  time,  its  tautology.  The  real  ground  contains  a  diversity 
of  content,  but  through  this  diversity  there  enters  contingency  and 
externality  as  regards  the  ground-relation.  In  the  first  place,  that 
which  is  regarded  AS  essential,  and  on  this  account  as  ground-deter- 
mination, is  not  the  ground  of  the  other  determinations  which  are 
connected  with  it.  In  the  second  place,  it  is  not  determined  which 


98  Essence. 

of  the  several  content-determinations  of  a  concrete  thing  is  to  be 
assumed  as  essential  and  as  ground.  The  choice  between  them,  there- 
fore, is  left  free ;  thus,  in  the  first  aspect,  for  example,  the  ground  of 
a  house  is  its  foundation ;  wherefore  this  ground  depends  upon  the 
gravity  inherent  in  sensuous  matter,  and  gravity  is  identical  in  this 
case  in  the  ground  and  grounded.  The  fact  that  there  belongs  to- 
heavy  matter  such  a  distinction,  viz.,  that  one  part  should  be  a  sub- 
strate and  the  other  a  modification  different  from  it:  this  distinction 
appertaining  to  a  dwelling-house  is  perfectly  indifferent  to  gravity 
itself.  Its  relation  to  the  other  content-determinations  of  the  final 
cause,  the  arrangement  of  the  house,  etc.,  is  external  to  it;  it  is 
therefore  a  substrate,  a  foundation,  but  not  a  ground  or  cause  of  the 
same.  Gravity  is  the  ground  or  cause  to  which  is  to  be  attributed 
the  fact  that  a  house  stands,  and,  as  well,  the  fact  that  a  stone  falls. 
The  stone  has  this  ground,  gravity,  in  itself ;  but  the  fact  that  it  has 
other  determinations  of  content  besides  gravity  —  determinations 
which  make  it  to  be  a  stone  —  is  a  fact  indifferent  to  gravity.  More- 
over, the  stone  is  a  somewhat  posited  through  another  somewhat :  that 
it  was  previously  at  a  distance  from  the  body  to  which  it  fell,  and  also 
that  the  time,  the  space,  and  their  relation,  the  movement,  are  another 
content  than  gravity,  and  are  capable  of  being  conceived  without 
it  —  to  use  the  ordinary  mode  of  expression  —  and  are  accordingly 
not  essentially  posited  through  it.  They  are  also  the  ground  that  a 
projectile  makes  a  flight  opposed  to  gravity.  It  is  evident,  from  the 
diversity  of  the  determinations  whose  ground  it  is,  that  something 
else  is  demanded,  which  makes  it  the  ground  of  this  or  .of  another 
determination. 

If  the  assertion  is  made  regarding  nature,  that  it  is  the  ground  of 
the  woi'ld ;  on  the  one  hand,  that  which  is  called  nature  is  identical 
with  the  world,  and  the  world  is  nothing  but  nature  itself.  And  yet 
they  are  also  different,  so  that  nature  is  rather  the  indeterminate,  or 
at  least  determined  only  in  such  general  characteristics  as  natural  laws, 
for  example ;  so,  too,  that  nature  is  the  self-identical  essence  of  the 
world,  and  requires  a  multitude  of  determinations  to  be  added  to  it 
in  order  to  become  the  world.  But  these  determinations  have  their 
ground  not  in  nature  as  such ;  they  are  rather  to  be  regarded  as 
contingent  and  indifferent  to  it.  We  have  the  same  relation  between 
God  and  nature  when  God  is  defined  as  the  ground  of  nature.  As 
ground,  He  is  its  essence.  Nature  contains  God  within  it,  and  is 
identical  with  Him ;  but  nature  has  further  manifold  determinations 
which  are  different  from  the  ground  itself.  Nature  is  the  third  term, 
therefore,  in  which  these  two  different  factors  unite.  The  men- 


The  Seal  Ground.  99" 

tioned  ground  is  neither  the  ground  of  the  manifoldness  different 
from  it,  nor  for  its  connection  with  it.  Nature  is,  therefore,  not  cog- 
nized as  having  its  ground  in  God;  for  in  that  case  He  would  only  be 
the  general  essence  of  nature,  whereas  the  ground  of  nature  is  a  defi- 

This  producing  of  real  grounds  is,  therefore,  a  formalism  just  as 
much  as  the  formal  ground  itself,  because  of  this  diversity  in  the 
content  of  the  ground,  or  the  difference  between  the  substrate  and 
that  which  is  connected  with  it  in  the  grounded  somewhat.  In  this. 
formal  ground,  the  self-identical  content  is  indifferent  as  regards. 
the  f  onn ;  in  the  real  ground,  the  same  thing  is  true.  TSuodgli  this 
fact,  moreover,  it  does  not  contain  within  itself  the  ground  or  reason 
for  deciding  which  of  the  many  determinations  shall  be  taken  as  i^e 
essential  one.  A  somewhat  is  concrete,  and  has  a  manifold  of  detcr- 
nunations  which  show  themselves  serf-subsistent  and  abiding.  There- 
fore, one  of  them  as  well  as  another  may  be  taken  as  ground,  and 
may  be  held  to  be  essential,  and  in  comparison  with  it  the  others  are 
a  mere  posited.  What  was  formerly  mentioned  applies  here:  that  if 
a  determination  occurs  which  in  one  aspect  is  viewed  as  the  gronad 
of  another,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  other  is  to  be  regarded  as  pos- 
ited by  it  in  any  other,  or  in  all  aspects.  Punishment,  for  pTampl^ 
has  a  variety  of  aspects  in  which  it  may  be  regarded,  — that  of  retri- 
bution, that  of  a  warning  example,  deterring  from  the  infraction  of 
law,  and  also  that  of  the  reformation  of  the  criminal.  Each  of  these 
different  aspects  has  been  regarded  as  the  ground  or  reason  of  "pun- 
ishment, because  each  one  is  an  essential  determination;  and,  viewed 
in  reference  to  it,  the  other  determinations  are  defined  as  contingent. 
But  the  one  which  is  assumed  as  ground  is  not  identical  with  the 
total  compass  of  punishment  (in  an  its  aspects) ;  punishment,  as  a 
concrete,  contains  not  only  one,  but  aH  of  the  aspects  which  are 
connected  with  each  other,  being  contained  in  punishment,  but  are 
not  the  ground  of  each  other.  As  another  example:  an  officer  has 
fitness  for  the  duties  of  his  office,  and  as  an  individual  has  relations 
to  kindred,  and  to  this  and  that  acquaintance ;  he  possesses  a  charac- 
ter of  his  own,  and  has  been  in  these  or  those  circumstances,  and 
has  had  such  and  such  opportunities  to  show  his  capacity,  etc. 
Each  one  of  these  tilings  may  be  taken  as  the  ground  or  reason  for 
his  possession  of  this  office ;  they  constitute  a  diversified  content, 
whose  elements  are  united  in  a  third.  The  form,  as  the  essential  and 
as  determined,  in  antithesis  to  the  posited,  is  external  to  it.  Each  of 
these  things  is  essential  to  the  officer,  because  as  a  particular  indi- 


100  Essence. 

vidnal  he  needs  them  for  his  realization.  In  so  far  as  his  office  may 
be  regarded  as  an  external  posited  determination,  each  one  of  the 
things  mentioned  may  be  regarded  as  the  ground  of  the  office ;  but, 
on  the  contrary,  the  office  could  also  be  regarded  as  the  ground  of 
«ach  one  of  them,  and  in  that  case  they  would  be  the  posited.  As 
they  actually  stand — that  is  to  say,  considered  in  an  individual 
^ase  —  the  office  is  an  external  determination  as  regards  content  and 
ground.  It  is  a  third,  which  confers  upon  them  the  form  of  ground 
and  grounded. 

Every  being  may  have  a  variety  of  grounds ;  each  one  of  the 
determinations  of  its  content,  as  self-identical,  penetrates  the  concrete 
totality,  and  for  this  reason  may  be  regarded  as  essential.  The 
various  aspects,  i.  e.,  determinations  which  lie  outside  of  the  thing 
itself,  have  no  limit  as  to  number,  for  the  reason  that  the  method  of 
making  combinations  is  a  purely  arbitrary  one.  Whether  a  ground 
has  this  or  that  sequence  is,  therefore,  quite  an  accidental  affair. 
Moral  motives,  for  example,  are  essential  determinations  of  an  ethical 
nature ;  but  what  follows  from  them  is  an  external  affair  quite  differ- 
ent from  them ;  it  follows,  and  it  does  not  follow,  from  them ;  it  is 
added  to  them  by  the  agency  of  a  third  somewhat.  In  fact,  when  a 
moral  determination  is  taken  for  a  ground,  it  is  not  contingent  that 
it  shall  have  a  result  or  a  ground,  but  it  is  a  contingency  whether 
it  shall  become  a  ground  or  not ;  but  since  the  content,  which  is  its 
result  when  the  moral  determination  has  been  taken  as  a  ground,  is 
an  externality,  it  may  be  annulled  through  another  externality. 
From  one  moral  motive,  therefore,  there  may  or  may  not  result  a 
deed.  Conversely,  a  deed  may  have  a  variety  of  grounds ;  it  contains 
as  a  concrete  many  essential  determinations,  each  one  of  which, 
therefore,  may  be  assigned  as  the  ground.  The  search  for  grounds, 
in  which  ratiocination  principally  consists,  is,  therefore,  an  endless 
procedure.  Each  and  every  thing  may  have  one  or  more  good 
grounds  assigned  for  it,  and  there  can  be  a  multitude  assigned  for  a 
thing  without  any  result  following  from  them.  That  which  Socrates 
and  Plato  called  sophistry  is  only  ratiocination  by  means  of  assign- 
ing grounds.  Plato  opposes  to  this  process  the  consideration  of  the 
Idea,  i.  e.,  of  the  necessary  nature  of  things,  or  their  ideal  totality 
(Begriff.)  Grounds  are  selected  only  from  essential  determinations 
of  content,  essential  relations,  and  aspects ;  and  each  thing,  as  well 
as  its  opposite,  possesses  several  of  these.  In  their  form  of  essen- 
tiality, one  does  as  well  as  the  other ;  and  since  no  one  of  them  con- 
tains the  entire  compass  of  the  object,  each  of  them  is  a  one-sided 


The  Perfect  Ground.  101 

ground,  which  does  not  exhaust  the  object  which  contains  all  these 
sides  within  it;  no  one  of  them  is  a  "sufficient"  ground,  i.  e.y 
ideal  totality  (Beyrtf). 

3.  The  Perfect  Ground. 

(1.)  In  the  real  ground,  the  ground  as  content  and  the  ground  as 
relation  are  contained  as  mere  substrates.  Ground  as  content  is  only 
posited  as  essential  and  as  ground.  Ground  as  relation  is  the  some- 
what of  the  grounded,  as  the  indefinite  substrate  of  a  diversified  con- 
tent, a  connection  between  the  different  elements  of  the  content, 
which  is  not  its  own  reflection,  but  something  external,  and.  conse- 
quently, only  a  posited.  The  real  ground-relation  is,  therefore, 
rather  the  ground  as  annulled ;  and,  therefore,  it  is  rather  the  side  of 
posited-being  or  of  the  grounded.  As  posited-being,  however,  the 
ground  has  returned  into  its  own  ground,  and  hence  is  a  grounded, 
and  has  another  ground ;  this  other  ground,  therefore,  determines 
itself  to  be  identical,  in  the  first  place,  with  the  real  ground  as 
grounded  through  it ;  both  sides  have,  therefore,  one  and  the  same 
content ;  the  two  determinations  of  content,  and  their  union  in  the 
somewhat,  are  therefore  contained  in  a  new  ground.  Secondly,  the 
new  ground,  in  which  that  merely  posited  external  union  (Verknuep- 
fttng)  as  been  annulled,  is,  as  their  reflection  into  themselves,  the 
absolute  relation  of  the  two  determinations  of  content. 

Through  this  fact — that  the  real  ground  has  returned  into  its  own 
ground — the  identity  of  the  ground  and  grounded,  or  formal  ground, 
is  restored.  The  ground-relation  which  has  arisen  is,  therefore,  the 
perfect  ground,  which  contains  within  itself  the  formal  and  the  real 
grounds,  and  which  mediates  in  the  latter,  through  each  other,  its 
immediate  content-determinations. 

(2.)  The  ground-relation  has  thus  far  developed  the  following 
determinations :  First,  a  somewhat  has  a  ground ;  it  contains  the  con- 
tent-determination, which  the  ground  is,  and  a  second  determination 
posited  through  the  ground.  But  as  indifferent  content,  the  one  is 
not  within  itself  ground,  nor  the  other  within  itself  the  grounded  of 
the  former ;  on  the  contrary,  this  relation  is,  in  the  immediatencss  of 
the  content,  annulled  or  posited,  and  as  such  has  another  somewhat 
for  its  ground.  This  second  relation,  which  differs  only  in  respect 
to  form,  has  the  same  content  as  the  former,  viz.,  the  two  determina- 
tions of  content,,  but  is  the  immediate  union  of  the  two.  Since, 
however,  the  different  elements  of  the  content,  thus  united,  are  con- 
sequently indifferent  as  regards  each  other,  the  union  is  not  their 
true,  absolute  relation,  in  which  the  one  of  the  determinations  would 


102  Essence. 

be  self-identical  in  the  posited-being,  while  the  other  would  be  only 
this  posited-being  of  the  same  self-identical  determination  ;  but  a  some- 
what is  their  substrate,  and  constitutes  their  relation,  which  is  not 
reflected,  but  is  only  an  immediate  relation,  and  which,  therefore,  is 
•only  a  relative  ground  as  opposed  to  their  union  in  another  some- 
what. The  two  somewhats  are,  therefore,  the  two  different  relations 
•of  content  which  we  have  found ;  they  stand  in  the  identical  ground- 
.relation  of  form ;  they  are  one  and  the  same  content  as  a  totality, 
-viz.,  the  two  determinations  of  content  and  their  relation.  They  are, 
therefore,  distinct  only  through  the  nature  of  this  relation,  which  in 
the  one  is  an  immediate  and  in  the  other  is  a  posited  relation ; 
through  which  the  one  is  distinguished  from  the  other  only  according 
to  form,  as  ground  and  grounded.  Secondly,  this  ground-relation  is 
not  only  formal,  but  also  real.  The  formal  ground  passes  over  into 
the  real  ground,  as  we  have  seen.  The  moments  of  form  are 
reflected  into  themselves ;  they  are  an  independent  content,  and  the 
ground-relation  contains  also  a  peculiar  content  of  its  own  as  ground, 
and  one  as  grounded.  The  content  constitutes  the  immediate  iden- 
tity of  the  two  sides  of  the  formal  ground,  and  hence  they  have  one 
and  the  same  content.  But  it  has  also  within  itself  the  form  ;  hence 
it  is  a  two-fold  content,  which  stands  in  the  relation  of  ground  and 
grounded.  One  of  the  two  determinations  of  content  which  belong 
to  the  two  somewhats  is,  therefore,  defined  not  as  merely  common 
to  them,  as  found  by  external  comparison,  but  as  their  identical  sub- 
strate and  the  basis  of  their  relation.  Opposed  to  the  other  deter- 
mination of  content  it  is  essential  and  the  ground  of  it  as  posited, 
viz.,  in  the  somewhat  whose  relation  the  grounded  is.  In  the 
first  somewhat,  which  is  the  ground-relation,  this  second  deter- 
mination of  content  is  also  immediately  united  to  the  first,  and 
according  to  its  nature.  The  other  somewhat,  however,  contains 
only  the  one  potentially,  as  that  in  which  it  is  immediately  identical 
with  the  first  somewhat;  but  it  contains  the  other  as  a  posited 
within  it.  The  first  determination  of  content  is  the  ground  of  the 
same,  through  this  fact:  that  it  is  united  within  the  first  somewhat 
primordially  to  the  other  determination  of  content. 

The  ground-relation  of  the  determinations  of  content  in  the  second 
somewhat  is  mediated,  therefore,  through  the  first  self-existent  rela- 
tion of  the  first  somewhat.  The  conclusion  is  this :  for  the  reason  that 
within  a  somewhat  the  determination  B  is  united  with  the  deter- 
mination A  by  nature  (cm  sich),  there  is  in  the  second  somewhat,  to 
•which  only  the  determination  A  belongs,  immediately  also  united  with 
it  the  determination  B.  In  the  second  somewhat  this  second  detemiina- 


The  Relatively  Unconditioned.  103 

tion  is  contained  not  only  mediately,  but  also  the  inference  that  its 
immediate  ground  is,  viz.,  through  its  immediate  relation  to  B,  in  the 
first  somewhat.  This  relation  is  consequently  the  ground  of  the 
ground  A,  and  die  entire  ground-relation  is  in  the  second  somewhat 
as  posited  or  grounded. 

3.  The  real  ground  thus  appears  as  the  self-external  reflection  of 
ground ;  the  perfect  mediation  thereof  is  the  restoration  of  its  self- 
identity.  But  since  the  latter  has  retained  at  the  same  time  the 
externality  of  the  real  ground,  it  follows  that  the  formal  ground- 
relation  in  this  unity  of  itself  and  the  real  ground  is  self-positing  as 
well  as  self-cancelling  ground.  The  ground-relation  mediates  itself 
through  its  self-negation.  In  the  first  place,  the  ground,  as  the  orig- 
inal relation,  is  the  relation  of  immediate  determinations  of  content. 
The  ground-relation  has,  as  essential  form  for  its  sides  or  terms,  such 
somewhats  as  have  already  been  cancelled  or  reduced  to  moments. 
Therefore,  as  form  of  immediate  determinations,  it  is  the  self-identi- 
cal relation,  which  is  at  the  same  time  relation  of  its  negation. 
Hence  it  is  ground  not  in  and  for  itself  (by  its  own  nature),  but  as  a 
relation  to  the  annulled  ground-relation.  In  the  second  place,  the 
annulled  relation,  or  the  immediate,  which  is  the  identical  substrate  in 
the  original  and  in  the  posited  relation,  is  a  real  ground  likewise  not 
in  and  for  itself,  but  it  is  posited  through  that  original  bond  of  union 
to  be  ground. 

The  ground-relation  in  its  totality  is,  consequently,  essentially  pre- 
supposing reflection ;  the  formal  ground  presupposes  the  immediate 
content-determination;  and  the  latter,  as  real  ground,  presupposes 
the  form.  The  ground  is  therefore  the  form,  as  immediate  bond  of 
union,  but  in  such  a  manner  that  it  repels  itself  from  itself,  and  pre- 
supposes the  immediateness,  and  in  this  relates  to  itself  as  to  another. 
This  immediate  is  the  determination  of  content,  the  simple  ground ; 
but  as  this  simple  ground  it  is  repelled  from  itself,  and  relates  to 
itself  as  to  another.  In  this  manner  the  total  ground-relation  is 
determined  as  conditioning  mediation. 

c. 

The  Condition. 
1.  The  Relatively  Unconditioned. 

(1.)  Ground  is  the  immediate,  and  the  grounded  is  the  mediated. 
But  ground  is  the  positing  reflection,  and,  as  such,  it  reduces  itself 
to  posited-being,  and  is  presupposing  reflection;  it  therefore  re- 


104  Essence. 

lates  to  itself  as  annulled,  as  an  immediate  through  which  it,  itself,, 
is  mediated.  This  mediation,  as  progress  from  the  immediate  to  the 
ground,  is  not  an  external  reflection,  but,  as  has  been  developed,  it 
is  due  to  the  activity  of  ground  itself ;  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  the 
ground-relation  is,  as  reflection  into  self-identity,  likewise  essentially 
self-externalizing  reflection.  The  immediate  to  which  ground  relates 
as  to  its  essential  presupposition  is  the  Condition  (i.  e.,  the  condi- 
tioning limits — Bedingung)  ;  the  real  ground  is,  therefore,  essentially 
conditioned ;  the  determinateness  which  it  contains  is  the  otherness  of 
itself. 

The  conditioning  limit  is,  therefore,  in  the  first  place,  an  immediate, 
manifold  being.  In  the  second  place,  this  being  is  related  to  another, 
to  a  somewhat  which  is  ground,  not  of  this  being,  but  of  something 
else  ;  for  the  being  itself  is  immediate,  and  without  ground.  In  this 
relation  it  is  a  posited  somewhat ;  according  to  it,  the  immediate  being 
would  be  a  conditioning  limit,  not  of  itself,  but  of  another ;  but  at 
the  same  time  this  being  for  another  is  itself  only  a  posited-being ; 
that  it  is  a  posited-being  is  annulled  in  its  immediateness.  and  a  beingr 
is  indifferent  as  regards  its  function  as  conditioning  limit.  In  the 
third  place,  the  conditioning  limit  is,  therefore,  an  immediate,  so  that 
it  constitutes  the  presupposition  of  the  ground.  In  this  phase  it  is 
the  form-relation  of  the  ground,  which  has  returned  into  self-iden- 
tity, and  hence  it  is  its  content.  But  the  content,  as  such,  is 
only  the  indifferent  unity  of  the  ground  as  it  is  in  the  form  — 
without  form,  no  content.  The  content  frees  itself  from  the 
form  through  the  fact  that  the  ground-relation  in  the  perfect 
ground  becomes  a  relation  external  to  its  identity ;  through  this 
the  content  preserves  its  immediateness.  In  so  far,  therefore, 
as  the  conditioning  limit  is  that  in  which  the  ground-relation 
possesses  its  self-identity,  it  constitutes  its  content ;  but  for  the 
reason  that  it  is  indifferent  to  this  form,  it  is  only  potentially  its 
content — that  is,  it  ought  to  be  the  content,  and  hence  it  constitutes 
the  material  for  the  ground.  Posited  as  conditioning  limit,  the  being, 
according  to  the  second  moment  (element  or  phase),  possesses  this 
peculiarity ;  it  loses  its  indifferent  immediateness.  and  becomes  a 
moment  of  another  being.  Through  its  immediateness,  it  is  indiffer- 
ent to  this  relation ;  but,  in  so  far  as  it  enters  this  relation,  it  consti- 
tutes the  nature  (Ansicliseyii)  of  the  ground,  and  is  the  uncondi- 
tioned for  it.  In  order  to  be  conditioning  limit,  it  has  its  presupposi- 
tion in  the  ground,  and  is  itself  conditioned,  but  this  characteristic  is 
an  external  (accidental)  one  for  it. 

(2.)  A  somewhat  is  not  through  its  conditioning  limit;  its  condi- 


Tke  Rdatimly  U Conditioned. 

knot  its  ground.     It is  the  moment  (phase)  of  uncon- 
mwBMss  for  the  ground,  but  it is  not  the  activity  and  the 


positing  •Inch  relates  negatrrely  10  itself,  and  reduces  Maplf  to  a 
The  ground-relaSKML,  therefore,  •fandi  opposed  to 
A  somewhat  has,  besides  its  conditioaing- 
rhfe  is  the  active  movement  of   reflection, 

it  has  tfc»  nm^**K*1mmmm*  ^^hM*  nf  ft  as  its  presupposition. 

But  it  is  the  entire  form;  and  the  independent  activity  of  mediation 
for  the  conditioning  nmit,  is  not  te  ground.    For  the  reason  that  this 

as  a  pouting  activity,  it  is  in  tins 
:  /.         _       .:     ;  -- 
iDed  positing  activity :  hence, 
:  to  its  determination  (  Batimmina = destina- 
.-   - 

the  identify  of 

a  pecuBar  content,  opposed  lothe  con- 
it.     The  former  is  the  content  of  the 
an  essential  form.      TLte   latter, 
material,  for  which  the  relation  to  the 
Destitutes  also  ite  nature.    Consequently 
of  the  independent  content,  which  possesses  no  refav 
;  of  ground,  with  that  which  goes  into  iteetf.  and  as 

of  the  same. 
(3.)  Thetwotnmsof  the  totan^— the  conditioning  fimk  and  the 

the  one,  which  m  Ike  non-related,  m 
in  which  it  is  conditioning  Emit:  the  other 
n-  which  the  particularized  being  of  the  cco- 


Moreorcr,  both  are  mediated.  The  conditioning  Emit  is  the  being  in 
itself  of  the  ground.  It  u  essential  moment  of  the  ground-relation 
to  the  extent  that  it  is  its  simple  self-identity.  But  diis  simple  self- 
identity  is  also  annulled;  this  being  in  itself,  or  nature,  is  only  a 

15  mdlffipfPtlt  JS  TCfinVOS   1AC  DBmtHr  OI 

ofthebeimj 

in  rt/ffli  is  for  the  ground,  constitutes  its  phase  of 

,a 


106  Essence. 

both  in  one  relation.  In  other  words,  the  contradiction  consists  in 
being  an  independent  self  subsistence  and  a  mere  element  at  the 
same  time. 

2.  The  Absolutely  Unconditioned. 

The  two  relatively  unconditioned  somewhats  manifest  themselves 
each  in  the  other.  The  conditioning  limit,  as  immediate,  manifests 
itself  in  the  form-relation  of  the  ground,  and  the  latter  manifests 
itself  in  immediate  being  as  its  posited-being  (dependence).  But 
each  of  these  relatively  unconditioned  somewhats  is  independent  of 
this  manifestation  of  its  other  within  it,  and  has  a  proper  content  of 
its  own. 

In  the  first  place,  the  conditioning  limit  is  immediate  being.  Its 
form  has  these  two  phases :  the  posited-beiug,  according  to  which  it 
is,  as  conditioning  limit,  material  and  element  of  the  ground ;  and 
(the  other  phase  is)  being-in-itself  (Ansichseyn — its  own  nature, 
which  is  through  itself,  and  not  a  mere  "posited-being,"  or  being 
derived  from  another,  and  dependent  on  it),  which  constitutes  the 
essentiality  of  the  ground,  or  its  simple  reflection-into-itself 
("  reflection- into-itself,"  it  will  be  remembered,  is  always  the  form 
of  self-relation  in  its  positive  aspect  of  identity,  independence,  and 
infinitude).  The  two  sides  of  form  are  external  to  the  immediate 
being,  for  immediate  being  is  the  cancelled  ground-relation.  But, 
first,  being  is  by  itself  only  the  process  of  self-annullment  in  its 
immediateness,  and  of  ceasing  to  be  (i.  e.,  of  "  going  to  the 
ground").  The  sphere  of  Being  (treated  in  the  first  part  of  this 
logic,  and  including  all  categories  of  immediateness,  such  as  quality, 
quantity,  and  measure)  is  only  the  becoming  of  Essence  (transi- 
tion to  Essence)  ;  it  is  its  essential  nature  to  reduce  itself  to  a  posited- 
being,  and  to  an  identity  which  is  the  immediate,  through  the  nega- 
tive of  it  (as  a  posited).  Therefore,  the  determinations  of  form, 
viz.,  of  posited-being,  and  of  self -identical  being-in-itself  —  the  form 
through  which  immediate  being  is  conditioning  limit  —  are  therefore 
not  external  to  it,  but  immediate  being  is  this  reflection  itself. 
Secondly,  as  conditioning  limit,  what  being  essentially  is,  is  now  also 
posited ;  it  is,  viz. ,  a  moment,  consequently  a  phase  of  another,  and 
at  the  same  time  likewise  the  being-in-itself  of  another ;  but  it  is  in 
itself  only  through  the  negation  of  itself,  i.  e.,  through  the  ground, 
and  through  its  reflection,  which  is  self-annulling,  and  consequently 
presupposing.  The  being-in-itself  of  the  categories  of  the  sphere  of 
Being  is,  consequently,  only  a  posited.  This  being-in-itself  of  the 


The  AbmhUdy  Unconditioned.  107 

conditioning  Kmit  has  these  two  aspects:  (1)  its  essentiality  as 
ground,  and  (2)  the  immediateness  of  its  particular  being.  These 
two  are  the  same.  The  particular  being  is  an  immediate,  but  the 
immediateness  is  essentially  what  is  mediated — mediated,  viz.. 
through  the  self-annulling  ground.  As  this  immediateness.  which  is 
mediated  through  the  self-annulling  mediation,  it  is  the  being-in- 
itself  of  ground,  and  at  the  same  time  its  unconditioned.  But  this 
being-in-itself  is,  at  the  same  time,  likewise  only  a  moment  or  posited 
being,  for  it  is  mediated.  The  conditioning  Kmit  is.  therefore,  the 
entire  form  of  the  ground-relation.  It  is  the  presupposed  being-in- 
itsdf  of  the  same.  But,  as  such,  IB  as  a  posited-being.  and  its 
immediateness  reduces  it  to  posited-being;  it  consequently  repels 
itself  from  itself,  so  that  it  is  annulled  (goes  to  the  ground)  as 
ground,  which  reduces  itself  to  posited-being,  and  consequently  to 
the  grounded.  And  the  two  are  one  and  the  same. 

Being-in-itself  is  likewise  found  in  connection  with  the  conditioned 
ground,  not  merely  as  manifestation  of  another  upon  it.  It  is 
independent,  and  this  means  that  it  is  the  self-relating  reflection  of 
the  activity  of  positing.  Hence,  it  is  the  self -identical —  i.  e.,  it  is 
its  being-in-itself.  and  its  content.  But  at  the  same  time  it  is  pre- 
supposing reflection.  It  relates  negatively  to  itself,  and  posits  its 
own  being-in-itself  as  something  opposed  to  it  in  another:  and  the 
conditioning  limit  is  the  real  phase  of  ground-relation,  as  well  accord- 
ing to  the  moment  of  being-in-itself  as  according  to  that  of  imme- 
diate being.  Immediate  being  is  essentially  and  solely  through  its 
ground,  and  is  a  moment  of  its  ground  as  a  presupposing  activity ; 
hence,  this  presupposing  activity  is  likewise  the  entire  movement. 

For  this  reason,  there  is  only  one  totality  of  form  extant,  and 
likewise  only  one  totality  of  content.  For  die  proper  content  of  the 
conditioning  1  mit  is  essential  content  only  in  so  far  as  the  identity  of 
self -reflection  in  the  form,  or  in  so  far  as  this  immediate  being  is  in 
itself  the  ground-relation.  This  immediate  being  is,  moreover,  con- 
ditioning limit  only  through  the  presupposing  reflection  of  the 
ground.  It  is  its  self-identity,  or  its  content,  posited  by  it  in  opposi- 
tion to  itself.  Particular  being  is,  therefore,  not  merely  a  formless 
material  for  the  ground-relation,  but  it  is  matter  that  has  received 
form ;  for  it  already  possesses  this  form,  and  it  is  content  since  it  is 
indifferent  towards  it.  while  it  is  in  identity  with  it.  Finally,  it  is  the 
same  content  which  ground  has,  for  it  is  content  precisely  in  so  far 
as  it  is  the  phase  of  self-identity  in  the  form-relation. 

The  two  sides  of  the  totality— the  conditioning  limit  and  the 
ground  —  are  therefore  one  essential  unity,  both  as  content  and  as 


108  Essence. 

form.  The}r  pass  over  into  each  other  through  their  own  activity ; 
or,  in  other  words,  since  they  are  movements  of  reflection,  they  posit 
themselves  as  annulled,  and  relate  to  this  annulment,  which  is  their 
negation,  and  therefore  mutually  presuppose  each  other.  But  this 
is,  at  the  same  time,  only  one  movement  of  reflection  for  both ;  their 
mutual  presupposition  is  therefore  only  one  activity ;  the  antithetic 
attitude  of  the  two  passes  over  into  the  phase  in  which  they  presup- 
pose their  one  identity  as  their  persistence  (self-dependence)  and  as. 
their  substrate.  This  substrate,  which  is  the  one  content  and  form 
unity  of  both,  is  the  truly  unconditioned ;  it  is  the  thing  in  itself  (die 
Sache  an  sich  selbst).  The  conditioning  limit,  as  defined  above,  is- 
only  the  relatively  unconditioned.  It  is  usually,  therefore,  regarded 
as  itself  conditioned  through  something  else,  and  a  new  condition  i& 
asked  for  ;  hence  the  progress,  ad  infinitum,  from  condition  to  condition, 
is  introduced.  Why  one  asks  for  the  condition  which  limits  another 
condition  means  the  same  thing  as  the  question,  why  does  one  assume 
it  as  conditioned?  The  answer  to  this  is,  because  it  is  a  finite  being. 
But  this  idea  of  finite  being  is  something  which  does  not  belong  to  the 
conception  of  conditioning  limit.  The  conditioning  limit,  as  such,  is 
therefore  itself  conditioned  through  something  else,  because  it  is  the 
posited  being-in-itself.  The  conditioning  limit  is  therefore  annulled, 
in  the  absolutely  unconditioned. 

The  absolutely  unconditioned  contains  the  two  moments :  ( 1 )  the 
conditioning  limit  and  (2)  the  ground.  It  is  the  unity  into  which 
they  have  returned.  The  two  together  constitute  the  form  or  the 
posited-being  of  the  absolutely  unconditioned.  The  unconditioned 
thing  (Sache)  is  the  conditioning  limit  of  both,  but  it  is  the  abso- 
lute—  that  is  to  say,  the  conditioning  limit,  which  is  ground  itself. 
As  ground,  it  is  the  negative  identity  which  has  repelled  itself  into 
the  two  moments  mentioned,  viz.,  (1)  into  the  shape  of  the  annulled 
ground-relation,  i.  e.,  that  of  an  immediate  self-external  multiplicity, 
devoid  of  unity,  which  relates  to  its  ground  as  to  its  other,  and  at 
the  same  time  constitutes  its  being-in-itself;  (2)  it  has  repelled  it 
into  an  internal,  simple  form,  which  is  ground,  but  which  relates  to 
the  self-identical  immediate  as  to  another,  and  determines  the  same 
as  conditioning  limit,  i.  e.,  determines  its  being-in-itself  as  its  own 
moment.  These  two  sides  presuppose  the  totality,  therefore,  as 
that  which  posits  them.  Conversely,  since  they  presuppose  the 
totality,  the  totality  seems  to  be  conditioned  through  them,  and  the 
"thing  in  itself"  (Sache)  seems  to  originate  from  its  conditioning 
limit  and  from  its  ground.  But  since  these  two  sides  have  shown 
themselves  identical,  the  relation  of  conditioning  limit  and  ground 


The  Thing  Emerge*  into  Existence.  109 

has  vanished,  and  these  two  categories  are  reduced  to  an  appearance. 
The  absolutely  unconditioned,  in  its  activity  of  posting  and  pro- 
posting,  is  only  the  activity  in  which  this  appearance  annals  itself. 
It  is  the  actirity  of  the  tiling  (5adte)  which  conditions  itself,  and 
places  itself  orer  against  its  conditions  as  their  ground.  Its  rela- 
tion as  that  of  conditions  and  their  ground  is,  however,  a  manifesta- 
tion within  it.  and  it  stands  in  relation  to  them  SB  its  own  self- 


i  TheTlriBs  (&dfcr)Eaei5K  i 

The  absolutely  unconditioned  is  the  absolute  ground,  identical  with 
its  conditioning  Emit;  it  is  the  immediate  thing  as  the  truly  essential. 
As  ground  it  relates  negatively  to  itself,  and  reduces  itself  to  posLteJ- 
being ;  hot  this  posited-being  is  the  reflection  which  is  completed  in 
its  two  phases  or  sides,  and  in  them  it  is  self-identical  form-relation, 
as  has  been  ascertained  is  the  f ongoing  investigation  of  its  nature 

This  posited-being,  therefore,  is,  in  the  first  place,  an- 
ground, or  the  thing  as  imtnediatr  and  without  any  activity  of 
reflection:  this  is  the  side  of  the  conditioning  limit.  This  is  the 
totality  of  the  determinations  of  the  thing—  the  thing  itself,  but  cast 
forth  into  the  externality  of  being;  it  is  the  restored  circle  of  being. 
In  the  conditioning  limit,  essence  sets  free  the  unity  of  its  reflection 
into  itself  as  an  immediatpneim,  which,  however,  has  now  the  charac- 
teristic of  being  a  presupposition  which  is  a  conditioning  limit,  and 
of  constituting  only  one  of  its  sides  or  phaups  The  conditioning 
Emits  are,  therefore,  the  entire  content  of  the  thing,  because  they  are 
the  unconditioned  in  the  form  of  the  formless  being  (Form  des  form- 
lose*  Seyms).  On  account  of  this  form,  however,  they  have  also  still 
another  aspect:  that  of  the  determinations  off  content  as  it  is  in  the 
Thing  as  such.  They  manifest  thusMthm  as  a  multiplicity  without 
unity,  intermingled  with  non-essential  and  other  circumstances,  which 
do  not  belong  to  the  sphere  of  particular  being,  in  so  far  as  it  consti- 
tutes the  conditioning  nmhs  of  this  particiilarized  thing.  The  sphere 
of  Being  is  itself  the  conditioning  Emit  for  the  absolute  unlimited 
thing.  Ground,  which  returns  into  itself,  posits  it  as  the  primary 
immediateness  to  which  it  rentes  as  its  unconditioned.  This  imme- 
djatrnfm  as  the  annulled  reflection  is  reflection  in  the  element  of 
Being.  This,  therefore,  as  such  completes  itself  to  a  totality.  The 
form  grows  as  determinateness  of  being,  and  manifests  itself  as  a 
content  different  from  the  determination  of  reflection,  and 

towards  it.  The  non-essential  which  appertains  to  the 
of  being,  and  which  it,  in  so  far  as  it  is  conditioning  limit, 


110  Essence. 

excludes,  is  the  determinateness  of  immediateness  into  which  the  form- 
unity  has  sunk.  This  form-unity,  as  the  relation  of  being,  is  first 
the  category  of  Becoming,  in  this  place  —  the  transition  of  one  deter- 
minateness of  being  into  another.  But  the  becoming  of  Being  is  its 
transition  into  Essence,  and  hence  its  return  into  Ground.  Hence 
particular  being,  which  constitutes  the  conditioning  limits,  is  in  truth 
not  determined  to  be  conditioning  limit  b}^  another,  and  is  not  used  as 
its  material ;  but  it,  by  its  own  activity,  reduces  itself  to  a  moment  of 
another.  Its  becoming  is,  moreover,  not  a  beginning  with  itself,  as  if 
it  were  the  true  primordial  and  immediate,  but  its  immediateness  is 
only  what  is  presupposed^  and  the  activity  of  its  becoming  is  the 
activity  of  reflection  itself.  The  truth  of  particular  being  is,  there- 
fore, its  realization  as  conditioning  limit.  Its  immediateness  is  solely 
through  the  reflection  of  the  ground-relation,  which  posits  itself  as 
annulled.  The  becoming,  so  far  as  it  is  immediateness,  is  only  the 
appearance  of  the  unconditioned,  since  the  latter  presupposes  itself, 
and  has  in  this  presupposition  its  form,  and  the  immediateness  of 
being  is  therefore  only  a  moment  or  phase  of  form. 

The  other  side  or  aspect  of  this  appearance  of  the  unconditioned 
is  the  ground-relation,  as  such,  which  is  determined  as  form  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  immediateness  of  the  conditioning  limits  and  the  content. 
It  is  the  form,  however,  of  the  absolute  Thing  which  possesses  within 
itself  the  unity  of  its  form  and  itself,  or  its  content ;  and,  since  it  de- 
termines its  content  to  be  a  conditioning  limit,  it  annuls  in  this  very 
positing  its  diversity,  and  reduces  it  to  a  moment;  conversely,  as 
form  devoid  of  essence  in  this  self -identity,  it  takes  on  the  form  of 
immediateness  as  persistent  reality.  The  reflection  of  ground  annuls 
the  immediateness  of  conditioning  limits,  and  relates  them  to  mo- 
ments within  the  unity  of  the  thing.  The  conditioning  limits,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  what  is  presupposed  by  the  unconditioned  thing 
itself ;  it  annuls,  therefore,  its  own  positing ;  or,  in  other  words,  its 
positing  reduces  itself  immediately  to  a  becoming ;  the  two  are, 
therefore,  one  unity.  The  movement  of  the  conditioning  limits 
within  themselves  is  a  becoming,  a  return  into  the  ground,  and  a  posit- 
ing of  the  ground.  But  the  ground  as  posited  —  that  is  to  say,  as 
annulled  —  is  the  immediate.  Ground  relates  to  itself  negatively, 
reduces  itself  to  posited-being,  and  furnishes  a  ground  for  the  con- 
ditioning limits.  In  the  fact,  however,  that  by  this  the  immediate 
particular  being  is  determined  into  a  posited,  the  ground  annuls  it, 
and  becomes  ground  in  that  act.  This  reflection,  therefore,  is  the 
mediation  of  the  unconditioned  thing  through  its  negation.  Or,  in 
other  words,  the  reflection  of  the  unconditioned  is  at  first  a  presup- 


The  Tkimy 


111 


i:------ 


;:::-:     .:*"•_.- 


-~ 


-     -    - 
B~  deiwi  of 


Ti-.  :   -•-.:- 

•:'   -..-.  -     -—  -          --  '. 

_•-•.-- 

-   i  -•-     :-  -  -  - 


112  Essence. 

into  existence  is  an  immediate  affair  only  through  the  fact  that  its 
mediation  is  a  vanishing  of  mediation. 

The  thing  proceeds  from  its  ground.  It  is  not  grounded  or  posited 
through  it  in  such  a  manner  that  the  ground  remains  standing  under 
it,  but  the  act  of  positing  is  the  outward  movement  of  ground  into 
itself,  and  the  simple  vanishing  of  itself  as  ground.  It  receives 
external  immediateness  through  its  union  with  the  conditioning  limits, 
and  thus  attains  the  phase  of  Being.  But  it  receives  external  immedi- 
ateness, not  as  an  external  somewhat,  nor  through  an  external  relation. 
On  the  contrary,  it  reduces  itself  as  ground  to  posited-being ;  its 
simple  essentiality  comes  into  self-identity  in  the  posited-being;  in 
this  annulment  of  itself  it  is  the  vanishing  of  its  difference  from  its 
posited-being,  consequently  it  is  simple,  essential  immediateness. 
The  ground,  therefore,  does  not  remain  behind  as  something  different 
from  that  which  is  grounded ;  but  the  truth  of  that  which  is  grounded 
lies  in  the  fact  that  the  ground  unites  itself  with  itself  in  this  move- 
ment, and  consequently  its  reflection  into  another  becomes  its  reflec- 
tion into  itself.  The  thing,  consequently,  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  uncon- 
ditioned, is  also  without  ground ;  and  it  issues  forth  from  the  ground 
only  in  so  far  as  it  proves  itself  perishable  ("goes  to  the  ground"), 
and  is  no  ground;  it  issues  forth  from  the  groundless,  i.  e.,  from  its 
own  essential  negativity,  or  pure  form. 

This  immediateness,  which  is  mediated  through  ground  and  condi- 
tion, and  is  self-identical  through  the  annulment  of  mediation,  is 
Existence. 


SECOND   SECTION. 


.  .    • .     , 


aotttag  efae  thaa  beiag  •  thai  phase  of 
ilr-     He««e  beiag 


•  topaaaeof  aaajih  •  If  ah  atil j  r  i*  Bkrwe 

of  £faefrst  section  of 

• 


_.--        -   :.   :   i 


brfo^  to  U»l  stage  of 


to  -j  pn  with  «Uek  I  write,  b«  there  B  K> 


."  in  virv  of  the  bet  chat  the 


enehnrofiBe  to  be  oafr  aa  are  of  a  circle  of 


114  Essence. 

Essence,"  of  course  does  not  mean  that  it  is  Essence,  if  Being  is 
taken  in  its  immediateness,  or  as  mere  transitory  phase,  but  it  means 
that  Being  when  traced  out  so  that  we  have  found  its  truth,  or  the 
totality  of  its  process,  or  the  true  nature  of  it,  is  Essence  or  the  abid- 
ing being  —  that  kind  of  being  that  abides  through  all  change  of  par- 
ticular form  or  phase.  So,  too,  the  second  proposition,  "Essence  is 
Being,"  does  not  mean  that  Essence  is  Being  no  matter  how  we  think  it. 
It  means  that  Essence  as  this  negative  self-relation  produces  and  sus- 
tains itself  in  immediateness — as  has  been  shown  in  this  book  in  the 
chapter  on  "  Ground."  It  may  be  truly  said  that  if  we  think  of  Being 
as  it  truly  is  we  must  think  it  as  a  phase  of  self-relation  ;  hence  Being 
is  only  an  aspect  of  Essence.  Again,  Essence  is  a  process  which  has 
immediateness  and  self-relation  as  its  result  and  as  its  constant 
product  —  hence  Essence  is  Being,  or  in  the  form  or  phase  of  Being 
and  is  more  than  Being,  for  it  abides,  and  is  true  Being,  or  existence. 
It  must  be  I'emarked  that  Being  always  has  the  form  of  self-relation, 
or  of  independence  —  but  not  an  explicit  self-relation,  or  a  relation 
which  is  in  the  form  of  "A  relates  to  B  which  relates  back  to  A, 
again  "=  A  determines  B  and  B  determines  A  —  so  that  A  relates 
to  itself  through  B,  or  so  that  A  determines  itself  through  B.  This 
self-mediation  through  another  is  not  perceived  by  the  thinking  which 
thinks  mere  Being.  And  yet  this  logical  investigation  finds  this  self- 
mediation  through  another  to  be  the  essential  presupposition  of  any 
or  all  forms  of  Being.  But  the  thinking  which  possesses  this  insight 
is  the  thinking  which  thinks  Essence.  The  thinking  which  thinks 
Essence  is  able  to  understand  that  those  categories  which  it  thought 
as  forms  of  Being,  are  such  arcs  of  the  process  of  self-relation  as 
include  the  result  of 'the  "positing  reflection."  (See  p.  14.)  Es- 
sence as  Being  —  here  termed  "  Existence  "  — is  the  permanent  man- 
ifestation of  Essence  through  its  own  activity.  Hence,  "Phenom- 
enon" means  complete  manifestation,  or  essential  appearance.  This 
complete  manifestation  has  "  emerged  from  negativity  and  internal- 
ity ;"  that  is  to  say,  we  have  found  that  the  negativity  of  the  process 
called  Essence  does  not  result  in  zero,  but  in  a  reality  which  pos- 
sesses immediateness  through  the  annullment  of  mediation ;  the  mere 
annullment  of  external  mediation  results  in  "  internality,"  but  the 
*'  Phenomenon  "  preserves  externality  or  abiding  objectivity]. 

Therefore,  Essence  manifests  itself  in  a  Phenomenon.  Reflection 
is  the  appearing- to-itself  of  Essence.  The  determinations  of  Re- 
flection are  "  posited  "  or  annulled  [?'.«.  dependent]  when  in  the  unity 
of  reflection  ;  in  other  words,  Reflection  is  Essence  as  immediately 
self-identical  in  its  posited-being  [its  dependence  being  converted 


115 

\j>  Bat  since-  the»  activity  [of  reflection,  which 
is  self-identical  in  its  ponted-beiag]  m  Ground,  it  determines  itself 
m  the  form  of  realty,  through  its  aeif-ananffiag  or  seif-retnrning  re- 
flection. Moreover,  since  this  iirfi  immaliim  [of  itself  as  real],  or 
the  other  of  the  Ground-relation  annuls  itself  in  the  reflection  of 

[*.«.  it  takes  up  its  conditions 
itself],  it  follows  that  the  Form-determina- 
of  independent  subsistence. 
:•:•-;  :--=  ::-.  •"..-  P    •-      :.: 

..  --  "  '  --..-.  . 
composed  of  existing  some- 
unity  of  essence 
-  -  -  :•_  -  ...  -  :  .  -.  - 
of  Thing  the  negativity  of  reflection 
but  for  the  reason  that  the  ground  of  the  thing  is  essen- 
tially this  mimauat  of  reflection  it  annub  its  immediateness :  the 
things  reduced  to  a  pasfted-being.  fJHegeTs style  of  writing  about  the 
investigation  of  the  caUgutkJB  is  dramatic;  each  category  is  treated 
as  though  self-active.  Its  ill  finilinn  is  taken  for  its  expressed  wffl  or 
intention,  and  then  its  hehaiim  or  its  implication  with  others  is 
with  this  its  definition  and  the  contradictions  noted, 
is  the  famous  fci  dialectic :"  each  category  is  treated  as 
though  it  expressed  independent, 
of  its  contradictory  behavior, 
universal,  reveals  to  us  the  imperfection 
of  the  category,  its  ilijiiadiaM  upon  other  categories  wit"  i  which 
it  forms  a  whole,  and  the  necessity  a  evident  of  a  new  defini- 
tion which  expresses  this  relation  to  others  in  a  new  unity.  The 
i  of  the  aew  nmlj  m  a  higher,  more  concrete  statement  of 
as  it  iiajjaatu  the  ptetkimi  statement  and  corrects 
its  defects.  Here,  for  example.  "Existence"  is  found  to  involve 
under  the  form  of  particular  "things."  Furthermore, 
found  to  involve  the  mnnminl  of  reflection  which  an- 
of  the  -things:"  hence  "things"  exist 
in  a  state  of  transience.  Tarn  ream*  here  stated  fe  the  brief 
of  what  »  to  be  shown  in  detafl  in  the  first  chapter  of 
of  Essence.] 

•  is rhcnomuMm  [not  merely  "  existence" 
their  traasrtonness  is  **  phenomenon "].  The  paw* 
omenoaiswhat  the  thing  »  in  itself  Qa  its  nature],  or  it  B  the 
truth  of  the  thing."  Existence,  as  posited  or  reflected  in  the 
[as  a  "thing "]  B,  however,  the  transcendence  of  itself, 


116  Essence. 

the  progress  ad  infinitum,  away  from  itself ;  the  world  of  phenomena 
places  itself  in  opposition  to  the  reflected  world,  the  world  of  being- 
in-itself  [i.e.  to  the  internal  nature  of  "  things"].  [This  is  a  brief 
announcement  of  the  contents  of  the  second  chapter  of  this  second, 
division  of  Essence]. 

But  the  essential  being  and  the  being  which  is  a  manifestation  or 
phenomenon,  stand  in  immediate  relation  to  each  other  [they  are 
mere  counterparts  or  counter  movements  of  one  activity].  Hence, 
thirdly,  "Existence"  [with  which  we  have  to  do  in  this  second  di- 
vision of  Essence]  is  Reciprocity  or  essential  relation  [or  state  of 
relation,  or  that  which  exists  only  in  relation]  ;  the  manifestation  in 
a  phenomenon  (Erscheinende)  exhibits  the  essential,  and  Essence  is 
[or  is  completely  included]  in  its  phenomenon:  — Essential  relation 
[Verhaltniss]  is  the  as-yet-imperfect  union  of  reflection  in  the  other- 
being,  [or  in  externality]  and  of  reflection  into  itself  ;  the  perfect 
interpenetration  of  the  two  is  Actuality.  [In  this  announcement  of 
the  contents  of  the  third  chapter  of  this  second  division  of  Essence 
we  arrive  at  the  idea  of  Actuality  as  the  complete  realization  of  the 
internal  nature  or  essence  in  outer  manifestation.  We  now  proceed 
to  take  up  the  subject  in  detail.] 

FIRST  CHAPTER. 

Existence. 

Since  the  Proposition  or  principle  of  the  "Ground"  expresses: 
Everything  that  is,  has  a  ground  or  is  a  posited  i.e.,  a  mediated  ;  the 
principle  of  Existence  would  have  to  be  expressed  as  follows :  Every- 
thing that  is,  exists.  The  truth  of  Being  is  not  found  in  a  first  imme- 
diate, but  rather  in  the  immediateness  which  has  emerged  from  Es- 
sence [this  immediateness  of  "Existence"]. 

If,  however,  the  assertion  is  made  that  whatever  exists  has  a 
ground  and  is  conditioned  [through  that  ground]  there  would  need 
an  additional  statement  [to  correct  the  one-sidedness  of  the  former]  : 
it  has  no  ground  and  is  unconditioned.  For  Existence  is  the  imme- 
diateness which  has  resulted  from  the  annulment  of  mediation  as 
found  in  the  relation  of  ground  and  condition  —  an  immediateness 
which  in  its  production  cancels  the  means  that  produced  it.  [An 
immediateness  which  results  from  the  cancelling  of  mediation  be- 
longs to  the  higher  order  of  immediateness.  All  self-mediation  is  of 
this  order.  Everything  pertaining  to  the  realm  of  Mind  furnishes 
an  illustration.  I  study  Euclid  ;  I  avail  myself  of  his  aid,  using  his 


Existence.  117 

demonstration  to  comprehend  the  nature  of  a  triangleT  bat  obtaining 
insight  into  the  subject  I  see  the  truth  immediately,  and  without  his 
aid-  At  first  there  was  dependence  on  Euclid,  mediation  through  his 
labors,  but  a  use  of  his  insight  as  mediation  gives  me  immediate  in- 
sight, makes  me  independent  of  his  labors,  and  therefore  annuls  the 
mediation.  The  history  of  Mind  everywhere  furnishes  the  example 
of  the  person  who  "  climbs  a  ladder  and  draws  the  ladder  up  after 
him."] 

If  the  "Proof  of  the  existence  of  God  "  is  referred  to  at  this  point, 
it  must  be  remembered  that  beside  immediate  Being  and  Existence 
[the  "  Being"  of  Essence]  there  is  a  third  form  of  Being  resulting 
from  the  Idea  [» "•  BegrifF '  ]  which  is  called  fc t  Objectivity. ' '  [The  three 
parts  of  the  Logic  treat  respectively,  Being,  Essence  and  Idea ;  in 
the  first,  we  have  immediate  Being,  utterly  without  mediation  and 
hence  without  persistence  and  truth ;  in  the  second  there  is  Essence 
whose  immediateness  is  Existence,  persistent  and  abiding,  but  imper- 
fect, because  its  externality  is  opposed  to  internality  :  in  the  third, 
the  Idea,  or  self-determination  as  completed  in  thought  and  will,  or 
conscious  personality  we  have  again  immediateness,  this  time  as 
"  objectivity."  —  subject- objectivity,  or  consciousness,  the  knowing 
of  self,  the  becoming-completely-objective  is  REVELATION.  Hence 
if  the  thought  of  mere  being  gives  us  the  appearance  of  the  Abso- 
lute, the  thought  of  Essence  gives  us  the  self-manifestation  and  the 
thought  of  Idea  gives  us  the  self -revelation  of  the  Absolute.1 

The  process  of  proving  something  is,  of  course,  a  mediated  know- 
ing. The  various  kinds  of  Being  demand  or  contain  their  own 
kinds  of  mediation ;  and  so  it  happens-  that  the  nature  of  the  process 
of  proof  varies  with  each  kind  of  mediation.  The  ontological  proof 
of  the  being  of  God  sets  out  from  ideas,  it  lays  down  as  postulate 
the  idea  of  the  totality  of  all  reality  and  then  subsumes  existence 
under  the  reality  [it  argues  for  the  necessity  of  the  existence  of 
the  totality]  —  it  is  therefore  the  mediation  of  the  syllogism 
and  is  not  in  place  for  us  to  consider  here.  We  have  already 
mentioned  in  another  place  what  Kant  has  urged  against  this  form 
of  proof,  and  have  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  Kant  understands 
by  the  term,  ki  Existence,"  only  particular  being,  and  by  the  cate- 
gory of  particular  being  every  thing  in  the  total  content  of  our 
experience  is  thought  as  standing  in  relation  to  some  other  thing  and 
as  being  itself  another  to  something  else ;  in  other  words,  it  falls 

I  3rockmeyera  "Letters  on  Faust"  (Journal  of  Speculative  P**/o*op*y, 
roL  1,  page  181}  for  distinctions  between  self-manifestation,  self-revelation  and 
self-definition-  —  Translator. 


118  Essence. 

under  the  category  of  "other-being."  For  example,  "somewhat" 
is  as  an  existing  thing  mediated  through  "another,"  and  existence 
itself  is  the  side  of  mediation  for  all  things.  Now  in  what  Kant  calls- 
the  Idea  [JBegrr(/f^=Idea  or  "  Notion  "*]  namely,  in  the  somewhat  in 
so  far  as  it  is  taken  simply,  as  related  to  itself  merely,  or  as  an 
*'  idea  in  the  mind,"  its  mediation  has  been  omitted;  in  its  abstract 
identity,  its  antithetic  relation  to  other  things  is  left  out.  The  onto- 
logical  proof,  according  to  this  view  would  have  to  show  that  the 
absolute  Idea,  viz.  the  idea  of  God  comes  to  particular  Being,  i.  e.  to 
mediation  ;  in  other  words,  as  the  simple  essence  proceeds  to  self- 
mediation.  This  takes  place  through  the  mentioned  subsumption  of 
existence  under  a  more  general  term,  namely,  reality,  which  is  as- 
sumed as  the  middle  term  between  God  in  his  Idea,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  existence,  on  the  other.  Of  this  mediation  so  far  as  it  has  the 
form  of  the  syllogism  (inference)  as  remarked  before,  this  is  not  the 
place  to  speak.  But  with  the  mediation  of  Essence  with  existence  — 
its  mode  and  manner  —  the  present  exposition  deals.  The  nature  of 
the  process  of  demonstration  is  to  be  considered  in  the  chapter  that 
treats  of  the  science  of  cognition  [third  part  of  this  logic].  Here 
we  are  to  treat  only  what  concerns  the  nature  of  mediation  in  gen- 
eral. 

The  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  assigns  a  ground  for  his  exist- 
ence. This  ground,  it  is  understood,  cannot  be  an  objective  [ex- 
ternal] ground  of  the  existence  of  God ;  for  God  exists  in  and  for 
himself  [and  without  grounds].  Hence  this  proof  assigns  merely  a 
ground  for  the  cognition  of  God's  existence.  This  species  of  ground 
[i.e.  for  knowledge,  or  subjective  convictions]  is  of  such  a  kind  that 
it  vanishes  in  the  object,  which  is  grounded  through  it  [or  the  ground 
of  proof  is  a  somewhat  whose  being  involves  the  object  proved,  and 
the  perception  of  the  object  proved  as  thus  involved  in  the  ground 
of  the  proof,  realizes  the  demonstration  ;  but  the  ground  of  the  proof 
is  rather  an  object  which  is  grounded  in  and  through  the  object 
proved;  hence  "ground"  and  "grounded"  are  used  in  opposite 

1  English  and  Scotch  writers  generally  translate  the  German  word  Begriff  by 
"Notion."  In  America  the  word  "notion"  is  used  for  vague  idea  or  one-sided 
apprehension  and  seldom  for  the  logical  concept,  or  Begriff.  The  use  of  the  word 
Begriff  by  Hegel  is  different  from  that  of  Kunt  and  others,  and  misleads  Germans 
as  to  the  tendency  of  his  system.  The  use  of  the  word  "  notion "  in  English 
makes  the  matter  still  worse ;  for  Begriff  like  concept  may  possess  an  objective 
meaning  without  doing  violence  to  the  word.  "Idea"  since  Plato's  time  has  pos- 
sessed an  objective  as  well  as  subjective  meaning,  and  has  signified  archetype  or 
pattern  as  well  as  subjective  "  notion."  —  Translator. 


Existent*.  119 

i  —  subjective  or  objective.  The 
ried  that  we  cannot  prove  the  existence  of  God, 
became  proving  is  grounding,  and  that  which  is  grounded  through 
another  could  not  be  divine  in  its  nature.  Here  was  a  coof  osion 
between  subjective  ground  of  knowledge  or  conviction  aud  objective 
ground  of  existence].  Now  the  ground  of  proof  which  is  based  on 
the  contingency  of  the  world  contains  [or  involves]  the  return  of 
the  world  into  the  absolute  essence  [die  contingency  of  the  world 
exhibits  its  dependence  —  no  thing  in  nature  abiding  but  each  pass- 
ing over  into  another ;  this  transitoriness  of  things  is  a  process  of 
evolving  and  annulling  determinations;  the  evolution  of  the  deter- 
minations is  the  creation  of  particular  beings  over  against  the  es- 
sence ;  their  annulment  is  the  return  into  the  indeterminate  essence :] 
for  the  contingent  is  the  in-itself-groundless  and  self-annulling.  The 
absolute  essence,  consequently,  according  to  this,  proceeds  from  the 
groundless;  the  ground  annuls  itself;  and  then  the  appearance  of 
relativity  vanishes ;  and  in  the  proof  vanishes  also  this  appearance 
of  relativity  on  the  part  of  God  as  a  being  that  was  grounded 
through  another.  This  mediation  [of  the  absolute  through  the  re- 
turn into  it  of  the  groundless]  is  consequently  the  true  one,  but  that 
stage  of  thinking  to  which  the  ••  proving  reflection  "  belongs,  does 
not  understand  the  nature  of  this  mediation ;  it  takes  this  mediation 
as  a  merely  subjective  affair,  and  therefore  carefully  removes  it  from 
God  iii»i*M»lf,  but  on  this  account  it  does  not  perceive  the  mediating 
activitv  involved  in  essence  itself.  The  relation  of  dependence  [*•«-» 
of  the  "grounded"  upon  the  "ground"]  which  the  proof  involves 
or  contains,  consists  in  this  that  they  are  both  in  one  [i.e.  "  ground "' 
and'  -grounded1'  are  one  being] — a  mediation  which  is  a  self- 
externality  which  is  self-annulling  in  its  nature  [i.e..  the  transitory 
which  is  posited  by  the  essence  is  a  self -externalizing  of  the  essence, 
bat  the  transitory  is  sett-annulling].  In  the  mentioned  exposition 
'•existence"  receives  an  erroneous  construction;  it  is  conceived  in 
the  dependent  relation  of  mediated  or  pished  [through  the  proof  — 
the  ground  being  taken  as  objective  instead  of  subjective]. 

On  the  other  hand  Existence  may  be  regarded  as  something  not 
merely  immediate.  Taken  in  the  phase  of  immediateness.  the  cogni- 
tion of  the  existence  of  God  has  been  expressed  as  an  act  of  Faith, 
a  knowing  which  does  not  rest  on  proof  —  a  knowing  by  the  immedi- 
ate consciousness.  The  knowing  is  said  to  come  to  this  result,  that 
it  knows  nothing ;  that  is  to  say,  that  it  gives  up  its  mediating  activity 
and  the  cognitions  which  it  has  arrived  at  through  such  activity. 
This  result  we  have  seen  in  what  precedes :  but  it  must  be  added  that 


120  Essence. 

reflection  when  it  ends  with  the  annulment  of  itself  does  not  on  this 
account  have  zero  for  a  result ;  so  that  after  this  annulment  the  posi- 
tive knowing  of  essence  may  take  place  as  an  immediate  relation  to 
the  same  and  entirely  separated  from  the  act  of  reflection  —  and  as 
though  the  act  of  reflection  had  not  been  —  as  though  the  immediate 
knowing  were  an  original  act  beginning  from  itself.  But  this  annul- 
ment of  reflection,  this  "  going-to-the-ground  "  of  mediation  is  itself 
the  "ground"  from  which  the  immediate  proceeds,  or  originates. 
Language  [i.e.  the  German  language]  unites  as  above  remarked  the 
two  meanings  of  destruction  and  ground  [for  "goes  to  destruction" 
the  German  says,  "goes  to  the  ground"].  It  is  said  also  that  the 
essence  of  God  is  the  abyss  [Abgrund]  for  the  finite  reason ;  it  is 
this  through  the  fact  that  the  finite  reason  gives  up  its  finitude  and 
loses  its  mediating  activity  in  the  being  of  God ;  but  this  abyss,  the 
negative  ground,  is  at  the  same  time  the  positive  ground  of  the 
origination  of  existence,  of  the  essence  which  is  in  itself  immediate 
and  of  which  mediation  is  an  essential  phase.  Mediation  through 
the  ground  annuls  itself,  but  does  not  leave  the  ground  lying  at  the 
basis  so  that  what  originates  from  it  is  a  "  posited,"  or  still  depends 
on  that  ground,  and  as  though  it  had  its  essence  elsewhere,  viz.  in 
the  ground;  but  this  ground  is  as  "abyss"  the  vanished  mediation, 
and,  conversely,  it  is  only  the  vanished  [self -an nulled]  mediation 
which  is  the  ground ;  and  only  through  this  negation  there  arises  the 
identical  and  the  immediate. 

Thus  "existence"  is  not  to  be  taken  here  in  the  sense  of  predi- 
cate or  of  determination  of  essence,  so  that  a  proposition  or  principle 
could  be  made  of  it.  "Essence  exists"  or  "essence  has  exist- 
ence"; but  essence  has  become  here  existence.  Essence  has  be- 
come existence  in  so  far  forth  as  essence  no  longer  distinguishes 
itself  into  "ground"  and  "grounded";  the  ground  has  annulled 
itself.  But  this  negation  (the  annulment  of  the  ground-relation)  is 
likewise  essentially  its  positing  affirmation  or  absolutely  positive 
continuity  with  itself;  existence  is  the  reflection  of  ground  into 
itself  [this  means :  something  is  ground,  i.e.  it  utters  itself  by  pos- 
iting something  else  which  manifests  the  ground  or  is  its  appearance ; 
in  its  transitoriness  its  determinations  are  annulled,  and  thus  it  re- 
turns to  the  ground;  ground  is  a  reflection  into  itself — through 
its  process  of  grounding  something,  and  again  annulling  what  is 
grounded  by  it ;  existence  includes  this  whole  process  of  the  reflec- 
tion of  ground  into  itself].  Its  identity  with  itself  which  results 
from  its  negation  [relating  to  itself]  is  therefore  the  mediation  which 


121 


posited  ifeetf  as  self-identical  and  through  tins  has 


fore  it 

ffi*g.  [This  is  the  general  statement  of  the  contents  of  this  first 
chapter.  It  goes  over  the  entire  discussion,  mentioning  only  the 
The  closing  sentence  of  this  paragraph  is 
of  Hegel's  most  peculiar  insight.  It  involves 
the  passage  from  the  generic  to  the  individual,  from  the  universal  to 
the  singular.  The  first  example  given  in  this  logic  of  this  insight  is 
found  in  the  treatment  of  Being,  in  Volume  L,  under  the  head  off 
Quality  (pages  113  and  114  c.  "£fcro*").  He  remarks,  after  the 
statement  that  Somewhat  (£tom*)  is  the  first  negation  of  negation, 
as  simple  existing  relation  to  itself,  "Being  [Ifcuqm],  Life,  Think- 
ing, &c_,  determine  themselves  essentially  in  the  form  of  AerapK.  ffr- 
*],  &c.  This  determination  is  of  the 


in  order  to  escape  from  the  mere  universal 
Being,  Life,  Thought.  &c- ;  and  so  to  be  able  to  descend 
from  the  general  idea  -deity"  to  that  of  a  [concrete,  personal] 
God."  Not  the  abstract  universal  any  more  than  the  abstract  par- 
ticular, is  the  reality.  Hegel  here  agrees  with  Aristotle;  only  the 
individual  has  true  reality.  But  the  "individual""  must  not  be  un- 
derstood as  mere  particular  being  or  phase,  but  as  the  self-deter- 
mining process  which  we  call  ego  or  person.  AH  eke  is  mere 
'"posited  being,""  and  has  its  explanation  only  through  the  self- 
totality  to  which  it  belongs.  Thus  in  this  place  Hegel 
to  be  "negative  unity" — t.e.  a  process  which  an- 
i of  development,  and  "returns  into  itself," 
being-in-itself :  but  each  and  every  phase  of  the 
reflected  into  itself:  and  hence  the  "  return-into-itself  "  is 
not  by  the  reduction  to  zero  of  the  particular  stages  of  development 
but  by  the  elevation  of  each  particular  stage  to  a  totality  within  itself 
by  adding  to  it  what  it  lacks  of  the  totality!  A,  b  and  c  are  three  mo- 
ments of  a  totality,  each  needs  the  other  two  to  make  its 
possible,  the  tota|  is  the  annulment  of  each,  but  if  the 

total  takes  the  form  of  *•  negative  unity  "  it  destroys 
individuality  of  the  moments,  a,  b  and  c  (think  of  the  annnl- 
it  of  acid  and  alkali  in  a  salt) ;  but  if  the  annulment  of  a,  b  and 


122  Essence. 

c  takes  place  by  the  addition  to  each  of  its  complement  then  each 
comes  to  true  individuality  by  the  possession  of  the  form  of  totality. 
Thus  a,  b,  c,  the  primary,  undeveloped  unity,  the  first  entelechy,  be- 
comes abc,  bca,  cab;  each  moment  annuls  itself  and  becomes  its 
own  totality.  This  is  the  form  of  preservation  of  the  individual  in 
the  universal  and  is  the  especial  insight  of  Hegel,  on  which  he  lays 
most  stress.  The  idea  of  "  reflection-into-itself  "  is  the  basis  of  this 
preservation  of  individuality  and  escape  from  pantheism  or  the  ab- 
stract universal  as  a  first  principle  in  the  universe.  Aristotle,  too, 
seems  to  have  held  this  concrete  principle  of  reflection-into-itself  as 
the  basis  of  true  being  and  true  reality.  It  was  his  commentator, 
Alexander  of  Aphrodisias,  who  interpreted  the  Master's  thought  as  a 
thought  of  "external  reflection."  and  hence  as  setting  up  the  ab- 
stract universal  instead  of  the  concrete  universal.  This  interpreta- 
tion was  adopted  by  the  Arabians ;  hence  Scholasticism  arose  as  the 
Christian  reaction,  which  in  Aquinas  finds  the  concrete  universal 
again.  Aristotle's  thought  of  first  and  second  ' k  entelechies  "  and  of 
"energy"  and  of  "active  reason"  is  founded  on  this  insight.  Ex- 
istence is  not  an  abstraction,  but,  as  Hegel  remarks,  existences  or 
things.] 

A. 

Thing  and  its  Properties. 

Existence  as  existing  somewhat  is  posited  in  the  form  of  negative 
unit}',  which  it  essentially  is  [a  negative  unity  annuls  all  of  its  manifold 
of  determinations,  leaving  them  only  a  "  posited  being,"  just  as  acid 
and  alkali  have  a  "  posited-being  "  only  when  they  exist  in  the  neg- 
ative unity  of  a  salt].  But  this  negative  unity  is  in  the  first  place 
only  immediate  determining,  and  hence  it  is  the  oneness  of  any 
"somewhat."  The  existing  somewhat  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
"  somewhat"  as  a  category  of  Being;  the  former  is  essentially  such 
an  immediateness  as  has  originated  through  the  reflection  of  media- 
tion into  itself  ["reflection-into-itself"  means  here  a  return  from 
mediation,  through  mediation,  back  to  immediateness  ;  the  mediation 
is  used  and  then  dispensed  with ;  the  ladder  has  been  ascended  and 
now  it  is  drawn  up  from  the  ground  ;  this  insight  into  the  use  of 
mediation  and  its  annulment  is  the  key  to  this  whole  book  of  Es- 
sence]. Hence  the  existing  somewhat  is  a  Thing  ["  Thing  "  is  the 
category  which  expresses  a  somewhat  which  is  mediated  through 
others,  and  yet  which  is  re-posited  by  the  others  —  pre-supposed  by 
them  —  and  thus  established  in  the  form  of  independence;  the  de- 


£V 


US 


[betwen  its  geaenfitr  as  existeKe  ud  Us 


not  •«  illy  a  Deng,  but  it  is  m  ne- 


.:   .=  -^-  i 


124  Essence. 

which,  as  such,  is  not  considered  as  existing.  The  category  of  pos- 
sibility [or  potentiality],  and  of  the  antithesis  of  the  thing,  and  its 
existence  belongs  later  in  this  Logic.)  But  the  thing-in-itself  and  its 
mediated  Being  are  both  contained  within  existence,  and  both  are  ex- 
istences themselves ;  the  thing-in-itself  exists  and  is  the  essential, 
while  the  mediated  being  is  the  unessential  existence  of  the  Thing. 

The  Thing-in-itself  as  the  simple  reflected  being  of  existence  [the 
phase  of  existence  as  reflected-into-itself,  or  as  annulled  mediation]  is 
not  the  ground  of  the  unessential  being;  it  is  the  unmoved,  undeter- 
mined unity,  for  it  is  only  annulled  mediation,  and  therefore  it  is  the 
basis  of  the  unessential  being  [Grundlage  =  basis ;  Grund  =  ground 
or  reason  ;  ground  arises  from  the  self-annullment  of  contradiction  ; 
contradiction  is  self-relation  in  its  aspect  of  self-negation  ;  this  self- 
negation  is  self-determination,  the  positing  of  determinations  within 
the  undetermined  subject  of  the  process ;  or  likewise  the  presuppos- 
ing activity  which  determines  a  presupposed  immediate ;  all  this  ac- 
tivity is  mediating  or  grounding  —  the  laying-of-a-foundation  for  an- 
other; thing-in-itself  is  not  a  foundation  or  ground  for  unessential 
existence,  because  all  existence  is  such  through  the  annulment  of 
mediation;  and  the  annulment  of  mediation  is  the  annulment  of  the 
very  distinction  which  the  process  of  ground  creates.]  For  that  rea- 
son, Reflection,  as  a  being  mediating  itself  through  another,  falls  out- 
side of  the  thing-in-itself.  The  thing-in-itself  is  defined  as  having  no 
particularized  manifold  within  it ;  and  on  this  account  it  receives  this 
manifoldness  only  when  brought  into  connection  with  it  through  the 
activity  of  reflection,  but  even  then  the  thing-in-itself  remains  indif- 
ferent to  the  manifoldness.  For  example,  the  thing-in-itself  has 
color  on  being  brought  to  the  eye,  smell  to  the  nose,  &c.  Its  diver- 
sity of  properties  according  to  this  view  is  due  to  the  "respects," 
"points  of  view,"  taken  by  some  external  observer,  particular  rela- 
tions which  the  outside  observer  assumes  towards  the  thing-in-itself, 
and  which  do  not  belong  to  the  thing-in-itself  as  its  own  determina- 
tions. 

2.  On  the  other  hand,  the  second  phase  distinguished  within  exist- 
ence is  the  one  containing  the  activity  of  reflection,  that  defined  as 
external,  and  which  is  in  the  first  place,  self-external  and  particular- 
ized manifoldness.  In  the  second  place  it  is  external  to  the  essen- 
tially existing  and  relates  to  it  as  to  its  absolute  presupposition. 
These  two  phases  or  "  moments "  of  external  reflection,  however, 
their  own  manifoldness  and  their  relation  to  the  thing-in-itself  op- 
posed to  them  as  their  other,  are  one  and  the  same.  [Note  carefully 


I 


1:' 


-'*•••-- 


The 


byiterff; 


itfe  attthe 
fore  kit  a 


am  to  tike  tAm^wteeif ;  tart 

off  tite 


r       I:  r:es  :.^_  ]     r:^   -..: 


"J. 


:    ,i- 


js  the  other  to  that  whkh  is  hi  itelf  [LCL, oppaned  twite  wnn 
•to]  its  bea^  n  Hi«£f  .     The 


-:  -* 


-..  ;  :* 
6am 
Far 


ftitakoa 


ft  ii  m  RftvB  Hb»  Hsrff  it  is  C 


126  Essence. 

essential  existence ;  but  a  consideration  of  the  latter  has  discovered 
within  it  the  movement  of  reflection  and  hence  it  is  a  thing-in-itself 
like  the  "  mentioned  first"].  But  this  second  thing-in-itself  is  only 
other  in  general ;  for  as  self-identical  thing  it  has  no  further  an- 
tithetic relation  to  the  first  [it  is  only  "  other,"  and  has  no  essential 
relation,  no  dependence  upon  the  first  thing-in-itself]  ;  it  is  the  reflec- 
tion into  itself  of  the  unessential  existence  just  like  the  first  thing- 
in-itself.  The  determinateness  of  the  various  things-in-themselves 
through  which  they  are  opposed  to  each  other  belongs  therefore  to 
external  reflection  [and  not  to  things-in-themselves]. 

3.  This  external  reflection  is  a  process  of  relation  of  the  things-in- 
themselves  to  each  other  —  their  reciprocal  mediation  as  mutual 
others.  The  things-in-themselves  are,  therefore,  extremes  of  a  syl- 
logism whose  middle  term  constitutes  their  external  existence  —  the 
existence  through  which  they  are  mutually  others  to  each  other  and 
different  things.  This  difference  of  theirs  is  found  only  in  their  re- 
lation to  each  other.  As  far  as  they  stand  in  relation  they  have 
superficial  determinations  distinguishing  them  from  each  other,  but 
these  determinations  of  difference  do  not  appertain  to  the  things-in- 
themselves  except  in  this  relation  to  each  other.  The  latter,  as  re- 
gards these  distinctions,  are  indifferent,  reflected  into  themselves,  and 
absolute  [?'.  e.  things  in  themselves  are  held  to  be  independently 
existent  for  themselves  and  as  having  unessential  relation  to  each 
other,  through  which  relation  the  manifold  of  marks,  properties,  ac- 
cidents, &c.,  which  characterize  concrete  things  arise].  — This  process 
of  relation  constitutes  the  totality  of  "Existence;"  the  thing-in- 
itself  stands  in  relation  to  an  activity  of  reflection  external  to  it,  in 
which  it  possesses  manifold  determinations.  In  this  external  reflec- 
tion it  is  the  repulsion  of  itself  from  itself  into  another  thing-in-itself. 
This  repulsion  is  the  counter  impulse  within  itself  inasmuch  as  each 
of  these  is  another  to  itself  only  as  reflecting  itself  from  and  out  of 
another.  It  has  its  posited-being  not  in  itself  but  in  another,  and  it 
is  determined  only  through  the  determinateness  of  the  other,  and 
this  other  is  likewise  determined  only  through  the  deterrainateness  of 
the  former.  [N.  B.  The  method  by  which  reflection  saves  the 
thing-in-itself  from  dependence  upon  beings  external  to  it  and  pre- 
serves its  self-identity ;  the  multiplicity  of  properties  and  other  de- 
terminations belonging  to  the  Thing  which  are  well  known  to  involve 
the  interrelation  of  things  and  their  interdependence,  is  made  to  be 
wholly  a  sphere  by  itself  unessential  and  contingent  as  regards  the 
things-in-themselves  ;  by  this  device  reflection  saves  the  independence 


1*7 


appertains  only  to  this  sphere  of  contingent 

says  that  the  posited-bcing  and  the 
do  not  belong  to  the  thing-in-itself  but  to  its  otner, 
•mil  I  In  1.1  fun  Ilir  lMnL  in  ihwlf  •  unigi  i  li  illy  Ihi  iilhn,  iiiililT.  iml 
to  it.]  Bat  the  two  things-in-theassetaes,  since  according  to  this 
'  does  not  appertain  to  themnefaes,  bat  each  one's 
solely  in  the  other,  are  not  different  from  each  other. 
The  thing-in-itsett,  since  it  is  defined  as  relating  t*  the  other  extreme 
thmg-n-itsetf,  stands  in  relation  tfo  that  which  is  not 
and  the  external  reflection  which  constitutes  the 
between  the  rtlirmi  n  is  a  process  of  relation 
solely  of  the  thing-in-itseif  to  itself :  in  other  words,  it  ts  essentially 
its  reflection  into  itself.  Consequently  it  is  in-itseM -extent  deter- 
or  the  drterminateneas  of  the  thing-in-itself .  Tbething- 

not  in  relation  to  an 
thing-in-itself  determinate- 
to  the  fanner:  the  determinateness  is  not  one 
to  the  surface  of  the  thing-in-itself  [to  its 
of  relation  to  others  outside  of  ft],  but  it  k  the  essential  me- 
of  itself  with  itself  as  its  own  other.  — The  two  thmgs-in- 


-    '    "    ^ 
to 
[for  tins  has  been  placed  by  the 

:  -      .'  .  ':  •:'•-       .'•:--. 

There  »  ooij  one  thing-in-itself 

in  a  process  of  relation  to  itself :  and 
to  itself  in  which  it  is  its  own  other  that 

of  the  thug-in-itself  »  the  "Property"  of 


Quafity  i* 

hichBn^is 
is  the  negativity  of 


The  negatirity  of  reflection, 
and  ft  is  relation, 
^quality 


128  Essence. 

unreflected  determinateness ;  it  is  relation  to  itself  as  its  own  other ; 
in  other  words  it  is  a  mediation  which  is  at  the  same  time  self -ident- 
ical.    The  abstract  thing-in-itself,  too,  is  this   process   of    relation 
which  returns  from  another  back  into  itself  ;  through  this  it  is  de- 
termined in  itself.     Its   determinateness,   however   is  its  nature  or 
constitution   [Beschaffenheif]  which  as  such  is  its  own  determining 
j  character  [Bestimmung  —  determination,  destination,  vocation,  quali- 
I  tative  character]  and  as  process  of  relation  to  another  does  not  pass 

over  into  other-being,  nor  is  it  subject  to  change. 

^i  u-r*"*1"1"/  A  thing  has  properties  ;  and  these  are,  in  the  first  place,  its  particu- 
^u^'^^Jlar  relations  to  another.  Properties  have  arisen  only  as  modes  of 
4  ^ ii>c  )  relation  of  the  things  to  each  other,  they  belong  therefore  to  the 
\activity  of  external  reflection  and  to  the  sides  of  posited-being  of 
the  thing.  But,  in  the  second  place,  the  thing  has  its  being-in-itself 
in  this  posited-being ;  it  preserves  itself  [as  self-identicall  in  this 
relation  to  others ;  it  is  therefore,  of  course,  only  a  surface  of  itself 
which  Existence  exposes  to  the  vicissitudes  of  change  and  becoming ; 
the  Property  does  not  suffer  dissolution  through  this.  A  thing  has  a 
property  of  influencing  another  thing  in  this  or  that  respect ;  and  of 
uttering  itself  in  a  manner  peculiar  to  itself  in  its  effects  upon  or 
relations  to  another.  It  manifests  this  property  (only  under  condi- 
tions that  are  adapted  to  it)  in  the  other  thing,  but  still  the  property 
is  peculiarly  its  own  and  its  self -identical  basis  ;  —  this  reflected  quality 
is  accordingly  called  a  property ;  in  this  it  passes  over  into  an  exter- 
nality but  the  property  still  retains  its  identity  in  that  externality. 
The  thing  through  its  properties  becomes  a  cause  and  the  cause  is 
preserved  in  its  effect.  Yet  in  this  place  the  thing  is  not  yet  deter- 
mined as  actual  cause ;  it  is  only  the  quiescent  thing  with  a  manifold 
of  properties ;  it  is  only  as  yet  the  in-itself  existent  reflection  of  its 
determinations  and  not  its  positing  reflection. 

The  thing-in-itself  is  therefore,  as  we  have  seen,  essentially  not 
merely  thing-in-itself  in  the  sense  that  its  properties  are  the  posited- 
being  of  an  external  1'eflection,  but  they  are  its  own  determinations 
through  which  it  stands  in  a  definite  relation  to  itself.  The  thing-in- 
itself  is  not  a  basis  devoid  of  determinations  existing  beyond  or  be- 
hind its  external  existence  ;  but  it  is  in  its  properties  ;  it  is  present  as 
their  ground,  which  means  [i.e.  "ground"  means]  self-identity  in 
its  posited-being ;  but  it  is  at  the  same  time  conditioned  ground,  and 
this  means  that  its  posited-being  is  likewise  self-external  reflection ; 
it  is  reflected  into  itself  and  self-identical  in  so  far  as  it  is  external. 
Through  existence  the  thing-in-itself  enters  into  external  relations. 
Existence  consists  in  this  external^ :  it  is  the  iramediateness  of 


JSzufera.  129 

in  thi*  tbe  thing  is  exposed  to  change;  bat  it  is  also  the 
of  Ground,  and  die  tiling  is  consequeudy  by 
itself  and  self-identical  in  its  change.  This  mention  of  die  groond- 
reiation  most  not  be  taken  here  in  die  sense  diat  die  thing  *$  such  is 
defined  as  ground  of  its  properties:  die  dung-ness  itself  is  as  such 
the  determination  of  Ground — die  property  is  not  distinct  from  its 
ground,  nor  does  it  constitute  merely  die  posited-heing.  but  it  has 
passed  over  into  its  externality  and  therefore  is  reafly  ground  reflected 
Tlie  property  itself  is  as  such  die  groaod  —  potted-being 
by  itself ;  in  other  words,  die  ground  constitutes  die 
form  of  its  self  identity :  its  determinateness  is  die  self -external  of 
die  ground :  and  die  whole  is,  in  its  repulsion  and  determining,  ground 
to  itself  in  its  external  immediateness.  Tbe  ihixLg-in-itseJf 
therefore  essentially  and  that  it  exists  means,  cv.nveisely.  that 
is  as  external  imisj  iliilini  1111  at  die  same  time  being-in- 


We  have  already  mentioned  when  considering  die  phases  of  partic- 
ular being  [page  ISO  of  dK  original  of  VoL  I  of  tins  Logic.  3d  ed.] 
(viz.,  under  die  phase  of  beytg-in-itsetf).  die  category  of  -  Thing- 
iu-«a.*erf."  and  in  diat  place  have  observed  diat  die  thing-in-itself  as 
such  is  nothing  but  the  empty  abstraction  from  all  detenninate»e*s. 
and  concerning  which  abstraction  one  of  course  can  know  nothing. 
for  he  precise  reason  dot  all  determination  [about  which  one  c*mld 
know  anything]  is  abstracted.  The  thing-in-itself  is  presupposed  to 
be  void  of  determination,  hence  all  determination  falls  outside  of  it 
in  a  reflection  foreign  to  h.  and  toward  which  it  is  indifferent,  this 
external  reflection  is  die  stage  of  consciousness  which  belongs  to 

idealism  attributes  aft 


ness  of  tilings  bodi  as  to  form  and  to  content  to  die  con- 
it  follows,  according  to  diat  standpoint,  diat  it  is  my 
subjective  affair  that  I  see  die  leaves  of  die  trees  not  as  hlack  but  as 
green ;  diat  die  sun  appears  round  and  not  square :  diat  sugar  tastes 
sweet  and  not  bitter;  and  diat  I  fix  die  first  and  second  strokes  of 
die  hour  as  in  succession  and  not  as  simultaneous,  nor  die  first  as 
cause  and  die  second  as  its  effect.  This  brilliant  exhibition  of  sub- 
jective idealism  is  in  direct  contradiction  to  the  consciousness  of 
freedom,  according  to  which  I  know  myself  to  be  general  and  unde- 
termined and  distinguish  from  myself  diose  manifold  and  necessary 
and  recognize  diem  as  external  to  myself  and  as  be- 


130  Essence. 

longing  to  the  things  alone.  The  ego  is  in  this  consciousness  of  its 
freedom  that  true  identity  reflected  into  itself  which  the  thing-in-itself 
is  defined  to  be.  Elsewhere  I  have  shown  that  this  transcendental 
idealism  never  transcends  the  limitation  of  the  ego  through  the  ob- 
ject, in  fact  never  gets  beyond  the  finite  world,  but  changes  only  the 
form  of  the  limitation,  which  remains  for  it  something  absolute,  inas- 
much, namely,  as  it  translates  it  out  of  the  objective  form  into  the 
subjective,  and  makes  it  into  determinatenesses  of  the  ego  and 
thereby  transfers  what  ordinary  consciousness  knows  as  change  and 
manifoldness  in  external  things  into  a  wild  hurlyburly  going  on  in 
the  ego  like  that  which  the  ordinary  consciousness  has  supposed  to 
exist  in  external  things.  In  the  present  consideration,  the  thing-in- 
itself  and  the  reflection  which  is  external  to  it  in  its  first  phase,  stand 
opposed  to  each  other.  This  phase  of  reflection  has  not  yet  deter- 
mined itself  as  consciousness  ;  nor  has  the  thing-in-itself  determined 
itself  as  ego.  It  has  become  evident  from  the  exposition  of  the  na- 
ture of  the  thing-in-itself  and  of  external  reflection,  that  this  exter- 
nal reflection  developes  into  the  thing-in-itself,  or,  conversely,  into  a 
determination  of  the  first  mentioned  thing-in-itself.  The  essential 
thing  in  regard  to  this  insufficiency  of  the  stand-point  upon  which 
the  mentioned  philosophy  rests,  consists  in  this,  that  it  sets  up  the 
abstract  thing-in-itself  as  an  ultimate  principle  and  opposes  to  this 
the  activity  of  reflection  or  the  determinateness  and  manifoldness 
of  properties,  while  in  point  of  fact  the  thing-in-itself  essentially  con- 
tains that  external  reflection  in  itself  and  developes  into  a  thing  with 
its  own  determinations  —  a  thing  endowed  with  properties  —  and  by 
this  means,  we  find  that  the  abstraction  of  the  thing,  viz.  the  pure 
thing-in-itself  shows  itself  to  be  an  untrue  determination. 

c.    Interaction  between  things. 

The  thing-in-itself  exists  essentially.  External  immediateness  and 
determinateness  belong  to  its  being-in-itself  [to  its  nature]  or  to  its 
reflection  into  itself  [i.e.,  to  it  without  reference  to  its  dependence 
on  others].  The  thing-in-itself  is  therefore  a  thing  with  properties; 
and  therefore  there  is  a  multiplicity  of  things ;  and  these  things  are 
not  distinguished  from  each  other  through  a  point  of  view  external  to 
them  as  [assumed  by  the  stand-point  treated  in  the  previous  section, 
wherein  the  multiplicity  that  pertains  to  the  manifold  properties  of  a 
thing  was  explained  by  referring  it  to  the  m.-uiifoldness  of  the  subject, 
i.e.,  to  the  five  senses  or  to  external  things  which  were  brought  into 
relation  to  it]  but  they  are  distinguished  from  each  other  through  the 


form  of  undetermined  ^f-kkrniiij  whkh  has  its  «*^uaiiioy  <o*a!h  w  no* 
propertr.  If.  dicrefore.  a  thins  or  dugs  an  general  an*  «pakircii  o»if  as 
deftule  propeitieB  it  IB  all  the  &UMC  winetSBer  «>u^  <«•  imunj 
of — ihi  ii  iKBi  H  an  •  IMJJI  •  qpMlilrtiM  uin  E>.:-;  £  •<nai3'>er- 
10  kind.  Tkat  vfeich  i*  regarded'  as  one  tfw^  caun  Ike  *i*r  ll« 


or  the  union  of  utanj  d 
to  be  an  extrmal  afbir  [dung  is  a  relative 

i  in  du?  dun*  is  a  mura 

?-£"••    :-  • 
iof  athiugl 

nund ;  he  dunks  its  relations  to  other  things,  and 
of  interaction,  d*  marks  which  it  has  ntcesv^l 

dungs;  the  mere  seusuous  consciousness  e 


0.1 y  i.  its  prapettn.     A  thing  fe 


- 


132  Essence. 

erties  is  nothing  but  the  abstract  being  in  itself,  an  external  aggregate 
and  a  non-essential  inclusion  [i.e.,  a  collection  of  materials  not  essen- 
tially related  to  each  other].  The  true  being-in-itself  is  the  being-in- 
itself  in  its  posited-being  and  this  is  the  property.  Hence  thing-ness 
has  become  for  us  "property." 

The  tiling,  according  to  this,  is  defined  as  an  in-itself-existent  ex- 
treme standing  in  relation  to  the  property  ;  and  the  property  is  a 
middle  term  between  the  things  which  stand  thus  in  relation.  But 
this  relation  [between  the  things,  and  constituting  the  property  or 
the  "  middle  term]  "  just  mentioned  is  that  in  which  the  things  meet 
as  the  self-repelling  reflection  and  in  which  they  are  distinguished 
from  and  related  to  each  other.  This  distinction  and  relation  of  the 
things  is  one  reflection  and  one  continuity  of  the  same.  The  things 
themselves  in  this  aspect  of  the  process  are  included  wholely  within 
the  continuity  of  the  property,  and  they  vanish  as  independent  ex- 
tremes which  possess  existence  outside  of  this  property. 

The  property  which  is  denned  as  constituting  the  relation  between 
the  independent  extremes  is  therefore  itself  what  is  independent 
[and  not  the  things,  as  was  supposed].  The  things  as  opposed  to 
this  [property  as  independent]  are  the  non-essential.  Things  are  es- 
sential only  so  far  as  they  have  a  phase  of  self-relating  reflection 
which  is  self-distinguishing  [self-repelling]  ;  but  this  phase  is  the 
"  property  "  [thus  the  only  phase  of  essentiality  belonging  to  things 
is  their  properties].  The  property  is  therefore  not  an  "annulled" 
phase  of  the  thing,  or,  in  other  words,  it  is  not  a  mere  "moment" 
of  the  thing;  but  the  thing  is  in  truth  only  an  including  surface  — 
the  non-essential  aggregate  ["  Umfang"  —  i.e.,  the  including  unity, 
containing  the  properties  within  it  as  the  only  realities ;  the  thing  has 
thus  become  a  husk,  shell,  cover,  containing  the  property  as  its  ker- 
nel] ;  although  the  thing  is  negative  unity,  it  is  only  the  oneness  of 
a  "somewhat,"  namely,  an  immediate  one  [i.e.,  the  "one"  of  the 
category  of  Being].  Although  the  thing  has  been  defined  as  non- 
essential  inclusion  in  a  former  connection,  when  it  was  deprived  of 
its  properties  by  an  external  act  of  abstraction,  yet  here  this  ab- 
straction has  taken  place  through  the  passing  over  of  the  thing-in- 
itself  into  property.  But  with  contrary  results ;  for  in  the  former 
act  of  abstraction  it  was  the  thing,  the  abstract  thing  without  its 
properties  that  was  thought  to  be  essential,  while  the  property  was 
thought  to  be  merely  an  external  determination ;  now  it  is  the  thing 
as  such  that  is  defined  to  be  a  mere  indifferent,  external  and  [non- 
essential]  form  for  the  properties.  The  properties  are  consequently 
now  freed  from  the  indefinite  and  powerless  bond  which  the  unity  of 


133 

the  thing  constitutes.  It  is  the  properties  that  constitute  the  exist- 
eoce  of  the  thing.  Each  property  is  an  independent  matter  or  ma- 
terial. Since  the  property  is  a  simple  self-continuity,  its  form  takes 
on  at  first  the  aspect  of  variety  [diversity  or  difference].  Therefore 
there  are  manifold  independent  matters  [or  properties  —  each  prop- 
erty being  a  matter],  and  the  thing  consists  of  these. 

B. 
Tke  Tkimg  etmsufx  of  Jfoffer*. 

The  transition  of  •*  property  "  into  a  •*  matter."  or  into  an  inde- 
pendent material  [Stop,  i.e,  stuff,  or  material]  is  the  well-known 
transition  which  the  science  of  chemistry  has  brought  about  as  re- 
gards the  matter  which  is  perceptible  by  oar  senses.  It  essays  to 
explain  the  properties  of  color,  of  smell,  of  taste,  dte..  as  light-cor- 
puscles, coloring  matter,  odor-corpuscles,  acid  particles  and  bitter 
particles,  *c..  or  it  assumes  a  caloric  matter,  or  an  electrical  or  mag- 
netic aaura  and  with  these  it  is  convinced  that  it  has  the  properties  in 
their  tangible  reality.  Thus  the  expression  is  current  that  things 
consist  of  ^different  materials  or  kinds  of  matter.  They  shrink  from 
calling  these, materials  or  kinds  of  matter  "things,"  although  they 
would  concede  that  a  pigment,  for  example,  is  a  thing.  I  do  not  know 
whether  they  would  call  the  matters  of  light,  beat,  and  electricity, 
*•  things."  They  distinguish  things  from  their  constituent  parts 
without  accurately  stating  whether  these  constituent  parts  are  also 
things,  or  whether  they  are  only  half  things.  But  at  least  these 


The  necessity  of  passing  over  from  the  stand-point  of  ••  proper- 
ties "  to  that  of  independent  matters,  in  other  words,  the  fact  that 
properties  are  in  truth  matters,  has  been  shown.  They  are  what  is 
essential,  and  consequently  what  is  truly  independent  in  the  Thing. 
At  the  same  time  however  the  reflection  of  the  property  into  itself 
[the  phase  of  its  independence  or  self-subsistence]  constitutes  only 
one  side  of  the  entire  activity  of  reflection.  It  constitutes  the  annul- 
ment of  the  distinction  and  the  self-continuity  of  the  property  which 
should  be  defined  as  an  existence  for  another.  The  thingness  in  its 
phase  of  negative  reflection  into  itself  in  which  it  is  a  distinguishing 
of  itself  from  others  and  a  repukion  of  others,  is  [by  this  one-sided 
view  of  the  property  as  mere  continuity]  reduced  to  a  non-essential 
moment.  But  at  the  same  time  it  has  defined  itself  still  further  in  a 
different  aspect.  This  negative  moment  (1)  has  been  preserved: 


134  Essence. 

for  the  property  has  become  self-continuous  and  an  independent  mat- 
matter  in  so  far  as  it  has  annulled  the  distinction  between  things ;  the 
continuity  of  the  property  over  into  the  domain  of  other  things  [other- 
being]  contains  therefore  itself  the  moment  of  negativity,  and  its 
independence  is  at  the  same  time  as  this  negative  unity  the  restored 
"somewhat"  of  ''thingness"  [/.e.,  since  the  property  includes  dif- 
ferent things  in  its  continuity,  the  property  itself,  becomes  thingness 
or  an  including  unity  of  an  included  multiplicity]  ;  it  is  the  negative 
independence  opposed  to  the  positive  phase  which  is  called  "stuff" 
or  matter.  Through  this  (2)  the  thing  passes  out  of  its  former  inde- 
terminateness  into  perfect  determinateness  [definiteness,  particu- 
larity]. As  thing-in-itself,  it  is  the  abstract  identit}^,,  the  simple, 
negative  existence,  or  it  is  defined  as  the  undetermined.  Secondly,  it 
is  determined  through  its  properties  through  which  it  is  distinguished 
from  others.  But  since  through  the  property  it  is  in  continuity  with 
others  instead  of  separated  from  them,  this  imperfect  distinction  is 
annulled.  The  thing  through  this  has  therefore  gone  back  into  itself, 
and  is  now  defined  as  perfectly  determinate  or  particular  in  itself,  it 
is  a  ••  this  thing." 

(3)  But  this  return  into  itself  is  the  self-relation  of  the  deter- 
mination ;  notwithstanding  this,  it  is  non-essential ;  the  continuity 
with  itself  constitutes  the  independent  matter  in  which  the  difference 
between  the  tilings  i.e.  their  determinateness  existing  in  and  for  itself, 
is  annulled  and  a  mere  external] affair.  The  thing  as  a  "this"  is 
therefore  perfected  determinateness  but  in  the  element  of  non-essen- 
tiality. 

Looked  at  from  the  side  of  the  activity  of  the  "property"  the 
property  is  not  merely  external  determination  but  Existence-by-itself . 
This  unity  of  externality  and  essentiality  repels  itself  from  itself  for 
the  reason  that  it  contains  within  itself  the  reflection  into  itself  and 
the  reflection  into  others  and  thus  it  is  on  the  one  hand  determination 
as  simple,  self-identical,  self-relating  and  independent,  in  which  the 
negative  unity,  i.  e.  the  one  of  the  thing,  is  annulled  ;  on  the  other 
hand  this  determination  exists  in  opposition  to  others  but  as  reflected 
into  itself,  a  one  determined  in  itself:  in  the  first  respect,  it  is  the 
free  matters  and  in  the  second  it  is  the  "this  thing."  These  are  the 
two  moments  or  phases  of  the  self-identical  externality  or  of  the 
"  property  "  reflected  into  itself.  The  property  was  understood  to 
be  that  by  which  the  things  were  distinguished.  Since  it  has  freed 
itself  from  this  its  negative  side  through  which  it  inheres  in  another, 
by  this  means,  the  thing  has  at  the  same  time  got  rid  of  its  side  of 
determinateness  through  other  things,  and  has  returned  into  itself  out 


135 

of  its  relation  to  others;  but  at  the  same  time  it  is  only  the  thing  in 
itself  become  other  to  itself;  since  the  manifold  properties  are  inde- 
pendent of  eaca  other  their  negative  relation  has  become  annulled  in 
the  unity  of  the  thing;  it  is  therefore  the  self-identical  negation  only 
as  opposed  to  the  positive  continuity  of  the  matter. 

The  T&w  constitutes  therefore  the  perfected  determinateness  of  the 
thing  in  that  it  is  at  the  same  time  external.  The  thing  is  composed 
of  independent  matters  which  are  indifferent  as  regards  then-  relation 
within  the  thing.  This  relation  is  therefore  only  a  non-essential  col- 
lection of  these  matters  and  the  distinction  of  one  thing  from  another 
rate  on  the  number  of  particular  matters  that  are  found  in  the  things 
respectively.  They  transcend  this  particular  thing  and  continue  into 
other  things  and  the  fact  that  they  belong  to  this  particular  thing  is 
no  restraint  or  limitation.  Quite  as  tittle  moreover  are  they  limiting 
conditions  or  restraints  for  each  other  because  their  negative  relation 
is  only  the  powerless  "This.1'  Therefore  they  do  not  annul  each 
other,  although  confined  within  the  thing;  being  independent  they 
are  impenetrable  as  regards  each  other :  in  their  determinaiienes*  they 
relate  solely  to  themselves  and  constitute  a  manifold  of  existences 
indifferent  to  [independent  of]  each  other :  they  can  have  only  a 
quantitative  limit.  The  thing  as  a  "This""  is  therefore  merely  a 
quantitative  relation  of  the  free  matters,  a  mere  collection  —  (the 
mere  conjunction --and")  of  the  properties.  The  thing  is  composed 
of  a  given  quantity  of  one  matter  amd  of  a  given  quantity  of  another, 
and  so  on ;  this  connection  or  aggregate  of  matters  is  no  essential 
but  the  thing  is  just  this  unity  of  matters  not  essentially 
[The  ordinary  consciousness  arbitrarily  selects  from  the  man- 
ifold of  sense-perception  an  aggregate  which  it  calls  "thing/'  Each 
thing  may  be  divided  at  win  into  several  things  or  may  be  concreted 
with  other  things  into  a  larger  thing;  a  thing  is  therefore  an  arbitrary 
synthesis  of  materials.  This  stage  of  thinking  also  isolates  properties 
of  a  thing  analytically;  it  supposes  that  the  properties  within  the 
thing  arise,  severally,  from  the  materials  that  compose  the  thing.  Its 
motto  is:  "The  ingredients  taken  together  will  have  no  attributes 
that  they  do  not  have,  taken  separately."  This  phase  of  conscious- 
ness wul  be  shown  in  this  chapter  to  be  a  psychological  incompetencj. 
That  whole  realm  of  scientific  thinking  whose  activity  expfa 
by  means  of  the  category  of  "  things,"  as  for  example  —  the 
simple  chemical  element —  is  therefore  utterly  inadeqnal 
a  true  theory  of  the  world  of  nature.] 


136  Essence. 

C. 
The  Dissolution  of  the  Thing. 

The  "  This  Thing,"  as  above  defined,  viz.,  as  the  merely  quantita- 
tive aggregate  of  free  matters,  is  absolutely  changeable.  Its  change 
consists  in  this  that  one  or  more  of  its  matters  may  be  withdrawn 
from  its  aggregate,  or  that  others  may  be  added  to  this  aggregate,  or 
they  may  be  changed  in  their  quantitative  relation  [relative  amount 
of  each]  to  each  other.  The  origination  and  dissolution  of  a  "this 
thing"  is  a  mere  external  destruction  of  such  external  combination 
or  it  is  the  re-combination  of  elements  for  which  it  is  indifferent 
whether  they  are  combined  or  not.  The  matters  circulate  out  of  and 
into  "this  thing"  without  restraint;  the  thing  itself  is  the  absolute 
porosity  without  any  principle  of  measure  belonging  to  it  that  should 
limit  the  kind  and  amount  of  the  matters — it  is  no  form-principle. 

Hence  the  thing  in  its  absolute  particularity  of  determinateness 
through  which  it  is  a  "  this  thing"  is  perpetually  exposed  to  dissolu- 
tion. This  dissolution  is  the  effect  of  external  influences  just  as  in  fact 
the  being  itself  of  the  thing  is  such  an  effect.  [But  its  dissolution 
and  the  externality  of  its  being  are  both  essential  to  its  nature.]  It  is 
only  a  conjunction  "  and  "  [connecting  the  properties  thus,  white  and 
acid,  &c.]  ;  it  consists  only  of  this  externality.  But  it  is  also  com- 
posed of  its  matters,  and  is  not  merely  an  abstract  "  this  "  as  such  — 
the  entire  "this  thing"  is  self -dissolution.  The  thing,  namely,  is 
defined  as  an  external  collection  of  independent  matters ;  these  mat- 
ters are  not  things,  they  do  not  possess  the  negative  independence 
which  belongs  to  the  thing;  but  they  are  the  independent  proper- 
ties—  determinatenesses  reflected  into  themselves.  The  matters  are 
therefore,  simple  and  self-related ;  but  their  content  is  a  determin- 
ateness ;  the  reflection  into  itself  is  only  the  form  of  this  content 
which  is  not  as  such  reflected  into  itself,  but  which  relates  to  others 
as  regards  its  determinateness  —  the  relation  of  the  matters  as  in- 
different to  each  other,  but  it  is  likewise  their  negative  relation ;  by 
reason  of  their  determinateness  [particularity]  the  matters  are  them- 
selves this  negative  reflection,  and  this  constitutes  the  punctateness 
[tendency  to  isolated  singleness,  brittleness  that  breaks  up  into  inde- 
pendent points,  disintegration,  individual  repulsion]  of  the  thing. 
Each  of  the  matters  is  not  what  the  others  are  and  according  to  the 
particularity  of  the  content  it  is  opposed  to  them,  and  the  one  is  not 
in  so  far  as  the  other  is  —  according  to  their  phase  of  independence. 

The  thing  is,  therefore,  the  relation  to  each  other  of  the  matters  of 


Thing.  137 

which  it  consists,  in  such  a  manner  that  each  one  exists  coordinately 
with  the  other,  but  at  the  same  time  each  one  does  not  exist  in  so  far 
as  the  other  exists.  In  so  far,  therefore,  as  the  one  matter  is  in  the 
thin?  the  others  are  annulled  by  it ;  but  at  the  same  time  the  thins  is 
the  conjunction  "  and  "  [White  and  sour  and  round  and  heavy  and 
hard  and  smooth  and  fragrant,  etc.],  or  the  independence  of  the  one 
matter  and  of  the  others.  In  the  existence  of  the  one  matter,  the 
others,  therefore,  do  not  exist,  and  yet  likewise  the  other  matters  do 
exist  in  the  former ;  and  so  reciprocally  of  all  there  different  mat- 
ters—  each  one  excludes  all  the  others,  and  at  the  same  time  partic- 
ipates in  them.  Since,  therefore,  in  the  same  respect  in  which  the 
one  exists  the  others  also  exist  and  this  is  the  one  existence  of  the 
matters  —  the  punctateness,  or  the  negative  unity  of  the  thing  —  thev 
interpenetrate  each  other  without  hindrance :  and  since  the  thing  is 
at  the  same  time  only  their  "and"'  and  the  matters  are  reflected  into 
their  determinateness  and  consequently  are  indifferent  towards  each 
other  and  do  not  come  in  contact  with  each  other  even  in  their  mutual 
interpenetration.  The  matters  are  therefore  essentially  porous  so  that 
each  one  exists  in  the  pores  of  the  other,  i.e.  in  the  non-existence  of 
the  other  [because  the  pores  are  the  vacuities  of  the  matters  wherein 
their  existence  ceases]  :  and  this  existence  of  the  others  is  likewise 
their  annulment  and  the  existence  of  the  first  [i.  e.,  in  the  pores  of 
the  others].  The  thing  is  therefore  the  self-contradictory  mediation 
of  independent  existence  through  its  opposite,  viz..  through  its  nega- 
tion, or  the  self-contradictory  mediation  of  one  independent  matter 
through  the  existence  and  non-existence  of  another.  The  category 
of  existence  has  attained  its  perfection  in  the  category  of  "  this 
thing,"  viz. :  it  is  the  unity  of  indejtendent  being  or  being-in-itself, 
and  of  non-essential  existence ;  the  truth  of  existence  is  therefore  its 
being- by-itself  [i.  e.,  independent  self-subsistence],  in  the  realm  of 
non -essentiality,  or  in  other  words  it  is  the  possession  of  its  self-sub- 
sistence in  another,  and  even  in  the  absolute  other  —  it  is  the  having 
its  own  nugatoriness  for  its  foundation.  It  is  therefore  PHENOM- 
ENON. 

Remark. 

It  is  one  of  the  current  notions  of  common  consciousness  that 
a  •'  thing"  is  composed  of  many  independent  matters.  On  the  one 
hand  the  thing  is  regarded  as  having  properties  whose  combination  is 
the  thing :  on  the  other  hand,  however,  the  various  determinations  are 
taken  as  matters  whose  self-subsistence  is  not  that  of  the  thing,  but 


138  Essence. 

contrariwise :  the  thing  consists  of  them  and  takes  its  self-subsistence 
from  them  —  the  thing  being  only  their  external  combination  and 
quantitative  limit.  Both  of  these  points  of  view,  that  of  the  proper- 
ties as  well  as  that  of  the  free  matters,  have  the  same  content,  the  dif- 
ference being  that  in  one  case  they  regard  the  moments  as  having 
their  negative  unity  in  the  Thingness,  i.  e.,  in  the  basis  different  from 
and  other  to  themselves,  and  in  the  other  case  they  regard  the  moments 
as  different  from  and  independent  of  each  other,  each  one  reflected 
into  itself  in  its  own  unity  and  not  in  the  unity  of  the  Thingness. 
These  matters  now  are  further  defined  as  independent  existence,  but 
they  are  also  together  in  one  thing.  The  "  this  thing"  possesses  the 
two  phases :  first  it  is  a  this  [punctate,  repelling,  atomic,  individual] 
and  secondly  it  is  the  "and"  [the  including  or  aggregating  unity]. 
The  "and"  is  that  which  occurs  in  external  sense-perception  as 
space-extension  ;  the  "  this,"  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  negative  unity, 
the  punctateness  [excluding  individuality]  of  the  thing.  The  matters 
are  together  within  the  punctateness  and  their  "and"  or  the  exten- 
sion is  everywhere  this  punctateness;  for  the  "and"  as  thingness  is 
essentially  a  negative  unity.  Where,  therefore,  the  one  of  these  mat- 
ters is,  there  in  one  and  the  same  point  is  the  other.  The  thing  does 
not  have  its  properties,  the  one  in  one  place  and  another  in  another  — 
for  example,  its  color  here,  its  scent  there,  its  heat  in  a  third  place,  &c., 
but  in  the  point  in  which  it  is  warm,  it  is  also  colored,  acid,  electric, 
&c.  Because  now  these  materials  are  not  external  to  each  other,  but 
are  in  one  "this,"  they  are  assumed  as  porous  and  as  though  one  ex- 
isted in  the  interstices  or  intervening  spaces  of  the  other.  Each  one 
which  exists  in  the  interstices  of  the  other  is  however  porous  itself, 
and  in  its  pores,  therefore,  the  others  exist  [and  it  again  within  their 
pores,  while  within  its  pores],  and  this  again  and  again  for  the  third 
time,  or  the  tenth  [and  so  ad  iiifinituni].  All  are  porous  and  in  the 
interstices  of  each  are  found  all  of  the  others,  just  as  each  one  is  in 
the  pores  of  every  other.  They  are  therefore  a  multiplicity  of  mat- 
ters that  interpenetrate  each  other  reciprocally,  and  are  interpene- 
trated, so  that  each  one  interpenetrates  in  turn  itself  again.  Each  is 
posited  as  its  own  negation,  and  this  negation  is  the  self-subsistence 
of  another ;  but  this  self-subsistence  is  likewise  the  negation  of  this 
other  and  the  self-subsistence  is  the  first. 

The  subterfuge  through  which  the  scientific  imagination  prevents 
the  contradiction  from  resulting  through  the  unity  of  several 
independent  matters  in  a  thing,  or  preserves  their  indifference  towards 
each  other  in  their  interpenetration  is,  as  is  well  known,  the  theory  of 
small  particles  or  atoms  and  of  pores  or  interstices.  Where  self-dis- 


Thing.  139 

ti  notion,  contradiction,  and  negation  of  negation  enter,  and  in  gen- 
eral where  anything  is  to  be  comprehended  [grasped  together  in 
thought]  the  scientific  imagination  descends  to  the  use  of  external, 
quantitative  distinctions.  In  order  to  ex  plain  origination  and  evanes- 
cence it  has  recourse  to  the  conceptions  of  •-  gradualness  "  and  -  by 
degrees,"  and  in  explaining  being  it  has  recourse  to  the  conception  of 
small  ness  or  minuteness  [molecules  or  atomic  constituents,  etc.],  in 
these  conceptions  the  varnishing  is  reduced  simply  to  an  iinjiervepu- 
ble  gradation  and  the  contradiction  is  reduced  to  a  c«~»n  fused  appear- 
ance, and  the  true  relation  is  obscured  by  conversion  inno  an  indefi- 
nite product  of  the  imagination,  whose  indistinctness  conceals  the 
process  of  self-annulment. 

Now.  if  we  examine  this  indistinctness  [and  !»ring  it  to  a  focus]  we 
find  it  to  be  nothing  at  all  but  the  contradiction  itself,  partly  the  sub- 
jective contradiction  of  the  activity  of  the  imagination.  partly  the  ob- 
jective activity  of  the  thing  perceived. 

The  activity  of  mental  representation  ["  scientific  imagination  "] 
itself  contains  all  of  the  elements  of  this  contradiction.  The  very 
first  aspect  of  its  activity  is  the  contradiction  involved  in  the  fact 
that  it  proposes  to  itself  to  bold  fast  to  simple  perception,  and 
to  allow  only  things  that  actually  exist  to  come  into  its  presence ; 
and  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  it  hastens  to  identify  as  sensu- 
ous beings  the  products  of  its  own  reflection,  thoughts  which 
cannot  be  verified  by  an  appeal  to  sense-perception.  The  small 
particles  or  atoms  and  the  pores  have,  according  to  it,  a  sensuous  ex- 
istence, and  the  same  kind  of  reality  is  predicated  of  their  posited 
being  [i.  «•..  dependent  qualities]  that  is  affirmed  of  color,  beat.  etc. 
Moreover  if  this  mental  picture  or  representation  [scientific  imagina- 
tion] of  the  objective  indistinctness  in  which  the  pores  and  atoms  are 
conceived  is  examined  attentively,  not  only  a  matter  and  also  its 
negation  are  recognized,  so  arranged  that  the  matter  and  the  pore, 
which  is  its  negation,  are  arranged  side  by  side  and  alternately, 
first  the  matter  and  then  the  pore:  but  in  this  particular  thing 
the  independent  matter  and  its  negation,  or  porosity  and  the 
other  independent  matter,  are  found  in  one  and  the  same  point, 
so  that  this  porosity  and  the  independent  existence  of  matters  in  each 
other  as  in  one  constitute  a  mutual  negation  and  interpenetration  of 
interpenetration.  The  modern  expositions  of  physics  in  their  ex- 
planation of  the*  expansion  of  steam  in  the  atmospheric  air,  and  of  the 
mixing  together  of  the  different  kinds  of  gases,  furnish  a  more  defin- 
ite example  of  the  phases  of  thought  here  presented.  They  show 
that,  for  example,  a  certain  volume  of  air  will  take  up  a  certain  quan- 


140  Essence. 

tity  of  steam,  and  that  an  equal  amount  of  space  empty  of  air  would 
not  contain  any  more;  and  that  the  different  kinds  of  gases  are  vacua 
to  each  other,  or  at  least  have  no  chemical  combination  with  each 
other,  each  being  self -continuous  when  it  pervades  the  other  and  each 
being  indifferent  to  the  other,  but  in  the  idea  of  the  thing  each  mat- 
ter is  found  just  where  the  other  is;  they  interpenetrate  the  same 
point,  the  independence  of  the  one  is  the  independence  of  the  other. 
This  is  contradictory  ;  the  thing,  however,  is  nothing  else  than  this 
contradiction,  and  therefore  it  is  properly  called  phenomenon. 

A  similar  application  is  made  of  this  notion  of  matters  in  explain- 
ing the  operations  of  the  mind  through  the  conception  of  psychic 
forces  or  "  faculties."  The  mind  is  in  a  much  deeper  sense  [than  the 
thing]  a  "  this  particular  "  somewhat,  a  negative  unity  in  which  its  de- 
terminations interpenetrate  each  other.  But  by  this  image-thinking 
it  is  commonly  conceived  as  a  kt  Thing."  Man  is  commonly  said  to 
consist  of  soul  and  body,  each  one  passing  for  something  independent 
of  the  other ;  in  the  same  manner  the  soul  is  made  to  consist  of  psy- 
chic forces  each  one  of  which  possesses  independent  existence  and 
has  an  activity  that  works  according  to  its  own  nature  without  refer- 
ence to  the  others.  For  example,  they  imagine  that  the  understand- 
ing acts  in  this  place,  the  imagination  in  that ;  and  that  the  under- 
standing may  be  set  in  activity  without  the  memory,  &c.  ;  or  that  one 
faculty  may  be  active  while  the  others  lie  dormant,  &c.  Since  they 
are  all  contained  in  the  psychical  thing,  the  soul,  which  is  a  simple 
material  and  which  as  simple  is  immaterial,  these  faculties  are  not 
represented  as  particular  matters  ;  but  they  are  represented  as  powers 
and  as  such  they  have  the  same  character  of  indifference  towards 
each  other  that  is  ascribed  to  the  matters  in  a  thing.  But  the  mind 
is  not  that  contradiction  which  a  thing  is ;  it  does  not  annul  itself 
and  thereby  become  phenomenal ;  but  it  is  already  in  itself  the  con- 
tradiction which  has  returned  into  its  absolute  unity,  the  Idea,  in 
which  distinctions  are  to  be  thought,  not  as  independent  existences, 
but  only  as  particular  moments,  or  phases,  in  the  thinking  subject. 

SECOND  CHAPTER. 

Phenomenon. 

Existence  is  the  immediateness  of  being  to  which  essence  has 
again  restored  itself.  This  immediateness  is  potentially  [in  its  nat- 
ure] the  reflection  of  essence  into  itself:  essence  has  as  existence 
proceeded  from  its  ground ;  ground  has  become  existence.  Exist- 


Phenomenon.  141 

ence  is  this  reflected  iramediateness  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  absolute 
negativity  in  itself.  It  is  now  also  posited  as  this  reflection  of  nega- 
tivity, since  it  is  now  defined  as  phenomenon. 

Phenomenon  is  therefore,  in  the  first  place,  essence  in  its  exist- 
ence ;  essence  is  immediately  present  in  it.  The  fact  that  it  is  not 
immediate  but  reflected  existence  is  its  phase  of  essence :  but  exist- 
ence as  essential  existence  is  phenomenon. 

Somewhat  is  a  mere  phenomenon  in  the  sense  that  existence  as 
such  is  only  a  posited  existence  —  not  in  and  for  itself.  Its  essen- 
tiality consists  in  having  within  it  the  negativity  of  reflection,  the 
nature  of  essence.  This  is  not  a  foreign,  external  reflection,  which 
belongs  to  essence,  and  in  contrast  to  which  existence  might  seem  to 
be  only  phenomenon.  But.  as  has  been  shown,  it  is  the  essentiality 
of  existence  to  be  phenomenon;  phenomenon  is  the  truth  of  exist- 
ence. The  activity  of  reflection  by  which  existence  becomes  phenom- 
enon belongs  to  existence  itself. 

Where  it  is  said  that  somewhat  is  only  a  phenomenon,  meaning 
that  it  is  in  contrast  to  the  true  existence,  the  fact  is  overlooked  that 
the  phenomenon  is  rather  the  higher  truth,  for  it  is  existence  as 
essential  opposed  to  existence  which  is  unessential  —  essential  exist- 
ence being  phenomenon  and  non-essential  existence  being  the  imme- 
diate existence  [existence  non-essential  is  existence  without  relations  : 
existence  in  its  relations  is  the  phenomenon  ;  the  present  doctrine  of 
"  relativity  "  belongs  to  the  doctrine  of  the  phenomenon.  Since  the 
non-essential  existence  is  only  one  of  the  phases  of  phenomenon, 
viz..  its  phase  of  immediate  existence,  while  the  negative  reflection  is 
the  other  phase,  it  is  seen  that  phenomenon  is  a  totality  more  essential 
than  existence].  If  phenomenon  is  called  non-essential  this  is  done 
from  the  supposition  that  the  immediate  is  something  positive  and 
true  as  opposed  to  the  phase  of  negativity  contained  in  the  phenome- 
non :  but  this  immediate  does  not  yet  contain  essential  truth  [i.  e..  it 
does  not  yet  contain  relativity  within  its  definition].  Existence  ceases 
to  be  non-essential  when  it  becomes  phenomenon. 

Essence  appears  to  itself,  first  in  its  simple  identity :  in  this  phase 
it  is  the  abstract  reflection,  it  is  the  pure  movement  from  nothing 
through  nothing  back  to  itself.  Essence  manifests  itself,  and  in  this 
phase  it  becomes  real  appearance,  since  the  phases  of  appearance  have 
existence  in  Manifestation  or  phenomenon.  The  manifestation  or 
phenomenon  is,  as  lias  been  shown,  the  thing  in  its  negative  self- medi- 
al ion  :  the  distinctions  which  it  contains  are  independent  matters. 
And  these  independent  matters  form  a  contradiction,  namely  they 
have  an  immediate  existence  of  their  own,  and  at  the  same  time  have 


142  Essence. 

their  existence  only  in  others  independent  of  them,  mid  consequently 
they  exist  in  the  negation  of  their  existence  ;  and  consequently,  again 
they  constitute  the  negation  of  those  other  independent  ones,  or,  what 
is  the  same  thing,  the  negation  of  their  own  negation.  Appearance  is 
the  same  mediation,  but  its  restless  phases  assume  in  the  mediation 
of  the  phenomenon  the  form  of  immediate  independence.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  immediate  independence  which  belongs  to  existence 
is  reduced  to  a  phase  of  the  former.  Phenomenon  is  therefore  the 
union  of  appearance  and  existence. 

Phenomenon  defined  more  accurately  is  essential  existence ;  its 
essentiality  is  separated  from  existence  as  non-essential  and  these  two 
sides  enter  into  relation  to  each  other.  It  is  therefore  in  the  first 
place  simple  self-identity,  which  at  the  same  time  contains  multipli- 
city ;  and  this  as  well  as  its  relation  remains  self-identical  within  the 
change  that  belongs  to  the  phenomenon.  This  is  the  law  of  the 
phenomenon. 

Secondly,  the  law  which  is  simple  amidst  the  diversity  [of  its  ap- 
plication] passes  into  the  antithesis  which  forms  the  self-opposition 
of  the  essential  phase  of  the  phenomenon  —  viz.,  that  of  a  phenom- 
enal world  over  against  a  noumenal  world. 

Thirdly,  this  antithesis  returns  into  its  ground:  the  noumenal  is 
found  in  the  phenomenal  and  the  phenomenal  is  taken  up  into  the 
noumenal,  and  so  the  phenomenal  becomes  essential  relation  \_Ver- 
hdltniss=necessavy  connection] . 


A. 

The  Law  of  the  Phenomenon. 

1.  The  phenomenon  is  the  existing  mediated  through  its  nega- 
tion which  constitutes  its  independence  or  self-subsistence.  This 
its  negation  is  however  another  independent  somewhat;  but  it  is  like- 
wise essentially  annulled. 

The  existing  somewhat  is  therefore  the  return  into  itself  through 
its  negation  and  through  the  negation  of  its  negation ;  it  has  there- 
fore essential  independence ;  and  at  the  same  time  it  is  a  mere  pos- 
ited being  [dependent]  which  lias  a  ground  and  has  its  existence  in 
another.  In  the  first  place,  therefore,  the  phenomenon  is  the  existence 
together  with  its  essentiality  —  the  posited-being  with  its  ground; 
but  this  ground  is  the  negation  ;  and  the  other  independent,  the 
around  of  the  first,  is  likewise  onlv  a  posited-being.  In  other  words 
the  existing  somewhat  is,  as  phenomenal,  reflected  into  another, 


Phenomenon.  143 

which  is  its  ground,  bat  this  ground  is  in  tarn  itself  reflected  into 
another.  The  essential  independence  which  appertains  to  it,  for  the 
reason  that  it  is  a  return  into  itself,  is  on  account  of  the  negativity 
of  its  moments  the  return  of  nought  through  nought  back  to  itself ; 
the  independence  of  the  existing  somewhats  is  therefore  onlv  essen- 
tial appearance.  The  connection  of  the  existing  somewhats  which 
ground  each  other  reciprocally,  consists  therefore  in  this  mutual  nega- 
tion that  the  independence  of  one  is  not  the  independence  of  the 
other,  but  its  posited-being  or  dependence :  and  this  relation  of  the 
posited-being.  or  dependence,  alone  constitutes  independence.  The 
ground  is  now  present  as  it  is  in  its  truth,  viz..  it  is  a  primary  some- 
what which  is  only  a  presupposed. 

Now  this  constitutes  the  negative  side  of  the  phenomenon.  But 
in  this  negative  mediation  there  is  contained  in  an  immediate  form 
the  positive  identity  of  the  existing  somewhats.  For  it  is  not  posited- 
being  [dependent]  as  opposed  to  an  essential  ground  —  in  other 
words,  it  is  not  an  appearance  belonging  to  an  independent  being. 
but  it  is  posited-being  [dependence]  which  relates  to  posited-l»eing. — 
in  other  words  it  is  an  appearance  only  within  an  appearance.  Within 
this  its  negation  or  its  other,  which  itself  has  been  annulled,  it  [tue 
phenomenon]  relates  only  to  itself  and  is  consequently  self-identical 
or  positive  essentiality.  This  identity  is  not  the  immediateness  which 
appertains  to  existence  as  such,  and  which  is  only  unessential,  and 
has  its  subsistence  in  another ;  but  it  is  the  essential  content  of  the 
phenomenon,  which  has  two  sides :  first,  in  the  form  of  posited-being 
or  of  external  immediateness ;  secondly,  the  posited-being  as  self- 
idt-iitical.  According  to  the  first  side,  it  is  a  particular  being,  a  con- 
tingent unessential  somewhat  exposed  to  change,  origination  and 
evanescence  by  reason  of  its  immediateness.  According  to  the  sec- 
ond side  it  is  the  simple  content  which  abides  under  the  mentioned 
origination  and  evanescence. 

This  content,  besides  being  the  simple  which  underlies  the  phase  of 
change,  is  also  a  definite,  particular  content,  containing  variety 
within  itself.  It  is  the  reflection  [retnrn-into-itself]  of  the  phenom- 
enon [«'.  *•..  the  totality  of  the  phenomenon  which  presents  the  complete 
cycle  of  the  activity  of  change,  and  hence  its  abiding  image  or  form, 
because  the  continued  activity  of  the  process  does  nothing  but  repeat 
over  and  over  again  the  cycle  of  phases  which  constitute  the  phe- 
nomenon; e.  g.,  the  year  contains  a  totality  of  seasons,  and  a  longer 
period  of  time  than  a  year  does  but  rej>eat  the  cycle  already  contained, 
as  a  totality,  within  the  year;  the  type  of  the  variety  of  seasons 
within  the  year  is  a  permanent  under  a  variable  —  it  is.  as  here  called 


144  Essence. 

by  Hegel,  the  "law  of  the  phenomenon"].  In  this  reflection  or  re- 
turn into  itself  the  particular  existences  are  negative  [  /.  e.,  perishable  ; 
but  they  form  a  series  which  returns  into  itself]  ;  this  reflection  con- 
sequently contains  essentially  the  determinateness  [  i.  e.,  the  series  of 
transitory  particular  existences  which  form  the  total  cycle  or  the  phe- 
nomenon, give  definite  particularity  to  the  cycle  or  phenomenon,  so 
that  one  phenomenon  is  distinguished  from  another  by  the  series  of 
evanescent  existences  within  it].  The  phenomenon  however  is  the 
manifold  variety,  existent  within  it,  which  runs  its  course  and 
passes  through  its  succession  of  phases ;  its  reflected  content  on  the 
other  hand  is  its  manifoldness  reduced  to  simplicity.  The  definite 
particular  content  which  is  essential  is  therefore  not  merely  a  single 
one  of  the  particular  phases  of  the  phenomenon,  but,  being  the  essen- 
tial particularity  of  the  phenomenon,  it  includes  the  entire  particularly 
or  determinateness  within  the  phenomenon,  the  particularity  of  each 
and  every  one.  In  the  phenomenon  then-fore  each  phase  of  its  suc- 
cession of  phases  possesses  its  self-subsistence  in  the  other  phases 
[i.  e.,  there  may  be  mutual  interdependence  among  these  phases]  in 
such  a  manner  that  each  phase  is  only  in  its  non-subsistence 
[i.  e.,  its  truth  or  totality  is  realized  only  by  the  transitoriness  of  each 
phase].  This  contradiction  annuls  itself ;  and  its  refleetion-into-it- 
self  is  the  identity  of  its  twofold  self  subsistence,  namely,  that  the 
posited-being  or  dependence  of  the  one  is  also  the  posited  being  or 
dependence  of  the  other.  [One  phase  of  transitorin/ess  has  its  sub- 
sistence in  another  phase  of  transitoriness;  the  second  phase  being 
transitory  and  having  its  phase  in  another,  the  first  phase  has  its  non- 
subsistence  as  well  as  its  subsistence  in  the  second  phase  ;  this  is  the 
contradiction  spoken  of  in  the  text.]  They  [the  two  dependent 
phases]  constitute  one  subsistence,  although  constituting  variety  or 
diversity  within  the  one  subsistence. 

In  the  essential  side  of  the  phenomenon,  consequently,  the  nega- 
tivity of  the  unessential  content  through  which  it  annuls  itself,  has 
consequently  returned  into  identity ;  it  is  an  indifferent  subsistence 
[*.  e.,  a  non-related,  neither  repelling  nor  attracting  distinction,  each 
one  independent  of  the  other]  which  is  not  the  annulled  particu- 
larity, [not  the  identity  of  the  particularities  within  the  phenome- 
non with  their  differences  omitted.]  but  rather  the  self-subsistence 
[the  positive  inclusion  of  all  the  differences  within  the  identity]  of 
the  other. 

This  unity  is  the  Law  of  the  Phenomenon. 

2.  The  law  is  therefore  what  is  positive  in  the  mediation  which 
constitutes  the  phenomenon.  The  phenomenon  is  in  its  first  phase. 


Phenomenon.  145 

existence  as  negative  self-mediation,  so  that  the  existing  thing  is 
mediated  through  its  own  non-subsistence  —  through  another  thing  — 
and  again  through  the  non-subsistence  of  this  other  thing  —  this  pro- 
cess constituting  its  self-mediation  [the  second  part  of  its  mediation, 
namery,  the  non-subsistence  of  Che  other  into  which  the  first  phase 
passes  is  as  important  as  the  non-subsistence  of  the  first  phase ;  in 
finding  out  the  totality  of  a  succession  of  appearances  with  intent  to 
find  the  law  or  the  ideal  type  which  Hegel  here  calls  "  Phenomenon  " 
we  must  trace  one  phase  into  another  and  another  again,  until  the 
first  phase  reappears,  then  we  have  the  totality  of  phases,  the  total 
particularity  involved  and  hence  the  permanent  or  the  law  of  the 
phenomenon].  In  this  is  contained,  first,  the  mere  appearance  and 
disappearance  of  the  several  phases,  and  this  is  the  unessential  side 
of  the  phenomenon ;  secondly,  it  contains  also  the  abiding  or  the 
law  [that  is  to  say,  the  necessary  recurrence,  or  repetition  of  the 
appearance  and  disappearance]  ;  for  each  of  that  series  of  phases  in 
the  phenomenon  exists  through  the  annulment  of  the  other  phases 
[their  annulment  posits  it]  ;  and  their  posited-being  [dependence]  as 
their  negativity  is  at  the  same  time  the  self-identical,  positive  phase 
of  their  dependence  [the  dependence  of  each  makes  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  others]. 

This  abiding  subsistence  which  belongs  to  the  phenomenon  and  is 
here  called  its  law  is,  therefore,  as  has  been  shown,  at  first  opposed 
to  the  immediateness  of  being  which  appertains  to  existence.  This 
immediateness,  it  is  true,  is  potentially  a  reflected  immediateness 
viz.,  that  which  is  returned  into  itself  as  ground ;  but  in  the  phenom- 
enon this  simple  immediateuess  is  different  from  the  reflected  imme- 
diateness which  showed  itself  formerly  in  the  category  of  Thing. 
The  existing  thing  in  its  dissolution  became  this  antithesis:  what 
there  was  positive  in  its  dissolution  is  the  self-identity  of  the  process 
of  the  phenomenon  as  posited-being  self-identical  in  its  other  posited- 
being.  In  the  second  place,  this  reflected  immediateness  has  been 
shown  to  be  opposed  as  posited-being  to  the  immediateness  of 
existence.  This  posited-being  is  now  the  essential  and  truly 
positive.  The  German  expression  Gesetz  [Gesetz  is  the  German 
word  for  "  law,"  from  the  verb  selzen,  to  posit]  contains  this  thought 
[t.  e.,  in  German,  law  means  the  posited ;  —  as  understood  by  Hegel, 
here,  the  law  states  the  particularity^  of  a  series  of  particular,  transi- 
tory beings  passing  over  into  each  other  and  thus  constituting  a  com- 
plete cycle,  so  that  the  mutual  dependence  —  or  posited-being  — 
makes  the  abiding  or  the  law].  In  this  posited-being  is  found  the 


146  Essence. 

essential  relation  of  the  two  sides  of  distinction  [that  of  the  one  phase 
to  the  others]  which  the  law  contains ;  they  constitute  a  diversity  of 
immediate  content  [elements  independent  of  each  other]  and  consti- 
tute this  as  the  reflecting  activity  of  the  vanishing  content  of  the  phe- 
nomenon. As  essential  diversity  or  variety  the  phases  of  the  phe- 
nomenon ate  simple  self-relating  elements.  But  likewise  each  ele- 
ment is  essentially  dependent  and  not  immediately  for  itself  —  in 
other  words  it  is  only  in  so  far  as  the  other  is. 

Thirdly,  phenomenon  and  law  have  one  and  the  same  content. 
Law  is  the  phenomenon's  reflection  into  self-identity ;  hence  the 
phenomenon  stands  opposed  to  that  which  is  reflected  into  itself  as 
the  nugatory  immediate,  and  in  this  shape  they  [the  law  and  the 
phenomenon] 'are  contrasted.  But  the  reflection  of  the  phenomenon 
which  causes  this  contrast  is  also  the  essential  identity  of  the  phen- 
omenon itself  and  of  its  reflection,  and  constitutes  the  nature  of  reflec- 
tion. This  reflection  is  self -identical  in  the  posited  being,  and  indif- 
ferent towards  that  contrast  which  constitutes  the  form  or  posited 
being ;  therefore  it  is  a  content  which  continues  beyond  the  phenom- 
enon and  into  the  law,  and  is  the  content  both  of  the  law  and  the 
phenomenon. 

This  content  constitutes  therefore  the  basis  of  the  phenomenon ;. 
the  law  is  this  basis  itself ;  the  phenomenon  is  the  same  content,  but 
it  contains  something  additional,  namely,  the  non-essential  content 
of  its  immediate  being.  Moreover  the  form-determination  through 
which  the  phenomenon  as  such  differs  from  the  law,  is  namely  a  con- 
tent and  likewise  a  different  content  from  that  of  the  law.  For  ex- 
istence is  as  immediateness,  on  the  whole,  a  self-identical  somewhat  in 
respect  to  matter  and  form,  and  therefore  a  content,  and  indifferent 
towards  its  form-determinations  ;  it  is  the  "  thingness  "  possessing 
properties  and  free  matters.  But  it  is  the  content  whose  independent 
immediateness  is  at  the  same  time  without  substantial  existence.  The 
self -identity  of  the  same  in  this  its  non-subsistence  [or  lack  of  "  sub- 
stantial existence  "]  is,  however,  the  other  essential  content.  This 
identity,  the  basis  of  the  phenomenon  and  which  constitutes  the  law,  is 
its  own  moment  [or  the  essential  element  of  the  phenomenon]  ;  it  is 
the  positive  side  of  essentiality  through  which  existence  becomes  and  is- 
phenomenon. 

The  law  is  therefore  not  something  beyond  the  phenomenon  or  out- 
side of  it  or  above  it,  but  immediately  present  in  it ;  the  realm  of 
laws  is  the  quiet  image  or  archetype  of  the  existing  or  phenomenal 
world.  The  two,  however,  constitute  one  totality,  and  the  existing 


Phenomenon.  1-47 

world  is  itself  the  realm  of  laws,  which  is  the  simple  self -identical  as 
well  as  the  self-identical  in  the  posited-being,  or  in  the  self-annulling 
independence  which  belongs  to  existence.  Existence  goes  back  into 
the  law  as  into  its  ground  [this  means  that  existence  is  annulled  in  its 
process,  and  loses  its  immediateness,  but  by  the  continuance  of  the 
process  returns  into  itself,  or  its  immediateness  reappears,  just  as 
summer's  heat  and  winter's  cold  recur  in  the  process  of  the  year ;  the 
law  is  the  general  type  of  the  entire  movement,  and  is  therefore 
always  in  self -identity,  although  its  existences  change  —  hence  the 
law  is  here  spoken  of  as  the  ground  of  existence,  —  i.  e.,  the  annul- 
ment of  existence  is  the  realization  of  the  ground  as  law].  The 
phenomenon  contains  both  the  simple  ground  and  the  annulling  activ- 
ity of  the  phenomenal  universe  of  which  it  is  the  essentiality  [i.  e..  the 
law  as  ground  and  the  negativity  which  makes  real  one  of  its  phases 
after  the  other]. 

3.  The  Law  is  therefore  the  essential  phenomenon ;  it  is  its  reflec- 
tion in  its  posited-being  [dependence],  the  identical  content  of  itself 
and  of  the  non-essential  existence.  In  the  first  place,  now  this  iden- 
tity- of  the  law  with  its  existence  is  only  immediate,  simple  identity, 
and  the  law  is  indifferent  in  respect  to  its  existence ;  the  phenomenon 
has  still  another  content  opposed  to  the  content  of  the  law.  That 
content,  however,  is  the  non-essential  and  the  return  into  the  content 
of  the  law ;  bnt  for  the  law  that  non-essential  is  something  that  already 
exists  for  itself  and  is  not  caused  by  it,  and  hence  it  is  an  external  con- 
tent in  some  way  attached  to  the  law.  The  phenomenon  is  a  collec- 
tion of  determinations  in  close  connection,  which  belong  to  "  this," 
or  the  concrete  somewhat,  and  are  not  contained  in  the  law,  but  are 
derived  from  some  other  source. 

In  the  second  place,  that  which  the  phenomenon  contains  besides 
the  law  is  defined  as  a  positive  or  as  another  content ;  bnt  it  is  essen- 
tially a  negative  somewhat ;  it  is  the  form,  and  its  activity  as  such, 
which  appertains  to  the  phenomenon.  The  realm  of  laws  is  the 
quiescent  content  of  the  phenomenon ;  the  phenomenon  is  the  same 
content  but  exhibiting  itself  in  the  restless  change  and  as  reflection 
into  another.  The  phenomenon  is  the  law  as  the  negative  self -chang- 
ing existence,  the  activity  of  the  transition  of  contraries  into  each 
other,  and  of  their  self-annulment  and  return  into  one  unity.  This 
side  of  restless  form  or  of  negativity  does  not  contain  the  law ;  the 
phenomenon,  therefore,  is  rather  the  totality  as  opposed  to  the  law, 
for  it  contains  the  law  and  also  something  additional,  namely,  the 
phase  of  tlie  self-active  form. 


148  Essence. 

This  lack  or  defect,  in  the  third  place,  is  to  be  found  in  the  law, 
viz.,  that  its  content  is  something  diverse  from  it,  external  to  it,  and 
indifferent  to  it ;  therefore  the  identity  of  its  sides  with  each  other  is 
only  an  immediate  and  internal  one,  but  not  yet  a  necessary  identity. 
In  the  law  there  are  two  determinations  of  content  connected  to- 
gether as  essential — for  example,  in  the  law  of  falling  bodies,  the 
extent  of  the  space  and  the  time  of  descent  are  essentially  connected  : 
the  space  varies  as  the  square  of  the  time.  The  law  states  only  the 
connection  as  an  existing  fact  —  a  mere  immediate  relation  —  with- 
out showing  the  necessity  for  the  same.  This  relation  is  therefore 
likewise  a  mere  posited  or  dependent  something,  just  as  in  the  phe- 
nomenon the  phase  of  immediateness  has  been  found  to  have  this 
meaning  of  dependence.  The  essential  unity  of  the  two  sides  of  the 
law  would  be  their  negativity.  In  that  negativity,  namely,  the  one 
would  be  found  to  contain  in  itself  the  other ;  but  this  essential  unity 
we  have  not  yet  found  in  the  law.  For  example,  in  the  idea  of  the 
space  passed  through  by  a  falling  body,  we  do  not  find  its  necessary 
correspondence  to  the  square  of  the  time  occupied  in  falling.  Since 
the  fall  of  the  body  is  a  sensuous  movement,  it  involves  a  relation  of 
time  and  space  ;  but  at  first  it  does  not  appear  that  the  nature  of  time 
involves  a  relation  to  space,  and  vice  versa;  one  would  say  that  time 
could  be  thought  without  space,  and  space  without  time ;  the  one 
stands  therefore  in  external  relation  to  the  other,  being  united  with  it 
in  movement. 

In  the  second  place,  the  quantitative  relation  of  space  and  time  to 
each  other  is  quite  indifferent.  The  law  which  states  this  quantita- 
tive relation  is  derived  from  experience,  and  in  so  far  it  is  only  imme- 
diate and  demands  farther  proof  of  its  necessity  —  a  mediation  for  the 
scientific  cognition  that  it  is  not  a  mere  accident,  something  that  hap- 
pens, but  that  it  is  necessary.  The  law  as  such  does  not  contain  this 
proof  of  its  objective  necessity.  The  law  is  therefore  only  the  posi- 
tive essentiality  of  the  phenomenon,  and  not  its  negative  essentiality 
according  to  which  the  determinations  of  content  are  "moments," 
or  phases  of  form,  and  as  such  pass  over  into  others  and  show  them- 
selves to  be  potentially  something  else  than  they  are  immediately.  In 
the  law  is  therefore  its  posited-being,  on  the  one  side,  the  same  as  its 
posited-being  on  the  other  side  ;  but  its  content  is  indifferent  to  this 
relation,  its  content  does  not  contain  within  it  this  posited-being. 
The  law  is  therefore  the  essential  form,  but  not  yet  the  real  form  as 
reflected  content  in  its  side  or  phases  of  activity. 


Phenomenon.  149 

B. 
The  Phenomenal  World  and  the  World  that  exists  in  itself. 

1.  The  existing  world  [i.  e.,  the  totality  of  existences  understood 
as  defined  in  the  foregoing}  becomes  a  quiet  realm  of  laws  :  the  nu- 
gatory content  of  its  manifold  particulars  has  its  subsistence  in 
another  [i.  e.,  each  particular  being  is  dependent  on  another]  its  sub- 
sistence therefore  is  its  dissolution  [t*.  e.,  its  being  in  another  is  annul- 
ment of  its  being  in  itself].  But  the  phenomenal  arrives  at  self- 
identitj-  in  this  other;  hence  the  phenomenon  in  its  change  is  an 
abiding  and  its  posited-being  is  law  [as  the  change  of  seasons  finds 
its  abiding  form  in  the  year].  The  law  is  this  simple  self-identity  of 
the  phenomenon ;  hence  its  basis  and  not  its  ground  or  substrate ; 
for  the  law  is  not  the  negative  unity  of  the  phenomenon,  but,  as  its 
simple  identity  it  is  the  immediate  unity  as  abstract,  and.  co-ordinate 
to  it,  is  found  also  its  other  content.  The  content  is  "  this  "  partic- 
ular, and  coheres  within  itself,  in  other  words  has  its  negative  reflec- 
tion within  itself.  It  is  reflected  into  another ;  and  this  other  is  itself 
an  existence  of  the  phenomenon ;  the  phenomenal  things  have  their 
grounds  [or  substrates]  and  conditions  in  other  phenomenal  things. 

In  fact  however  the  law  is  also  the  other  of  the  phenomenon  as 
such  and  its  negative  reflection  is  into  its  other.  The  content  of  the 
phenomenon,  which  is  different  from  the  content  of  the  law,  is  the 
existing  somewhat  which  has  its  negativity  for  its  substrate  or  in 
other  words  is  reflected  into  its  non-being.  But  this  other  which  is 
also  an  existing  somewhat  is  likewise  such  an  existence  reflected  into  its 
non-being ;  it  is  therefore  the  same,  and  the  phenomenal  in  being 
reflected  into  it  is  not  in  fact  reflected  into  another  but  reflected  into 
itself :  and  this  very  reflection  into  itself  of  the  posited-being  [de- 
pendence] is  the  law.  But  as  phenomenal  it  is  essentially  reflected 
into  its  non-being,  or  its  identity  is  likewise  essentially  its  negativity 
and  its  other.  The  reflection  into  itself  of  the  phenomenon,  ».  e.,  the 
law,  is  therefore  not  only  its  identical  basis  but  it  has  in  it  its  anti- 
thesis, and  the  law  is  its  negative  unity. 

Therefore  the  definition  of  the  law  in  the  phenomenon  has 
changed  ;  at  first  it  was  only  a  varied  content  and  the  formal  reflec- 
tion of  posited-being  into  itself  [»".  e.,  self-dependence]  so  that  the 
posited-being  of  one  of  its  sides  is  the  posited-being  of  the  other. 
But  since  it  is  also  the  negative  reflection  into  itself,  its  sides  stand 
in  relation  to  each  other  not  as  mere  indifferent  and  independent  ones 
but  as  related  to  each  other  negatively.  In  other  words  when  the 


150  Essence. 

law  is  considered  merely  by  itself  the  sides  of  its  content  are  indiffer- 
ent towards  each  other;  but  they  are  likewise  annulled  through  their 
identity ;  the  posited-being  of  the  one  is  the  posited-being  of  the 
other;  therefore  the  subsistence  of  each  one  is  also  its  own  non- 
subsistence.  This  posited-being  or  dependence  of  the  one  within  the 
other  is  their  negative  unity,  and  each  is  not  only  its  own  posited- 
being  but  also  that  of  the  other,  or  each  is  itself  this  negative 
unity. 

The  positive  identity  which  they  have  in  the  law  as  such  is  their  in- 
ternal unit}',  now  found  for  the  first  time,  which  needs  proof  and 
mediation  for  the  reason  that  this  negative  unity  is  not  yet  posited  on 
them.  But  since  the  different  sides  of  the  law  are  now  defined  as 
retaining  their  difference  in  their  negative  unity  through  the  fact  that 
each  one  contains  its  other  within  itself  and  at  the  same  time  as  inde- 
pendent repels  its  otherness  from  itself,  it  follows  that  the  identity  of 
the  law  is  now  a  posited  and  real  one. 

Hence  therefore  the  law  has  received  the  element  of  the  negative 
form  of  its  sides  which  it  heretofore  lacked  ;  the  element  which  here- 
tofore still  belonged  to  the  phenomenon.  Consequently  existence  has 
now  completely  returned  into  itself,  and  has  reflected  itself  into  its 
absolute  other-being  which  exists  in  and  for  itself.  That  which  was 
law  in  the  previous  consideration  is  therefore  no  longer  merely  one 
side  of  the  totality  whose  other  was  the  phenomenon  as  such,  but  it 
is  itself  the  totality.  It  is  the  essential  totality  of  the  phenomenon,  so 
that  it  now  contains  also  the  element  of  non-essentiality  which  had  hith- 
erto belonged  only  to  the  phenomenon  and  not  to  the  law.  But  it 
contains  this  element  of  non-essentiality  as  reflected,  as  in  itself  ex- 
istent, i.  e.,  as  essential  negativity.  The  law  is  as  an  immediate  con- 
tent particularized,  contradistinguished  from  the  other  laws,  of  which 
there  are  an  indefinite  number.  But  since  it  now  has  the  essential 
negativity  belonging  to  it,  it  contains  no  longer  a  merely  indifferent 
contingent  content ;  but  its  content  is  all  determinateness  standing  in 
essential  relation  and  thus  constituting  a  totality.  Therefore  the 
phenomenon  reflected  into  itself  is  now  a  world  which  reveals  itself  as 
in-and-for-itself  existent  above  the  phenomenal  world. 

The  realm  of  laws  contains  nothing  but  the  simple,  changeless,  but 
still  varied  content  of  the  existing  world  ;  but  now  since  it  is  the 
total  reflection  of  this  existing  world,  it  contains  also  its  non-essential 
manifoldness.  This  phase  of  mutability  and  change  as  reflected  into 
itself  and  essential  [  i.  e.,  closing  together  into  cycles  of  change]  is 
the  absolute  negativity  or  the  form,  whose  elements  have  the  reality 
of  independent  but  reflected  existence  in  the  world  that  exists  in  and 


Phenomenon.  151 

for  itself.  And,  conversely,  tins  reflected  independence  possesses 
the  form  within  itself,  and  through  this  its  content  is  not  a  mere  man- 
ifold but  essentially  connected  and  interdependent. 

This  world  which  exists  in  and  for  itself  is  called  the  "supersen- 
sible world  "  ;  in  so  far  as  the  existing  world  is  defined  as  sensuous, 
viz.,  as  existing  for  sense-perception,  as  the  direct  object  of  con- 
sciousness. The  supersensible  world  likewise  has  immediateness  or 
existence,  but  it  is  reflected,  essential  existence.  Essence  as  yet 
does  not  possess  particularized  being,  but  it  is  in  a  deeper  sense  than 
mere  being ;  the  thing  is  the  beginning  of  reflected  existence  ;  it  is  an 
immediateness  which  is  not  yet  posited  as  essential  or  reflected.  But 
the  thing  is  not  in  truth  an  existent  immediate. 

It  is  only  when  the  things  are  posited  as  things  of  another,  of  a 
supersensible  world,  that  they  become  true  existences  and  possess 
truth  in  contrast  to  mere  beings.  It  is  then  recognized  that  there  is 
another  being  distinguished  from  immediate  being  and  that  this  other 
being  is  the  true  existence.  On  the  one  hand  in  this  category  of 
true  existence  the  sensuous  conception  is  laid  aside  as  inadequate,  for 
it  ascribes  existence  only  to  the  immediate  being  of  feeling  and  sense- 
perception  ;  and  on  the  other  hand  also  unconscious  reflection  is 
transcended,  for  though  it  possesses  the  idea  of  things,  forces,  the 
internal,  &c.,  yet  it  does  not  know  that  such  ideas  are  not  sensuous 
and  do  not  correspond  to  immediate  beings  but  are  reflected  exist- 


2.  The  world  which  exists  in  and  for  itself  is  the  totality  of  exist- 
ence ;  there  is  nothing  else  outside  of  it.  But  since  it  is  in  itself  the 
absolute  negativity  or  form,  its  reflection  into  itself  is  negative  relation 
to  itself.  Therefore  it  contains  within  itself  the  antithesis,  on  the 
one  hand  being  an  essential  world  which  repels,  on  the  other  hand, 
from  itself  the  world  of  other-being  or  the  world  of  phenomenon. 
Therefore  since  it  is  the  totality  and  also  one  side  of  the  antithesis 
•which  it  contains,  it  constitutes  an  independent  world  opposed  to  the 
•world  of  phenomenon.  The  phenomenal  world  has  in  the  essential 
•world  its  negative  unity  in  which  it  is  annulled  and  in  which  it  finds 
its  substrate.  Moreover,  the  essential  world  is  the  positing  substrate 
or  ground  of  the  phenomenal  world ;  and  in  the  next  place  since  it 
contains  the  absolute  form  in  its  essentiality  it  annuls  its  self-identity, 
and  becomes  posited-being  and  as  this  posited-immediateuess  is  the 
phenomenal  world. 

Moreover  it  is  not  merely  the  general  ground  or  substrate  of  the 
phenomenal  world,  but  its  particular  ground.  As  a  realm  of  laws,  it 
already  possesses  a  manifold  content  and  although  it  is  the  essential 


152  .Essence. 

of  the  phenomenal  world  and  a  substrate  replete  with  content,  it  is 
the  particular  substrate  of  others,  but  only  as  regards  this  content ; 
for  the  phenomenal  world  had  still  a  variety  of  other  content  than 
that  realm  of  laws,  because  the  negative  element  still  properly  be- 
longed to  it.  But  now  since  the  realm  of  laws  likewise  possesses  this 
moment  of  negativity  it  becomes  the  totality  of  the  content  of  the 
phenomenal  world  and  the  substrate  of  all  its  manifoldness.  But  it 
is  at  the  same  time  the  negative  of  it,  and  therefore  a  world  in  oppo- 
sition to  it.  Namely,  in  the  identity  of  the  two  worlds  and  while  the 
one  is  defined  according  to  form  as  the  essential  and  the  other  as 
non-essential  the  category  of  ground  of  substrate  has  again  made  its 
appearance ;  but  at  the  same  time  it  is  the  ground-relation  of  the 
phenomenon,  namely,  as  relation  not  of  an  identical  content  nor  of  a 
merely  disparate  content  such  as  the  law  is,  but  as  total  relation  or 
as  negative  identity  and  essential  relation  of  the  content  as  an  anti- 
thesis. 

The  realm  of  laws  is  not  merely  a  realm  in  which  the  posited-being 
of  a  content  is  the  posited-being  of  another  —  but  this  identity  is 
essentially  negative  unity,  too,  as  has  been  seen ;  each  of  the  two 
sides  of  the  law  is  in  the  negative  unity  potentially  its  other  content. 
The  other  is  therefore  not  indefinitely  another  in  general,  but  it  is  its 
other  or  it  contains  likewise  the  content  of  the  former ;  therefore  the 
two  sides  are  opposed.  Since  the  realm  of  laws  contains  this  nega- 
tive moment  and  the  antithesis  within  it,  and  consequently,  as  the 
totality  repels  from  itself  a  phenomenal  world  as  opposed  to  a  world 
existent  in  and  for  itself,  the  identity  of  the  two  is  the  essential  re- 
lation of  the  antithesis. 

The  ground-relation  as  such  is  the  antithesis  which  has  been  an- 
nulled in  its  contradiction,  and  existence  is  the  ground  which  has 
gone  into  self-identity.  But  existence  becomes  phenomenon,  and 
ground  is  annulled  in  existence ;  it  restores  itself  and  reappears  as 
the  return  of  the  phenomenon  into  itself,  but  it  does  this  at  the  same 
time  in  the  form  of  annulled  ground,  viz.,  as  the  ground  of  opposite 
determinations  ;  the  identity  of  such  however  is  essentially  becoming 
and  transition,  and  not  the  ground-relation  in  its  proper  form. 

The  world  that  exists  in  and  for  itself  is  therefore  itself  a  world 
which  is  distinguished  within  itself  into  the  totality  of  manifold  con- 
tent ;  it  is  identical  with  the  phenomenal  or  posited,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
its  ground  ;  but  this  connection  of  identity  is  at  the  same  time  de- 
termined as  antithesis,  because  the  form  of  the  phenomenal  world  is 
the  form  of  reflection  into  its  other  being;  hence  it  has  returned  into 
the  world  which  exists  in  and  for  itself,  and  thus  has  returned  trulv 


Phenomenon.  153 

into  itself,  as  the  latter  is  its  opposite  Ft.  e.,  it  is  self -opposed].  The 
relation  is  therefore  defined  as  this,  that  the  in-and-f or- itself  existent 
world  is  the  inverted,  phenomenal  world. 


C. 

Dissolution  of  the  Phenomennn. 

The  world  which  exists  in  and  for  itself  is  the  definite,  determined 
ground  of  the  phenomenal  world,  and  is  this  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  in 
itself  the  negative  moment  and  therefore  the  totality  of  the  determi- 
nations of  content  and  of  their  changes  —  the  totality  of  determina- 
tions of  content  corresponds  to  the  phenomenal  world  but  at  the 
same  time  constitutes  a  side  in  opposition  to  it.  The  two  worlds 
therefore  stand  in  this  relation  to  each  other:  that  whatsoever  is  pos- 
itive in  the  phenomenal  world  is  negative  in  the  for- itself -existent 
world :  and  conversely,  whatever  is  negative  in  the  former  is  positive 
in  the  hitter.  The  north  pole  in  the  phenomenal  world  is  the  south 
pole  when  considered  in-and-f or-itself  and,  conversely ;  positive  elec- 
tricity is  in-itself  negative  electricity,  &c.  Whatever  is  evil  in  phe- 
nomenal existence  or  misfortune,  &c.,  is  in-and-f  or-itself  good  and  a 
happy  fortune. 

In  fact  the  difference  between  these  two  worlds  has  vanished  in 
this  form  of  antithetic  relation,  so  that  the  world  which  is  defined  as 
existing  in  and  for  itself  is  the  same  as  the  phenomenal  world  and 
the  latter  is  identical  with  the  essential  world  which  exists  in  itself 
[it  is  evident  that  if  the  counterpart  or  opposite  of  each  phase  in  the 
one  world  exists  in  the  other  world,  that  each  world  will  contain  all 
the  phases  of  the  other  world  in  an  inverted  order  —  provided 
that  either  world  is  a  totality  and  contains  all  phases  of  existence]. 
The  phenomenal  world  is  first  defined  as  reflection  in  the  form  of 
other-being  so  that  its  determinations  and  existences  are  regarded 
as  having  their  ground  and  subsistence  in  another;  but  since  this 
other  is  likewise  such  a  being  reflected  into  another  they  are  related 
in  such  a  way  that  they  become  self-relation  inasmuch  as  the  other 
to  which  they  relate  is  a  self-annulling  other ;  the  phenomenal  world 
is  hence  a  self-identical  law  in  itself. 

Conversely,  the  world  that  exists  in-and-for-itself  is  at  first  self- 
identical —  a  content  which  is  elevated  above  change  and  otherness; 
but  the  latter  as  perfect  reflection  of  the  phenomenal  world  into  itself 
or  for  the  reason  that  its  difference  is  reflected  into  itself  and  there- 


154  Essence. 

fore  absolute  distinction  [i.  e.,  self-distinction]  it  therefore  contains 
the  negative  phase  and  the  relation  to  itself  as  to  its  own  other ; 
through  this  it  becomes  a  self-opposed,  a  self-inverted,  a  content 
devoid  of  essence.  Moreover,  this  content  [i.  e.,  of  the  self-existent 
world]  has  received  also  the  form  of  immediate  existence.  For  it  is, 
first,  the  ground  of  the  phenomenal ;  but  since  it  contains  its  opposite 
within  itself  it  is  likewise  annulled  ground  and  immediate  existence. 

The  phenomenal  and  the  essential  worlds  are  consequently  totali- 
ties—  each  within  itself  the  totality  of  the  reflection  which  is  identical 
with  itself  and  of  the  reflection  into  another,  or  in  other  words,  the 
totality  containing  the  being-in-and-for-itself  and  the  phenomenon. 
They  thus  constitute  two  independent  totalities  of  existence.  The 
one  is  defined  as  merely  reflected  existence  and  the  other  as  mere 
immediate  existence,  but  in  fact  each  continues  into  its  other,  and  is 
the  identity  of  itself  and  the  other.  What  we  have  therefore 
before  us  is  this  one  totality  which  repels  itself  into  two  totalities,  the 
one  the  reflected  totality  and  the  other  the  immediate  totality.  Each 
of  these  is  at  first  independent  but  independent  only  as  a  totality ; 
and  each  is  a  totality  only  in  so  far  as  it  contains  essentially  the  other 
within  itself  as  a  moment  [N.  B.  independence  implies  totality,  and 
totality  implies  the  inclusion  of  its  other  within  itself.  All  develop- 
ment and  becoming  consist  in  the  process  of  unfolding  from  itself  its 
other-being  or  of  developing  its  counterpart  within  itself.  At  first 
there  is  a  series  of  mutually  limiting  elements ;  then  growth  and 
development  of  each  element  results  in  each  element  becoming  a 
totality,  so  that  each  is  identical  with  the  whole  and  a  reflection  of  it]. 
The  distinct  independence  of  each  —  the  one  defined  as  immediate, 
distinguished  from  the  other  defined  as  reflected — is  now  posited  in 
such  a  manner  that  it  is  essential  relation  to  its  other,  and  hence  this 
independence  is  formed  only  in  this  unitv  of  the  two. 

It  should  have  proceeded  from  the  law  of  the  phenomenon  ;  the 
latter  is  the  identity  of  a  diversified  content  with  another  content  — 
so  that  the  posited-being  of  the  one  is  the  posited-being  of  the  other. 
In  the  law  this  distinction  still  exists  that  the  identity  of  its  sides  is 
only  an  inner  identity,  and  these  sides  do  not  possess  this  identity  as 
yet  in  themselves ;  therefore  on  the  one  hand  that  identity  is  not  yet 
realized ;  the  content  of  the  law  is  not  an  identical  content  but  an 
indifferent  manifold.  On  the  other  hand  it  is  defined  as  a  mere  po- 
tentiality that  the  posited-being  of  the  one  is  the  posited-being  of  the 
other ;  this  is  not  yet  present  in  it.  Now  however  the  law  is  realized  ; 
its  inner  identity  is  at  the  same  time  externally  real ;  conversely,  the 
content  of  the  law  is  elevated  into  ideality ;  for  it  is  annulled  in  it- 


Essential  Relation.  lib 

self —  reflected  into  itself,  since  each  side  has  within  it  its  other  and 
is  consequently  identical  with  it  and  with  itself  in  very  truth. 

The  law  has  therefore  become  essential  relation  or  "  necessary  con- 
nection." The  truth  of  the  non-essential  world  is  in  the  first  place 
a  world  which  exists  for  its  other  as  an  in-and-for-itself-existent,  but 
hence  this  is  the  totality,  because  it  is  itself  and  also  that  former  world  ; 
both  are  immediate  existences  and  consequently  reflections  in  their 
other-being  and  therefore  true  reflections  into  themselves.  The -word 
*'  world  "  expresses  in  general  the  formless  totality  of  multiplicity,  of 
manifold  indifferent  objects.  This  world  of  indifferent  multiplicity 
whether  essential  or  phenomenal  has  gone  to  the  ground ;  its  mul- 
tiplicity has  ceased  to  be  a  multiplicity  of  mere  indifferent,  unrelated 
beings ;  it  is  now  a  totality  or  universum  —  an  essential  relation. 
There  are  two  totalities  of  content  in  the  phenomenon;  at  first  they 
are  defined  as  mutually  indifferent  and  independent,  and  they  have 
form  each  within  itself  but  not  as  opposed  to  each  other,  but  this  form 
has  shown  itself  to  be  their  relation  and  the  essential  relation  is  the 
perfection  of  their  form-unity. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. 

Essential  Relation. 

The  truth  of  the  phenomenon  is  the  essential  relation  [recipro- 
cal relation  or  necessary  connection].  Its  content  has  immediate  in- 
dependence, both  existing  immediateness  and  reflecting  immediate- 
ness,  or  reflection  that  is  identical  with  itself ;  at  the  same  time  in 
this  independence  it  is  a  relative  —  merely  reflected  into  its  other  or 
a  unity  with  its  other  through  relation.  In  this  unity  the  independ- 
ent content  is  a  posited  and  annulled ;  but  this  very  unit}'  constitutes 
its  essentiality  and  independence ;  this  reflection  into  another  is  re- 
flection into  itself.  The  relation  has  sides,  since  it  is  reflection  into 
another ;  it  has  self-distinction  within  it ;  and  the  sides  have  indepen- 
dent existence,  since  in  their  indifference  towards  each  other  the}'  are 
bent  back  into  themselves  and  disconnected  from  each  other  so  that 
the  existence  of  each  has  its  significance  only  in  its  relation  to  the 
other,  or  in  the  negative  unity. 

The  essential  relation  is  not  yet  the  true  tertium  quid  of  Essence 
and  Existence,  but  it  contains  already  their  definite  union.  Essence 
is  realized  in  it  in  such  a  manner  that  it  has  independent  existing 
elements  for  its  reality  ;  and  these  have  returned  from  their  indiffer- 
ence into  their  essential  unit}*  so  that  they  have  this  essential  unity 


156  Essence. 

for  their  reality.  The  determinations  of  reflection  —  the  positive  and 
negative  —  are  likewise  reflected  into  themselves  when  they  are  re- 
flected into  their  opposites.  But  they  have  no  other  determination 
than  this  their  negative  unity.  The  essential  relation,  on  the  con- 
trary, has  for  its  sides  two  independent  totalities.  It  is  the  same 
antithesis  as  that  of  positive  and  negative,  but  it  is  at  the  same  time 
an  inverted  world.  Each  side  of  the  essential  relation  is  a  totality 
which,  however,  as  essentially  and  opposite,  has  a  "beyond"  to 
itself ;  it  is  only  phenomenon,  its  existence  is  not  its  own,  but  rather 
the  existence  belonging  to  its  other.  It  is  therefore  disconnected  or 
broken  within  itself.  But  this  self-annulment  is,  at  the  same  time, 
the  unity  of  itself  and  its  other,  and  therefore  it  is  a  totality,  and 
on  this  account  it  has  independent  existence,  and  is  essential  reflec- 
tion into  itself. 

This  is  the  definition  of  the  "  Essential  Relation."  But  in  the  first 
place,  the  identity  which  it  contains  is  not  yet  perfect ;  the  totality 
which  each  relative  term  is  in  itself  is  at  first  only  an  internal  one. 
Each  side  of  the  essential  relation  is  in  the  first  place  posited  in  one 
determination  only  of  the  negative  unity,  the  proper  independence  of 
each  of  the  two  sides  is  that  which  constitutes  the  form  of  the  essen- 
tial relation.  Its  identity,  therefore,  is  only  a  relation  to  which  their 
independence  is  external,  namely,  in  the  two  sides;  the  reflected 
unity  of  that  identity  and  of  the  independent  existences  has  not  yet 
been  attained  —  substance  has  not  yet  been  reached.  The  definition 
of  essential  relation  as  given  requires  the  unity  of  the  reflected  and 
immediate  independence.  But  the  first  realization  of  this  definition 
is  immediate  and  its  moments  are  opposed  to  each  other,  and  their 
unity  is  only  an  essential  reference  to  each  other,  which  becomes 
afterwards  a  unity  corresponding  to  the  idea  or  definition,  when  it  i& 
realized,  i.  e.,  when  those  moments  have  posited  the  mentioned  unity 
through  their  activity. 

The  essential  relation  is  therefore  at  first  the  relation  of  the  ivhole 
and  the  parts,  i.  e.,  the  relation  of  the  reflected  and  the  immediate  in- 
dependence in  which  they  mutually  condition  and  presuppose  each 
other. 

In  this  form  of  essential  relation  neither  of  the  sides  is  pos- 
ited as  moment  of  the  other;  their  identity  is  therefore  itself  one 
side ;  in  other  words  their  identity  is  not  their  negative  unity.  The 
second  phase  of  this  essential  relation  is  that  in  which  the  one  side  is 
a  moment  of  the  other,  and  is  contained  in  it  as  in  its  ground  —  the 
true  independence  of  both.  This  is  the  relation  of  force  and  its  man- 
ifestation. 


Essential  Relation.  157 

Thirdly,  this  inequality  or  non-identity  that  still  remains  within  the 
relation  annuls  itself,  and  the  final  form  of  essential  relation  appears — 
that  of  Internal  and  External.  In  this  form  of  essential  relation 
which  has  become  entirely  formal  the  essential  relation  goes  to  the 
ground,  and  there  arises  true  activity  or  Substance  as  the  absolute 
unity  of  immediate  and  reflected  existence. 


The  Relation  of  the  Whole  and  the  Parts. 

The  essential  relation  contains  in  the  first  place  the  reflected -into- 
itself  independence  of  existence ;  hence  it  is  the  simple  form  whose 
determinations  are  existences  but  at  the  same  time  are  posited  —  held 
as  moments  in  the  unit}*.  This  independence  which  is  reflected  into 
itself  is  at  the  same  time  reflection  into  its  opposite,  namely,  immediate 
independence ;  and  its  existence  is  essentially  this  identity  with  its 
opposite,  just  as  much  as  it  is  its  own  independence.  For  this  reason 
the  other  side  also  is  immediately  posited ;  the  immediate  independ- 
ence which  is  determined  as  the  other  and  is  a  diversified  manifold 
within  itself  but  in  such  a  manner  that  this  manifoldness  is  also  essen- 
tially a  relation  to  the  other  side  is  that  to  which  the  reflected  inde- 
pendence belongs.  The  former  side,  the  wholeor  totality  is  the  inde- 
pendence which  constitutes  the  in-and-for-itself-existing  world.  The 
other  side,  the  parts,  is  the  immediate  existence,  which  was  called  the 
"phenomenal  world."  In  the  relation  of  whole  and  parts  the  two 
sides  are  these  independent  worlds  —  each  of  which,  however,  reflects 
the  other  within  itself,  and  is  at  the  same  time  only  this  identity  of 
both.  Now  since  the  essential  relation  is  in  its  first  phase  only  the 
immediate,  it  follows  that  the  negative  unity  and  the  positive  inde- 
pendence is  predicated  of  it  as  an  additional  circumstance ;  the  two 
sides  are  posited  as  moments  and  yet  likewise  as  existing  independ- 
ently. That  the  two  are  posited  as  moments  means  that  first  the 
whole,  the  reflected  independence,  is  an  existence  which  contains  the 
other,  the  immediate  independence  as  a  moment  or  element  of  it ; 
in  this  the  whole  constitutes  the  unity  of  the  two  sides,  their  substrate, 
and  the  immediate  existence  takes  the  form  of  posited-being.  Con- 
versely, on  the  other  hand  the  parts  are  the  immediate  —  the  side 
which  contains  within  itself  a  manifold  existence,  an  independent 
substrate ;  the  reflected  unity,  on  the  contrary,  the  whole,  is  only 
an  external  relation. 

2.  This  essential  relation  [of  the  whole  and  the  parts]  contains 


158  Essence. 

therefore  the  independence  of  the  sides,  and  likewise  their  annulment, 
and  it  contains  both  absolutely  in  one  relation.  The  whole  is  the  in- 
dependent, and  the  parts  are  only  moments  or  elements  of  this  unity  ; 
but  likewise  the  parts  are  also  independent,  and  their  reflected  unity 
[the  whole]  is  only  a  moment  or  element;  and  each  is  in  its  indepen- 
dence merely  a  relative  of  the  other.  This  essential  relation  isr 
therefore,  an  immediate  self-contradiction  and  annuls  itself. 

A  closer  examination  shows  that  the  whole  is  a  reflected  unity 
which  has  independent  existence  for  itself ;  but  this  its  independence 
is  likewise  repelled  from  it ;  the  whole  is  a  negative  unity  in  negative 
relation  to  itself ;  consequently  it  is  self-externalized  ;  it  has  its  exist- 
ence in  its  opposite,  in  the  manifold  immediateness  —  the  parts.  The 
whole,  therefore,  consists  of  the  parts,  has  its  existence  in  them,  and 
is  nothing  without  them.  It  is,  therefore,  the  entire  essential  relation 
and  the  independent  totality ;  and  on  precisely  this  ground  it  is  only 
a  relative  somewhat,  for  that  which  makes  it  a  totalit}7  is  its  other, 
the  parts ;  and  it  has  its  being  not  in  itself  but  in  its  other. 

So  also  are  the  parts  likewise  the  entirety  of  this  essential  relation. 
They  are  the  immediate  independence  opposed  to  the  reflected  inde- 
pendence, and  have  their  being  not  in  the  whole,  but  for  themselves. 
They  have,  moreover,  the  whole  as  an  element  which  belongs  to 
them :  it  constitutes  their  relation  [to  each  other]  ;  without  the  whole 
there  are  no  parts.  Since  they  are  independent,  this  relation  or  neces- 
sary connection  is  only  an  external  phase  towards  which  they  are 
iu-and-for-themselves  indifferent.  At  the  same -time,  however,  the 
parts  as  manifold  existence  consolidate  into  one,  for  manifold  exist- 
ence is  being  without  reflection ;  the  parts  have  their  independence 
only  in  the  reflected  unity,  which  is  this  unity  as  well  as  also  the  ex- 
isting manifoldness ;  that  is  to  say,  they  have  independence  only  in 
the  whole,  which  is  at  the  same  time,  however,  an  independence  dif- 
ferent from  the  parts. 

The  whole  and  the  parts,  therefore,  condition  each  other  recipro- 
cally ;  but  the  essential  relation  in  the  form  considered  here  stands 
higher  than  the  relation  of  condition  and  conditioned,  as  considered 
above  [as  the  result  of  the  ground-relation].  This  relation  is  now 
realized :  namely,  it  is  posited  that  the  condition  is  the  essential  in- 
dependence of  the  conditioned,  and  is  presupposed  by  it.  The  con- 
dition as  such  is  only  the  immediate  and  only  an  implicit  presupposi- 
tion. The  whole,  however,  is  the  condition  of  the  parts,  and  yet  it 
contains  the  immediate  implication  that  it  is  only  in  so  far  as  it  pre- 
supposes the  parts.  Since,  therefore,  the  two  sides  of  the  essential 
relation  are  posited  as  mutually  conditioning,  to  each  there  belongs 


Essential  Relation.  15i> 

immediate  independence,  but  an  independence  which  is  mediated  or 
posited  for  each  through  the  other.  The  entire  essential  relation 
through  this  reciprocity  becomes  a  return  of  the  conditioning  activity 
into  itself,  and  hence  the  not  relative,  the  unconditioned. 

Since  the  sides  of  the  essential  relation  possess  their  independence 
only  through  each  other,  we  have  only  one  identity  for  the  two,  and 
in  this  identity  they  are  only  moments  or  complemental  elements ; 
but  since  each  is  independent  within  itself,  there  are  two  independent 
existences,  mutually  indifferent. 

In  the  first  respect  [of  the  contradiction  just  stated]  the  essential 
identity  of  these  sides  is  the  whole  equal  to  the  parts  and  the  parts 
equal  to  the  whole.  There  is  nothing  in  the  whole  which  is  not  in  the 
parts,  and  nothing  in  the  parts  which  is  not  in  the  whole.  The  whole 
is  not  abstract  unity,  but  the  unity  as  a  diversified  multiplicity  [of 
different,  independent  ones]  ;  but  this  unity,  within  which  the  mani- 
fold ones  relate  to  each  other,  is  the  determinateness  through  which 
each  one  is  a  "pai't."  The  essential  relation  has,  therefore,  an  in- 
separable identity  and  only  one  independence. 

Moreover  the  whole  is  equal  to  the  parts,  but  it  is  not  the  same  as 
the  parts  ;  the  whole  is  the  reflected  unity,  but  the  parts  constitute  the 
particularity  or  the  otherness  of  the  unity,  and  are  the  man}'  differ- 
ent ones.  The  whole  is  not  equal  to  them  when  they  are  regarded  as 
these  independent  ones,  but  is  equal  to  them  only  when  taken  to- 
gether. This  "  together  "  is  nothing  else  than  their  unity,  the  whole 
as  such.  The  whole  is,  therefore,  in  the  parts  only  self-identical,  and 
the  identity  of  the  whole  and  the  parts  expresses  only  the  tautology 
that  the  whole,  as  whole,  is  not  identical  with  the  parts  but  with  the 
whole  of  the  parts. 

Conversely,  the  parts  are  equal  to  the  whole,  but  since  the}-  pos- 
sess the  phase  of  otherness  the}'  are  not  equal  to  the  whole  as  unity, 
but  only  in  so  far  as  one  of  its  manifold  determinations  belongs  to 
each  part  or  the  parts  are  equal  to  the  whole  regarded  as  manifold ; 
in  other  words,  they  are  equal  to  it  as  a  divided  whole,  that  is  to  say, 
as  divided  into  parts.  Hence  we  have  the  same  tautology  as  before  ; 
that  the  parts,  as  parts,  are  not  identical  with  the  whole  as  such,  but 
with  the  whole  considered  as  the  whole  of  the  parts. 

The  whole  and  the  parts  regarded  in  this  manner  are  external  and 
indifferent  to  each  other ;  each  side  relates  only  to  itself.  And  thus 
held  asunder  they  are  destroyed.  The  whole  which  is  indifferent 
towards  the  parts  is  only  the  abstract  identity,  without  distinction 
within  itself;  it  is  not  a  whole  except  as  containing  distinctions 
•within  itself,  and  distinctions  within  itself  such  as  are  reflected  into 


100  Essence. 

themselves  as  manifold  determinations,  and  have  immediate  inde- 
pendence. And  the  identity  of  reflection  has  been  shown  to  have 
this  reflection  into  its  other  as  its  truth.  Likewise  the  parts  as  in- 
different towards  the  unity  of  the  whole  are  only  a  multiplicity  of 
ones  unrelated  towards  the  other,  and  are  therefore  in  themselves 
others,  which  therefore  are  self-annulling.  This  relation  to  itself  of 
each  of  the  two  sides  is  its  independence,  but  this  independence 
which  each  possesses  is  rather  its  self-negation.  Each  has  therefore 
its  independence  not  within  itself  but  within  the  other ;  this  other 
which  possesses  its  being  is  its  presupposed  immediate  which  prom- 
ises to  be  its  first  and  its  beginning. 

The  truth  of  the  essential  relation  consists  therefore  in  the  media- 
tion ;  its  essence  is  negative  unity  in  which  both  the  reflected  and  the 
existent  immediateness  is  annulled.  The  essential  relation  is  the 
contradiction  which  goes  back  into  its  ground,  into  the  unity  which 
as  returning  is  the  reflected  unity ;  but  since  the  reflected  unity  has 
also  been  annulled  it  relates  negatively  to  itself,  annuls  itself,  and 
reduces  itself  to  existent  immediateness.  But  this  is  negative  rela- 
tion in  so  far  as  it  is  a  first  and  immediate  or  is  mediated  through 
another,  and  on  this  account  a  posited.  This  other  existent  immedi- 
ateness is  likewise  only  as  annulled;  its  independence  is  a  first  some- 
what [an  immediate]  but  only  to  vanish ;  and  it  has  a  being  that  is 
posited  and  mediated. 

In  this  determination  the  essential  relation  remains  no  longer  whole 
and  parts ;  the  immediateness  which  its  sides  possessed  has  passed 
over  into  posited-being  and  mediation ;  each  is  posited  in  so  far  as 
it  is  immediate  as  self -an  nulling  and  as  transition  into  the  other ;  and 
in  so  far  as  itself  is  negative  relation  it  is  conditioned  through  the 
other  as  through  its  positive ;  and  its  immediate  transition  is  likewise 
an  immediate,  that  is  to  say  an  annulment,  which  is  posited  through 
the  other.  Hence  the  relation  of  the  Whole  and  the  Parts  has  gone 
over  into  the  relation  of  Force  and  Manifestation. 

Remark. 

The  antinomy  of  the  infinite  divisibility  of  matter  has  been  already 
discussed  in  connection  with  the  idea  of  quantity.  Quantity  is  the 
unity  of  continuity  and  discreteness ;  it  contains  in  the  independent 
one  its  continuity  into  another  and  in  this  identity  continued  without 
break  it  has  likewise  the  negation  of  that  identity.  The  immediate 
relation  of  these  moments  of  quantity  are  expressed  as  the  essential  re- 
lation of  the  Whole  and  the  Parts,  the  One  of  Quantity  being  regarded 


Essential  Relation.  161 

as  part,  and  the  continuity  of  quantity  being  taken  as  the  Whole  which 
is  composed  of  parts.  The  antinomy  then  consists  in  the  contradiction 
which  has  been  solved  in  the  essential  relation  of  the  whole  and  the 
parts.  Whole  and  parts  are,  namely,  essentially  related  to  each 
other  and  constitute  one  identity,  and  they  are  likewise  indifferent 
to  each  other  and  possess  independence.  The  essential  relation  is 
therefore  this  antinomy :  when  one  of  the  moments  frees  itself  from 
its  other  the  other  at  once  reappears  within  it. 

When  the  existing  somewhat  is  defined  as  whole  it  has  parts,  and 
the  parts  constitute  its  reality;  the  unity  of  the  whole  is  only  a 
posited  relation — an  external  juxtaposition  which  does  not  concern  the 
independently  existing  somewhats.  In  so  far  as  the  somewkats  are 
parts  they  are  not  the  whole,  not  combined,  and  are  accordingly  simple. 
And  since  the  relation  to  a  whole  is  an  external  affair  it  does  not 
concern  it ;  the  independent  somewhat  is  accordingly  not  a  part,  for  a 
part  is  such  only  in  relation  to  a  whole.  But  since*  in  this  view  it  is 
not  a  part,  it  is  a  whole  itself  already ;  for  there  is  only  this  essential 
relation  of  whole  and  parts,  and  the  independent  somewhat  is  either 
one  or  the  other  of  the  two.  But  since  it  is  the  whole  it  follows  that  it 
is  composed  of  parts,  and  its  parts  as  independent  wholes  are  again 
composed  of  parts,  and  so  ad  in^nilutn.  This  infinitude  consists  only 
in  the  perennial  alternation  of  the  two  determinations  of  the  essential 
relation  in  which  each  gives  rise  immediately  to  the  other,  so  that 
the  posited-being  of  each  is  its  own 'vanishing.  Hatter  defined  as 
whole  therefore  consists  of  parts  and  in  these  parts  the  whole  be- 
comes a  non-essential  relation  and  vanishes.  The  part  thus  f  or-and- 
by-itsetf  is  not  a  part  but  the  whole.  The  antinomy  of  this  syllogism, 
considered  carefully,  proves  really  to  be  this :  since  the  whole  is  not 
the  independent,  the  part  is  the  independent ;  but  since  the  part  is 
independent  only  when  not  in  relation  to  the  whole  it  is  the  indepen- 
dent not  as  part  but  rather  as  the  whole.  The  infinitude  of  the  progress 
which  arises,  is  the  incapacity  of  uniting  the  two  thoughts  which  con- 
tain this  mediation  so  that  on  this  account  each  of  the  two  determina- 
tions becomes  dependent  and  passes  over  into  the  other  just  because 
of  its  independence  and  separation. 


The  Essential  Relation  of  Force  and  ft*  Manifestation. 

Force  is  the  negative  unity  in  which  the  contradiction  of  the  whole 
and  parts  has  resolved  itself,  as  the  truth  of  essential  relation, 
ii 


1G2  Essence. 

The  whole  and  parts  is  the  essential  relation  as  it  appears  when  seized 
in  a  thoughtless  manner,  or  by  mind  in  its  representative  thinking  or 
thinking  in  images,  or,  considered  objectively,  it  is  the  dead  mechani- 
cal aggregate  which  has  form-determinations  through  which  the  mani- 
foldness  of  its  independent  matters  is  brought  into  relation  in  a  unity, 
but  a  unity  which  is  after  all  only  external  to  it.  The  essential  rela- 
tion [or  necessary  connection  between  force  and  its  manifestation] 
of  force  is  however  a  higher  form  of  return-into-itself  in  which  the 
unity  of  the  whole  which  constituted  the  relation  of  the  independent 
others  (parts)  has  ceased  to  be  external  and  indifferent  to  this  multi- 
plicity. 

As  this  essential  relation  has  now  been  defined,  the  immediate  and 
the  reflected  forms  of  independence  are  posited  in  one  unity  as  an- 
nulled or  as  moments,  while  in  the  preceding  form  of  the  essential 
relation  (whole  and  parts)  they  were  real  sides  or  extremes  existing 
for  themselves.  In  this  result,  first,  we  see  that  the  reflected  unity 
and  its  immediate  being,  in  so  far  as  the  two  are  first  and  immediate, 
are  by  nature  self -annulling  phases  and  forms  of  reciprocal  transition. 
The  former,  the  force,  passes  into  its  manifestation,  and  the  mani- 
festation vanishes  and  goes  back  into  the  force  as  into  its  ground 
and  only  exists  when  it  is  posited  by  the  force  and  sustained  by  it. 
In  the  second  place,  this  transition  is  not  merely  a  becoming  and  a 
vanishing,  but  it  is  a  negative  self-relation ;  in  other  words,  that 
which  changes  its  determination  is  while  doing  so  reflected  into  itself 
and  preserves  itself.  The  movement  of  force  is  not  so  much  a  trans- 
ition as  a  translation  or  transference  of  itself  which  remains  self- 
identical  in  this  transference  of  itself  through  its  own  posited  change. 
In  the  third  place,  this  reflected  unity  which  relates  to  itself  is  also 
annulled  and  a  moment  [or  compleraental  element]  ;  it  is  mediated 
through  its  other,  and  conditioned  through  it ;  its  negative  relation 
to  itself  which  is  first  and  begins  the  movement  of  transition  from 
itself  has  likewise  a  presupposition  by  which  it  is  solicited  to  activit}', 
and  another  from  which  it  begins. 

a.  The  Conditioning  of  Force. 

Considered  in  its  special  determinations  force  has,  in  the  first  place, 
the  phase  of  existent  imraediateness  belonging  to  it;  opposed  to  this, 
it  itself  is  a  negative  unity.  But  the  latter  as  a  determination  of 
immediate  being  is  an  existing  somewhat.  This  somewhat,  for  the 
reason  that  it  is  the  negative  unity  as  an  immediate,  appears  to  be  a 
first  [presupposed  as  already  existing]  a  somewhat  opposed  to  the 


Essential  Relation.  1(53 

force  since  the  force  is  a  reflected  existence,  a  posited-being,  and  hence 
it  seems  to  belong  to  an  existing  thing  or  to  a  matter.  This  is  not 
understood  as  though  the  force  were  the  form  of  this  thing,  and  the 
thing  were  determined  through  it ;  but  the  thing  is  conceived  to  be 
an  immediate  and  to  be  a  separate  existence  and  indifferent  to  the 
force.  And  according  to  this  view  there  is  no  ground  or  reason  in 
the  thing  why  it  should  possess  a  force ;  it  is  the  force,  on  the  other 
hand,  as  the  side  of  posited  being  which  essentially  presupposes  the 
thing.  Therefore  if  the  question  is  asked,  how  it  happens  that  the 
thing  or  matter  is  endowed  with  a  force,  the  explanation  is  given  that 
the  force  is  impressed  on  it  by  a  foreign  power,  and  that  it  is  only 
something  external  to  the  thing  or  matter. 

Regarded  as  this  immediate  reality,  force  is  a  quiescent  determin- 
ateness  of  the  thing ;  not  as  a  self-uttering  or  manifesting,  but  as  an 
immediate  externality.  Hence  the  force  is  designated  as  a  matter 
and  instead  of  being  called  a  magnetic  force,  an  electric  force,  &c., 
there  is  assumed  a  magnetic  matter,  an  electric  matter,  &c.  ;  or  instead 
of  the  well-known  attractive  force  there  is  conceived  a  subtle  ether 
which  holds  all  things  together.  There  are  matters  into  which  the 
powerless,  inactive  negative  unity  of  the  thing  dissolves,  and  these 
have  been  already  considered  [in  Book  II.,  section  2,  B  and  C]. 

But  force  contains  immediate  existence  as  phase  or  moment,  as 
such  a  somewhat  as  while  it  is  condition,  passes  into  transition  and 
annuls  itself ;  thei'efore  immediate  existence  as  a  phase  of  force  is 
not  an  existing  thing  [has  not  the  form  of  "thing"].  It  is  more- 
over not  negation  as  determinateness,  but  negative  unity  which  is  re- 
flected into  itself.  The  thing  to  which  the  force  belongs  has  conse- 
quently here  no  further  significance ;  it  is  rather  the  positing  of  ex- 
ternality which  manifests  itself  as  existence.  Therefore  it  is  also  not 
merely  a  determined  matter  [a  special  form  of  it]  ;  such  independ- 
ence [as  particular  matter]  has  long  ago  passed  over  into  posited- 
being  and  phenomenon. 

Second^',  force  is  the  unity  of  the  reflected  reality  and  of  imme- 
diate reality  —  or  of  the  form-unity  and  of  external  independence. 
It  is  both  in  one  ;  it  is  the  contact  of  such  somewhats  that  the  one  is 
in  so  far  as  the  other  is  not ;  the  self-identical  positive  and  the 
negated  reflection.  Force  is  therefore  the  self-repelling  contradic- 
tion. It  is  active ;  in  other  words  it  is  self-related  negative  unity, 
in  which  reflected  jmmediateness  or  essential  being-in-itself  is  posited 
as  being  only  annulled  or  a  phase ;  consequently  in  so  far  as  it  dis- 
tinguishes itself  from  immediate  existence,  it  passes  over  into  it. 


I(j4  Essence. 

Force  therefore  is  posited  as  the  determination  of  the  reflected  unity 
of  the  whole  as  the  becoming  of  existing,  external  multiplicity. 

But,  thirdly,  force  is  at  first  only  potential  and  immediate  activity ; 
it  is  reflected  unity  and  likewise  essentially  the  negation  of  essential 
unity ;  and  since  it  is  different  from  these,  and  onty  the  identity  of 
itself  and  its  negation,  it  is  related  to  them  essentially  as  an  imme- 
diateness  external  to  them,  and  they  are  consequently  its  presuppo- 
sition and  condition. 

This  presupposition  now  is  not  a  thing  already  existing  in  contrast 
-with  it ;  such  indifferent  independence  is  annulled  in  the  force  ;  as 
its  condition  the  presupposition  is  an  independent  other  to  the  force. 
But  since  it  is  not  a  thing,  and  since  the  independent  immediateness 
has  here  determined  itself  to  be  a  self-relating  negative  unity,  this 
presupposition  is  itself  force.  The  activity  of  force  is  therefore 
conditioned  through  itself  as  a  self-other,  i.  e.,  it  is  conditioned 
through  a  force. 

Force  is,  according  to  this,  an  essential  relation  in  which  each  side 
is  the  same  as  the  other.  Forces  stand  in  essential  relation  to  each 
other  [and  not  forces  and  things].  In  the  first  place,  they  are  re- 
garded as  indifferent  to  each  other.  The  unity  of  their  essential 
relation  is  at  first  only  an  internal,  potential  unity.  The  condition- 
ing of  one  force  through  another  is,  therefore,  regarded  as  the 
product  of  the  force's  own  activity ;  in  other  words,  is  looked  upon 
at  first  as  a  prepositing  activity,  an  act  of  negative  self -relation. 
This  other  force  which  conditions  the  first  force  lies  beyond  its  posit- 
ing activity,  viz.,  the  reflection  which  returns  into  itself  immediately 
in  its  activity  of  returning. 

b.  The  Soliciting  Force. 

Force  is  conditioned  because  the  phase  of  immediate  existence 
which  it  contains  is  a  mere  posited,  but,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  at 
the  same  time  immediate  it  is  a  presupposed,  in  which  the  force  itself 
is  negated.  Therefore  the  externality  which  force  encounters  is  its 
own  presupposing  activity  itself,  which  is  posited  directly  as  another 
force. 

This  presupposition  is  moreover  mutual.  Each  of  the  two  forces 
contains  the  unity-reflected-into-itself  as  annulled,  and  is  therefore 
presupposing.  It  posits  itself  as  external ;  this  externality  is  its  own 
externality;  but  since  it  is  likewise  unity  reflected-into-itself,  it 
posits  this  externality  not  within  itself,  but  as  another  force. 

But  the  external,  as  such,  is  the  self-annulling;  moreover  the  self- 
reflecting  activity  is  essentially  related  to  that  external  as  its  other, 


Essential  Relation.  165 

but  likewise  as  to  something  nugatory  in  itself  and  in  identity  with 
it.  Since  the  presupposing  activity  is  likewise  reflection  into  itself,  it 
is  the  annulment  of  its  mentioned  negation,  and  posits  the  same  as 
its  own  external.  Therefore  the  force  as  conditioning  is  reciprocally 
the  occasion  which  excites  the  activity  of  the  other  force  against 
which  it  is  active.  It  does  not  stand  in  the  relation  of  a  passivity,  a 
being  determined  by  another  force  which  came  into  it,  but  it  is  an 
occasion  which  solicits  the  other.  It  is  within  itself  a  negativity  of 
itself  and  the  repulsion  of  itself  from  itself  is  its  own  positing.  Its 
activity  therefore  consists  in  this,  that  it  annuls  its  occasion  as  an 
external  occasion  ;  it  reduces  it  to  a  mere  occasion,  and  posits  it  as 
its  own  repulsion  from  itself  —  it  makes  it  into  its  own  manifestation 
[i.  e.,  the  force  makes  the  occasion  of  its  activity  the  utterance  of 
the  force  itself;  it  annuls  the  determination  which  it  finds  in  the 
object  upon  which  it,  the  force,  acts,  and  replaces  those  determina- 
tions with  its  own  determinations]. 

The  self-externalizing  force  is  therefore  the  same  that  was  previ- 
ously defined  as  the  presupposing  activity,  i.  e.,  that  which  made  itself 
external.  But  the  force  as  self-externalizing  is  at  the  same  time  a 
negating  of  externality  and  a  positing  of  it  as  its  own  activity.  In 
so  far  now  as  we  begin  with  this  view  of  force  as  a  negative  unity  of 
itself,  and  consequently  a  presupposing  reflection,  it  is  all  the  same 
as  if  we  began  with  the  view  of  the  soliciting  occasion  in  the  pro- 
cess of  manifestation  of  a  force.  The  force  is  therefore  defined  as  a 
self-annulling  identity  according  to  its  ideal,  but  as  a  reality  it  be- 
comes one  of  two  forces  soliciting  or  solicited.  But  the  ideal  of  the 
force  is  in  general  the  identitj"  of  the  positing  and  presupposing  re- 
flection —  in  other  words,  of  the  reflected  and  immediate  unity  — 
and  each  of  these  determinations  is  only  a  phase  or  moment,  in  one 
unity,  and  consequently  is  mediated  through  the  other.  But  like- 
wise there  is  no  way  of  characterizing  which  of  the  two  forces  that 
stand  in  mutual  relation  is  the  soliciting  or  which  the  solicited ;  each 
of  the  two  form-determinations  belongs  to  the  one  as  much  as  to  the 
other.  But  this  identity  is  not  merely  an  external  one  of  comparison, 
but  it  is  also  their  essential  unity. 

The  one  force,  for  instance,  is  defined  as  the  soliciting  and  the 
other  as  the  solicited ;  these  form-determinations  appear  thus  as  im- 
mediate, as  belonging  essentially  to  the  forces.  But  they  are.  essen- 
tially mediated.  The  one  force  is  solicited,  the  soliciting  occasion  is 
a  determination  posited  within  it  from  without.  But  force  is  itself 
the  presupposing ;  it  is  essentially  reflection  into  itself,  and  it  annuls 
the  externality  of  the  soliciting  occasion  and  makes  it  its  own  solici- 


166  Essence. 

tation.  The  soliciting  is  therefore  its  own  deed ;  in  other  words,  it 
determines  the  fact  that  the  other  force  shall  be  another  and  a  solicit- 
ing force.  The  soliciting  relates  to  its  other,  negatively,  so  that  it 
annuls  its  externality,  and  is  thus  so  far  a  positing  force ;  but  it  is 
this  only  through  the  presupposition  of  having  another  opposed  to  it, 
i.  e.,  it  is  soliciting  only  so  far  as  it  has  an  externality  to  it,  conse- 
quently only  so  far  as  it  is  solicited.  In  other  words  it  is  soliciting 
only  in  so  far  as  it  is  solicited  to  be  soliciting.  Conversely,  also,  the 
former  solicits  only  in  so  far  as  the  other  solicits  it  to  solicit.  Each 
of  the  two  therefore  receives  its  occasion  or  impulse  from  the  other ; 
but  the  occasion  which  it  gives  as  active  consists  in  this,  that  it  re- 
ceives from  the  other  an  occasion  or  impulse.  The  occasion  or  im- 
pulse which  it  receives  is  solicited  by  itself.  The  two,  the  given  and 
the  received  occasion,  or  the  active  extern alization  and  the  pas- 
sive externality  are  therefore  not  immediate  but  mediated,  and  each 
of  the  two  forces  is  consequently  itself  the  determinateness  which 
the  other  has  presented  to  it  —  is  mediated  through  the  other,  and  the 
mediating  other  is  likewise  its  own  determining  positing. 

Therefore  this  fact  that  an  occasion  for  the  activity  of  a  force  is  pre- 
sented through  another  force  to  which  it  is  in  so  far  passive,  but,  on 
account  of  the  occasion,  goes  over  from  its  passivity  into  activit}'  —  all 
this  is  only  the  return  of  force  into  itself.  It  externalizes  itself,  or 
manifests  itself.  The  externalization  is  reaction  in  the  sense  that  it 
posits  the  externality  as  its  own  phase  or  moment,  and  consequently 
annuls  the  solicitation  of  itself  through  another  force.  The  two  are 
therefore  one.  The  externalizing  of  the  force,  whereby  it  gives  itself 
extantness  for  others  through  its  negative  activity  upon  itself,  and 
the  infinite  return  in  this  externality  to  itself,  so  that  this  externality 
is  only  its  own  self -relation.  The  presupposing  reflection  to  which 
belongs  the  conditioning  activity  and  the  "  occasion,"  is  therefore 
only  the  reflection  returning  into  itself,  and  the  activity  is  essentially 
reactive  against  itself.  The  positing  of  the  occasion,  or  of  the  ex- 
ternal as  itself  the  annulment  of  the  same,  and  conversely,  the  annul- 
ment of  the  occasion,  is  the  positing  of  externality  [_i.  e.,  of  the  force 
itself]. 

c.  The  Infinitude  of  Force. 

Force  is  finite  in  so  far  as  its  moments  have  still  the  form  of  im- 
mediateness ;  their  presupposing  ajid  their  self-relating  reflections  are 
distinct  in  this  determination.  The  presupposing  reflection  manifests 
itself  as  an  external  force  independently  existing,  and  the  self-relating 
reflection  manifests  itself  in  relation  to  it  as  passive.  Force  is  there- 


Essential  Relation.  167 

fore  conditioned  as  regards  form,  and  likewise  limited  as  regards  its 
content ;  for  a  determinateness  as  regards  form  contains  a  limitation 
as  regards  content.  But  the  activity  of  force  consists  in  self-utter- 
ance. This  means,  as  has  been  shown,  the  annulment  of  externality 
and  the  determining  of  it  to  be  that  in  which  force  is  identical  with 
itself.  Therefore  what  the  force  really  manifests  is  this,  that  its  rela- 
tion to  another  is  its  relation  to  itself,  that  its  passivity  consists  in  its 
activity.  The  occasion  through  which  it  is  solicited  to  activity  is  its 
own  soliciting ;  and  the  externality  which  comes  to  it  [to  solicit  it]  is 
no  immediate  somewhat,  but  mediated  through  it;  and  likewise  its 
own  essential  identity  with  itself  is  not  immediate,  but  mediated 
through  its  negation.  In  other  words,  the  force  manifests  this,  or 
expresses  this,  that  its  externality  is  identical  with  its  internality. 


c. 

Relation  of  External  and  Internal. 

1.  The  essential  relation  of  the  whole  and  the  parts  is  the  immedi- 
ate phase  of  essential  relation ;  the  reflected  immediateness  and  the 
existent  immediateness  have  therefore  within  it,  each  an  independence 
of  its  own ;  but  since  they  stand  in  essential  relation  their  independ- 
ence is  only  their  negative  unity.  This  is  now  posited  in  the  utter- 
ance or  manifestation  of  force.  The  reflected  unity  is  essentially  the 
becoming-other  as  transference  of  itself  into  externality,  but  exter- 
nality has  likewise  immediately  gone  back  into  the  reflected  unity. 
The  distinction  between  the  independent  forces  annuls  itself;  the 
manifestation  of  force  is  only  a  mediation  of  the  reflected  unity  with 
itself.  It  is  only  an  empty  transparent  distinction  —  a  mere  appear- 
ance ;  but  this  appearance  is  the  mediation  which  constitutes  the 
independent  reality  itself.  Besides  the  contrary  or  opposite  deter- 
minations which  mutually  annul  each  other,  and  besides  their  activity 
of  transition  the  immediateness  from  which  the  movement  into  the 
other  is  begun  is  itself  only  a  posited  being ;  and  through  this  each 
of  the  determinations  is  in  its  immediateness  already  the  unity  with 
its  other  and  therefore  the  transition  is  likewise  the  self-positing 
return  into  itself. 

The  Internal  is  defined  as  the  form  of  the  reflected  immediateness, 
or  of  Essence,  as  opposed  to  the  External  which  is  the  form  of  Being ; 
they  however,  form  only  one  identity.  This  identity  is,  in  the  first 
place,  the  solid  unity  of  the  two  as  substrate  replete  with  content  — 
in  other  words  as  the  absolute  Thing  [Sacke]  or  substrate  in  which 


1C)  6  Essence. 

the  two  determinations  named  are  indifferent,  external  moments. 
In  so  far  as  it  is  content  and  totality  which  constitutes  the  Internal 
and  which  becomes  likewise  External,  but  in  this  becoming  does  not 
change  or  pass  over  out  of  itself,  but  remains  self-identical.  The 
External  in  this  respect  is  not  only  identical  with  the  Internal  as 
regards  its  content,  but  the  two  constitute  only  one  thing  \_Sache~\. 

But  this  thing  \_Sache]  as  simple  identity  with  itself  is  different 
from  its  form-determinations  —  in  other  words,  the  latter  are  exter- 
nal to  it ;  in  this  respect  it  is  itself  an  internal  which  is  different  from 
its  externality.  This  externality,  however,  consists  in  the  two  de- 
terminations, viz.,  the  internal  and  external,  which  constitute  it. 
But  the  thing  \_Sache~\  is  itself  nothing  but  the  unity  of  the  two. 
Consequently  the  two  sides  are  again  identical  as  regards  the  content. 
But  in  the  thing  \_Sache]  they  form  a  self-penetrating  identity  as  a 
substrate  replete  with  content.  But  in  the  external,  as  forms  of  the 
thing  \_Sache]  the  two  sides  are  opposed  to  the  former  identity  and 
are  consequently  mutually  indifferent. 

2.  They  have  thus  become  different  form-determinations  which 
possess  an  identical  substrate  not  in  themselves,  but  in  another ;  they 
are'determinations  of  reflection;  the  internal  as  the  form  of  reflection- 
into-itself  is  essentiality,  the  external  in  the  form  of  immediateness 
reflected  into  something  else  is  non-essentiality.  But  the  nature  of 
the  essential  relation  has  exhibited  these  determinations  as  constitut- 
ing merely  one  identity.  Force  is  in  its  utterance  a  presupposing 
activity  which  is  identical  with  the  determining  activity  as  returning 
into  itself.  Therefore  in  so  far  as  internal  and  external  are  regarded 
as  form-determinations,  they  are  first  only  the  simple  form  itself ;  sec- 
ondly, since  they  are  defined  within  it  as  opposites  their  unity  is  the 
pure,  abstract  mediation  in  which  the  one  is  immediately  because  the 
other  is,  and  the  latter  immediately  because  the  former  is ;  thus  the 
internal  is  immediately  the  external  and  it  has  the  form  of  externality 
because  it  is  the  internal ;  conversely,  the  external  is  only  an  internal 
because  it  is  only  an  external. 

Since  this  form-unity  contains  the  two  determinations  as  opposed, 
their  identity  is  only  this  transition,  and  it  is  an  identity  which  differs 
from  them,  rather  than  their  identity  with  fulness  of  content.  In 
other  words  this  firm  retention  of  the  form  is  the  side  of  particular- 
ity. And  what  is  posited  in  this  regard  is  not  the  real  totality  of  the 
whole,  but  the  totality  or  the  thing  [-Sac/te]  itself  merely  in  the  de- 
terminateness  of  form.  Since  this  is  merely  a  composite  or  aggre- 
gate unity  of  the  two  opposite  determinations,  it  follows  that  each  is 
essentially  in  the  other  determinateness  and  only  in  the  other,  and  it 


Essential  Relation.  169 

follows  also  as  first  remarked  that  they  are  only  in  the  former  deter- 
minateness,  it  being  indifferent  which  determinateness  we  take  first  — 
whether  that  of  substrate  or  of  thing  \_Sache].  [It  is  evident 
that  if  the  external  is  outside  of  the  internal  the  internal  is  also  out- 
side of  the  external  —  i.  e..  separate  from  it,  beyond  its  limits.  This 
shows  the  emptiness  of  the  distinction  of  external  and  internal  as 
affording  any  real  explanation.] 

It  follows  that  anything  that  is  only  an  internal  is  likewise  for  that 
reason  only  an  external ;  and  conversely,  whatever  is  only  external 
is  likewise  only  internal.  In  other  words,  since  the  internal  is  defined 
as  Essence,  while  the  external  is  defined  as  Being,  it  follows  that  a 
thing  [Sacke]  in  so  far  as  it  is  only  in  its  essence  is  for  that  reason 
only  an  immediate  being  [i.  e.,  without  mediation  or  essential  relation 
which  it  ought  to  have  if  it  is  Essence]  ;  or  on  the  other  hand  a  thing 
[Sache]  which  only  is,  or  has  being  alone,  is  for  that  reason  still  in 
its  essence  [i.  e.,  has  not  unfolded  its  nature  —  manifested  its  essence, 
and  hence  is  no  true  being].  The  external  and  internal  ai-e  sides  of 
determination  in  which  determinateness  is  posited  in  such  a  manner 
that  each  of  the  two  determinations  not  only  presupposes  the  other 
and  passes  over  into  it  as  into  its  truth,  but,  besides  this,  remains 
posited  as  determinateness  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  truth  of  the  other, 
and  indicates  the  totality  of  the  two.  The  internal  is  therefore  the 
completion  of  Essence  as  regards  form.  Essence,  viz.,  defined  as  in- 
ternal, as  such,  must  necessarily  be  defective,  and  a  mere  relation  to 
its  other,  the  external ;  and  the  external  is  likewise  not  mere  being 
or  existence  even,  but  a  somewhat  relating  to  essence  or  to  the  inter- 
nal. But  it  is  not  merely  the  relation  of  each  to  the  other  that  we 
have  here,  but  the  absolute  form  in  its  completeness,  viz.,  that  each  is 
immediately  its  opposite,  and  the  common  relation  of  these  opposites 
to  their  third  or  their  unity.  Their  mediation  lacks  however  as  yet 
this  identical  substrate  containing  them  both ;  their  relation  is  on 
this  account  an  immediate  inversion  of  the  one  into  the  other,  and 
this  negative  unity  which  combines  them  is  a  simple  point,  without  any 
content. 

Remark. 

The  activity  of  Essence  is  in  general  the  becoming  [or  production 
of,  or  genesis  of]  the  Idea  [Begriff  or  "  concrete  Idea,"  as  the  being 
which  is  both  subjective  and  objective,  i.  e.,  self-determined  as  its 
own  object — conscious  being].  In  the  essential  relation  of  the  in- 
ternal and  external  the  essential  feature  of  the  Idea  makes  its  appear- 


170  Essence. 

ance,  viz.,  the  existence  of  such  a  negative  unity  that  each  of  its 
moments  is  not  only  its  other,  but  is  also  the  totalit}'  of  the  whole 
[human  nature  manifests  itself  as  such  a  negative  unity  of  individual 
human  beings,  each  one  of  which  not  only  depends  upon  the  others 
and  avails  itself  of  their  strength,  but  through  this  relation  realizes 
within  itself  its  own  negative  unity,  i.  e.,  elevates  itself  to  a  total  by 
this  means].  But  this  totality  is  in  the  Idea  as  such  the  universal 
[i.  e.,  the  category  of  the  universal  corresponds  to  the  totality  in  the 
category  of  External  and  Internal]  ;  the  totality  however  is  a  sub- 
strate which  has  not  yet  appeared  at  the  stage  of  the  process 
where  we  have  internal  and  external.  In  the  negative  identity  of  in- 
ternal and  external,  which  is  the  immediate  inversion  of  each  of  these 
determinations  into  the  other,  there  is  also  lacking  that  substrate 
which  has  been  called  thing  [$ac/ie]. 

The  unmediated  identity  of  form  as  it  is  here  posited  as  yet  without  the 
activity  filled  with  content  belonging  to  the  thing  \_Sache']  itself  ought 
to  be  noted  very  carefully.  It  makes  its  appearance  in  the  thing 
[  Sache  ]  as  it  is  in  its  beginning.  Similarly  pure  being  is  immediately 
nothing.  So  too  everything  real  in  its  beginning  is  such  an  immediate 
identity  only ;  for  in  its  beginning  it  has  not  yet  developed  its 
moments,  and  contrasted  them,  nor  withdrawn  itself  back  out  of  its 
externality,  and  on  the  other  hand  it  has  not  yet  through  its  own  ac- 
tivity proceeded  forth  from  its  internality  and  externalized  itself.  In 
such  case  it  is  therefore  only  the  internal  as  determinateness  in  con- 
trast with  the  external,  and  only  the  external  as  a  contrast  with  the 
internal.  Hence  it  is  in  one  respect  only  an  immediate  being;  in 
another  respect,  in  so  far  as  it  is  likewise  the  negativity  which  is 
destined  to  become  the  activity  of  development,  it  is  as  such  essen- 
tially only  an  internal. 

In  all  natural  scientific  and  spiritual  evolution,  in  general,  this 
phase  presents  itself  and  it  is  important  to  recognize  it:  that  the  first 
phase  of  any  thing  is  that  of  its  internality,  in  other  words  its  exist- 
ence in  its  idea  [  an  ideal  not  yet  realized,  e.  g.,  an  acorn  not  yet  be- 
come an  oak,  a  child  or  a  savage  not  yet  become  a  developed,  civ- 
ilized man]  and  is  for  this  reason  only  its  immediate  passive  being. 
And  the  most  convenient  example  of  this  is  the  essential  relation  just 
above  considered  which  has  passed  through  mediation  —  the  essential 
relation  of  force,  —  and  has  realized  the  essential  relation  within 
itself, — its  ideal,  or  first  internality.  On  this  account,  because  it 
is  first  internal  only,  it  is  only  the  external  immediate  essential  rela- 
tion, —  the  essential  relation  of  the  "  whole  and  the  parts  "  in  which 
the  sides  have  an  indifferent  reality,  outside  of  relation  to  each  other. 


Essential  Relation.  171 

Their  identity  does  not  yet  essentially  exist  for  them ;  it  is  only 
internal  as  yet,  and  on  this  account  they  fall  asunder,  and  have  only 
an  immediate  external  existence.  So  too  the  sphere  of  Being  in  gen- 
eral is  nothing  but  an  internality,  and  what  is  the  same  thing  the 
sphere  of  existent  immediateness  or  of  externality. 

Essence  is  at  first  only  the  internal ;  and  consequently  as  such  it  is 
taken  for  a  mere  unsystematized  common  interest  and  quite  external. 
In  German  one  has  the  words,  Schulwesen  =  school-essence  [  where 
the  English  say  school-system] ,  Zeitungswesen  =r  newspaper-es- 
sence [where  the  English  say  journalism]  and  understand  under  these 
expressions  a  common  interest  formed  by  external  combination  of  ex- 
isting objects,  without  essential  connection  or  organization.  Among 
concrete  objects  the  seed  of  a  plant  is  an  internal  plant  [  internally  a 
plant  ]  and  a  child  is  an  internal  man  [  a  man  not  yet  realized].  But 
on  this  account  the  plant  or  the  man  as  a  germ  is  only  an  immediate 
somewhat,  an  external  being,  which  has  not  yet  attained  the  negative 
relation  to  itself,  and  is  therefore  a  passive  being  exposed  to  external 
influences ;  so  also  God  defined  in  his  immediate  idea  would  not  be 
spirit;  spirit  is  not  the  immediate,  the  opposite  of  mediation,  but 
rather  the  essence  which  externally  posits  immediateness,  and  eternally 
returns  from  that  immediateness  into  itself.  Regarded  as  immediate 
therefore  God  would  be  only  nature.  In  other  words  Nature  is  only 
the  internality  of  spirit,  not  the  actuality  of  spirit,  and  is  therefore 
not  the  true  God.  In  other  words  God  in  the  first  [  or  lowest  form 
of  ]  thinking  is  only  pure  being,  or  mere  essence,  that  is  to  say,  the 
abstract  absolute,  and  not  God  as  absolute  spirit  [  self-conscious  ] 
which  alone  is  the  true  nature  of  God. 

3.  The  first  of  the  considered  identities  of  the  internal  and  ex- 
ternal is  the  identity  opposed  to  the  distinction  of  these  determ- 
inations as  an  indifferent  substrate  opposed  to  a  form  external  to  it, 
or  an  identity  as  content.  The  second  of  the  identities  considered  is 
the  unmediated  identity  of  the  distinction  of  the  external  and  inter- 
nal, viz.,  the  immediate  inversion  of  each  into  its  opposite  —  this  is 
the  pure  form.  But  these  two  identities  are  only  the  sides  of  one 
totality ;  in  other  words  the  totality  itself  is  only  their  conversion  of 
•each  into  the  other.  The  totality  as  substrate  and  content  is  their 
immediateness  reflected  into  itself  by  means  of  the  presupposing  re- 
flection of  form  which  annuls  its  distinction  and  posits  itself  as  in- 
different identity,  as  reflected  unity  opposed  to  it.  In  other  words 
the  identity  is  the  form  itself  in  so  far  as  it  is  defined  as  variety,  or 
indifferent  multiplicity,  and  in  so  far  as  it  reduces  itself  to  one  of  its 


172  Essence. 

sides  as  externality,  and  to  the  other  of  its  sides  as  immediateness 
reflected  into  itself,  or  internality. 

Hence,  on  the  other  hand,  the  distinctions  of  form  —  the  internal 
and  the  external,  are  by  this  means  posited  each  as  the  totality  of 
itself  and  its  other;  the  internal  as  simple  identity  reflected  into  itself 
is  therefore  the  immediate  and  consequently  being  and  externality,  as 
well  as  essence.  The  external,  on  the  other  hand  as  manifold,  par- 
ticular being,  mere  externality,  is  posited  as  unessential,  and  returned 
into  its  ground,  and  consequently  as  internal  [that  which  is  posited  as 
unessential  is  thereby  posited  as  dependent  and  as  belonging  to  some- 
thing else  whose  manifestation  it  is ;  and  as  a  manifestation  or  ap- 
pearance it  is  only  the  internality  of  something  else,  which  has  thus 
been  externalized  as  appearance].  This  transition  of  each  into  the 
other  forms  their  immediate  identity  as  substrate,  but  it  is  also  their 
mediated  identity,  viz.,  each  is  through  its  other  what  it  is  within 
itself,  i,  e.,  the  totality  of  the  essential  relation.  Or  conversely,  the 
determinateness  of  each  side  is  meditated  with  the  other  determin- 
ateness,  through  the  fact  that  it  is  potentially  the  totality  ;  the  totality 
mediates  itself  therefore  through  the  form,  or  through  the  determ- 
inateness, and  the  determinateness  mediates  itself  through  its  simple 
identity. 

Any  somewhat  is  what  it  is  therefore  wholly  in  its  externality ;  its 
externality  is  its  totality ;  it  is  likewise  its  unity  reflected  into  itself. 
Its  manifestation  or  phenomenal  existence  is  not  merely  reflection 
into  something  else,  but  reflection  into  itself,  and  its  externality  is 
therefore  the  externality  of  that  which  it  is  in  itself;  and  since  in  this 
way  its  content  and  its  form  are  absolutely  identical  there  is  nothing 
in  and  for  itself  but  this,  to  utter  itself  or  manifest  itself.  It  is  the 
revelation  of  its  own  essence,  so  that  this  essence  consists  merely  in 
self-revelation. 

The  essential  relation  has  thus  defined  itself  as  identity  of  its  phe- 
nomenal manifestation  with  its  interaality,  and  therefore  now  defines 
essence  as  Actuality. 


Actuality  173 

THIRD  SECTION. 

ACTUALITY. 

Actuality  is  the  unity  of  Essence  and  Existence.  In  it  the 
formless  essence  and  the  fleeting  phenomenon  have  their  truth  —  in 
other  words,  persistence  devoid  of  determination  and  multiplicity 
devoid  of  persistence  find  here  their  truth.  Although  existence  is 
immediateness  which  has  resulted  from  a  ground  it  has  not  the  form 
posited  within  it  and  as  belonging  to  it.  When  it  determines  itself 
and  forms  itself  it  is  the  phenomenon  [t.  e.,  totality  of  appearance]. 
And  since  it  develops  persistence  as  reflection-into-another  until  it 
becomes  reflection  into  itself,  there  originate  two  worlds,  two  totali- 
ties of  content,  the  one  of  which  is  defined  as  reflected  into  itself 
and  the  other  as  reflected  into  another.  The  essential  relation,  how- 
ever, exhibits  its  form-relation  which  arrives  at  its  full  development 
in  the  essential  relation  of  Internal  and  External  as  one  identical 
substrate  for  the  content  of  both,  and  thus  only  one  identity  of  form. 
Through  the  fact  that  this  identity  of  the  form  has  arisen,  the  cate- 
gorv  of  form  has  lost  its  multiplicity  of  distinctions  [and  is  hence 
annulled]  and  one  absolute  totality  has  resulted. 

This  unity  of  the  Internal  and  External  is  the  absolute  actuality 
(  WvrJdiekkc&).  This  actuality  is  in  its  first  phase  of  consideration 
the  absolute  as  such ;  and  in  so  far  as  it  is  posited  as  unity  in  which 
the  form  is  annulled,  it  has  become  the  empty  or  external  distinction 
of  External  and  Internal.  The  activity  of  reflection  is  regarded  as 
an  external  affair  in  its  relation  to  this  absolute,  and  not  as  the  activ- 
ity of  the  absolute  itself,  but  since  this  reflection  essentially  belongs 
to  it,  it  is  [?'.  e. ,  will  be  found  to  be]  the  negative  return  of  the  abso- 
lute into  itself.  [Such  is  the  first  phase  of  Actuality.] 

In  the  second  place  [i.  e.,  in  the  second  phase  of  its  consideration] 
this  unity  of  the  Internal  and  External  is  the  Actuality  properly  so- 
called.  Actuality,  Possibility,  and  Necessity  constitute  the  formal 
moments  [elements  or  phases]  of  the  absolute,  i.  e.,  its  reflection. 

In  the  third  place  [the  third  phase  of  its  consideration]  the  unity 
of  the  absolute  and  of  its  activity  of  reflection  is  the  absolute  essential 
relation  —  in  other'  words  it  is  the  absolute  as  essential  relation  to 
itself ;  this  is  called  SUBSTANCE. 

[In  the  preceding  paragraphs,  Hegel  gives  the  substance  or  out- 
line of  this  third  section  of  Essence.] 


174  Essence. 

FIRST  CHAPTER. 
The  Absolute. 

The  simple,  pure  identity  of  the  absolute  is  indeterminate  [without 
particularization] .  In  other  words  within  it  all  determinateness, 
whether  of  essence  and  existence  or  of  being,  have  been  annulled ; 
and  so  has  the  activity  of  reflection.  In  so  far  as  this  is  the  case  the 
definition  of  that  which  the  absolute  is,  is  merely  negative ;  and  the 
absolute  itself  appeai-s  only  as  the  negation  of  all  predicates  and  as 
entirely  empty  and  void ;  but  in  as  much  as  the  absolute  must  at  the 
same  time  be  pronounced  as  the  affirmation  of  all  predicates,  it  is 
manifestly  the  most  formal  contradiction.  In  so  far  as  this  negating 
and  affirming  belong  to  external  reflection  it  is  a  formal,  non-system- 
atic dialectic,  which,  with  little  trouble,  seizes  upon  determinations 
of  different  kinds  here  and  there,  and  with  just  as  little  trouble  shows 
up  their  finitude  and  mere  relativity,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
totality  hovers  before  it,  and  it  pronounces  this  absolute  to  possess 
all  determinations  inherent  within  it.  It  has  not  the  ability  to  bring 
this  affirming  and  negating  to  a  true  unity.  There  is  a  necessity, 
however,  to  show  what  this  absolute  is,  but  this  exposition  must  not 
be  a  determining  or  a  defining  of  it,  nor  an  external  reflection,  because 
by  them  determinations  of  the  absolute  would  appear ;  there  is  admis- 
sible only  an  analysis  or  exposition  —  the  exposition  on  the  part  of  the 
absolute  itself  —  which  only  shows  what  it  is. 

A. 

The  Display  or  Exposition  of  the  Absolute. 

The  Absolute  is  not  merely  Being,  nor  is  it  merely  Essence. 
Being  is  the  first  non-reflected  immediateness ;  Essence  is  the  re- 
flected immediateness.  Each  of  the  two  is  a  totality  within  itself, 
but  a  definite,  particular  totality.  In  the  sphere  of  Essence  the  cate- 
gory of  Being  reappears  as  Existence ;  and  the  relation  of  being  to 
essence  has  developed  into  the  essential  relation  of  Internal  and  Ex- 
ternal. The  Internal  is  the  Essence  as  totality,  which  is  related  to 
being  .and  is  immediate  being.  The  External  is  being,  but  it  is  re- 
lated to  the  activity  of  reflection  and  it  is  immediate  identity  with 
essence.  The  absolute  itself  is  the  absolute  unity  of  the  two.  It  is 


The  Absolute.  175 

that  which  constitutes  the  ground  of  the  essential  relation,  which  as 
essential  relation  has  not  gone  back  into  this  identity,  and  its  ground 
is  not  yet  posited. 

Hence  it  is  evident  that  the  definition  of  the  absolute  makes  it  to 
be  absolute  form,  but  at  the  same  time  not  as  an  identity  whose 
moments  or  phases  are  mere  simple  determinatenesses ;  it  is  rather 
the  identity  whose  moments  or  phases  are  both  totalities,  and  as 
such  are  indifferent  to  the  form,  and  hence  constitute  the  perfect 
content  of  the  whole.  Conversely,  the  absolute  is  the  absolute  con- 
tent in  such  a  manner  that  the  content  which  as  such  is  an  indiffer- 
ent [i.  e.,  a  non-related]  multiplicity  and  possesses  the  negative  form- 
relation  within  it,  and  through  this  its  multiplicity  forms  one  solid 
[i.e.,  homogeneous  or  continuous]  identity. 

The  identity  of  the  absolute  is  consequently  the  absolute  through 
this  fact,  that  each  of  its  parts  is  the  whole,  in  other  words,  that 
each  determinateness  is  the  totality.  This  makes  each  determinate- 
ness  to  be  a  transparent  appearance,  a  distinction  that  has  vanished 
in  its  posited-being.  Essence,  existence,  in-itself-existent  world, 
whole,  part,  force, — these  reflected  determinations  appear  to  the 
imaging  [representing]  form  of  thought  as  if  they  were  something 
valid  in  and  for  themselves  —  as  possessing  true  being;  but  the  ab- 
solute is  their  ground  and  they  have  vanished  into  it.  Since  in  the 
absolute  the  form  is  only  simple  self-identity,  the  absolute  does  not 
determine  itself  [or  particularize  itself  ]  ;  for  determination  is  a  form- 
distinction  [a  distinction  within  form.]  But  since  the  absolute  con- 
tains all  distinction  and  form-determination  —  in  other  words  since 
it  is  absolute  form  and  activity  of  reflection,  it  must  have  difference 
or  diversity  in  its  content.  But  the  absolute  itself  is  absolute  iden- 
tity. This  is  its  definition  since  all  multiplicity  of  the  self-existent 
world  and  of  the  phenomenal  world,  or  of  the  internal  and  external 
totalities  have  vanished.  In  itself  there  is  no  becoming,  for  it  is  not 
&  form  of  Being  nor  is  it  the  self-reflecting  form  of  determination ; 
it  is  not  essence,  which  determines  itself  only  within  itself;  it  is 
moreover  not  a  self-manifestation,  for  it  is  the  identity  of  the  internal 
and  external. 

But  the  activity  of  reflection  stands  in  opposition  to  its  absolute 
identity.  The  activity  of  reflection  is  annulled  in  its  absolute  iden- 
tity. Hence  it  is  only  the  internality  of  it  and  therefore  external  to  it 
p.  «.,  separate  from  it].  The  activity  of  reflection  consists  in  this  — 
the  annulment  of  its  activity  in  the  absolute.  It  is  *4  the  beyond  "  of 
the  manifold  distinctions  and  determinations  and  of  their  activity 
which  the  absolute  holds  in  abeyance.  It  is  therefore  their  assump- 


176  Essence. 

tion  [adoption]  but  at  the  same  time  their  destruction.  It  is  thus 
the  negative  exposition  of  the  absolute  already  mentioned.  In  their 
true  presentation  this  exposition  forms  the  whole  of  the  logical  activ- 
ity which  has  preceded  in  this  investigation,  including  the  spheres  of 
Being  and  Essence,  whose  content  is  not  gathered  together  from 
without  as  something  accidentally  found,  nor  has  it  gone  down  into 
the  ab}'ss  of  the  absolute  through  external  reflection,  but  it  is  de- 
termined within  it  through  its  own  inner  necessity:  a  becoming, 
inherent  in  being,  and  an  activity  of  reflection  belonging  to  essence 
has  returned  into  the  absolute  as  its  ground. 

This  Display  or  exposition  has  however  a  positive  side,  namely,  in 
so  far  as  the  finite  within  it  —  that  which  perishes  —  shows  by  perish- 
ing that  it  is  related  to  the  absolute,  or  that  the  absolute  is  contained 
in  it  [or  manifested  upon  it].  But  this  side  is  not  so  much  the  posi- 
tive exhibition  of  the  absolute  itself  as  it  is  the  exhibition  of  the  de- 
terminations which  it  has  through  the  fact  that  the  absolute  is  its 
foundation  and  also  its  ground  — in  other  words,  that  which  gives  it, 
as  appearance,  a  reality,  is  the  absolute  itself.  The  appearance  is  not 
a  mere  nothing,  but  it  is  reflection,  i.  e.,  relation  to  the  absolute ;  in 
other  words,  it  is  appearance,  in  so  far  as  the  absolute  appears  in  it. 
This  positive  exposition  or  display,  therefore,  prevents  the  finite 
from  disappearing  and  regards  it  as  an  expression  and  image  of  the 
absolute.  But  the  transparency  of  the  finite  which  permits  only  the 
absolute  to  appear  through  it,  results  in  its  entire  disappearance,  for 
there  is  nothing  in  the  finite  which  can  give  it  an  independent  indi- 
viduality as  against  the  absolute ;  it  is  only  a  medium  which  is  lost 
in  the  manifestation  of  that  which  shines  through  it. 

This  positive  analysis  or  display  of  the  absolute  is  therefore  only  an 
appearance ;  for  the  true  positive  which  contains  it  and  the  content 
which  is  exhibited,  is  the  absolute  itself.  As  regards  the  further  de- 
terminations, the  form  in  which  the  absolute  appears  is  something 
nugatory  which  the  exhibition  assumes  as  an  external  affair,  and  makes 
its  beginning  with  it.  Such  a  determination  has  not  its  beginning  in 
the  absolute,  but  only  its  end.  This  exhibition  is  therefore  an  abso- 
lute deed  through  its  relation  to  the  absolute  into  which  it  returns ; 
but  it  is  not  this  in  its  point  of  departure,  for  that  is  only  an  external 
determination  to  the  absolute. 

In  fact,  however,  the  display  or  exposition  of  the  absolute  is  its 
own  act,  and  it  begins  with  itself  as  well  as  arrives  at  itself.  The 
absolute  is  determined  solely  as  absolute  identit}' ;  through  the  activ- 
ity of  reflection  it  is  posited  as  identical  in  contrast  with  antithesis 
and  multiplicity ;  in  other  words  it  is  only  the  negative  of  reflection 


The  Absolute.  177 

and  of  determination  in  general.  Not  only  that  exhibition  of  the  abso- 
lute is  something  incomplete,  but  so  also  is  this  absolute  itself  at  which 
it  has  arrived.  In  other  words,  that  absolute  which  exists  only  as 
absolute  identity  is  such  an  absolute  merely  as  belongs  to  external 
reflection.  It  is  therefore  not  what  is  absolute  in  an  absolute  sense, 
but  it  is  the  absolute  in  the  form  of  determinateness  or  particularity- 
it  is  what  is  called  "  Attribute." 

The  absolute  however  is  not  attribute  merely  because  it  is  the 
object  of  external  reflection  and  is  particularized  through  that.  In 
other  words  reflection  is  not  external  to  it  solely ;  but  it  is  also  imme- 
diate, and  therefore  because  it  is  external  it  is  also  internal.  The 
absolute  is  the  absolute  only  because  it  is  not  abstract  identity,  but 
the  identity  of  being  and  essence  —  i.  e.,  the  identity  of  the  internal 
and  external.  It  is  therefore  the  absolute  form  which  causes  its 
manifestation  within  itself  and  determines  it  to  be  an  attribute. 


B. 

The  Absolute  Attribute. 

The  expression  which  has  been  used  —  the  absolute  absolute  [the 
absolute  taken  absolutely] — denotes  the  absolute  as  returned  into  itself 
in  its  own  form,  or  that  whose  form  is  identical  with  its  content.  The 
attribute  is  only  the  relative  absolute  —  an  expression  wliich  means' 
only  that  the  absolute  is  in  a  form-determination.  The  form  is 
namely  at  first,  before  its  complete  analysis  or  exposition,  only  inter- 
nal, or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  only  external  —  particularized  form  or 
negation.  But  since  it  is  the  form  of  the  absolute,  the  attribute  is  the 
entire  content  of  the  absolute ;  it  is  the  totality  —  such  a  totality  as 
we  formerly  named  a  "world"  [the  "  phenomenonal  world  "  and 
the  "  in-itself-existent  world  "]  or  as  one  of  the  sides  of  the  essential 
relation — each  of  those  sides  being  at  the  same  time  the  entire  rela- 
tion. But  those  two  "  worlds  "  —  the  phenomenal  and  in-itself-exist- 
ent worlds  —  were  defined  as  antithetic  to  each  other  in  their  nature. 
One  side  of  the  essential  relation  was  identical  with  the  other ;  the 
whole  identical  with  the  parts ;  the  manifestation  of  the  force  pos- 
sessed the  same  content  as  the  force  itself,  and  the  "external"4  was 
the  same  as  the  "internal."  At  the  same  time  however  each  of  these 
sides  possessed  an  ^immediate  reality  of  its  own  ;  one  side  possessed 
an  existent  immediateness  and  the  other  a  reflected  immediateness. 
In  the  absolute  on  the  contrary  these  distinctions  of  immediateness 
are  reduced  to  a  mere  appearance  [or  seeming]  and  the  totality 
12 


178  Essence. 

which  is  the  attribute  is  posited  as  its  true  and  only  proper  reality ; 
but  the  determination  in  which  it  appears  is  posited  as  non-essential. 

The  absolute  is  therefore  attribute  for  the  reason  that  it  is  simple, 
absolute  identity  in  the  determination  of  identity.  There  may  be 
other  determinations  joined  to  this  determination  —  so  that  there  are 
several  attributes.  But  since  the  absolute  identity  has  only  this 
meaning,  not  only  that  all  determinations  are  annulled,  but  that  it  is 
also  the  activity  of  reflection  which  has  annulled  itself,  it  conse- 
quently happens  that  all  determinations  belonging  to  it  are  posited 
as  annulled.  In  other  words,  the  totality  is  posited  as  the  absolute  ; 
or  the  attribute  has  for  its  realit}1'  and  content  the  absolute.  Its 
form-determination  through  which  it  is  attribute  is  therefore  also 
posited  immediately  as  mere  appearance,  and  thus  the  negative  is 
posited  as  negative.  The  positive  appearance,  which  the  exhibition 
or  exposition  reaches  through  the  attribute,  — since  it  takes  the 
finite  in  its  limitation  as  something  lacking  self-existence,  and  annuls 
its  independent  existence  in  the  absolute  and  reduces  it  to  an  at- 
tribute, —  again  annuls  it  as  attribute;  it  causes  it  to  perish  in  the 
simple  absolute,  and  thus  it  recalls  the  act  which  distinguished  or 
displayed  it  as  attribute. 

Since,  however,  the  reflection  thus  returns  from  its  act  of  distin- 
guishing back  to  the  identity  of  the  absolute,  it  has  not  emerged 
from  its  externality  and  arrived  at  the  true  absolute.  It  has  reached 
only  the  indefinite,  abstract  identity;  i.  e.,  that  form  of  it  which  has 
the  determinateness  of  identity.  In  other  words,  the  reflection,  since 
it  is  determined  as  attribute,  —  as  the  internal  form  of  the  absolute,  — 
is  in  this  determining,  different  from  the  externality;  the  internal  de- 
termination does  not  interpenetrate  the  absolute  —  its  manifestation 
is  a  vanishing,  as  a  mere  posited  on  the  absolute. 

The  form  therefore  taken  as  external,  or  as  internal,  whereby  the 
absolute  becomes  an  attribute,  is  therefore  posited  as  a  self-nugatory, 
a  mere  appearance,  a  mere  mode  and  manner  of  existence. 

C. 

The  Modus  of  the  Absolute. 

The  attribute  is  in  the  first  phase  the  absolute  as  simple  self-iden- 
tity. In  the  second  phase  it  is  negation,  and  as  such  negation  it  is 
the  formal  activity  of  reflection  into  itself.  These  two  sides  consti- 
tute the  two  extremes  of  the  attribute  while  it  itself  is  the  middle 
term,  since  it  is  itself  both  the  absolute  and  the  determinateness. 


The  Absolute.  179 

The  second  of  these  two  extremes  is  the  negative  as  negative,  the 
activity  of  reflection  external  to  the  absolute.  In  other  words,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  taken  as  the  internal  of  the  absolute,  and  it  is  defined  as 
the  activity  of  positing  itself  as  modus,  it  is  the  externality  of  the 
absolute,  its  lapse  into  the  realm  of  change  and  contingency,  of  im- 
mediate being —  its  transition  into  the  opposite  without  return  into 
i.self ;  the  multiplicity  of  form  and  content  determinations,  without 
totality. 

The  modus  as  the  externality  of  the  absolute  is  moreover  the  ex- 
ternality posited  as  externality,  a  mere  "  mode  and  manner;"  conse- 
quently the  appearance  as  appearance,  or  the  reflection  into  itself  of 
form ;  consequently  the  self-identity  which  is  the  absolute.  In  fact 
therefore  the  absolute  is  posited  as  absolute  identity  first  in  the 
modus  ;  it  is  only  what  it  is,  i.  e.,  self-identity  as  self -relating  negativ- 
ity, as  appearance  which  is  posited  as  appearance. 

Therefore  in  so  far  as  the  analysis  or  exposition  of  the  absolute 
begins  with  its  absolute  identity  and  passes  over  to  the  attribute  and 
thence  to  the  modus  it  has  in  these  moments  completed  its  course. 
But,  in  the  first  place,  it  is  not  a  merely  negative  activity  in  its  atti- 
tude towards  these  determinations,  but  it  is  the  reflecting  activity  it- 
self, the  very  activity  by  which  the  absolute  is  true  absolute  identity. 
In  the  second  place  it  does  not  have  to  do  merely  with  externality, 
and  the  modus  is  not  the  extreme  of  externality,  but  since  it  is  ap- 
pearance as  appearance,  it  is  the  return  into  itself,  the  self-annulling 
reflection  as  which  the  absolute  is  absolute  being. 

In  the  third  place  the  exhibiting  reflection  appears  to  commence 
with  its  own  determinations,  and  with  the  external  —  the  modus  or 
the  determinations  of  the  attribute  —  taking  them  up  as  though  they 
were  already  existent  outside  of  the  absolute,  and  the  activity  of  the 
existing  reflection  seems  to  consist  in  this  —  that  it  reduces  these 
determinations  to  independent  identities.  But  in  fact  the  exhibiting 
reflection  finds  the  determinateness  with  which  it  begins  in  the  abso- 
lute. For  the  absolute  as  first  indifferent  identity  is  only  the  deter- 
mined absolute,  called  the  attribute  because  it  is  the  inactive  absolute 
devoid  of  ^reflection.  This  determinateuess,  since  it  is  determinate- 
ness,  belongs  to  the  reflecting  activity ;  only  through  it  is  it  deter- 
mined as  the  first  identical  and  only  through  it  does  it  possess  the 
absolute  form,  and  is  not  merely  in  identity  but  a  positing  of  itself 
in  identity. 

The  true  meaning  of  the  modus  is  therefore  that  it  is  the  reflecting 
activity  belonging  to  the  absolute;  an  activity  of  determination 
whereby  it  does  not  become  another,  but  only  becomes  what  it  is 


180  Essence. 

already ;  it  is  thus  a  transparent  externality,  which  shows  what  it  is 
in  itself;  a  movement,  away  from  itself  whose  externality  is  at  the 
same  time  its  internality ;  and  hence  it  is  a  positing  which  is  not  a 
mere  positing,  but  absolute  being. 

If  therefore  the  question  is  asked  regarding  the  content  of  the  ex- 
position of  the  absolute,  what  it  is  that  the  absolute  exhibits?  it  must 
be  remembered  that  the  distinction  between  form  and  content  in  the 
absolute  has  utterly  vanished.  Or  that  the  content  of  the  absolute  is 
self-manifestation.  The  absolute  is  absolute  form,  which  as  the 
diremption  or  dualizationof  the  absolute  is  wholly  self-identical  —  the 
negative  as  negative ;  or  it  comes  into  identity  with  itself  which  is 
likewise  indifferent  towards  its  distinctions  and  is  thus  absolute  con- 
tent; the  content  is  therefore  only  this  very  exposition  (or  exhibition 
of  itself). 

The  absolute  as  this  self-sustaining  activity  of  exposition  as  mode 
and  manner,  which  is  its  absolute  self-identity,  is  manifestation  not 
of  an  internal,  nor  a  manifestation  made  to  something  else,  but  it  is 
only  a  manifesting  of  itself  for  itself  absolutely;  it  is  therefore 
Actuality  [  WirJclichkeif] . 

Remark. 

The  idea  of  the  "  substance  "  of  Spinoza  corresponds  to  this  idea 
of  the  absolute,  and  to  the  essential  (reciprocal)  relations  of  reflec- 
tion belonging  to  it,  as  we  have  explained  above.  Spinozism  is  defi- 
cient as  a  philosophy  through  the  fact  that  the  activity  of  reflection 
and  its  manifold  determining  is  an  external  form  of  thinking.  His 
"substance"  is  one  substance,  one  indivisible  totality ;  there  is  no 
deterrainateness  or  particularity  that  is  not  contained  in  or  annulled 
b}'  this  absolute  ;  and  it  is  important  enough  that  all  which  appears 
to  the  naive  representation,  or  the  defining  understanding  as  some- 
thing independent,  is  reduced  utterly  to  a  mere  posited-being  [de- 
pendence] within  that  necessary  thought  [of  the  absolute  or 
substance].  "  Determinateness  is  negation,"  is  the  absolute  principle 
of  Spinozistic  philosophy  ;  this  true  and  simple  insight  establishes  the 
absolute  unity  of  substance.  But  Spinoza  remains  at  the  stand- 
point of  negation  as  determinateness  or  quality ;  he  does  not  reach 
the  idea  of  absolute  negation,  i.  e.,  self-negating  negation ;  hence  his 
"substance  "  does  not  contain  absolute  form  [self-determined  form] 
and  the  science  of  it  is  no  immanent  scientific  process  [i.  e.,  a  nec- 
essary procedure].  His  "  substance  "  is  absolute  unity  of  thought 
and  being  or  extension ;  therefore  it  contains  the  thinking  activity, 


The  Absolute.  181 

but  only  in  its  unity  with  extension.  This  implies  that  the  thinking 
does  not  separate  itself  from  extension,  and  consequently  is  not  an 
activity  of  determining  and  form-giving,  nor  a  return  into  itself,  nor 
a  beginning  with  itself.  The  "substance  "  therefore  lacks  the  prin- 
ciple of  personality,  a  defect  which  has  been  urged  against  the  Spino- 
zistic  system  most  frequently.  Moreover  its  form  of  knowing  is  ex- 
ternal reflection,  which  takes  up  the  determinateness  of  attribute  and 
mode  as  a  finite  phenomenon  without  deducing  it  from  the  idea  of 
"  substance,"  and  it  makes  reflections  upon  the  same  in  an  external 
manner,  and,  assuming  those  determinations  as  given,  refers  them  to 
the  absolute,  without  commencing  its  procedure  in  the  absolute. 

The  definitions  which  Spinoza  gives  of  "substance"  are  those  of 
self-cause  —  causa  sui  —  defined  as  a  somewhat,  "whose  essence 
includes  within  itself  its  existence ;"  and  he  says  that  "  The  idea  of 
the  absolute  does  not  need  the  idea  of  anything  else  for  its  concep- 
tion." These  definitions,  deep  and  true  as  they  are,  are  nevertheless 
assumed  without  proof  in  his  system.  Mathematics  and  other  sub- 
ordinate sciences  are  obliged  to  begin  with  presuppositions  ;  the}'  are 
under  the  necessity  of  assuming  their  elements  or  matter  with  which 
they  have  to  deal.  But  the  absolute  cannot  be  a  direct  immediate 
something ;  it  is  essentially  its  own  result. 

After  the  definition  of  the  absolute,  Spinoza  gives  next  his  defini- 
tion of  attribute,  namely,  as  "  That  which  the  intellect  comprehends 
as  the  nature  or  essence  of  the  absolute."  Not  to  dwell  upon  the 
fact  that  the  intellect  is  assumed  as  something  subsequent  to  the 
attribute  according  to  its  nature  —  for  Spinoza  defines  the  intellect  as  a 
modus  —  it  must  be  observed  that  the  attribute  which  is  a  determina- 
tion of  the  absolute  is  made  by  Spinoza  dependent  upon  something 
else,  namely,  the  intellect  which  regards  "  substance  "  from  an  exter- 
nal and  independent  point  of  view. 

Spinoza  defines  the  attribute  further  as  infinite ;  and  infinite  also 
in  the  sense  of  infinite  multiplicity.  There  appear  however  only  two 
attributes  —  thought  and  extension  and  it  is  not  shown  how  infinite 
multiplicity  is  reduced  to  this  antithesis  of  thought  and  extension. 
These  two  attributes  are  therefore  taken  from  experience.  Thought 
and  being  are  the  absolute  conceived  in  a  determination.  The  abso- 
lute itself  is  their  absolute  unity,  and  within  it  they  are  only  non- 
essential  forms ;  the  arrangement  of  things  is  the  same  as  that  of 
mental  images  or  thoughts,  and  the  one  absolute  is  perceived  only  by 
the  external  reflection,  by  a  modus,  as  existing  in  those  two  determ- 
inations [thought  and  extension]  —  on  the  one  hand,  as  the 
totality  of  mental  images,  and  on  the  other,  as  a  totality  of  things 


182  Essence. 

and  events.  As  it  is  this  external  reflection  that  makes  that 
distinction,  so  it  is  the  same  reflection  that  carries  it  back  into  the  ab- 
solute identity,  and  annuls  it.  This  entire  activity  however  goes  on 
outside  of  the  absolute.  Although  the  absolute  is  also  the  activity 
of  thought,  and  hence  thinking  occurs  only  in  the  absolute,  yet,  as 
already  remarked,  thought,  in  the  absolute,  is  only  in  unity  with  exten- 
sion, consequently  not  as  the  activity  which  is  essentially  opposed  to 
extension.  Spinoza  makes  the  sublime  demand  upon  thought  that  it 
shall  consider  things  under  the  form  of  eternity,  sub  specie  ceterni, 
i.  e.,  as  they  are  in  the  absolute.  But  in  that  absolute  which  is  only 
the  inactive  identity,  the  attribute,  as  well  as  the  modus,  exist  only  as 
vanishing,  not  as  beginning,  so  that  even  that  vanishing  has  its  posi- 
tive origin  only  from  without. 

The  third,  the  modus,  is  understood  by  Spinoza  as  an  affection  of 
substance,  particular  determinateness,  that  which  is  in  another  and 
is  apprehended  through  that  other.  The  attributes  really  have  for 
their  determination  only  indefinite  multiplicity.  Each  of  the  attri- 
butes should  express  the  totality  of  substance  and  be  understood 
through  itself,  but,  in  so  far  as  the  absolute  exists  as  determined  or 
particular,  it  involves  other-being  and  cannot  be  understood  through 
itself.  In  the  modus  therefore  the  definition  of  attribute  is  first 
posited  in  its  true  form.  This  third  remains  moreover  mere  modus  ; 
on  the  one  hand  it  is  an  immediately  given  somewhat,  and  on  the  other 
hand  its  nngatoriness  is  not  recognized  as  reflection  into  itself.  The 
Spinozistic  exposition  of  the  absolute  is  therefore  complete  only  in  so 
far  as  it  begins  with  the  absolute,  proceeds  to  the  attribute,  and  con- 
cludes with  the  modus.  These  three,  however,  are  merely  mentioned 
one  after  the  other  without  showing  any  inner  necessity  of  develop- 
ment; the  third  is  not  negation  defined  as  negation  —  the  negation 
relating  to  itself  negatively,  through  which  it  would  be  a  return  into 
itself  within  the  first  identity,  and  thus  the  true  identity.  Therefore 
it  lacks  the  necessity  of  procedure  from  the  absolute  to  the  non-essen- 
tial, as  well  as  their  dissolution  again  into  the  identity.  In  other  words 
it  lacks  the  becoming  of  the  identity  as  well  as  of  its  determina- 
tions. 

In  like  manner  the  oriental  idea  of  emanation  conceives  the  abso- 
lute as  the  self-kindling  light.  But  the  light  not  onl}"  originates 
within  itself,  it  streams  forth  away  from  itself.  Its  rays  are  depart- 
ures from  its  undimmed  clearness ;  the  remote  results  are  more  im- 
perfect than  the  preceding  ones  from  whence  they  came.  The 
raying  forth  of  the  light  is  taken  only  as  an  event,  and  the  process 
only  as  a  continnous  loss  of  energy.  Hence  the  being  continually 


The  Absolute.  183 

grows  dimmer  and  the  end  of  the  line  is  night  —  the  negative,  which 
does  not  turn  back  to  the  source  of  light. 

The  defect  of  reflection,  which  Spinoza's  exposition  of  the  abso- 
lute contains  as  an  emanation  theory,  does  not  exist  in  the  idea  of 
the  monad  as  set  forth  by  Leibnitz.  The  one-sidedness  of  the 
philosophical  principle  usually  draws  out  its  opposite  principle 
in  another  system  so  that  the  whole,  the  totality,  exists  in  its  com- 
pleteness although  sundered  into  different  systems.  The  monad  is 
merely  one,  a  negative  reflected  into  itself ;  it  is  the  totality  of  the 
content  of  the  world.  The  variety  and  multiplicity  within  it  has  not 
vanished  altogether  but  is  preserved  in  a  negative  manner.  Spinoza's 
*' substance"  is  the  unity  of  all  contents.  But  this  manifold  con- 
tent of  the  world  does  not  exist  as  such  within  the  "  substance  "  but 
only  in  the  activity  of  reflection  external  to  it.  The  monad  is 
essentially  a  representing  activity.  And  although  it  is  finite  it  pos- 
sesses no  passivity ;  but  the  changes  and  determinations  within  it  are 
manifestations  in  itself.  It  is  an  "  Eutelechy;"  the  revelation  is  its 
own  activity.  By  this  the  monad  is  particularized  and  distinguished 
from  others ;  the  determinateness  of  particularity  consists  in  the 
special  content  and  in  the  mode  and  manner  of  the  manifestation. 
The  monad  is  therefore  potentially  —  as  regards  its  substance  —  the 
totality,  but  not  in  its  manifestation.  This  limitation  of  the  monad 
does  not  appertain  to  it  as  self-positing  or  self-representing,  but,  to 
its  nature,  its  potentiality ;  in  other  words  it  is  an  absolute  limit,  a 
predestination  imposed  upon  it  through  another  being.  Moreover 
the  limited  ones  are  in  relation  to  each  other  while  the  monads  are 
self-contained  absolutes.  Hence  the  harmony  of  these  limitations, 
namely,  the  relation  of  the  monads  to  each  other,  is  external  to  the 
monads  and  proceeds  from  another  being,  or  is  a  "pre-established 
harmony." 

It  is  clear  that  through  the  principle  of  reflection-into-itself,  which 
constitutes  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  monad,  that  otherness 
and  the  influence  of  the  external  is  removed,  and  the  changes  which 
happen  to  the  monad  are  through  its  own  activity.  But  on  the  other 
hand,  the  passivity  is  converted  into  an  absolute  limitation,  a  limita- 
tion of  nature  or  constitution  [a  limitation  impressed  upon  it  from  with- 
out]. Leibnitz  ascribes  to  the  monads  a  certain  kind  of  completeness 
within  themselves,  a  kind  of  independence.  They  are  created  beings. 
Upon  a  closer  examination  of  the  nature  of  this  limitation  it  appears 
that  the  self-manifestation  which  belongs  to  the  monad  is  the  totality 
of  form.  It  is  an  extremely  important  idea  that  the  changes  in  the 
monad  are  conceived  as  self-manifestations,  as  actions  devoid  of 


184  Essence. 

passivity,  and  the  principle  of  reflectiou-into-itself,  or  of  individual- 
ization,  is  made  prominent  as  essential.  Moreover  it  is  necessary  that 
the  finitude  or  particularity  is  allowed  to  exist  within  the  monad  — 
that  the  content  or  the  substance  is  distinguished  from  the  form,  and 
moreover  that  the  content  is  limited  while  the  form  is  infinite.  But 
in  the  idea  of  the  absolute  monad  we  ought  to  find  not  only  the  men- 
tioned unity  of  form  and  content,  but  also  the  nature  of  reflection  as 
self-related  negativity  which  repels  itself  from  itself  and  is  thereby 
a  positing  and  creating  activity.  In  the  system  of  Leibnitz  we  find 
further  the  doctrine  that  God  is  the  source  of  the  existence  and  of 
the  essence  of  the  monads:  which  means  that  the  mentioned  absolute 
limitations  in  the  nature  of  the  monads  are  not  existent  in  and  for 
themselves  but  that  they  vanish  in  the  absolute.  But  these  notions 
are  derived  from  current  conceptions  which  are  without  philosophical 
development  and  not  brought  up  to  the  speculative  stand-point. 
Hence  the  principle  of  individualization  does  not  receive  its  deeper 
meaning;  the  thoughts  on  the  distinction  between  the  different  finite 
monads  and  upon  their  relation  to  the  absolute,  do  not  originate  in 
this  essence  itself,  i.  e.,  in  an  absolute  manner.  They  belong  only  to 
discursive  reasoning  —  to  dogmatic  reflection,  and  they  therefore 
attain  no  internal  coherence. 


SECOND  CHAPTER. 

Actuality. 

The  absolute  is  the  unity  of  the  internal  and  external  as  the  first 
phase  of  unity  existing  in  itself  or  potentially.  The  exhibition  or 
exposition  proved  to  be  an  external  reflection,  which  possessed  the 
immediate  on  its  side  as  an  already  given  somewhat ;  but  it  is  an 
activity  which  i-elates  the  immediate  to  the  absolute,  and  as  such 
connects  it  to  the  latter,  and  determines  it  as  a  mere  mode  and  man- 
ner. But  this  mode  and  manner  is  the  activity  of  determination 
which  belongs  to  the  absolute  itself;  it  is  namely  its  first  identity  or 
its  mere  in-itself -existent  unity.  And  although  by  means  of  this 
reflection,  that  former  being-in-itself  or  nature  is  posited  as  a  non- 
essential  determination,  yet  through  its  negative  relation  to  itself  it 
becomes  the  mode  ("  modus  ")  as  described.  This  activity  of  reflec- 
tion as  annulling  itself  in  its  determinations  and  as  activity  that 
returns  into  itself,  becomes  true  absolute  identity,  and  is  at  the  same 
time  the  determining  [particularizing]  of  the  absolute  —  in  other 
•words,  its  modality.  The  mode  is,  therefore,  the  externality  of  the 


Actuality.  185 

absolute,  but  only  as  its  reflection  into  itself ;  in  other  words,  it  is  its 
own  manifestation,  so  that  this  externalization  is  the  reflection  into 
itself  of  the  absolute,  and,  therefore,  its  being-in-and-for-itself. 

Therefore  as  the  manifestation  which  shows  the  absolute  as  having 
no  other  content  than  to  be  self-manifestation,  the  absolute  becomes 
absolute  form.  The  "  actuality"  is  to  be  seized  or  conceived  as  this 
reflected  absoluteness.  The  category  of  being  does  not  express  actu- 
ality ;  for  it  is  only  a  first  immediateness  ;  its  reflection  is,  therefore, 
only  a  becoming  —  a  transition  into  something  else;  in  other  words 
its  immediateness  is  not  being-in-and-for-itself.  The  category  of 
Actuality  is  moreover  higher  than  that  of  Existence.  Existence  has 
an  immediateness  which  has  issued  forth  from  Ground  and  Condi- 
tions—  in  other  words  from  Essence  and  its  reflection.  It  is  there- 
fore potentially  what  actuality  is,  real  reflection,  but  it  is  as  yet  not 
the  posited  unity  of  reflection  and  immediateness.  Existence  ac- 
cordingly passes  over  into  "Phenomenon"  when  it  develops  the 
activity  of  reflection  that  it  contains.  It  is  the  category  of  Ground 
that  has  become  annulled  ("  gone  to  the  ground  ")  ;  its  determination 
is  its  restoration,  hence  it  becomes  essential  [or  reciprocal]  relation  ; 
and  its  final  activity  of  reflection  is  the  positing  of  its  immediateness 
as  reflection  into  itself,  and  conversely.  This  unity,  which  contains 
Existence  or  immediateness  and  being-in-itself  as  mere  moments  or 
subordinate  elements,  is  now  before  us  as  the  Actuality.  The  actual 
is  therefore  manifestation,  it  does  not  pass  over  into  the  sphere  of 
change  through  its  externality  nor  is  it  an  appearance  in  something 
else,  but  it  manifests  itself.  This  means  that  it  is  itself  in  its  exter- 
nality, and  is  only  in  that  externality  ;  in  other  words,  it  is  only  the 
activity  which  distinguishes  and  determines. 

In  the  actuality  as  this  absolute  form,  the  moments  or  elements  are 
only  as  annulled  —  formal,  not  yet  realized;  their  diversity  [multi- 
plicity] belongs,  therefore,  to  external  reflection,  and  is  not  defined 
as  content. 

Actualitv  as  immediate  unity  of  form  of  the  internal  and  external 
is  consequently  in  the  determination  of  immediateness  as  opposed  to 
the  determination  of  reflection  into  itself ;  in  other  words  it  is  an  ac- 
tuality opposed  to  a  possibility.  The  relation  of  the  two  to  each 
other  constitutes  therefore  a  third  term :  the  actual  defines  itself  as  a 
being  reflected  into  itself,  and  the  latter  is  at  the  same  time  an  imme- 
diately existing  somewhat.  This  third  term  is  Necessity. 

But  in  the  first  place,  since  the  actual  and  p  issible  are  formal  dis- 
tinctions, their  relation  too  is  only  formal,  and  consists  only  in  this 


180  Essence, 

that  the  one  as  well  as  the  other  is  a  posited-being,  hence  mere  Con- 
tingency. 

Now,  because  the  contingency  contains  the  actual  as  well  as  the 
possible,  as  mere  posited-being,  they  have  received  the  determination 
within  themselves  ;  there  arises  therefore,  secondly,  the  real  actuality. 
And  with  this  likewise  there  arises  the  real  possibility  and  the  relative 
necessity.  The  reflection  of  the  relative  necessity  into  itself  gives, 
thirdly,  absolute  necessity,  which  is  absolute  possibility,  or  poten- 
tiality and  actuality. 


Contingency  or  Formal  Actuality,  Possibility  and  Necessity. 

1.  Actuality  is  "  formal"  in  so  far  as  it  is  mere  immediate  unre- 
flected  actuality  —  the  first  phase  of  actuality  —  consequently  merely 
in  this  form-determination,  but  not  as  totality  of  form.     It  is  in  this 
phase  nothing  more  than  a  being  or  existence  in  general.     But  since 
it  is  not  merely  immediate  existence  but  essentially  the  form-unity  of 
the  being-in-itself  or  of  internality  and  externality  it  contains  imme- 
diately   being-in-itself  or  potentiality.     Whatever  is  actual  is  pos- 
sible. 

2.  This  potentiality  is  actuality  that  is  reflected  into  itself.     But 
this  first  phase  of  reflected-being  is  also  a  formal  phase  and  hence 
only  the  determination  of  identity  with  itself,  or  of  being-in-itself  in 
general. 

Since,  however,  the  determination  here  is  the  totality  of  form,  this 
being-in-itself  is  determined  as  annulled  or  as  essentially  a  mere  rela- 
tion to  actuality ;  as  the  negative  of  actuality  posited  as  negative. 
Potentiality  contains  therefore  two  phases  ;  first,  the  positive  phase, 
its  reflection  into  itself ;  but  since  it  is  within  the  absolute  form  it  is 
reduced  to  a  mere  phase,  its  reflection  into  itself  is  no  longer  valid  as 
essence,  but  in  the  second  place  possesses  the  negative  significance, 
viz.,  that  the  potentiality  is  something  defective,  something  that  refers 
to  another,  t.  e.,  to  the  actuality,  and  supplements  its  deficiencies  with 
the  same. 

According  to  the  first  phase,  the  merely  positive  side,  the  poten- 
tiality is  therefore  the  mere  form-determination  of  self-identity, 
i.  e.,  the  form  of  essentiality.  In  this  phase  it  is  devoid  of  relativ- 
ity, an  indefinite  receptacle  for  everything  in  general.  In  the  sense 
of  formal  potentiality  ever3?thing  is  possible  which  does  not  contra- 
dict itself ;  the  realm  of  potentiality  is  therefore  the  limitless  multi- 


Actuality.  187 

plicity.  But  every  individual  of  the  multiplicity  is  particularized  or 
determined  within  itself  and  in  opposition  to  others,  and  has  the 
negation  inherent  in  it.  Indifferent  variety  or  diversity  passes  over 
into  antithesis  [i.  e.,  is  found  upon  careful  examination  to  imply 
antithesis  as  the  basis  of  its  distinction]  ;  but  antithesis  is  contradic- 
tion [i.  e.,  implies  contradiction,  which  is  the  first  phase  of  self- 
distinction  ;  that  is  to  say,  all  distinction  or  difference  rests  finally 
on  self-distinction].  Therefore  every  particular  thing  is  likewise  a 
contradictory  somewhat  [as  well  as  a  possible  one],  and  therefore 
everything  is  impossible. 

This  merely  formal  statement  regarding  anything  —  that  it  is  pos- 
sible—  is  therefore  likewise  shallow  and  empty,  like  the  principle  of 
contradiction,  and  every  content  that  it  may  have,  e.g.,  ';A  is  pos- 
sible," means  only  that  A  is  A.  In  so  far  as  one  regards  this  without 
considering  the  development  of  the  content  it  has  the  form  of  sim- 
plicity. Distinction  arises  within  it  only  upon  the  annulment  of  the 
form  of  simplicity.  When  one  holds  fast  to  the  simple  form,  the 
content  remains  a  self -identical  one  and  therefore  a  possible.  There 
is  nothing  more  expressed,  however,  by  this  term  "  possible  "  than 
with  the  formal  principle  of  identity. 

The  possible  contains  however  more  than  the  mere  principle  of 
identity.  The  possible  is  the  reflection-into-itself  again  reflected ; 
in  other  words,  the  identical  as  phase  of  the  totality  is  also  de- 
termined or  defined  to  be  not  in-itself,  i.  e.,  potential.  It  has  therefore 
the  second  determination  —  to  be  a  mere  possible  something  —  and  its 
ideal  is  the  totality  of  the  form.  The  potentiality  without  this  ideal 
is  the  essentiality  as  such  ;  but  the  absolute  form  contains  the  essence 
merely  as  moment,  and  has  no  truth  except  as  being.  Potentiality  is 
this  mere  essentiality  posited  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  a  mere 
phase  and  not  commensurate  with  the  absolute  form.  It  is  being-in- 
itself  defined  as  mere  posited;  in  other  words  as  not  possessing 
being-in-itself.  The  potentiality  is  therefore  the  contradiction  or  the 
impossibility. 

In  the  first  place,  this  states  that  the  possibility  whose  posited  form- 
determination  is  annulled,  possesses  a  content.  This  as  possible  is  a 
being-in-itself  which  is  at  the  same  time  annulled  or  other-being 
[?.  e.,  a  being  for  others  or  dependent].  Since  it  is  for  this  reason 
only  a  possible  being  it  follows  that  another  being  is  possible,  and 
even  its  opposite.  'A  is  A ;  likewise  not-A  is  not-A.  These  two 
principles  both  express  the  possibility  of  its  content.  But  these 
principles  as  identical  are  indifferent  towards  each  other ;  when  one 
of  them  is  posited  the  other  is  not  of  necessity  also  posited.  The 


188  Essence. 

potentiality  is  the  relation  in  which  the  two  are  brought  into  compari- 
son. It  contains  in  its  determination  as  a  reflection  of  the  totality, 
the  implication  that  the  opposite  is  also  possible.  It  is  therefore  the 
relating  ground :  that  because  A  is  A  also  not-A  is  not-A.  In  the 
possible  A  the  possible  not-A  is  contained,  and  it  is  this  relation 
that  determines  both  as  possible. 

As  this  relation  however  —  that  in  one  possible  thing  its  other  is  also 
contained — it  is  the  contradiction  that  annuls  itself.  Since  now  accord- 
ing to  its  definition  it  is  reflected  and  the  reflection  is  self-annulled,  as 
has  been  shown,  it  is  consequently  also  the  immediate  and  with  this 
it  is  actuality. 

3.  This  actuality  is  not  the  first  phase  of  actuality,  but  the  re- 
flected form  of  it  —  posited  as  unity  of  itself  and  potentiality.  The 
actual  as  such  is  possible ;  it  is  in  immediate  positive  identity  with 
potentiality ;  but  potentiality  has  defined  itself  as  mere  potentiality ; 
consequently  the  actual  is  defined  as  merely  a  possible.  And  it 
follows  immediately  that  because  the  potentiality  is  found  in  the 
actuality  that  it  is  annulled  and  mere  potentiality.  Conversely, 
actuality  which  is  in  unity  with  potentiality  is  only  the  annulled  im- 
mediateness ;  in  other  words,  because  the  formal  actuality  is  a  mere 
immediate,  first  phase,  it  is  only  an  element,  a  mere  annulled  actu- 
ality. 

Hence  a  more  accurate  definition  is  reached  of  the  degree  in  which 
possibility  is  actuality.  Possibility  is,  namely,  not  all  actuality  —  of 
the  real  and  absolute  actuality  we  are  not  speaking  here.  This 
phase  is  only  the  first  one,  namely,  the  formal  one  which  has  been 
defined  as  mere  possibility,  therefore  formal  actuality,  which  is  mere 
being  or  existence  in  general.  Every  possible  therefore  possesses 
being,  or  existence. 

This  unity  of  potentiality  and  actuality  is  contingency.  The  con- 
tingent is  an  actual  which  is  at  the  same  time  defined  as  merely  possible 
and  whose  other  or  opposite  is  likewise  possible.  This  actuality  i& 
therefore  mere  being  or  existence  posited  in  its  truth  as  having  the 
value  of  a  posited-being  or  potentiality.  Conversely,  potentiality  aa 
reflection  into  itself  or  being-in-itself,  is  posited  as  posited-being. 
Whatever  is  possible  is  an  actual  in  this  sense  of  actuality ;  it  has 
only  as  much  value  as  the  contingent  actuality,  and  is  itself  contin- 
gent. 

The  contingent  presents  therefore  two  sides.  First,  in  so  far  as 
it  possesses  potentiality  immediately,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  in  so 
far  as  potentiality  is  annulled  in  it,  it  is  not  posited-being  nor  medi- 
ated but  it  is  immediate  actuality,  it  has  no  ground.  Since  this  ini- 


Actuality.  189 

mediate  actuality  belongs  also  to  the  possible,  it  is  defined  as  the 
contingent  and  likewise  as  devoid  of  ground,  just  as  the  actual  was. 

The  contingent  is  however,  in  the  second  place,  the  actual  as  a 
mere  possible,  in  other  words,  as  a  posited-being ;  and  so  too  the 
possible  is  as  formal  being-in-itself,  mere  posited-being.  Conse- 
quently, the  two  are  not  in  and  for  themselves  but  each  has  its  true 
reflection  into  itself  in  another,  in  other  words,  it  has  a  ground. 

The  contingent  has  therefore  no  ground,  just  for  the  reason  that  it 
is  contingent ;  and  likewise  it  has  a  ground  because  it  is  contingent. 

It  is  the  posited,  nnmediated  vanishing  of  the  external  and  internal 
into  each  other ;  in  other  words  the  vanishing  of  the  reflection  into 
itself — into  being — and  vice  versa.  It  is  posited  through  this  that 
possibility  and  actuality  each  within  itself  possesses  this  determination 
and  consequently  that  they  are  moments  or  elements  of  the  absolute 
form.  The  actuality  in  its  immediate  unity  with  potentiality  is  mere 
existence  and  therefore  defined  as  groundless,  that  is  as  a  mere 
posited  or  mere  potential.  In  other  words,  it  is  posited  as  reflected 
and  determined  in  opposition  to  potentiality,  and  therefore  it  is  sun- 
dered from  the  potentiality  and  from  reflection  into  itself  and  conse- 
quently it  is  likewise  immediate  and  only  a  possible.  Likewise  poten- 
tiality as  simple  being-in-itself  is  an  immediate  somewhat,  merely  an 
existent  in  general.  In  other  words,  opposed  to  actuality  it  is  a 
being  in  itself  devoid  of  actuality,  merely  a  possible :  and  just  on  this 
account  an  existence  in  general  which  is  not  reflected  into  itself. 

This  absolute  unrest  of  the  becoming  of  these  two  determinations 
is  contingency.  But  for  the  reason  that  each  vanishes  immediately 
in  its  opposite,  it  goes  together  with  itself  —  [returns  into  itself  —  A 
vanishing  in  B,  which  vanishes  again  into  A]  and  this  identity  of 
the  same,  of  one  in  the  other,  is  Necessity. 

The  necessary  somewhat  is  an  actual  somewhat,  hence  it  is  devoid 
of  ground,  as  it  is  an  immediate ;  but  it  has  likewise  its  actuality 
through  another,  or  in  its  ground ;  but  it  is  at  the  same  time  the 
posited-being  of  this  ground  and  its  reflection  into  itself;  the  poten- 
tiality of  the  necessity  is  annulled. 

The  contingent  is  therefore  necessary  because  the  actual  is  deter- 
mined as  possible,  and  hence  its  immediateness  is  annulled,  and  is 
repelled  into  ground,  t.  e.,  being-in-itself,  and  grounded ;  and  also 
since  this  its  potentiality  is  the  ground-relation,  it  is  entirely  annulled, 
and  it  is  posited  as  being.  That  which  is  necessary  is ;  and  this  exis- 
tent is  itself  that  which  is  necessary.  At  the  same  time  it  is  in  itself; 
this  reflection  into  itself  is  something  else  than  the  immediateness  of 
the  sphere  of  being;  and  the  necessity  of  die  existent  is  something 


190  Essence. 

else.  The  existent  itself  is  therefore  not  that  which  is  necessary ; 
but  this  being-in-itself  is  mere  posited-being  —  it  is  annulled  and  even 
immediate.  Therefore  actuality  is  in  its  distinctions,  i.  e.,  its  possi- 
bility, self-identical.  As  this  identity  it  is  Necessity. 

B. 

Relative  Necessity,  or  Real  Actuality,  Possibility  and  Necessity. 

1.  Necessity  as  thus  derived  is  formal,  for  the  reason  that  its  ele- 
ments are  formal;  they  are,  viz.,  simple  determinations,   which   are 
totality  only  as  immediate  unity  or  as  the  immediate  conversion  of 
the  one  into  the  other,  and  consequently  not  as  having  the  form  of 
independence.      In  this  formal  necessity  the  unity  is  therefore  only 
asimple  one,  and  indifferent  towards  its  distinctions.     As  immediate 
unity  of  form-determinations  this  necessity  is  actuality  ;  but  such  an 
actuality  as  possesses  a  content  for  the  reason  that  its  unity  is   now 
defined  as  indifferent  towards  the  distinction  of  its  form-determina- 
tions, viz.,  itself  and  possibility.     This  content  contains  an  indif- 
ferent identity,  also  an  indifferent  form,  i.  e.,  as  a  mere  diversity 
of  determinations,  and  it  is  a  manifold  content.    This  actuality  is  real 
actuality.    Real  actuality,  as  such,  is  in  its  first  phase  the  thing  with 
many  properties,  the  existing  world ;  but  it  is  not  the  existence  that 
loses  itself  in  the  phenomenon,  but  as  actuality  it  is  at   the  same 
time  being-in-itself   and  reflection-into-itself ;  it  preserves   its   indi- 
viduality  in  the   multiplicity  of  mere   existence ;    its  externality  is 
only  an  internal  activity  of  relation  to  itself.     That  which  is  actual 
can  act ;  its  actuality  is  manifested  in  what  it  produces.     Its  activity 
of  relation  to  another  is  the  manifestation  of  itself;  not  a  transition 
as  the  existent  somewhat  relates  to  another,  nor  a  phenomenal  ap- 
pearance like  that  of   the  thing  which  has  mere  relativity  to  another 
which  is  independent,  but  possesses  its  reflection-into-itself,  its  par- 
ticular essentiality  in  some  other  independent  being. 

The  real  actuality  has  likewise  the  potentiality  immediately  within 
itself.  It  contains  the  element  of  being-in-itself ;  but  as  mere  first 
phase  the  immediate  unity  is  in  one  of  the  determinations  of  form, 
hence  as  the  existent,  which  is  different  from  the  being-in-itself  or 
the  potentiality. 

2.  This  potentiality  as  the  being-in-itself  of  the  real  actuality  is 
the  real  potentiality  and  as  such  a  being-in-itself  full  of  contents. 
Formal  potentiality  is  the  reflection  into  itself  only  as  abstract  iden- 
tity, an  identity  in  which  a  something  is  not  self-contradictory.     But 
in  so  far  as  one  examines  the  determinations,  circumstances,  and  con- 


Actuality.  191 

ditions  of  a  somewhat  with  a  view  to  learn  its  potentialities  he  deserts 
the  formal  point  of  view  and  comes  to  the  consideration  of  its  real 
potentiality. 

This  real  potentiality  is  itself  immediate  existence,  not  however 
for  the  reason  that  the  potentiality  as  such  as  a  formal  element  is 
immediately  its  opposite  —  an  actuality  that  is  not  reflected ;  but, 
because  it  is  real  possibility,  this  determination  belongs  to  it  itself. 
The  real  possibility  of  a  thing  is  therefore  the  existing  multiplicity  of 
surrounding  conditions  which  stand  in  relation  to  it. 

This  multiplicity  of  existence  is  potentiality  as  well  as  actuality,  but 
its  identity  is  only  the  content  which  is  indifferent  towards  the  determi- 
nations of  form  ;  they  constitute  thei-efore  the  form,  determined  [par- 
ticularized] in  respect  to  their  identity.  In  other  words,  the  immedi- 
ate, real  actuality,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  immediate,  is  determined 
against  [or  defined  and  distinguished  from]  its  potentiality ;  as  this 
determinate  [definite,  special]  and  reflected  it  is  the  real  potentiality. 
This  is  the  posited  totality  of  form,  but  the  form  in  its  determinate- 
ness  [particularity],  namely,  the  actuality  as  formal  or  immediate, 
and  likewise  the  potentiality  as  the  abstract  being-in-itself.  This 
actuality  which  constitutes  the  potentiality  of  a  thing  is  therefore  not 
its  own  potentiality  but  the  being-in-itself  of  another  actuality ;  it  is 
itself  the  actuality  which  is  to  be  annulled  —  the  potentiality  as  mere 
potentiality.  Hence  the  real  potentiality  constitutes  the  totality  of 
conditions  which  is  not  an  actuality  reflected  into  itself  but  which  is 
defined  as  something  whose  destiny  is  to  go  back  into  itself  and  to 
become  another. 

What  is  really  potential  is  therefore  as  regards  its  being-in-itself 
something  formally  identical,  that  is,  something  which  does  not  con- 
tradict itself  as  regards  its  simple  contents ;  but  it  is  necessary  also 
that  it  should  not  contradict  itself  as  regards  the  developed  condi- 
tions and  various  surroundings  with  which  it  is  connected  —  it  must 
be  self-identical  even  in  these.  Secondly,  because  it  is  manifold 
and  stands  in  manifold  connection  with  others,  there  is  diversity 
within  itself,  and  this  diversity  passes  over  into  opposition  [antithe- 
sis] and  into  self-contradiction.  When  one  speaks  of  potentiality 
and  undertakes  to  show  its  contradiction  he  has  only  to  call  attention 
to  the  multiplicity  of  its  content,  or  of  its  conditioned  existence ;  by 
this  its  contradiction  is  easily  shown.  But  this  is  not  a  contradiction 
of  external  comparison.  For  the  existence  that  contained  multiplicity, 
on  that  account,  essentially  annuls  itself  and  is  destroyed  ;  hence  it  is 
essentially  a  mere  potentiality.  If  all  the  conditions  of  a  thing  are 
complete  and  present  the  thing  becomes  actual ;  the  completeness  of 


192  Essence. 

the  conditions  is  the  totality  of  the  content  of  a  thing  and  the  thing 
itself  is  this  content  determined  as  actual  in  the  entire  scope  of  its 
possibility.  In  the  sphere  of  the  conditioned  ground  the  conditions 
have  the  form  outside  of  them  —  that  is  to  say :  the  ground  or  the 
reflection  which  exists  for  itself,  is  outside  of  them ;  and  this  relates 
to  the  moments  of  the  thing  and  brings  them  into  existence.  Here, 
on  the  contrary,  the  immediate  actuality  is  not  defined  to  be  condi- 
tioned through  a  presupposing  reflection,  but  it  is  posited  that  it 
itself  is  the  potentiality. 

In  the  self-annulling,  real  potentiality,  that  which  is  annulled  is  two- 
fold ;  for  it  is  itself  twofold  —  actuality  and  potentiality.  (1.)  The 
actuality  is  the  formal,  or  an  existence  which  has  an  immediate, 
independent  manifestation,  and  through  its  annulment  has  become 
reflected  and  a  moment  of  another  being,  and  hence  contains  within 
it  the  being-in-itself .  (2.)  The  mentioned  existence  was  also  deter- 
mined as  the  potentiality  or  as  being-in-itself,  but  it  was  the  being-in- 
itself  of  another.  Since  it  therefore  annuls  itself,  the  being-in-itself 
gets  annulled,  and  passes  over  into  actuality.  This  movement  of  the 
self-annulling,  real  potentiality  produces  therefore  the  same  moments 
that  were  already  extant,  each  arising  from  the  other ;  in  this  nega- 
tion it  is  therefore  also  not  a  transition  but  a  return  into  itself.  In 
the  case  of  the  formal  potentiality,  for  the  reason  that  the  somewhat 
was  potential,  it  was  not  itself  but  something  else  that  was  potential. 
The  real  potentiality  has  no  longer  such  another  over  against  it,  for 
it  is  real  in  so  far  as  itself  is  also  the  actuality.  Since  it  annuls 
therefore  the  immediate  existence  of  the  same  —  i.  e. ,  the  circle  of 
conditions  —  it  becomes  being-in-itself  which  it  already  is,  namely, 
the  being-in-itself  of  another.  And  since  conversely  it  annuls  at  the 
same  time  its  moment  of  being-in-itself,  it  becomes  actuality ;  that 
is,  it  becomes  the  moment  which  it  likewise  is  already.  That  which 
vanishes  is  therefore  the  definition  of  the  actuality  as  the  potentiality 
or  being-in-itself  of  another ;  and,  conversely,  there  vanishes  the 
potentiality  as  an  actuality  which  is  not  the  actuality  of  its  poten- 
tiality. (3.)  The  negation  of  the  real  potentiality  is  consequently  its 
identity  with  itself ;  since  it  therefore  is  the  opposite  of  this  annul- 
ment in  its  annulment,  it  is  the  real  necessity. 

That  which  is  necessary  cannot  be  otherwise  than  it  is ;  but  that 
which  is  possible,  is ;  for  the  potentiality  is  the  being-in-itself,  the 
mere  posited-being,  and  therefore  it  is  essentially  other-being.  The 
formal  potentiality  is  this  identity  as  transition  into  an  absolute 
other;  but  the  real,  since  it  has  the  other  moment,  the  actuality, 
belonging  to  it,  is  already  itself  necessity.  What,  therefore,  is  really 


Actuality.  193 

possible  can  never  be  anything  else ;  under  these  conditions  and  cir- 
cumstances, nothing  else  can  happen.  Real  possibility  and  necessity 
are  therefore  only  apparently  distinct ;  their  identity  is  not  one  that 
develops,  but  one  that  is  presupposed  and  underlies  them.  The 
real  necessity  is  therefore  relation  which  is  full  of  contents  [i.  e..  a 
totality  of  conditions]  ;  for  the  content  [which  consists  in  these 
details]  is  the  mentioned  identity  existing  in  itself,  which  is  indif- 
ferent as  regards  the  distinctions  of  form. 

This  necessity  is  however  at  the  same  time  relative.  That  is  to 
say:  it  has  a  presupposition  as  its  origin  —  it  has  its  beginning  in 
what  is  contingent.  The  really  actual  as  such  is  a  completelv 
defined  actual,  and  possesses  this  completely  defined  character  as  its 
immediate  being  —  as  a  multiplicity  of  existing  circumstances :  but 
this  immediate  being  as  definiteness  is  also  the  negative  of  it  [i*.  e. .  of 
the  really  actual]  — it  is  its  being-in-itself  or  potentiality:  hence  it 
is  real  possibility.  As  this  unity  of  tile  two  moments  it  is  the  totality 
of  form,  but  the  totality  which  is  still  external  to  itself :  it  is  there- 
fore unity  of  possibility  and  actuality  in  such  a  manner  that  (1)  the 
multiplex  existence  is  immediately  or  positively  the  potentiality  —  a 
potential  that  is  self-identical,  because  it  is  actual.  (2.)  In  so  far 
as  the  potentiality  of  existence  is  posited,  it  is  determined  as  mere 
potentiality  and  as  immediate  conversion  of  actuality  into  its  oppo- 
site—  or  as  contingency.  Therefore  this  potentiality  which  has  the 
immediate  actuality  attached  to  it  as  its  condition,  is  only  the  being- 
in-itself  as  the  potentiality  of  another.  Through  the  fact  that  —  as 
has  been  shown  —  this  other-being  annuls  itself  and  this  posited- 
being  is  itself  posited,  the  real  potentiality  becomes  necessity.  But 
this  necessity  begins  with  that  real  potentiality  as  a  unity  of  the 
potential  and  actual,  which  is  not  yet  reflected  into  itself.  This  pre- 
supposition, and  the  self-returning  movement  are  as  yet  separate. 
In  other  words,  the  necessity  has  not  as  yet  determined  itself  into 
contingency. 

The  relativity  of  the  real  necessity  presents  itself  in  the  content  as 
an  identity  which  is  indifferent  to  the  form,  and  which  is.  therefore, 
distinct  from  it  and  a  definite  content  altogether.  The  really  neces- 
sarv  is  on  this  account  a  limited  actuality  which,  on  account  of  this 
limitation,  may  be  regarded  also  as  a  contingent. 

In  fact  the  real  necessity  is  in  itself  also  contingency.  This  is 
evident  in  the  fact  -that  the  really  necessary  as  regards  the  form  is  lim- 
ited as  regards  its  content,  and  through  this  limitation  possesses  con- 
tingency. But  also  in  the  form  of  the  real  necessity  there  is  found 
contingency ;  for,  as  has  been  shown,  the  real  potentiality  is  only  in 


194  Essence. 

itself  necessary,  but  it  is  posited  as  the  other-being  of  actuality  and 
potentiality  opposed  to  each  other.  The  real  necessity  contains 
therefore  contingency ;  it  is  the  return  into  self  out  of  the  mentioned 
restless  other-being  of  actuality  and '  potentiality  opposed  to  each 
other,  but  it  is  not  the  return- into  itself,  from  itself. 

In  itself  therefore  there  is  found  here  the  unity  of  necessity  and 
contingency ;  this  unity  is  to  be  called  the  absolute  actuality. 

C. 

ABSOLUTE   NECESSITY. 

The  real  necessity  is  definitely  determined  necessity ;  the  formal 
has  as  yet  no  content  nor  determinateness  belonging  to  it.  The 
determinateness  of  necessity  consists  in  the  contingency  or  the  nega- 
tion which  it  possesses.  This  has  been  shown. 

This  definite  determinateness  in  its  first  simplicity  is  actuality. 
The  definitely  determined  necessity  is  therefore  immediately  actual 
necessity.  This  actuality  which  as  such  is  itself  necessaiy  because  it 
contains  the  necessity  as  its  being-in-itself  is  the  absolute  actuality. 
It  is  actuality  which  can  never  be  other  than  it  is  ;  for  its  being-in- 
itself  is  not  potentiality  but  necessity  itself.  But  this  actuality, 
because  it  is  posited,  is  absolute,  that  is  to  say,  it  is  the  unity  of 
itself  and  with  possibility  —  a  mere  empty  determination ;  in  other 
words  it  is  contingency.  The  emptiness  of  its  determination  reduces 
it  to  a  mere  potentiality  —  to  a  determination  which  can  be  just  as 
well  something  else  and  be  determined  as  potential.  This  poten- 
tiality is  however  itself  the  absolute ;  for  it  is  precisely  the  poten- 
tiality which  will  be  determined  as  potentiality  as  well  as  actuality. 
Through  the  fact  that  it  is  this  indifference  to  itself  it  is  posited  as  an 
empty,  contingent  determination. 

Thus  the  real  necessity  contains  contingency  not  only  in  itself 
[/.  e. ,  potentially] ,  but  this  will  also  develop  itself ;  this  develop- 
ment however  as  externality  is  only  its  being-in-itself,  because  it  is 
only  an  immediate  determinateness.  It  is  not  only  this  but  its  own 
development  or  the  presupposition  that  it  has  its  own  positing.  For 
as  real  necessity  it  is  the  annulment  of  actuality  in  potentiality  and 
conversely.  Since  it  is  the  simple  comrersion  of  one  of  these 
moments  into  the  other,  it  is  also  its  simple  positive  unity,  since 
each  as  shown  goes  together  with  itself  [i.  e.,  comes  into  identity 
with  itself  in  the  other].  But  it  is  thus  actuality;  such  an  actuality, 
however,  as  is  only  this  simple  going  together  of  the  form  with  itself. 
Its  negative  positing  of  those  elements  is  therefore  presupposition  or 
the  positing  of  itself  as  annulled  or  as  immediateness. 


Actuality.  195 

In  this,  however,  this  actuality  is  defined  as  negative ;  it  is  a  going- 
together-with-itself  [arrival  at  self-identty]  that  proceeds  from  actu- 
ality which  was  real  potentiality.  Therefore  this  new  actuality  arises 
only  from  being-in-itself,  from  the  negation  of  itself.  Thus  it  is 
determined  immediately  as  potentiality,  as  mediated  through  its  nega- 
tion. This  potentiality,  however,  is  nothing  but  this  mediation  in 
which  the  being-in-itself  (namely,  it  itself  and  the  immediateness)  are 
both,  in  the  same  way,  posited-being.  Hence  it  is  the  necessity 
which  is  just  as  well  the  annulment  of  this  posited-being  or  the 
positing  of  immediateness  and  the  annulment  of  being-in-itself,  as  it 
is  the  determining  of  this  annulment  as  posited-being.  It  is  there- 
fore itself  which  determines  itself  as  contingency,  and  in  its  being 
repels  itself  from  itself,  and  in  this  repulsion  has  only  returned  into 
itself  —  and  in  this  return  as  into  its  being,  has  repelled  itself  from 
itself. 

Hence  the  form  in  its  realization  has  penetrated  all  of  its  distinc- 
tions and  made  itself  transparent ;  and  as  absolute  necessity  is  only 
this  simple  identity  of  being- with-itself,  in  its  negation,  or  in  the 
essence,  the  distinction  of  content  and  form  even  has  likewise  van- 
ished. For  that  unity  of  potentiality  and  actuality  and  of  actuality 
in  potentiality  is  the  form  indifferent  to  itself  in  its  determinate- 
ness  or  in  the  posited-being  —  a  thing  with  its  totality  of  conditions 
from  which  the  form  of  necessity  has  been  removed  as  far  as  it 
is  external.  But  in  this  way  it  is  this  reflected  identity  of  the  two 
determinations  as  indifferent  to  it,  and  consequently  the  form-deter- 
mination of  the  being-in-itself  opposed  to  the  posited-being.  and  this 
potentialitv  constitutes  the  limitation  of  content  that  the  real  neces- 
sitv  possessed.  The  dissolution  of  this  difference,  however,  is  the 
absolute  necessity  whose  content  is  this  self-penetrating  difference 
within  it. 

The  absolute  necessity  is  therefore  the  truth,  into  which  actuality 
and  potentiality  in  general,  as  well  as  formal  and  real  necessity,  return. 
It  is,  as  shown,  the  being  which  in  its  negation  —  in  essence  —  relates 
to  itself  and  is  being.  It  is  likewise  simple  immediateness,  or  pure 
beiug  as  simple  reflection-into-itself  or  pure  essence  within  it,  these 
two  are  one  and  the  same.  The  purely  necessary  w,  only  because 
it  is ;  it  has  no  other  condition  nor  ground.  It  is  likewise  pure 
essence,  its  being  is  the  simple  reflection  into  itself ;  it  is  because 
it  is.  As  reflection  it  has  ground  and  condition,  but  it  has  only  itself 
for  ground  and  condition.  It  is  being  in  itself,  but  its  being-in-itself 
is  its  immediateness  —  its  potentiality  is  its  actuality.  It  is  there- 
fore because  it  is.  As  the  going  together  with  itself  of  being  [f.  e.y 


196  Essence. 

the  arrival  at  self-identity]  it  is  essence ;  but  for  the   reason   that 
this  simple  somewhat  is  likewise  immediate  simplicity  it  is  being. 

Absolute  necessity  is  therefore  reflection,  or  the  form  of  the  abso- 
lute. It  is  the  unity  of  being  and  essence  —  simple  immediateness, 
which  is  absolute  negativity.  On  the  one  hand,  its  distinctions  are 
nothing  but  determinations  of  reflection,  only  however  as  existent 
multiplicity,  actuality  full  of  distinctions,  and  this  has  the  shape  of 
independent  somewhats  opposed  to  each  other  as  others.  On  the 
other  hand,  their  relation  is  the  absolute  identity ;  it  is  the  absolute 
conversion  of  their  actuality  into  their  potentiality  and  of  their  poten- 
tiality into  actuality.  Absolute  necessity  is  therefore  blind.  On  the 
one  hand,  the  distinctions  of  actuality  and  potentiality  have  the  form 
of  reflection-into-itself  as  being;  they  are  therefore  both  as  free 
actualities,  neither  of  which  appears  in  the  other,  nor  exhibits  a  single 
trace  of  its  relation  to  the  other  —  each  is  grounded  in  itself  and  is 
necessary  in  itself.  Necessity  as  essence  is  included  within  this 
being.  The  contact  of  these  actualities  with  each  other  appears 
therefore  as  an  empty  externality.  The  actuality  of  the  one  in  the 
other  is  the  mere  potentiality  —  contingency.  For  being  is  posited 
as  absolutely  necessary,  as  mediation  with  itself,  which  is  absolute 
negation  of  mediation  through  another,  or  as  being  which  is  only 
identical  with  being.  It  is  another  which  has  actuality  in  being,  and 
is  therefore  determined  as  merely  potential,  empty  posited-being. 

But  this  contingency  is  rather  the  absolute  necessit3r.  It  is  the 
essence  of  those  free  actualities  necessary  in  themselves.  This 
essence  avoids  light,  because  in  these  actualities  there  is  no  appear- 
ing, no  reflex,  for  the  reason  that  they  are  grounded  only  within 
themselves,  and  shaped  for  themselves,  — self-manifestations  —  be- 
cause they  are  mere  being.  But  their  essence  will  manifest  itself  in 
them  and  reveal  what  it  is  and  what  they  are.  The  simplicity  of  its 
being,  of  its  repose  upon  itself,  is  the  absolute  negativity :  it  is  the 
freedom  of  their  non-manifesting  immediateness.  This  negative 
breaks  forth  in  them,  because  being  is  the  contradiction  of  itself 
through  this,  its  essence.  And  this  negation  breaks  forth  in  contrast 
to  this  being  in  the  form  of  being,  —  hence  as  the  negation  of  those 
actualities  —  which  is  absolutely  different  from  their  being,  as  well  as 
from  their  non-being,  —  and  hence  comes  forth  as  a  free  other-being 
opposed  to  it  as  its  being.  Yet  it  was  not  to  be  ignored  in  them. 
They  are,  in  their  self-dependent  formation,  indifferent  to  form, 
hence  a  content  of  different  actualities  —  a  definitely  determined  con- 
tent. This  is  the  seal  which  necessity  impresses  upon  them,  since  it 
sets  them  free  as  absolute,  actual  things,  possessing  absolute  return- 


Actuality.  197 

into-itself  in  their  determination.  Upon  them  it  impresses  itself,  and 
its  impressions  are  marks  of  its  right  over  them,  and  they  are  seized 
by  it  and  perish.  This  manifestation  of  that  which  is  the  deter- 
minateness  in  truth  —  negative  relation  to  itself  —  is  blind  dissolution 
in  other-being.  The  manifestation  or  reflection  appears,  in  the  phase 
of  being,  as  becoming  or  transition  of  being  into  naught.  But  being 
is  conversely  also  essence,  and  in  the  phase  of  essence  "  becoming" 
is  reflection  or  appearance.  Hence  externality  is  their  internality, 
their  relation  is  absolute  identity ;  and  the  transition  of  the  actual 
into  the  possible,  or  of  being  into  naught,  is  a  going  together  with 
itself  [arrival  at  self-identity].  Contingency  is  absolute  necessity, 
it  is  itself  the  presupposition  of  the  mentioned  first  absolute  actuality. 
This  identity  of  being  with  itself  in  its  negation  is  the  category  of 
Substance.  It  is  this  unity  as  in  its  negation,  or  as  in  contingency : 
hence  it  is  Substance  as  essential  relation  to  itself.  The  blind  transi- 
tion of  necessity  is  rather  the  self-exposition  of  the  absolute,  the 
movement  of  the  absolute  within  itself  which  in  its  externalization 
exhibits  or  manifests  only  itself. 


THIRD  CHAPTER. 
The  Absolute  Essential- Relation  or  Reciprocal-Relation. 

The  absolute  necessity  is  not  the  necessary  —  still  less  a  necessary  — 
but  Necessity  —  being  which  is  pure  and  simple  reflection.  It  is 
essential  relation  [  VerJtaeltniss^  reciprocity,  relativity]  because  it  is 
the  activity  of  distinguishing,  each  of  whose  moments  is  the  entire 
totality,  and  whose  moments  have  independent  existence  in  such  a 
manner  that  the  totality  has  only  one  simple  existence  [notwith- 
standing the  multiplicity  that  it  includes],  and  therefore  the  distinc- 
tions within  it  have  only  the  appearance  of  independence,  and  this 
appearance  is  the  absolute  itself.  The  Essence  as  such  is  reflection 
or  appearance ;  essence  as  absolute  relativity  [Verhaeltniss,  reciprocal 
relation]  is,  however,  appearance  posited  as  appearance,  and  this  as 
self-relation  is  the  absolute  actuality.  The  absolute,  which  has  been 
unfolded  and  exhibited  by  external  reflection,  now  unfolds  itself,  it 
being  absolute  form  or  necessity  [it  sunders  itself  into  a  form  of 
relation  or  disrupts  itself].  This  self-unfolding  [self -disruption]  is 
its  self-positing  and  it  fa  only  in  this  self-positing.  As  light  in 
nature  is  not  a  something  nor  a  thing,  but  exists  only  as  appearance, 
so  manifestation  is  absolute  actuality  in  its  self-identity. 

The  sides  of  absolute  relativity  are  therefore  not  attributes.     In  an 


198  Essence. 

attribute,  the  absolute  appears  only  in  one  of  its  moments  [phases] 
as  a  presupposed  somewhat  and  taken  up  by  the  external  reflection. 
The  unfolding  or  display  of  the  absolute  [its  self-sundering]  is 
performed  by  the  Absolute  Necessity,  however,  which  is  self-iden- 
tical as  self-determining.  Since  it  is  the  activity  of  appearing  which 
is  posited  as  appearance,  the  sides  of  this  relativity  are  totalities, 
because  they  are  appearance  ;  because  as  appearance  the  distinctions 
are  both  themselves  and  their  opposite,  and  thus  the  whole.  Con- 
versely, they  are  appearance,  because  they  are  totalities.  This  act 
of  distinction,  or  activity  of  appearing,  which  pertains  to  the  abso- 
lute, is  therefore  only  the  positing  of  itself  as  self-identity. 

This  essential  relation  [reciprocity]  in  its  immediate  form  is  the 
relation  of  Substance  and  Accidents,  the  immediate  vanishing  and 
becoming  of  absolute  appearance  in  itself.  Since  substance  deter- 
mines itself  as  being  for  itself  opposed  to  another,  or  the  absolute 
reciprocity  becomes  real  [in  both  its  moments]  it  becomes  the  recip- 
rocal relation  found  in  Causality.  Finally,  when  the  latter  [causality] 
passes  over  into  self -relation  in  reciprocal  action  [interaction] ,  then 
the  absolute  essential  relation  [interrelation]  is  posited  in  all  the 
essential  characteristics  that  it  contains.  This  posited  unity  of  itself 
in  its  determinations  —  which  are  posited  as  the  whole  and  as  deter- 
minations at  the  same  time,  is  the  category  of  the  IDEA  [Beg r iff = 
concrete  idea] . 


The  Reciprocal  Relation  as  Substantiality. 

Absolute  necessity  is  absolute  essential- relation  or  reciprocity, 
because  it  is  not  being  as  such,  but  being  which  is  because  it  is 
[being  which  expresses  the  ground  of  itself]  being  as  the  absolute 
mediation  of  itself  through  itself.  This  being  is  Substance ;  as  the 
ultimate  unity  of  Essence  and  Being ;  it  is  the  being  in  all  being.  It 
is  neither  the  unreflected  immediate,  nor  an  abstract  something  stand- 
ing behind  existence  and  phenomenon,  but  it  is  the  immediate  act- 
uality itself  as  absolute  reflection  into  itself  as  in-and-for-itself,  inde- 
pendent, existence.  Substance  as  this  unity  of  being  and  reflection 
is  essentially  their  appearance  and  positecl-being.  The  activity  of 
appearing  is  the  self-relating  appearing  and  hence  it  has  the  form  of 
being  [the  "form  of  being"  is  that  of  self- relation].  This  being  is 
substance  as  such.  Conversely,  this  being  is  only  the  self-identical, 
posited-being,  hence  it  is  the  totality  as  appearance  or  it  is  Acci- 
clentality. 


The  Reciprocal  Relation  as  Substantiality.          199 

This  activity  of  appearing  is  identity  as  form  [the  form  is  the 
determining  activity  which  makes  the  distinctions  which  belong  to  the 
object]  ;  — it  is  the  unity  of  potentiality  and  actuality.  First  it  is 
Becoming.  —  Contingency  as  the  sphere  of  beginning  and  ceasing. 
For  according  to  the  determination  of  immediateness  the  relation  of 
potentiality  and  actuality  is  an  immediate  transformation  of  each  into 
its  other.  But  since  being  is  appearance  its  relation  is  also  identical 
relation,  in  other  words,  the  appearance  of  each  in  the  other  —  hence 
it  is  reflection.  The  activity  of  accidentally,  therefore,  presents  in 
each  of  its  moments  the  appearance  of  the  categories  of  being  and  of 
the  reflection-determinations  of  essence  —  each  appearing  in  the  other. 
The  immediate  somewhat  has  a  content :  its  immediateness  is  at  the 
same  time  a  reflected  indifference  as  regards  the  form.  This  content 
is  determined  and  since  this  is  the  determinateness  of  beinsr  the  some- 
what passes  over  into  another.  But  quality  is  also  a  determinateness 
of  reflection:  hence  it  is  indifferent  variety  [different  things  existing 
without  relation  to  each  other].  This  annuls  itself;  but  it  is  self- 
reflected  being-in-itself ;  hence  it  is  potentiality  and  this  being-in- 
itself  is  in  its  transition,  which  is  likewise  reflection-into-itself  —  the 
necessarily  actual. 

This  activity  of  accidentality  is  the  effectiveness  [Actuosilat  =  ex- 
ternal manifestation]  of  substance  as  a  quiet  outflow  from  itself.  It 
is  not  an  activity  as  directed  against  anything  else,  but  active  against 
itself  as  simple  element  offering  no  resistance.  The  annulment  of 
what  is  presupposed  is  the  vanishing  of  appearance.  First  in  the 
activity  which  annuls  the  immediate  originates  the  immediate  itself. 
This  is  the  activity  of  appearance.  The  beginning  with  itself  as 
source  or  origin  is  the  positing  of  this  very  self  from  which  it  starts 
[its  presupposing  is  a  positing]. 

Substance,  as  this  identity  of  the  activity  of  appearance,  is  the 
totality  of  the  entire  process,  and  includes  accidentality  within  it,  aad 
aceidentality  is  the  entire  substance  itself.  This  distinction  of  sub- 
stance into  the  simple  identity  of  being,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
reciprocity  of  accidents,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  form  of  its  activity 
of  appearance.  The  former  [identity]  is  the  formless  substance 
conceived  by  the  imagination,  to  which  appearance  does  not  seem  to 
be  appearance.  This  image-thinking  chugs  to  an  absolute  which  is 
an  indeterminate  identity  that  possesses  no  truth,  but  is  only  the  deter- 
minateness of  immediate  actuality,  or  in  other  words,  the  being-in- 
itself,  or  potentiality.  These  are  determinations  of  form  which  per- 
tain to  accidentality. 

The  other  determination,  that  of  the  reciprocity  of  accidents,  is 


200  Essence. 

the  absolute  form-unity  of  accidentality  —  substance  as  absolute 
might  or  power.  The  ceasing  of  the  accident  is  its  return  as  actu- 
ality into  itself,  as  into  its  being-in-itself  or  into  its  potentiality. 
But  this  its  beiug-in-itself  is  only  a  posited-being.  Hence  it  is  alsa 
actuality,  and  because  these  form-determinations  are  likewise  con- 
tent-determinntions  this  potential  somewhat  is,  as  regards  content, 
another  particular,  actual  somewhat.  Substance  manifests  itself 
through  the  content  of  the  actuality,  into  which  it  translates  the 
potential,  as  creative  might ;  and  through  the  content  of  the  poten- 
tiality, into  which  it  transmutes  the  actual,  it  manifests  itself  as 
destructive  might.  But  the  two  are  identical.  The  creative  activity 
is  destructive,  and  the  destructive  activity  is  creative.  For  the 
negative  and  positive,  potentiality  and  actuality  are  absolutely  united 
in  substantial  necessity. 

Accidents  as  such  —  and  there  are  many  of  them,  since  multiplicity 
is  one  of  the  determinations  of  being  —  have  no  power  over  each 
other.  The}'  are  existent  somewhats  or  existent  for  themselves  — 
things  existing  with  manifold  properties  —  wholes  consisting  of  parts, 
independent  parts  —  forces  which  need  to  be  solicited  into  activity 
by  each  other  and  which  are  conditioned  through  each  other.  In 
so  far  as  such  an  accidental  somewhat  seems  to  exercise  power 
over  another,  it  is  the  power  of  the  substance  that  is  manifest- 
ing itself.  This  substance  includes  both  within  it,  and  as  nega- 
tivity it  gives  them  unequal  values  —  it  posits  the  one  as  vanishing 
and  the  other  as  arising,  or  it  determines  the  former  as  passing 
over  into  its  potentiality  and  the  latter  as  passing  over  into  its  actu- 
ality. Substance  eternally  dirempts  itself  into  these  distinctions  of 
form  and  content  and  eternally  purifies  itself  from  this  one-sidedness ; 
but  in  this  purifying  it  dirempts  itself  again  into  the  distinctions, 
one  accident  replaces  another  onty  because  its  own  subsistence  is 
this  totality  of  form  and  content  in  which  it,  as  well  as  its  other, 
vanishes. 

On  account  of  this  immediate  identity  and  presence  of  substance 
in  its  accidents,  there  is  no  real  distinction  remaining  between  them. 
In  this  first  determination  substance  is  not  yet  manifested  according 
to  its  whole  extent.  If  substance  is  distinguished  as  the  self- 
identical  being-in-and-for-itself  from  itself  as  totality  of  accidents, 
it  is  the  mediating-power.  This  is  necessity  which  retains  positive 
persistence  in  the  negativity  of  accidents,  and  in  its  persistence 
retains  its  mere  posited-being.  This  mediating  term  is  consequently 
the  unity  of  substantiality  and  accidentality  itself,  and  its  extremes 
have  no  proper  self-subsistence  of  their  own.  Substantiality  is  there- 


The  Reciprocal  Relation  as  /Substantiality*          201 

fore  only  reciprocal  relation  as  immediately  vanishing ;  it  relates  to 
itself  not  as  negative,  and  is  immediate  unity  of  power  with  itself  in 
the  form  of  identity  alone,  and  not  of  its  negative  essence.  This 
can  also  be  explained  in  another  way,  as  follows :  Appearance  or 
accidentally  is  in  itself  substance  through  power,  but  it  is  not  so 
posited  as  this  activity  of  appearance  identical  with  itself.  There- 
fore substance  possesses  aecidentality  in  its  form  or  posited-being, 
but  not  in  itself ;  aecidentality  is  not  substance  as  substance.  The 
substantiality-relation  therefore  reveals  itself  as  a  formal  power  whose 
distinctions  are  not  substantial;  substance  is  in  fact  only  the  internal 
of  accidents,  and  the  accidents  are  only  at'ached  to  the  substance. 
In  other  words,  this  reciprocal  relation  is  only  an  appearing-totality 
as  a  becoming ;  but  it  is  likewise  reflection ;  aecidentality  which  is 
in-itself  substance  is  therefore  posited  as  substance.  Therefore  it 
is  defined  as  self-relating  negativity  opposed  to  itself,  —  determined 
as  self-relating,  simple  identity  with  itself ;  and  it  is  f or-itself-existent 
mighty  substance.  The  substantiality-relation,  through  this,  passes 
over  into  the  causality-relation. 

B. 

The  Causality- Relation. 

Substance  is  might,  that  is  reflected  into  itself  and  not  merely 
transition.  But  it  is  a  might,  which  posits  determinations,  and  dis- 
tinguishes them  from  itself.  In  its  determining  it  is  self-relating  and 
it  is  that  which  posits  its  determining  as  negative  or  as  posited-being. 
This  is  consequently  annulled  substantiality,  merely  posited  —  it  is 
Effect ;  the  substance  existing  for  itself  however  is  the  Cause. 

This  causality-relation  is  in  the  first  place  only  this  reciprocal  rela- 
tion of  cause  and  effect ;  it  is  the  f ormal  causal-relation. 

a.  Formal  Causality. 

1.  Cause  is  the  source,  in  contrast  with  the  effect;  but  the  sub- 
stance is  the  power  of  manifestation,  or  it  possesses  aecidentality. 
But  it  is  as  power  likewise  reflection  into  itself  in  its  appearance ; 
therefore  it  unfolds  its  transition  and  this  activity  of  appearing  is 
determined  as  appearance  —  in  other  words,  the  accidents  are  posited 
as  mere  effect  [or  as  merely  posited.]  The  substance  however  in 
its  determining  does  not  start  from  accidentalitv  as  though  the  latter 
existed  already  in  another,  and  now  was  to  be  posited  as  determi- 
nateness —  but  both  substance  and  its  aecidentality  are  one  activity. 
Substance  as  power  determines  itself ;  but  this  determining  is  imme- 


202  Essence. 

diately  the  annulment  of  the  determining  and  the  return.  It  deter- 
mines itself  —  it,  the  determining  is  therefore  the  immediate,  and 
itself  already  the  determined.  Since  it  determines  itself  it  posits 
this  already  determined  as  determined ;  it  has  therefore  annulled  the 
posited-being,  and  returned  into  itself.  Conversely,  this  return, 
because  it  is  the  negative  relation  of  substance  to  itself,  is  itself  a 
determining  or  repelling  from  itself.  Through  this  return  the  deter- 
mined originates  and  from  this  it  seemed  to  begin,  and  to  posit  it  as 
an  already  existent  determined  somewhat.  Therefore  the  absolute 
activity  of  manifestation  \_Actuositat]  is  Cause.  The  power  of  sub- 
stance, in  its  truth  as  manifestation,  which  unfolds  what  was  within 
itself,  namely,  the  accidents,  which  is  the  posited-being  immediately 

n  the  development  of  the  same,  —  it  sets  up  this  as  posited-being : 
the  Effect.  This  is  therefore,  in  the  first  place,  the  same  as  the  acci- 
dentality  which  occurs  in  the  relation  of  substantiality,  viz.,  sub- 
stance as  posited-being.  But,  secondly,  the  accidents  as  such  are 
subtantial  only  through  their  vanishing  —  as  transitory.  As  effect, 
however,  they  are  posited-being  as  self-identical.  Cause  is  mani- 
fested in  the  effect  as  the  whole  substance,  viz. ,  as  reflected  into  itself 
in  the  posited-being  as  such. 

2.  The  substance  as  not-posited,  original  source  stands  over  against 
this  posited-being  reflected  into  itself  —  the  determined  as  deter- 
mined. Since  it  as  absolute  might  or  power  is  return  into  itself,  but 
as  self-determining  in  this  return,  it  is  not  any  longer  the  mere  in- 
itself  of  its  accidents,  but  it  is  also  posited  as  this  being-in-itself. 
Substance  has  therefore  actuality  first  in  the  category  of  Cause.  But 
this  actuality,  viz.,  that  its  being-in-itself  —  its  determinateness  in 
the  relation  of  substantiality  is  now  posited  as  determinateness  in 
the  category  of  Effect.  Substance,  therefore,  has  its  actuality  which 
it  possesses  as  cause,  only  in  its  effect.  This  is  the  necessity  which 
the  cause  is.  It  is  the  actual  substance,  because  the  substance  as 
power  determines  itself.  But  it  is  at  the  same  time  cause,  because  it 
unfolds  this  determinateness  or  posits  it  as  posited-being.  Therefore 
it  posits  its  actuality  as  posited-being  or  as  the  effect.  This  is 
the  other  of  the  cause,  the  posited-being  over  against  the  origin  or 
source  and  mediated  through  this.  But  the  cause  as  necessity  annuls 
also  this  its  mediation,  and  is  in  the  determining  of  itself  as  the  origi- 
nal self-relating  opposed  to  the  mediated,  the  i-eturn  into  itself.  For 
the  posited-being  is  determined  as  posited-being,  and  is  therefore 
self-identical.  The  cause  is  therefore  first  in  the  effect  truly  actual 
and  self -identical.  The  effect  is  therefore  necessary  because  it  is  the 
manifestation  of  the  cause  or  it  is  this  necessity  which  the  cause  is. 


The  Causality-Relation.  203 

Only  as  this  necessity  is  the  cause  self-acting,  originating  from  itself, 
without  being  solicited  by  another  —  and  the  independent  source  of 
self-production.  It-  must  act ;  its  originality  consists  in  the  fact  that 
its  reflection-into-itself  is  a.  determining-positing,  and  conversely, 
both  are  in  one  unity. 

The  effect  contains  therefore  nothing  that  is  not  in  the  cause. 
Conversely,  the  cause  contains  nothing  that  is  not  in  its  effect.  The 
cause  is  cause  only  in  so  far  as  it  produces  an  effect.  And  the 
cause  is  nothing  else  than  this  determination  which  produces  an 
effect,  and  the  effect  nothing  else  than  the  determination  which  has 
a  cause.  In  the  cause  as  such  lies  its  effect ;  and  in  the  effect  its 
cause.  In  so  far  as  the  cause  has  not  yet  acted,  or  in  so  far  as  it 
has  ceased  to  act,  it  is  not  cause.  The  effect  in  so  far  as  its  cause 
has  vanished  is  no  longer  effect  but  only  an  indifferent  actuality. 

3.  In  this  identity  of  cause  and  effect,  has  vanished  the  form 
through  which  they  were  distinguished  as  being-in-itself  and  posited- 
being.  Cause  is  quenched  in  its  effect ;  and  with  this  the  effect  is 
likewise  quenched  because  it  is  only  the  deterniinateness  belonging 
to  the  cause.  This  causality  that  is  exhausted  [quenched]  in  its 
effect  is  consequently  an  immediateness  that  is  indifferent  towards 
the  necessary  connection  between  cause  and  effect,  and  is  external 
to  it 

b.  The  Specialized  Causality-Relation  in  its  Special  Applications. 

1.  The  identity  of  the  cause  in  its  effect  is  the  annulment  of  its 
power  and  negativity,  and  therefore  the  unity  indifferent  towards 
distinctions  of  form  —  it  is  content.  It  is  therefore  related  only  in- 
itself  to  the  form  which  is  here  causality.  They  are  therefore  posited 
as  differing,  and  the  form  opposed  to  the  content  is  an  actual  only  in 
an  immediate  sense  —  a  contingent  causality. 

Moreover,  the  content  as  thus  determined  is  a  "content  diverse 
within  itself ;  and  the  cause  is  determined  as  regards  its  content,  and 
is  therefore  the  effect.  The  content,  since  the  reflected-being  is  here 
also  immediate  actuality,  is,  so  far  forth,  actual  but  the  finite  sub- 
stance. 

This  is  the  causality-relation  in  its  reality  and  finitude.  As  formal 
it  is  the  infinite,  necessary  connection  within  the  absolute  power 
whose  content  is  pure  manifestation  or  necessity.  As  finite  caus- 
ality, on  the  other  hand,  it  has  a  given  content  and  is  an  external 
distinction  appertaining  to  this  identical  somewhat  which  is  in  its 
determinations  one  and  the  same  substance. 

Through  this  identity  of  content  causality  is  an  analytical  proposi- 


204  Essence. 

tion.  The  same  content  is  taken  in  the  first  instance  as  cause  and  in 
the  second  instance  as  effect ;  there  it  is  self-existent,  and  here  only 
posited-being  or  a  determination  belonging  to  another.  Since  these 
determinations  of  form  are  external  reflection,  it  follows  that  it  is 
only  a  tautological  activity  of  a  subjective  understanding  which 
describes  one  phenomenon  as  effect,  and  traces  it  back  to  its  cause 
for  the  purpose  of  comprehending  and  explaining  it.  It  amounts 
only  to  a  repetition  of  one  and  the  same  content.  There  is  nothing 
in  the  cause  different  from  what  is  in  the  effect.  Rain,  for  example, 
is  the  cause  of  the  moisture  which  is  its  effect.  The  rain  makes 
moist  —  this  is  an  analytical  proposition ;  the  same  water  which  con- 
stitutes the  rain  constitutes  the  moisture.  As  rain  this  water  exists 
in  the  form  of  an  object  per  se;  as  moisture  or  wetness,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  an  adjective,  a  posited  which  does  not  .possess  its 
own  self-subsistence ;  and  the  one  determination  as  well  as  the 
other  is  external  to  it.  Thus  again  the  cause  of  a  color  is  said  to  be 
a  coloring-matter,  a  pigment,  which  is  one  and  tlie  same  actuality  as 
the  color  itself ;  at  one  time  being  taken  in  the  external  form  of  an 
active  —  that  is  to  say,  externally-connected  with  an  activity  different 
from  it  [i.  e.,  as  cause]  ;  and  in  the  second  place  in  the  likewise 
external  determination  of  an  effect.  The  cause  of  a  deed  is  the 
internal  resolution  in  an  active  subject  which  as  an  external  being 
has  received  through  an  action  the  internal  resolution  and  is  the 
same  content  and  value.  If  the  activity  of  a  body  is  regarded  as  an 
effect  its  cause  is  an  impelling  force.  But  it  is  the  same  quantum  of 
activity  before  and  after  the  impulse  —  the  same  existence  which  the 
impelling  body  contains  and  imparts  to  the  impelled  body.  So  much 
as  it  imparts,  so  much  it  itself  loses. 

The  cause,  e.  g.,  the  painter  or  the  impelling  body,  has,  it  is  true, 
other  content  besides  —  the  former  as  the  colors  and  the  form  com- 
bining them  into  paintings ;  the  latter  as  an  activity  of  determined 
strength  and  direction.  But  this  latter  content  is  a  contingent 
matter  not  concerning  the  cause.  What  the  painter  possesses  in  other 
qualities  is  to  be  abstracted  in  considering  him  as  cause  of  this 
painting  —  they  have  nothing  to  do  with  this  painting ;  only  those 
qualities  of  his  which  exhibit  themselves  in  this  effect  are  its  cause, 
the  rest  is  not  cause.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  the  impelling  body 
whether  it  is  stone  or  wood,  green  or  yellow,  etc.,  does  not  concern 
this  impulse  —  in  those  qualities  it  is  not  cause  here. 

It  is  to  be  noted  of  this  tautology  of  the  causality-ivlation  that  it 
does  not  seem  to  contain  tautology  when  only  the  remote  causes  of 
an  effect  are  adduced  and  not  the  proximate  ones.  The  change  '^f 


The  Causality-Relation.  205 

form  which  the  subject  that  forms  the  basis  suffers  in  this  passage 
through  several  members  of  a  series  conceals  the  identity  which  is 
preserved  in  it.  It  connects  itself  in  this  multiplication  of  causes 
which  enter  between  it  and  the  ultimate  effect,  with  other  things  and 
circumstances  in  such  a  manner  that  it  is  not  the  first  member  of  the 
series  which  is  called  cause  that  contains  the  perfect  effect,  but  only 
this  series  of  causes  taken  together.  So,  for  example,  if  a  man  came 
into  circumstances  such  that  he  developed  his  talents,  through  the 
fact  that  he  had  lost  his  father,  killed  by  a  bullet  in  a  battle,  it  would 
be  possible  to  regard  this  shot,  or  in  an  ascending  series,  the  battle, 
or  the  war.  or  the  causes  of  the  war,  etc.,  ad  infinitum,  as  the  cause 
of  the  development  of  this  man's  talents.  But  it  is  evident  that,  for 
example,  the  shot  in  question  is  not  the  cause  of  this  intrinsically,  but 
that  it  is  only  the  condition  of  it  through  its  connection  with  other 
active  determinations.  In  other  words,  it  is  not  the  cause,  but  only  a 
single  phase  of  the  circumstances  which  gave  it  possibility. 

In  the  next  place,  it  is  to  be  especially  noted  how  inadequate  is 
the  application  of  the  causal  relation  to  phenomena  of  physical-organic 
and  spiritual  life.  Here  it  is  shown  that  what  is  called  the  cause  has 
quite  a  different  content  from  the  effect :  and  for  this  reason  that 
that  which  acts  upon  the  vital  is  determined  as  independent  of  this 
and  is  changed  and  transformed,  since  vitality  does  not  allow  a  cause 
to  produce  its  effect,  that  is  to  say  annuls  it  as  cause.  Therefore  it 
is  not  proper  to  say  that  nourishment  is  the  cause  of  the  blood,  or 
that  articles  of  food  or  coldness  or  moisture  is  the  cause  of  fever  etc. 
And  it  is  improper  to  speak  of  the  Ionic  climate  as  the  cause  of  the 
Homeric  poems,  or  to  allege  Caesar's  ambition  as  the  cause  of  the 
destruction  of  the  republican  constitution  of  Rome.  In  history 
spiritual  masses  and  individuals  are  in  reciprocal  determination  with 
each  other.  It  is  the  nature  of  mind  in  a  far  higher  sense  than  the 
character  of  organic  life  to  take  up  into  itself  something  that  origi- 
nates in  another ;  it  does  not  allow  it  to  continue  its  causal  activity 
when  within  it,  but  it  transmutes  and  transforms  it.  But  these 
reciprocal  relations  belong  to  the  stage  of  the  Idea  and  will  receive 
consideration  with  it  [i.  e.,  in  the  Third  part  of  this  Logic]. 

It  may  be  further  remarked  here  that  in  so  far  as  the  necessary 
connection  of  cause  and  effect  is  conceded  although  not  in  its  proper 
sense,  the  effect  cannot  be  greater  than  the  cause,  for  the  effect  is 
nothing  but  the  manifestation  of  the  cause.  It  is  a  play  of  wit, 
much  resorted  to  in  history,  to  explain  great  effects  through  small 
causes,  and  for  a  deep  and  widely  prevailing  event  to  allege  an  anec- 
dote as  the  first  cause.  Such  a  cause  so-called  is  nothing  but  an 


206  Essence. 

occasion,  an  external  incitement  of  which  the  internal  spirit  of  the 
event  did  not  stand  in  need,  or  it  might  have  used  any  one  of  an 
innumerable  multitude  of  others  for  the  occasion  of  its  manifestation. 
Conversely,  it  is  to  be  regarded  that  the  small  and  contingent  has 
been  determined  by  the  great  event  as  its  occasion.  That  arabesque- 
painting  of  history  which  builds  up  a  great  shape  on  a  slender  stalk 
is  therefore  though  brilliant  only  a  superficial  treatment.  In  this 
development  of  the  great  out  of  the  small,  the  true  order  of  things  is 
inverted  and  spirit  is  made  to  take  its  occasion  from  external  circum- 
stance. But  for  this  very  reason  this  external  is  not  conceived  as  a 
real  cause  in  it  —  in  other  words  this  inversion  itself  annuls  the  causal 
relation. 

2.  But  this  determinate  ness  of  the  causal  relation  that  content  and 
form  are  diverse  and  indifferent  to  each  other,  extends  further.  The 
form-determination  is  also  the  content-determination;  cause  and 
effect,  the  two  sides  of  the  relation,  are  therefore  also  another  con- 
tent. In  other  words,  the  content  because  it  is  only  the  content  of  a 
form,  has  its  distinction  within  itself  and  is  essentially  diverse  or 
varied  [possessing  variety  within  itself] .  But  since  its  form  is  the 
causal  relation  which  is  a  content  identical  in  cause  and  effect,  the 
varied  content  is  connected  externally  with  the  cause  and  with  the 
effect ;  consequently  it  does  not  enter  into  the  activity  of  the  causal 
relation. 

This  external  content  is  therefore  outside  of  the  necessary  con- 
nection between  cause  and  effect  —  it  is  an  immediate  existence. 
In  other  words,  because  as  content  it  is  the  in-itself  existent  identity 
of  cause  and  effect  it  is  also  immediate,  existent  identity.  This  is 
therefore  something  or  other  which  possesses  manifold  determinations 
in  its  being,  and  among  these  the  determination  that  it  is  in  one 
respect  a  cause  or  an  effect.  The  form-determinations,  cause  and 
effect,  have  their  substrate  in  it ;  that  is  to  say,  have  their  essential 
subsistence  —  and  each  side  has  a  special  subsistence  —  for  their 
identity  is  their  subsistence.  At  the  same  time,  however,  it  is  its 
immediate  subsistence,  and  not  its  subsistence  as  form-unity  or  as 
essential  connection. 

But  this  thing  is  not  merely  substrate,  but  also  substance,  for  it  is 
the  identical  self-subsistence  only  in  the  form  of  essential  connection. 
Moreover,  it  is  finite  substance,  for  it  is  determined  as  immediate  in 
opposition  to  its  causality.  But  it  has  likewise  causality,  because  it 
is  identical  only  as  this  causal  relation.  As  cause  this  substrate  is 
negative  relation  to  itself.  But  itself  to  which  it  relates  is  first  a 
posited-being,  because  it  is  determined  as  an  immediate  actual. 


The  Causality-Relation.  207 

This  posited-being  as  content  is  some  one  determination.  Secondly, 
the  causality  is  external  to  it ;  this,  consequently,  makes  its  posited- 
being.  Since  it  is  now  causal  substance,  its  causality  consists  in 
this :  to  relate  to  itself  negatively  and  therefore  to  its  posited-being 
and  external  causality.  The  activity  of  this  substance  begins  there- 
fore from  without,  and  emancipates  itself  from  this  external  deter- 
mination, and  its  retnrn-into-itself  is  the  preservation  of  its  immediate 
existence  and  the  annulment  of  its  posited  existence,  and  consequently 
of  its  causality. 

Thus,  a  moving  stone  is  a  cause ;  its  movement  is  a  determination 
which  it  possesses  —  one  among  many  determinations,  such  as  color, 
shape,  etc. ,  which  do  not  belong  to  its  causality.  Because  its  imme- 
diate existence  is  separated  from  its  form-relation,  i.  e. .  its  causality, 
this  form-relation  is  something  external.  Its  movement  and  the 
causality  which  pertains  to  it  is  only  a  posited-being  within  it.  But 
the  causality  is  also  its  own.  This  is  involved  in  the  fact  that  its 
substantial  self-subsistence  is  its  identical  relation  to  itself,  but  this 
is  now  defined  as  posited-being.  it  is  therefore  at  the  same  time  neg- 
ative relation  to  itself.  Its  causality  which  is  directed  upon  itself  as 
upon  the  posited-being  or  an  external,  consists  therefore  in  this,  that 
it  annuls  it  and  by  its  removal  returns  into  itself ;  consequently  it  is 
not  self-identical  in  its  posited-being,  but  it  restores  only  its  abstract 
independence.  In  other  words,  the  rain  is  the  cause  of  the  moisture 
which  is  the  same  water  as  before.  This  water  is  determined  as  rain 
and  cause,  through  the  fact  that  the  determination  is  posited  in  it  by 
another.  Another  force  or  something  has  elevated  the  water  into 
the  air  by  evaporation  and  brought  it  together  into  a  mass  whose 
weight  has  made  it  fall.  Its  removal  from  the  earth  is  a  determina- 
tion alien  to  its  original  identity  with  itself  —  its  weight.  Its  caus- 
ality consists  in  removing  the  same  and  in  restoring  that  identity, 
and  therewith  annulling  its  causality. 

The  now  considered  second  determinateness  of  causality  belongs  to 
the  form :  this  connection  is  causality  as  self-external  as  primary 
independence  which  is  at  the  same  time  in-itself-posited-being  or 
effect.  This  union  of  the  opposite  determination  as  in  an  existent 
substrate  constitutes  the  infinite  regress  in  the  series  of  causes. 
Beginning  is  made  with  the  effect ;  this  has  a  cause ;  the  cause  again 
has  a  cause,  and  so  on.  Why  has  the  cause  again  a  cause  ?  That 
is,  why  is  it  that'  the  same  side  which,  previous!}'  determined  as 
cause,  is  now  detennined  as  effect,  and  a  new  cause  now  demanded 
for  it  ?  On  the  ground  that  the  cause  is  a  finite,  a  determined ;  it  is 
determined  as  one  element  of  the  form  opposed  to  the  effect  as  the 


208  Essence. 

other  element ;  hence  it  has  its  determinateness  or  negation  outside 
of  it.  Precisely  for  this  reason  it  is  itself  finite,  has  its  determi- 
nateness on  it,  and  is  consequently  posited-being,  or  effect.  This, 
its  identity,  is  also  posited,  but  it  is  a  third  —  the  immediate  sub- 
strate. Causality  is  therefore  self-external,  because  its  originality  is 
here  an  immediateness.  The  form-distinction  is  therefore  first  deter- 
minateness and  not  yet  determinateness  posited  as  determinateness  — 
it  is  existent  other-being.  Finite  reflection  holds  fast  to  this  immedi- 
ate, removes  the  form-unity  from  it  and  makes  it  a  cause  in  one  respect 
and  an  effect  in  another ;  and  on  the  other  hand  it  transposes  the 
form-unity  into  the  realm  of  infinitude,  and  by  this  perpetual  progress 
or  regress  from  cause  to  cause  it  expresses  its  incompetency  to  attain 
and  hold  it. 

With  the  effect  it  is  the  same  case  —  or  rather  the  infinite  progress 
from  cause  to  cause.  In  the  latter  the  cause  develops  into  an  effect 
which  has  again  another  cause.  Conversely,  the  effect  becomes 
cause  which  again  has  an  effect.  The  considered  particular  cause 
begins  in  an  externality,  and  returns  into  its  effect  not  as  cause,  but 
it  loses  its  causality  in  it.  Conversely,  the  effect  arrives  at  a  sub- 
strate which  is  substance,  an  original,  self-relating  subsistence.  In  it 
therefore  this  posited-being,  becomes  posited-being  —  i.  e. ,  this  sub- 
stance, since  an  effect  is  posited  in  it,  takes  ont  he  form  of  cause. 
But  the  mentioned  first  effect,  the  posited-being  which  was  external 
to  it  is  a  different  one  from  the  second  which  is  produced  by  it ;  for 
this  second  is  determined  as  its  reflection-into-itself ,  but  the  first  one 
was  an  externality  to  it.  But  since  the  causality  is  here,  the  self -ex- 
ternal causality,  it  returns,  in  its  effect,  not  into  itself.  In  its  effect 
it  becomes  external,  its  effect  is  again  posited-being  in  a  substrate  — 
as  another  substance  —  which  reduces  it  to  a  posited-being,  or  mani- 
fests itself  as  a  cause,  and  repels  its  effect  again  from  itself,  and  so 
on  in  the  infinite  progress. 

3.  It  is  now  for  us  to  see  what  has  become  through  the  move- 
ment of  the  determination  or  limited  causal  relation.  The  formal 
causality  exhausts  itself  in  the  effect ;  through  this  the  identity  of  the 
two  moments  has  arisen ;  with  this  the  unity  of  the  cause  and  the 
effect  is  only  in-itself,  and  the  form-relation  is  external  to  it. 
This  identity  is  also  immediate  according  to  the  two  determinations 
of  immediateness  —  first  as  being-in-itself ,  a  content,  to  which  caus- 
ality comes  externally;  secondly,  as  an  existing  substrate  in  which 
cause  and  effect  inhere  as  different  form-determinations.  These  are 
in  themselves  one,  but  each  is  on  account  of  this-in-itself,  or  the 
externality  of  form,  self,  hence  in  its  unity  with  the  other,  deter- 


The  Causality-Relation.  209 

mined  also  as  other  in  opposition  to  it.  Therefore  the  cause  has  an 
effect  and  is  at  the  same  time  an  effect  itself ;  and  the  effect  has  not 
only  a  cause  but  is  also  itself  a  cause.  But  the  effect  which  the 
cause  has,  and  the  effect  which  it  is  —  likewise  the  cause  which  the 
effect  has  and  the  cause  which  it  is  —  are  different. 

Through  the  movement  of  the  limited  causal  relation  it  has  resulted 
that  the  cause  is  extinguished  not  only  in  the  effect,  and  with  it  the 
effect  also,  as  in  formal  causality,  but  the  cause  in  its  extinction, 
reappears  again  in  the  effect,  and  that  the  effect  vanishes  in  the 
cause,  but  reappears  again,  likewise.  Each  of  these  determinations- 
annuls  itself  in  its  positing  and  posits  itself  in  its  annulment.  It  is 
not  an  external  transition  of  causality  from  one  substrate  to  another, 
but  this  becoming- other  is  its  own  positing.  Causality  therefore 
presupposes  itself,  or  conditions  itself.  The  identity  preexisting- 
merely-in-itself,  the  substrate,  is  therefore  now  determined  as  pre- 
supposition, or  it  is  posited  in  opposition  to  the  active  causality,  and 
the  reflection  (formerly  external  to  the  identity)  stands  now  in  essen- 
tial connection  with  the  same. 

c.  Action  and  Reaction. 

Causality  is  presupposing  activity.  The  cause  is  conditioned,  it  is 
the  negative  relation  to  itself  as  presupposed,  as  external  other, 
which  however  is  in  itself,  but  only  in  itself,  causality.  It  is,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  substantial  identity  into  which  formal  causality  passes 
over,  that  has  now  determined  itself  in  opposition  to  it  as  its  negative. 
In  other  words,  it  is  the  same  as  the  substance  of  the  causality-rela- 
tion, but  which  stands  in  opposition  to  the  power  of  accidentally  as 
self-substantial  activity.  It  is  the  passive  substance.  That  which  is 
passive  is  the  immediate,  or  in-itself- existing  which  is  not  also  for- 
itself :  the  pure  being  or  the  essence  which  is  only  in  this  determinate- 
ness  of  abstract  self-identity.  To  the  passive  stands  in  opposition 
the  active  substance  as  negative  self-relation.  It  is  the  cause,  in  so- 
far  as  it  has  restored  itself  from  the  effect  in  the  limited,  specialized 
causality,  through  the  negation  of  itself  —  and  which  is  active  as  a, 
positing  in  its  other-being,  i.  e.,  as  immediate  —  and  through  its  nega- 
tion mediates  itself  through  itself.  On  this  account  causality  has  no 
longer  any  substrate  in  which  it  inheres  and  is  not  form-determina- 
tion opposed  to  this  identity,  but  is  itself  the  substance,  or  the  ulti- 
mate and  original  is  only  causality.  The  substrate  is  the  passive 
substance  which  has  presupposed  itself. 

The  cause  now  acts ;  for  it  is  the  negative  power  related  to  itself ; 

14 


210  Essence. 

at  the  same  time  it  is  presupposed  by  it ;  hence  it  acts  upon  itself  as 
though  itself  were  another  —  upon  itself  as  upon  passive  substance. 
Consequently,  in  the  first  place  it  annuls  its  other-being  and  returns 
within  it  into  itself.  Secondly,  it  determines  the  same,  and  posits 
this  annulment  of  its  other-being,  or  the  return-into-itself  as  a  deter- 
minateness.  This  posited-being,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  at  the  same 
time  its  return  into  itself,  is,  in  the  first  place,  its  effect.  But,  con- 
versely, because  it  determines  itself  as  its  other,  presupposing  it,  it 
posits  the  effect  in  the  other,  the  passive  substance.  In  other  words, 
because  the  passive  substance  is  itself  the  duplicated,  namely,  an 
independent  other,  and  at  the  same  time  is  a  presupposed,  and  in- 
itself  already  identical  with  the  active  cause,  the  activity  of  this 
passive  substance  is  also  double.  Both  phases  of  activity  are  in 
one,  the  annulment  of  its  being-determined,  namely,  its  condition, 
or  the  annulment  of  the  independence  of  the  passive  substance ;  and 
besides  this,  that  it  annuls  its  identity  with  the  same,  and  conse- 
quently presupposes  itself  or  posits  itself  as  other.  Through  the 
last  moment  the  passive  substance  is  preserved ;  the  first  annulment 
of  it  manifests  itself  in  relation  to  it,  in  such  a  manner  that  only  a 
few  of  the  determinations  are  annulled  in  it,  and  their  identity  with 
the  first  in  the  effect  becomes  external  to  it. 

In  so  far  it  suffers  external  compulsion.  The  external  compulsion 
is  the  manifestation  of  the  power,  or  the  power  as  external.  But 
the  power  is  external  only  in  so  far  as  the  causal  substance  is  pre- 
supposing in  its  activity  at  the  same  time  that  it  is  positing  —  i.  e. ,  it 
posits  itself  as  annulled.  Conversely,  therefore,  the  act  of  external 
compulsion  is  an  act  of  .the  power.  It  is  only  another,  presupposed 
by  itself,  that  the  external-compulsory  cause  acts  upon  —  its  effect 
on  it  is  negative  relation  to  itself,  or  it  is  the  manifestation  of  itself. 
The  passive  is  the  independent,  which  is  only  a  posited  —  something 
broken  in  itself  —  an  actuality  which  is  conditioned,  and  the  condi- 
tion now  in  its  truth,  namely,  an  actuality  which  is  only  a  possibility, 
or,  conversely,  a  being-in-itself  which  is  only  the  determinateness  of 
the  being-in-itself,  onty  passive.  Hence  that  upon  which  the  external 
compulsion  is  exerted  not  only  may  be  subject  to  violence  but  must 
be.  That  which  exerts  compulsion  upon  the  other  does  it  because 
it  is  the  power  of  the  same  which  manifests  itself  and  the  other  in 
it.  The  passive  substance  is  posited  only  through  the  external  com- 
pulsion as  that  which  it  is  in  truth,  namely,  because  it  is  the  simple 
positive  or  immediate  substance,  and  for  this  reason  is  only  a  posited. 
The  presupposition  which  is  its  condition  is  the  appearance  of  imme- 
diateness,  which  appearance  the  active  causality  removes  from  it. 


T/ie  Causality- Relation.  '2\l 

The  passive  substance  is  therefore  given  its  dues  only  through  the 
influence  of  another  constraining  force.  "What  it  loses  is  the  men- 
tioned immediateness  —  the  substantiality  foreign  to  it.  What  it 
receives  as  a  foreign,  namely,  the  being-determined  as  a  posited-being 
is  its  own  determination,  but  since  it  is  now  posited  in  its  posited- 
being  or  in  its  own  determination  it  is  not  annulled  through  this,  but 
it  goes  into  identity  with  itself,  and  is  therefore,  in  this  activity  of 
becoming,  determined,  primitive  independence.  The  passive  sub- 
stance is  therefore,  on  the  one  hand,  preserved  or  posited  through 
the  active,  namely,  in  so  far  as  the  latter  makes  itself  merely  an 
annulled  activity  —  but  on  the  other  hand  it  is  the  doing  of  the  pas- 
sive itself,  to  go  into  identity  with  itself  and  consequently  to  make 
itself  primitive  independence  and  cause.  The  being-posited  through 
another  and  its  own  becoming  is  the  same  thing. 

Through  the  fact  that  the  passive  substance  has  inverted  itself 
into  a  cause,  the  effect  is  annulled  within  it.  This  constitutes  its 
reaction  in  general.  It  is  in  itself  the  posited-being  as  passive  sub- 
stance ;  also  the  posited-being  is  posited  within  it  through  the  other 
substance  in  so  far,  namely,  as  it  received  on  it  the  effect.  Its 
reaction  contains  therefore  two  phases:  (1)  That  it  is  posited  as 
what  it  is  in  itself,  and  (2)  that  it  exhibits  itself  in  its  being-in-itself 
as  that  which  it  is  posited.  It  is  in-itself  posited-being.  and  there- 
fore it  receives  an  effect  upon  it  through  the  other.  But  this  posited- 
being  is,  conversely,  its  own  being-in-itself,  hence  this  is  its  effect 
and  it  exhibits  itself  as  cause. 

Secondly,  the  reaction  is  opposed  to  the  first-acting  cause.  The 
effect  which  the  previously  passive  substance  annuls  within  itself 
is,  namely,  that  effect  of  the  first-acting  cause.  The  cause  has 
however  its  substantial  actuality  only  in  its  effect.  And  since  this  is 
annulled  its  causal  substantiality  is  also  annulled.  This  takes  place 
first  in  itself  and  through  itself  when  it  becomes  effect;  in  this 
identity  its  negative  determination  vanishes,  and  it  becomes  passive. 
Secondly,  this  happens  through  that  which  was  formerly  passive,  but 
is  now  the  reacting  substance  which  annuls  its  effect.  In  the  limited 
causality,  the  substance  upon  which  it  acts  becomes  also  again  the 
cause,  it  acts  therefore  against  the  activity  which  has  posited  it  as  an 
effect.  But  it  does  not  react  against  that  cause,  but  it  posits  its 
effect  again  in  another  substance,  and  thus  the  progress  of  effects 
ad  infinitum  presents  itself.  For  the  reason  that  the  cause  here  in 
its  effect  is  first  self-identical  only  in-itself,  and,  therefore,  on  the 
one  hand,  it  vanishes  into  an  immediate  identity  in  its  inactivity ;  on 
the  other  hand,  it  arouses  its  activity,  again,  in  another  substance. 


212  Essence. 

In  the  limited  causality,  on  the  other  hand,  the  cause  relates  to  itself 
in  the  effect,  because  it  is  its  other  as  condition,  as  presupposed,  and 
its  action  is  therefore  just  as  much  a  becoming  of  its  other  as  it  is  a 
positing  and  annulling  of  the  other. 

Moreover  it  stands  in  this  relation  as  passive  substance.  But,  as 
we  saw,  it  originates  through  the  effect  that  has  been  produced  upon 
it  as  primitive  substance.  The  mentioned  first  cause  which  acts,  and 
receives  its  effect  as  reaction  upon  itself,  appears  again  therefore  as  a 
cause ;  and  by  this  the  activitj7  which  in  the  finite  causalit}'  extends 
into  the  infinite  progress,  is  redirected  toward  its  origin  and  returns 
into  itself,  and  becomes  an  infinite  reciprocal-action. 


Reciprocal  Action. 

In  finite  causality  there  are  substances  which  act  upon  each  other. 
Mechanism  consists  in  this  externality  of  causality  in  which  the 
cause  is  reflected  into  itself  in  its  effect,  and  is  a  repelling  being. 
In  other  words,  the  identity  which  has  the  causal  substance,  and  its 
effect  within  it,  remains  immediately  self-external,  and  the  effect 
passes  over  into  another  substance.  In  reciprocal  action,  this  mech- 
anism is  annulled ;  for  it  contains  in  the  first  place  the  vanishing  of 
that  original  persistence  of  immediate  substantiality.  In  the  second 
place,  it  involves  the  origination  of  the  cause,  and  hence  the  primitive 
independence  mediates  itself  through  its  negation. 

Reciprocal  action  first  exhibits  itself  as  opposite  causal  activity 
proceeding  from  substances  that  are  presupposed  and  self-condi- 
tioning. Each  one  of  them  is  opposed  to  the  other  as  active  and  at 
the  same  time  as  passive  substance.  Since  both  are  passive  as  well 
as  active,  each  of  these  distinctions  is  annulled.  It  is  a  perfectly 
transparent  appearance.  They  are  substances  onby  in  so  far  as  they 
are  the  identity  of  the  active  and  passive.  Reciprocal  action  is  there- 
fore still  an  empty  form  and  mode.  It  needs  only  an  external  com- 
bination of  that  which  is  just  as  well  in  itself  as  posited. 

In  the  first  place,  there  are  no  longer  any  substrates  which  stand 
in  relation  to  each  other,  but  they  are  substances.  In  the  activity 
of  the  conditioned  causality  the  other  presupposed  immediatenes? 
is  an  milled,  and  the  conditioning  of  the  causal  activity  is  only  an 
influence  from  without,  or  it  is  its  own  passivity.  This  influence 
from  without,  however,  does  not  come  from  another  original  sub- 
stance but  from  a  causality  winch  conditions  thi\,;:gh  external 


Reciprocal  Action,  213 

influence,  or  is  a  mediated  causality.  This  is  external,  in  the  first 
place  —  it  comes  to  the  cause,  and  constitutes  its  side  of  passivity, 
and  is  therefore  mediated  through  itself ;  it  is  produced  through  its 
own  activity,  and  hence  it  is  passivity  posited  through  its  own  activ- 
ity. Causality  is  conditioned  and  conditioning ;  the  conditioning  is 
the  passive,  but  the  conditioned  is  also  passive.  This  conditioning 
or  the  passivity  is  the  negation  of  the  cause  by  itself,  since  it  essen- 
tially makes  itself  into  effect,  and  by  this  very  act  becomes  cause. 
The  cause  has  not  only  an  effect,  but  in  the  effect  it  stands  in  rela- 
tion to  itself  as  cause. 

Through  this,  causality  has  returned  into  its  absolute  ideal,  and  has 
become  the  idea  itself  [idea  =  Begriff,  the  totality  of  a  process  in  its 
three  phases  of  universal,  particular,  and  individual  i.  e.  of  deter- 
mining, determined  and  self-determined].  It  is  in  the  first  place, 
real  necessity.  It  is  absolute  identity  .with  itself,  so  that  the 
distinction  of  necessity  is  opposed  to  the  inter-related  determina- 
tions within  it  —  substances,  free  actualities,  opposed  to  each  other. 
Necessity  is  in  this  way,  the  internal  identity.  Causality  is  its  mani- 
festation in  which  its  appearance  of  substantial  other-being  has  been 
annulled,  and  the  necessity  is  elevated  to  freedom.  In  reciprocal 
action,  the  original  causality  presents  itself  as  arising  from  its  nega- 
tion, passivity,  and  as  vanishing  also  into  this  passivity  and  becom- 
ing the  passivity.  But  this  happens  in  such  a  manner  that  the  becom- 
ing is.  at  the  same  time,  a  mere  appearance.  The  transition  into 
another  is  reflection  into  itself.  The  negation  which  is  the  ground  of 
the  cause  is  its  positive  return  into  self-identity. 

Necessity  and  causality  have  therefore  vanished  in  this  result. 
They  contain  both  the  immediate  identity  as  connection  and  relation  and 
the  absolute  substantiality  of  the  distinct  somewhats,  and  consequently 
their  absolute  contingency.  This  is  the  primitive  independent  unity 
of  substantial  multiplicity ;  hence  absolute  contradiction.  Necessity 
is  the  being  which  is  because  it  is ;  the  unity  of  being  with  itself 
which  is  its  own  ground ;  but,  conversely,  because  it  has  a  ground  it 
is  not  being,  it  is  only  appearance  —  relation  or  mediation.  Caus- 
ality is  this  1-  Ited  transition  of  original  independent  being,  the 
cause,  into  appearance  or  mere  posited-being  —  and  conversely,  of 
posited-l>eing  into  original  independence.  But  the  identity  of  being 
and  appearance  is  still  internal  necessity.  This  intemality  or  this 
being-in-itself  is  annulled  by  the  activity  of  causality.  In  this  activ- 
itv.  substantiality  loses  its  sides,  which  stand  in  essential  connec- 
tion—  and  necessity  conceals  itself.  Necessity  does  not  through 
this  become  freedom  —  i.  e.,  through  the  fact  that  it  vanishes  —  but 


214  Essence. 

through  the  fact  that  its  internal  identity  is  manifested.  This  is  a 
manifestation  which  is  the  identical  movement  of  the  distinct  phases 
within  it  —  the  reflection  of  appearance,  as  appearance,  into  itself. 
Conversely,  contingency  becomes  freedom  through  this ;  the  sides  of 
necessity  which  have  the  form  of  free  actualities  not  appearing  in 
each  other  [net  mutually  dependent]  are  now  posited  as  identity,  so 
that  these  totalities  of  reflection-into-itself  appear  in  their  difference 
only  as  identical,  or  are  posited  only  as  one  and  the  same  reflection. 
The  absolute  substance  distinguishing  itself  from  itself  as  absolute 
form,  therefore,  does  not  any  longer  repel  itself  as  necessity,  nor  does 
it  fall  asunder  as  contingency  into  indifferent  substances  external  to 
each  other;  but  it  distinguishes  itself,  on  the  one  hand,  (1)  into  the 
totality  which  is  the  primitive  independent  (that  was  the  formerly 
passive  substance),  and  is  the  reflection  out  of  detcrminateness  into 
itself,  as  a  simple  whole  which  contains  its  posited-being  in  itself, 
and,  in  this,  is  posited  as  self-identical ;  this  is  the  UNIVERSAL 
[das  Allgemeine],  In  the  second  place  (this  self -distinction)  is  the 
(2)  totality  (which  was  formerly  the  causal  substance),  and  which 
is  likewise  the  reflection  out  of  determinateness  into  itself  as  negative 
determinateness,  and  which  is  therefore  the  whole  as  self-identical 
determinateness,  but  is  now  posited  as  self -identical  negativity ;  — 
this  is  THE  INDIVIDUAL  [cZas  Einzelne].  But  since  the  Univer- 
sal is  only  self-identical  inasmuch  as  it  contains  the  determinateness 
within  itself  as  annulled,  and  is  therefore  the  negative  as  negative,  it 
is  immediately  the  same  negativity  that  Individuality  is.  And  the 
Individuality,  because  it  is  the  particularized  determination  [the 
determined  determination],  which  is  the  negative  as  negative,  is 
immediately  the  same  identity  that  Universality  is.  This  its  simple 
identity  is  particularity  which  retains  from  the  Individual  the  moment 
of  determinateness  and  from  the  Universal  the  moment  of  reflection- 
into-itself,  and  holds  these  in  immediate  unity.  These  three  totalities 
are  therefore  one  and  the  same  reflection,  which  as  negative  self-rela- 
tion distinguishes  itself  into  Universality  and  Individuality,  but  inas- 
much as  the  distinction  is  a  perfectly  transparent  one  —  a  determin- 
ate simplicity,  or  a  simple  determinateness  —  it  is  one  and  the  same 
identity.  This  is  the  IDEA  [_Begriff~\,  THE  REALM  OF  SUBJEC- 
TIVITY, OR  OF  FREEDOM. 


I        -  ^.^j-ji  cW  -t~c,    =    <{>3r ,  ;- 

•  •  «-    l»' 

6^'- 


"7      '  *"*' 

{J/ls&  CL^t^-tsi^t-^i**sc&   -         /  3ii . 

UCx^v^>  .il^. 

t»^  ^^  «u.^t  •(  -  »i- 


A     000028789    6 


